In a pointed reminder of the complex relationship between control and its subversion in China’s media, many professional journalists today mourned the passing of Zeng Li (曾礼), affectionately known as “Old Zeng,” a man who served as a “content examiner” (审读员) at Southern Weekly but also played a crucial role in the paper’s fight against overbearing censorship policies earlier this year.
Zeng Li passed away on April 3, just days after his retirement from Southern Weekly, a paper known for its strong independent streak in a tightly controlled media environment. He was 61 years old.

[ABOVE: Zeng Li, an “unusual news examiner” who played an important role in the Southern Weekly incident in January 2013.]
Journalists, writers and others took to Chinese social media, chatrooms and other forums to remember Zeng Li, his character and his contributions. They also widely circulated a copy of Zeng’s farewell letter, in which he looked back fondly but with some remorse on his time at Southern Weekly:

Looking back on these four years, I know I did things I shouldn’t have done, that I killed reports that I shouldn’t have killed, that I removed content I shouldn’t have removed. But in the end I had an awakening, preferring not to carry out my political mission, refusing to go against my conscience and to become a criminal of history.

Zeng had served as a content examiner at Southern Weekly since 2008, when authorities endeavoured to reign in outspoken newspapers in the Southern Daily Group, including Southern Weekly and Southern Metropolis Daily, by instituting a new system of prior censorship. For this purpose, a group of “old comrades,” including Zeng, were brought onboard and tasked with reviewing content ahead of publication. This policy was a marked departure from past practice, in which “news commentators,” or yuepingyuan (阅评员), from the Central Propaganda Department pored over news content after publication with an eye to identifying transgressions but prior censorship was not generally practiced.
In the midst of the Southern Weekly incident in January this year, when staff openly protested rigorous prior censorship and sought to defend the paper’s legacy, a blog post by Zeng Li called “Who Revised the New Year’s Greeting at Southern Weekly?” was instrumental in bringing the ugliness of these censorship tactics to light.
Responding to the news of Zeng’s death, China Media Project director Qian Gang (钱钢), a former managing editor at Southern Weekly, wrote on Sina Weibo and Facebook today:

Today is Grave Sweeping Day and I light a candle to remember a contemporary who has just passed away — Zeng Li, a former content examiner (审读员) at Southern Weekly. Three days ago I received personal correspondence from him on Weibo. Never did I think that this exchange would be our last. During our first days of correspondence, he sent me three notes talking about his blog post, “Who Revised the New Year’s Greeting at Southern Weekly.” I felt deep pain and sorrow at hearing the news. I salute this very unusual news examiner (检察官)!

“There is no longevity for the good,” one user wailed with a weeping emoticon.
Writer and journalist Xia Yu (夏榆) wrote in response to Qian Gang’s post:

When I was at Southern Weekly I had a lot of opinions about Zeng Li, feeling that the review system (审读制度) muzzled the life of Southern Weekly. When the storm happened at Southern Weekly last year [when propaganda chiefs were installed in top posts] I saw courage in Old Zeng’s actions. I saw that he treasured the newspaper’s tradition perhaps even more than the radical youth [working there], that he wanted to preserve its legacy. I pay my respects to Old Zeng and his courage and conscience!

Weng Sizai (翁思再), a veteran journalist and a researcher at East China Normal University, wrote: “I read his blog post in the midst of the Southern Weekly incident. What a pity!”
Zhu Yong (祝勇), a reporter at Southern Metropolis Daily, wrote: “What a great pity! When he announced his retirement I really felt we had gained one more voice for freedom.”
Lei Lei (雷磊), a reporter at Southern Weekly, wrote on Sina Weibo:

I drank with Old Zeng at the annual meeting, and with his typical good humor he tossed back a half glass of red wine. One month ago, when I had exhausted myself on a story outside [Guangzhou], Old Zeng offered me encouragement on Weibo. Do a good job of it, young one, he said. Before when I heard he was retiring I was happy for him to have the chance to live out his days in peace. Never did I think that four days later he would be gone. Over the past year you were a pleasant surprise for this newspaper, and during your last stretch you worked hard so that the paper could come out as normal . . . May the spirit of the deceased come back to us!

