Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Deleted post: Xi Jinping the good husband

The following post from journalist Xiao Han (萧含) sharing a photoshopped photo of Chinese President Xi Jinping (习近平) holding the handbag of his wife, Peng Liyuan (彭丽媛), as they disembark from an airplane during Xi’s official tour of Africa was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 7:50 p.m. yesterday, March 27, 2013. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post is a repost of an original post that read: “Even a really awesome husband must help his wife carry her bag. Ha ha!”


The image below is an unaltered image of Xi and Peng disembarking from the airplane, in which Peng holds the handbag.

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Hu's decade of "failed" power

It was almost 10 years ago that Time magazine asked, “Who’s Hu?” The question tugged at a thread of hope — that China’s new president, Hu Jintao, might lead the country into a new era of reform and openness.
The same question asked of the “enigmatic Hu Jintao” can now be asked of his equally enigmatic successor, Xi Jinping, though not quite with the same jangle: Who is Xi?
In the case of Hu Jintao, the bloom was off the rose by 2004. I remember sitting at a table of Chinese journalists in Beijing in December that year. The mood was gloomy. There was talk of a new “Winter” of intensified media controls. Finally, investigative reporter Zhao Shilong (赵世龙) tossed out a hopeful remark that hit the table like a wet rag: “I just wish Hu Jintao would show us his true face,” he said. On the opposite side of the table, Freezing Point deputy editor Lu Yuegang (卢跃刚) scowled, “This is his true face!”
(That very month, Wuhan’s New Weekly, of which Zhao Shilong was chief editor, was shut down by authorities. Just over a year later, Lu Yuegang was shuffled over to the research department at China Youth Daily after the high-profile crackdown on Freezing Point.)


[ABOVE: Knowing what China’s leaders think, and how they might act, is a difficult guessing game. And reliable information is hard to come by.]
In 2005 Nicholas Kristof dusted off the “Who’s Hu?” witticism. But by this time all hopes were sunk. Hu was now “the worst leader China has had since Hua Guofeng,” taking the country backward on a whole range of issues.
Obviously, it’s too early to say history is repeating itself. But the questions certainly are being repeated. Who is Xi? Will he be the reformer China needs? Are these the wrong questions?
I had a strong sense of déjà vu this week as I sat down with another veteran journalist facing intimidation by the authorities. The key now, he said, was to watch Xi Jinping after his return from his official tours to Russia and Africa. Then, having officially succeeded Hu Jintao as president at the recent National People’s Congress, and having cemented his leadership status with an overseas tour, Xi might be in a position to make his move.
What move is that? The move to make substantive reforms of the kind many people have been waiting for. Beginning, perhaps, with reforms to the system of re-education through labor and the household register system.
As we wait hopefully, let’s turn to an interesting assessment of the past 10 years by one of China’s most influential thinkers, Sun Liping (孙立平), who happens to have been current president Xi Jinping’s PhD advisor at Tsinghua University.
Sun Liping, who has been an outspoken critic of social inequality in China and the dangers posed by powerful political interests, wrote recently of the past 10 years of the Hu-Wen administration as a “failure of power.”
Interestingly, Sun also talks about the Beijing Olympics as an event that profoundly changed the course of Chinese politics, and for the worse. “Looking back now,” Sun writes, “it might be that the Olympics were something we did that we ought not to have done.”

The Third Stage in the Failure of Power” (权力溃败的第三阶段)
March 11, 2013
Sun Liping (孙立平)
After we entered the 21st century, and after we experienced a brief period of what was termed a new administration, the trend of failing power grew more and more severe — even becoming the most noticeable characteristic of this era.
The Sun Zhigang Incident brought an end to the custody and repatriation system. SARS drove a current of information openness. There was the Chen Liangyu (陈良宇) case and the fight against corruption. [2003] was a time of what seemed like logical administration and harmony — and people generally had high hopes for the new leadership.
But then, without explanation, the new administration lowered its banners and muffled its drums. It studied the ways of North Korea. Control and stability preservation (维稳) become the salient priority, and this approach was relentless.


