In an open letter circulating on Chinese social media today, a group of more than 100 prominent individuals — including academics, journalists, lawyers, economists and former Party officials — call on China’s government to immediately ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or ICCPR. The treaty, one of three main components of the UN’s International Bill of Rights, commits ratifying parties to a series of core individual civil and political rights, including freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and due process.
Addressed directly to the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC), the open letter poses a strong challenge to China’s incoming leadership ahead of the annual “two meetings” of the NPC and CPPCC, which are scheduled to convene on March 5 and March 3 respectively.
The language of the open letter is reasoned and constructive, outlining China’s past achievements on human rights, including the Chinese Communist Party’s early pledge to “fight for human rights and freedom.”
We understand from inside sources that this letter was originally intended for a Thursday release through a prominent Chinese newspaper. Authorities, however, learned of the letter by late Monday and the authors had no choice but to release it to the public today.
Current signers of the letter include prominent legal scholar He Weifang (贺卫方), economist Mao Yushi (茅于轼), activist and scholar Ran Yunfei (冉云飞), well-known lawyers Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强) and Xu Zhiyong (许志永), investigative reporter Wang Keqin (王克勤), author Wang Lixiong (王力雄) and many, many others. This is a laundry list of some of China’s most prominent and influential pro-reform figures.

Our translation of the document is still in progress, but we are including the draft here so that readers can grasp its significance. We apologise for any translation errors and direct readers to the full-text Chinese version at the end of the translation.

A Citizen Proposition: Calling for Immediate Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the NPC
To the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress:
On the eve of the opening of the 12th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, as China’s new government prepares to take the stage, we solemnly and openly propose the following as citizens of China: that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights be ratified, in order to further promote and establish the principles of human rights and constitutionalism in China. Our concrete reasons are as follows:
1. The International Bill of Human Rights, as the basic declaration, establishment and standardization of basic human rights principles, accords with the tenets of national establishment and constitutionalism that the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party have always emphasized.
Together, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which together form the main structure of the International Bill of Human Rights, have become the core principles of human rights protection for the international community. Among these, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is regarded as “the most authoritative expression of the most basic human rights standards generally accepted today.” The various basic human rights formulated in this treaty, as the first generation of human rights, are of fundamental importance. Since the end of the 18th century, these rights, as precious institutional fruits of humanity’s modern constitutional revolution, have become basic and indispensable provisions for the constitutions made by the vast majority of nations and peoples – they represent humanity’s universal appeal for rights, freedom and dignity.
The values and solicitude promoted by the International Bill of Human Rights have also been declared continuously by the government of China and by the Chinese Communist Party, and are the goals and tenets upon which the nation was founded and constitutionalism established. Before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party issued an appeal to “fight for human rights and freedom,” and this was entered into documents of a constitutional nature, including Draft Constitution for the Constitution of the Soviet Republic of China (中华苏维埃共和国宪法大纲) and Administrative Program for the Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia Region (陕甘宁边区施政纲领), and for this purpose a whole series of ordinances were promulgated in Communist Party-controlled areas in order to guarantee [these principles]. In the constitutional movement that seized the entire country in the 1940s, the Chinese Communist Party also was a principal promoter [of these values], and human rights protection was one of the essential issues. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the 1954 Constitution included a special clause stipulating the “basic rights and responsibilities of citizens,” and this established the basic tone of our country’s constitution, with a foundational role for human rights. While [China] afterwards suffered many turns and setbacks, and paid a steep price on the issues of constitutionalism and human rights protection, the great goal of [establishing] human rights has already become a core agenda inseparable from the project of [national] transition in which we are presently engaged. This can be seen most recently in the second human rights plan formulated by our country, the National Human Rights Action Plan (2012-2015).
2. Immediate ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights will honor the solemn pledge of the Chinese government, satisfy the fondest hopes of the Chinese people, and demonstrate China’s commitment to be a responsible world power.
When the United Nations passed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966, it called on all nations to see both treaties as part of a whole, signing and ratifying both together. As of November 1, 2010, 167 of the 193 United Nations member countries had formally joined the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 2001, China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which has been referred to as the “second generation of human rights.” But today, 15 years after our country signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998, it has still not ratified this treaty, which is regarded as the “first generation of human rights.” China’s government has placed its emphasis on the gradual improvement of China’s existing legal system in advance of ratification, so that it can accommodate the demands and various responsibilities of the treaty. However, the gap between the signing of human rights treaties and their ratification must still be kept within the realm of reason, in order to promote further progress on civil rights and political rights, and in order to avoid unnecessary conjecture from the international community.