The full text in image form of Zeng Li’s farewell letter upon his retirement from Southern Weekly last month follows. The letter is well worth a read:

Deng Yuwen, the deputy editor of the Central Party School’s Study Times journal and an influential commentary writer, was suspended from his post earlier this week. The cause of the Deng’s suspension is reportedly an article published on February 27 in the Financial Times, in which Deng argued that China’s relationship with North Korea had become a liability.
This isn’t the first time that an editorial written by a prominent Chinese journalist for the Financial Times has kicked up a domestic storm.
Chang Ping, a former CMP fellow and a prominent editor at the Southern Daily Group, came under fire in 2008 after he published an editorial on FT Chinese about unrest in Tibet. That editorial, “Where does the truth about Lhasa come from?“, was the beginning of the end for Chang Ping’s long career with Southern Weekly. He was finally forced out in January 2011.

[ABOVE: An image of Deng Yuwen that has been shared widely on Sina Weibo since the news on April 1 of Deng’s suspension.]
But one of the most interesting differences between Chang Ping’s case and that of Deng Yuwen is how much the latter has been talked about inside China. And one important reason for this is the rise of the microblog.
Back in 2008, when Chang Ping’s editorial caused a stink, Sina Weibo’s launch was more than a year off. Sure, there were online forums like Tianya that enabled discussion of many issues, but these forums were actively and quite effectively guided by online censors — that was the year that saw the rise of the so-called “50-cent Party” — who kept the Tibet issue squarely on sideshows like the so-called “Jack Cafferty Affair.”
It’s difficult to quantify the discussion over Deng Yuwen’s suspension and China’s policy toward North Korea, but there definitely is plenty of discussion out there. Once again, this raises the broader issue of how media control itself is being subjected to a greater degree of exposure than we’ve seen in the past, thanks in large part to the development of social media and other internet tools.
The following is just a taste of the discussion on Sina Weibo about Deng Yuwen’s suspension.
Li Hongwen (李鸿文), a Shenzhen-based Weibo user with just under 20,000 followers, wrote:

Study Times deputy editor Deng Yuwen has been suspended — http://t.cn/zT2WQA3 — Deng Yuwen is an intra-system writer who dared to use an intra-system (体制内) platform to speak a bit of truth. And this little bit of truth was not only critical but also constructive. It was entirely “politically correct.” The tyrants of the Golden Shit Dynasty (金屎王朝) [of North Korea] have angered the gods, and there’s nothing at all wrong with saying that in our foreign policy we should extricate ourselves from this piece of shit — for the sake also of the Chinese Dream (中国梦).

“The system can’t even stomach its own people,” said one comment under Li Hongwen’s post.
“Things will only get tighter and tighter, because they worry day and night about losing their grip on power,” said another.
Wu Liucun, an overseas Chinese Weibo user with more than 12,000 followers, wrote:

Actually, Deng Yuwen’s point of view is already being discussed actively among citizens, who naturally care about China’s national interests. When the news came out online that Deng has been suspended, this generated a lot of discussion online. Some objected to the suspension while other felt it was too lenient, that he should lose his official status (开除公职). Some thought he must be a dog serving the Americans, and that he should be struck.

Another user, with just a few hundred followers, wrote that the complete absence of substantive discussion of the North Korean issue was “lamentable,” suggesting this is a discussion many Chinese do want to have:

Damnit, if it weren’t for the fact that this is a foreign policy failure, would they have been afraid of criticism in the first place? . . . This is normal, of course. Of course Party-run publications aren’t going to permit viewpoints that go against the official view . . . What’s lamentable, though, is the fact that no other substantive viewpoints [on this issue] exist outside the Party papers.