How did this change happen? To this day I can’t explain it no matter how hard I try. I’ve asked many friends without getting a real answer. The only thing I can think of is the impact of the Olympic Games, although behind it of course must also be counted the old thought patterns of the new leadership and its lack of confidence.
I’ve long thought that the impact of the Beijing Olympics on China was very deep, much more than a matter of dollars and cents. The highly cautious attitude [of the leadership] in facing such a grand event of this kind profoundly impacted China’s historical path even afterward. The Olympics marked the beginning, it can be said, of the ascendance of the stability preservation regime in China. Looking back now, it might be that the Olympics were something we did that we ought not to have done.
In the 21st century, China’s two most obvious characteristics have been the inflation of power (权力膨胀) and the failure of power (权力溃败), and the way the two of these have woven together. The process of the strengthening of the government’s capacity to extract resources, which had already begun before, concentrated more and more money in the hands of the government [during this decade]. And he who has wealth speaks loudest.
Meanwhile, with the successful hosting of the [Beijing] Olympic Games, the psychology of caution [that had emerged in the years ahead of the Games] transmuted into a fantasy of a national system concentrating forces to do great things. It was against this backdrop that the failure of power became more and more severe. As big money meant bigger influence an attitude of wantonness prevailed, and the national system fostered and encouraged the arbitrary and capricious use of power.
Objectively speaking, over the past 10 years people have strained every single nerve and exhausted themselves physically and mentally. This is because they have employed the most awful means imaginable to deal with an awful situation. Vested interests have now become entrenched, the result being tremendous social unfairness. In dealing with this social unfairness, [the government] is utterly helpless. It can only turn to stability preservation in hopes of ensuring unwelcome things don’t happen.
Preservation of this sort has preserved China right down into the gutter. Not only because it has it contributed to social unfairness and worsened social tensions, but also because it has destroyed the mechanisms for the normal operation of society.
Recently I raised the issue of the “license to do evil” (作恶授权). In stability preservation, the overriding concern is that “nothing happens,” and no one pays any attention to how you achieve that goal. Whatever abuse of power you commit can be justified in the name of stability preservation. Also in the name of stability preservation, any suppression of supervisory powers [such as public opinion] can be justified.

Li Keqiang urges more information openness

During a State Council work conference on clean government earlier this week, China’s new premier, Li Keqiang (李克强), affirmed the principle of open government information (OGI), saying there needed to be greater transparency in China to “allow the masses to effectively supervise the government.”
Li words echoed the sentiments of his predecessor, Wen Jiabao, who said during his government work report to the National People’s Congress in March 2010 that China needed to “create the conditions for the public to criticize and monitor the government.”
Li Keqiang said this week that open government information had become even more imperative as social media had created mass demand for timely information:

Right now our society is already one with a high level of transparency. There are already hundreds of millions of Weibo users. If government information is not released in a timely manner this generates animated discussion and speculation, and this can easily cause resentment among the people and give rise to negative influences, ultimately putting the government on its back foot in doing its work.

Offering what quickly became a popular meme on social media, Li also said the government needed to “speak the truth, and deliver” (说真话、交实底).


[ABOVE: Premier Li Keqiang addresses a State Council conference on clean government on March 25, 2013.]
Li said there were many “hot spot issues,” or redian wenti (热点问题), in China today that directly concerned the interests of the public — issues like environmental pollution, food safety and workplace safety. These issues, he said, were both important and “delicate.”
“We need to release related information in a timely way, actively allowing the masses to understand the actual situation, and subjecting ourselves to the supervision of the public and the media,” Li said.
He emphasized that the government needed to be proactive, and that it “cannot respond and be open only after the reaction from society has become severe.”
One Weibo user quipped in response to the Li Keqiang news, adding a giggling emoticon: “Speaking the truth and delivering — are they just thinking of this now?”

Li Keqiang OGI quote 3.2013

Right now our society is already one with a high level of transparency. There are already hundreds of millions of Weibo users. If government information is not released in a timely manner this generates animated discussion and speculation, and this can easily cause resentment among the people and give rise to negative influences, ultimately putting the government on its back foot in doing its work.