As a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, China has always been an active initiator and participant in the International Bill of Human Rights. China’s government played an important role in the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). International human rights standards are therefore not imported products but in fact include the achievements of Chinese culture and the Chinese people. The signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 15 years ago demonstrated even more our country’s serious commitment to the protection of basic human rights as a responsible world power. Afterwards, both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao said openly on numerous occasions both at home and overseas that China would immediately take the legal steps to ratify the treaty once the conditions were right. In the beginning of 2008, more than 10,000 Chinese citizens signed a call for the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And so there is no longer any need to vacillate. In order to adapt to trends in human rights development, live up to our government’s pledges and answer the demands of the people, in order to behave in a manner consistent with a major power, we must join the treaty without hesitation, with a positive and decisive attitude.
3. Since China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the country’s reform and opening process has deepened, its building of rule of law has advanced, a general rights awareness has awakened, and a civil society is developing – the time is right for China to ratify the treaty.
In 2011, China released its White Paper on the Socialism With Chinese Characteristics Legal System (中国特色社会主义法律体系), declaring that a complete, scientific [or “rational”], harmonious and unified legal system of socialism with Chinese characteristics had already been achieved [in China] under the command of the Constitution. Especially deserving of mention is the fact that in 2004 the language “our nation respects and guarantees human rights” was added to the Constitution, so that the protection of human rights was elevated to a constitutional principle. In 2013, the newly amended Criminal Law (刑事诉讼法) took effect, introducing many stipulations in line with the spirit of modern human rights and rule of law – for example, the exclusion of illegal evidence, the improvement of procedures for reviewing capital punishment cases, the right against self-incrimination, the expansion of lawyers’ rights, stricter procedures for the arrest of suspects, etcetera. At the National Politics and Law Work Teleconference held at the beginning of this year, it was clearly emphasized that a people-based [approach], justice and fairness were to be taken as the heart and soul of rule of law development. Moreover, there was specific mention of the further advancement of reforms to the re-education through labor system, legal and petitioning work (涉法涉诉信访工作), the operating mechanisms of judicial power (司法权力运行机制) and the household registration system (户籍制度). It can be said that the building of rule of law in our country over the past 30 years has moved steadily in the direction of human rights, and the results we have achieved are entirely the natural and logical result of overall social progress. The expansion of civil rights and the elevation of the political status [of citizens] has also, objectively speaking, created favorable conditions for the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
It cannot be denied that there remains a substantial gap between the requirements of international human rights treaties and the situation in China with respect to human rights and rule of law. But when we speak of the right moment, this has never meant that everything is as ready as it could possibly be, or that perfection has been achieved; it means that we have made full preparations for the protection and advancement of human rights, that we have provided a stable foundation making it possible to join up [with the requirements as stipulated in international treaties].
Human rights work is dynamic and diverse, and the proper space and mechanisms for constructive interaction must be created between the domestic and the international spheres, between government and society, between the present and future, between the particular and the general. In this respect, now is the best time for our country to ratify the treaty. As for remaining difficulties or inadequacies in China’s present legal system that may require time to address, we can do as other countries have routinely done in ratifying the treaty; we can make appropriate compromises (保留), issue statements, notices or opposition/demurs (?). But we must be sincere, serious and deliberate, showing the utmost respect for the sacred and long-lasting nature of human rights work.
4. Ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would be a constructive step toward renewing. . . safeguarding the life and authority of the Constitution.
In his speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of the promulgation of the current Constitution, Mr. Xi Jinping said: “The life of the Constitution is in its actualization; the authority of the Constitution is in its actualization.” These words profoundly express the basic governing idea of a “constitutional China” (宪行中国). A number of the more favourable clauses in our current Constitution are intrinsically consistent with the basic principles and spirit of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The critical factor in ensuring that these favourable clauses truly become authoritative signs for the fashioning of the national spirit, for the consolidation of political consensus and the realisation of a revival of civilisation, is the taking seriously of civil rights and the implementation of the Constitution — and to this end we must actively seek [to create] pluralistic mechanisms for the implementation of the Constitution.