Wu Yichun (吴义春), a lawyer in Guangdong province, announced through Sina Weibo that he had just made a new post to his blog on China.com. The post, “Deng Yuwen Suspended After Calling on China to Give Up North Korea,” is in fact a re-run of the BBC Chinese version of the Deng story. But the lawyer’s blog post is a good illustration of how many Chinese are not only aware of the Deng Yuwen story, they are aware (thanks in part to Weibo) of how the story is being reported outside China:

A report from the New York Times says that due to Deng Yuwen’s status as deputy editor of the Study Times, his article drew widespread attention in Washington and in Europe, and some people read this as a sign that China’s new leadership was fed up with North Korea, and that they were planning to adjust the relationship with Pyongyang.
However, as of now there are no signs whatsoever that China’s policy makers are interested in responding to Deng Yuwen’s suggestions.

Users also shared other writings from Deng Yuwen, including this piece that ran in Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao on April 1, in which Deng discusses President Xi Jinping’s diplomatic tour of Africa.

[ABOVE: Users on Sina Weibo share other writings of suspended Study Times deputy editor Deng Yuwen, including this April 1 article in Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao.]

The following post from Ji Yueying (齐月英-朝阳), a resident in Beijing facing property demolition, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 7:42 p.m. on March 29, 2013. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post read:

Another original thing has happened at the site of the illegal construction site at the doorstep of my home. A policeman from the Shuangjing Police Substation with license number 035076 went so far as to back up one of the workers, directing them in carrying on this forced and illegal work.

The original Chinese-language post follows:

我家门口违法施工现场又出新鲜事，双井派出所警号035076的警察竟然给违法施工人员撑腰，指挥他们强行违法施工，谁给他这么大的胆子[怒]

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The following post from journalist Xiao Han (萧含) sharing a photoshopped photo of Chinese President Xi Jinping (习近平) holding the handbag of his wife, Peng Liyuan (彭丽媛), as they disembark from an airplane during Xi’s official tour of Africa was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 7:50 p.m. yesterday, March 27, 2013. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post is a repost of an original post that read: “Even a really awesome husband must help his wife carry her bag. Ha ha!”

The image below is an unaltered image of Xi and Peng disembarking from the airplane, in which Peng holds the handbag.

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

It was almost 10 years ago that Time magazine asked, “Who’s Hu?” The question tugged at a thread of hope — that China’s new president, Hu Jintao, might lead the country into a new era of reform and openness.
The same question asked of the “enigmatic Hu Jintao” can now be asked of his equally enigmatic successor, Xi Jinping, though not quite with the same jangle: Who is Xi?
In the case of Hu Jintao, the bloom was off the rose by 2004. I remember sitting at a table of Chinese journalists in Beijing in December that year. The mood was gloomy. There was talk of a new “Winter” of intensified media controls. Finally, investigative reporter Zhao Shilong (赵世龙) tossed out a hopeful remark that hit the table like a wet rag: “I just wish Hu Jintao would show us his true face,” he said. On the opposite side of the table, Freezing Point deputy editor Lu Yuegang (卢跃刚) scowled, “This is his true face!”
(That very month, Wuhan’s New Weekly, of which Zhao Shilong was chief editor, was shut down by authorities. Just over a year later, Lu Yuegang was shuffled over to the research department at China Youth Daily after the high-profile crackdown on Freezing Point.)