Cartoonist's Weibo account axed again

CMP reported last week that the Weibo account of political cartoonist Kuang Biao (邝飚) had been deleted for the 29th time. Our happy ending was that Kuang had managed to open another Sina account, reaching more than 2,000 fans in less than 24 hours.
Unfortunately, Kuang’s latest account, “Brother Kuang Cartoon 28″ (飚哥漫画28世), has already been deleted. Visits are routed to a page that reads: “We’re sorry, the account you’re visiting is not [accessible] as normal, and the account cannot be visit at this time.”


For those of you who aren’t familiar with Kuang Biao’s work, we encourage you to buy his most recent collection of cartoons. Or simply try this Google search of his Chinese name.

Secret Smog


In 2013, China has experienced some of the worst air pollution on record. The poor and often abysmal quality of air in many of China’s cities has caused anger as the government’s failure to grapple with the problem, and has also prompted some soul searching about the long-term effects of rapid growth. In the above cartoon, posted to Sina Weibo by artist Lao Xiao (老肖漫画), a cloud of smog covers the eyes of a pedestrian with its grey hands. The pedestrian says in response: “I don’t know what your name is, but I know it’s that bastard called GDP that sent you.”

Censorship, no laughing matter

Thanks to an astounding ability to land on their feet, cats have been said to have nine lives. Surviving as a political cartoonist on Chinese social media apparently requires a similar level of agility.
Kuang Biao (邝飚), one of China’s boldest and most original cartoonists, announced yesterday that his account on Sina Weibo had been shut down yet again. Kuang told the China Media Project that this is the 29th time his account has been shut down on the popular social media platform.


In his first Weibo post on his new account, “Brother Kuang Cartoon 28” (飚哥漫画28世), which already has more than 2,200 fans, Kuang wrote: “Goodnight my friends! Just now Brother Kuang Cartoon 27 was buried alive. . . I’m so fortunate to have been born in a nation of rule of law, where I experience the joy of democracy and freedom.”
The post was accompanied by one of Kuang’s earlier works (ABOVE), in which a monstrous figure squatting over a workbench prepares to plane a dissident so that they conform to his specifications.

[ABOVE: Cartoonist Kuang Biao sets up a new Weibo account after his latest was shut down on March 20.]

Media Mob Tactics


In its special “315 gala” for World Consumer Rights Day, the state-run China Central Television aired an investigative feature alleging unfair treatment by Apple of its customers in China. But the attention shifted back on CCTV after a Sina Weibo post from the account of a Taiwanese celebrity seemed to reveal a plan to have celebrities post about the segment soon after it aired. Many Chinese users on social media said they believed CCTV was guilty of foul play and was going after companies (including Apple and Volkswagen) that had not advertised with the network. In the above cartoon by Xiao Mao (小矛), posted to Sina Weibo on March 16,, a mob underling in a black suit and black tie looks at a list and says: “It looks like Apple, Volkswagen and a few others haven’t paid their protection fees yet.” Seated below, a white-haired mob boss grinds his teeth and says: “Let’s do a special gala and blacken their names. Perhaps we can air it at around 8:20!”

Post by leftist calling for revolution deleted

The following post by “Ma Jiming CN” (马霁明CN) saying that revolution is the only way to really root out rampant corruption in China, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 8:42 a.m. today, March 19, 2013. “Ma Jiming CN” is a self-identified Maoist who currently has more than 19,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]

[Without a revolution, corruption can’t possibly be restrained] China is about to enter a rapid historical process of rot and “granulation” (沙化), and this can’t be stopped! There may be some moderation of official corruption now, but the corrupting trend of the rash and self-seeking drive for profit throughout our entire society will grow more an more severe. Even though weak ideological slogans and propaganda education will do their utmost to resist it, the “economic foundation will dictate the overall structure”, and aside from revolution all work is in vain.

The original Chinese language post follows:

【除非发生革命,腐败不可能遏制】中国将进入加速腐烂“沙化”历史进程,不可阻挡!官场腐败或许有所收敛,但整个社会私有化下的“自私自利、唯利是图和一盘散沙化”的腐败将越演越烈。尽管软弱无力的意识形态空口号和宣传教化会做出顽强抵抗,但“经济基础决定上层建筑”,除了革命都是徒劳无功的。


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.