[ABOVE: Knowing what China’s leaders think, and how they might act, is a difficult guessing game. And reliable information is hard to come by.]
In 2005 Nicholas Kristof dusted off the “Who’s Hu?” witticism. But by this time all hopes were sunk. Hu was now “the worst leader China has had since Hua Guofeng,” taking the country backward on a whole range of issues.
Obviously, it’s too early to say history is repeating itself. But the questions certainly are being repeated. Who is Xi? Will he be the reformer China needs? Are these the wrong questions?
I had a strong sense of déjà vu this week as I sat down with another veteran journalist facing intimidation by the authorities. The key now, he said, was to watch Xi Jinping after his return from his official tours to Russia and Africa. Then, having officially succeeded Hu Jintao as president at the recent National People’s Congress, and having cemented his leadership status with an overseas tour, Xi might be in a position to make his move.
What move is that? The move to make substantive reforms of the kind many people have been waiting for. Beginning, perhaps, with reforms to the system of re-education through labor and the household register system.
As we wait hopefully, let’s turn to an interesting assessment of the past 10 years by one of China’s most influential thinkers, Sun Liping (孙立平), who happens to have been current president Xi Jinping’s PhD advisor at Tsinghua University.
Sun Liping, who has been an outspoken critic of social inequality in China and the dangers posed by powerful political interests, wrote recently of the past 10 years of the Hu-Wen administration as a “failure of power.”
Interestingly, Sun also talks about the Beijing Olympics as an event that profoundly changed the course of Chinese politics, and for the worse. “Looking back now,” Sun writes, “it might be that the Olympics were something we did that we ought not to have done.”

“The Third Stage in the Failure of Power” (权力溃败的第三阶段)
March 11, 2013
Sun Liping (孙立平)
After we entered the 21st century, and after we experienced a brief period of what was termed a new administration, the trend of failing power grew more and more severe — even becoming the most noticeable characteristic of this era.
The Sun Zhigang Incident brought an end to the custody and repatriation system. SARS drove a current of information openness. There was the Chen Liangyu (陈良宇) case and the fight against corruption. [2003] was a time of what seemed like logical administration and harmony — and people generally had high hopes for the new leadership.
But then, without explanation, the new administration lowered its banners and muffled its drums. It studied the ways of North Korea. Control and stability preservation (维稳) become the salient priority, and this approach was relentless.

How did this change happen? To this day I can’t explain it no matter how hard I try. I’ve asked many friends without getting a real answer. The only thing I can think of is the impact of the Olympic Games, although behind it of course must also be counted the old thought patterns of the new leadership and its lack of confidence.
I’ve long thought that the impact of the Beijing Olympics on China was very deep, much more than a matter of dollars and cents. The highly cautious attitude [of the leadership] in facing such a grand event of this kind profoundly impacted China’s historical path even afterward. The Olympics marked the beginning, it can be said, of the ascendance of the stability preservation regime in China. Looking back now, it might be that the Olympics were something we did that we ought not to have done.
In the 21st century, China’s two most obvious characteristics have been the inflation of power (权力膨胀) and the failure of power (权力溃败), and the way the two of these have woven together. The process of the strengthening of the government’s capacity to extract resources, which had already begun before, concentrated more and more money in the hands of the government [during this decade]. And he who has wealth speaks loudest.
Meanwhile, with the successful hosting of the [Beijing] Olympic Games, the psychology of caution [that had emerged in the years ahead of the Games] transmuted into a fantasy of a national system concentrating forces to do great things. It was against this backdrop that the failure of power became more and more severe. As big money meant bigger influence an attitude of wantonness prevailed, and the national system fostered and encouraged the arbitrary and capricious use of power.
Objectively speaking, over the past 10 years people have strained every single nerve and exhausted themselves physically and mentally. This is because they have employed the most awful means imaginable to deal with an awful situation. Vested interests have now become entrenched, the result being tremendous social unfairness. In dealing with this social unfairness, [the government] is utterly helpless. It can only turn to stability preservation in hopes of ensuring unwelcome things don’t happen.
Preservation of this sort has preserved China right down into the gutter. Not only because it has it contributed to social unfairness and worsened social tensions, but also because it has destroyed the mechanisms for the normal operation of society.
Recently I raised the issue of the “license to do evil” (作恶授权). In stability preservation, the overriding concern is that “nothing happens,” and no one pays any attention to how you achieve that goal. Whatever abuse of power you commit can be justified in the name of stability preservation. Also in the name of stability preservation, any suppression of supervisory powers [such as public opinion] can be justified.

During a State Council work conference on clean government earlier this week, China’s new premier, Li Keqiang (李克强), affirmed the principle of open government information (OGI), saying there needed to be greater transparency in China to “allow the masses to effectively supervise the government.”
Li words echoed the sentiments of his predecessor, Wen Jiabao, who said during his government work report to the National People’s Congress in March 2010 that China needed to “create the conditions for the public to criticize and monitor the government.”
Li Keqiang said this week that open government information had become even more imperative as social media had created mass demand for timely information:

Right now our society is already one with a high level of transparency. There are already hundreds of millions of Weibo users. If government information is not released in a timely manner this generates animated discussion and speculation, and this can easily cause resentment among the people and give rise to negative influences, ultimately putting the government on its back foot in doing its work.

Offering what quickly became a popular meme on social media, Li also said the government needed to “speak the truth, and deliver” (说真话、交实底).

[ABOVE: Premier Li Keqiang addresses a State Council conference on clean government on March 25, 2013.]
Li said there were many “hot spot issues,” or redian wenti (热点问题), in China today that directly concerned the interests of the public — issues like environmental pollution, food safety and workplace safety. These issues, he said, were both important and “delicate.”
“We need to release related information in a timely way, actively allowing the masses to understand the actual situation, and subjecting ourselves to the supervision of the public and the media,” Li said.
He emphasized that the government needed to be proactive, and that it “cannot respond and be open only after the reaction from society has become severe.”
One Weibo user quipped in response to the Li Keqiang news, adding a giggling emoticon: “Speaking the truth and delivering — are they just thinking of this now?”

CMP reported last week that the Weibo account of political cartoonist Kuang Biao (邝飚) had been deleted for the 29th time. Our happy ending was that Kuang had managed to open another Sina account, reaching more than 2,000 fans in less than 24 hours.
Unfortunately, Kuang’s latest account, “Brother Kuang Cartoon 28″ (飚哥漫画28世), has already been deleted. Visits are routed to a page that reads: “We’re sorry, the account you’re visiting is not [accessible] as normal, and the account cannot be visit at this time.”

For those of you who aren’t familiar with Kuang Biao’s work, we encourage you to buy his most recent collection of cartoons. Or simply try this Google search of his Chinese name.

In 2013, China has experienced some of the worst air pollution on record. The poor and often abysmal quality of air in many of China’s cities has caused anger as the government’s failure to grapple with the problem, and has also prompted some soul searching about the long-term effects of rapid growth. In the above cartoon, posted to Sina Weibo by artist Lao Xiao (老肖漫画), a cloud of smog covers the eyes of a pedestrian with its grey hands. The pedestrian says in response: “I don’t know what your name is, but I know it’s that bastard called GDP that sent you.”

Thanks to an astounding ability to land on their feet, cats have been said to have nine lives. Surviving as a political cartoonist on Chinese social media apparently requires a similar level of agility.
Kuang Biao (邝飚), one of China’s boldest and most original cartoonists, announced yesterday that his account on Sina Weibo had been shut down yet again. Kuang told the China Media Project that this is the 29th time his account has been shut down on the popular social media platform.

In his first Weibo post on his new account, “Brother Kuang Cartoon 28” (飚哥漫画28世), which already has more than 2,200 fans, Kuang wrote: “Goodnight my friends! Just now Brother Kuang Cartoon 27 was buried alive. . . I’m so fortunate to have been born in a nation of rule of law, where I experience the joy of democracy and freedom.”
The post was accompanied by one of Kuang’s earlier works (ABOVE), in which a monstrous figure squatting over a workbench prepares to plane a dissident so that they conform to his specifications.

[ABOVE: Cartoonist Kuang Biao sets up a new Weibo account after his latest was shut down on March 20.]