From the constitutional experiences of various nations we can see that these implementation mechanisms largely comprise systems of constitutional interpretation (释宪机制), mechanisms for constitutional review (违宪审查机制), mechanisms for the judicial [application] of the constitution (宪法司法化机制), constitutional supervisory mechanisms (宪法监督机制) and mechanisms for the direct application of constitutional clauses (宪法条款直接适用机制). In our country at present, all of these mechanisms exist only on paper — they must be given real force through more concrete and workable constitutional practices.
Ratifying the the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would in fact be a feasible step toward the innovation of multiple constitutional implementation mechanisms. First of all, this treaty itself emphasises the use of measures to check the government and limit public power in order to reach the goal of respecting and protecting human rights, and these can indirectly help to lay the foundation for popular sovereignty and models of checking and balancing power, thereby improving the governing ideas and governing capacity of the government. Next, through the process of implementation of the International Bill of Rights, a rich and normalised body of experience has been accumulated in terms of rule of law for human rights protection. This includes reporting procedures for treaty parties, procedures for petition by nations or individuals, stipulations concerning monitoring and encouragement of the legislative and judicial authorities in various [party] nations to apply remedial measures for human rights [protection], etcetera. These assist treaty party nations in fulfilling their human rights pledges, and enable deep and far-reaching reforms and improvements to constitutional structures. Third, as the United Nations Human Rights Council monitors the implementation of the human rights treaties, it respects the autonomy and the constitutions of various nations. This takes shape primarily through the promotion of consensus and on the basis of constructive dialogue and cooperation. Imperceptibly, this provides a model of requisite autonomy, rationality, respect, tolerance and other prerequisites in the process of constitutional implementation in various countries.
5. Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at the earliest possible date could prompt our country to deal more candidly, openly and unequivocally with the supreme principles of human rights and constitutionalism, realising the great mission of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
The standards and experience of the International Bill of Rights on human rights continue to show that these basic human rights are universal (普遍性), equal (平等性), inalienable (不可分割性) and interdependent (相互依赖性). For a China which at present is working to realise the great mission of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation this is of particular significance. Among our myriad priorities, human rights is paramount. The goal is human rights, and political power must serve human rights, for human rights are the origin of legitimacy (保障人权始有合法性). The principles of human rights and constitutionalism should therefore become an overarching consensus in Chinese society. In fact, human rights and constitutionalism are inherently connected, just as explicated by Mr. Xi Jinping: “Only by ensuring that all citizens are equal before the law, by respecting and protecting human rights, by ensuring that the people enjoy broad rights and freedom according to the law, only then can the Constitution enter deep in the people’s hearts, only then can it move among the masses, and only then can the implementation of the Constitution truly become a conscious action on the part of all the people.” We worry that — as we [as a society] lack a proper sense of human rights, and as we lack basic protections for personal freedom, rights and dignity — our entire society risks sliding into [a chaos of] hatred and violence, moving toward separatism and hostile division, in the event that we face a comprehensive crisis. We worry that — as we lack proper knowledge of constitutionalism, as we lack the most basic understanding and faith in the sanctity and authority of constitutionalism — our country might give way to an instrumentalism (工具主义) [that sees politics only as a means to an end], that our leaders will find it difficult to establish a set of values that accord with modern civilisation, and that they will then forfeit all governing legitimacy and all necessary dignity.
In summary, for citizens and the government, for our nation and peoples, the establishment of a nation of human rights, of a China in which constitutionalism is in force, this is the only true and fundamental measure of the gloriousness of our achievements and of our dreams [CHECK]. We must foster a civil society rooted in fairness, peace, rationality and openness, and we must build a decent politics founded on love and justice. The establishment of human rights in our country and the achievement of constitutionalism are principles representing our most sincere and well-intentioned hopes, and they express our profound concern for personal fortunes, community welfare, national honor and [the fruits of] human civilization. We remain confident that if people can become the foundation [of our country] in practice, and if the constitution can guarantee their dignity (以宪为尊), we can promote harmony in our society today, and we can achieve national strength and prosperity for China’s future at the lowest possible cost. We also believe that if we work with human rights and constitutionalism in China as our direction, focus and point of entry, and if we proceed with determination and belief, remaining tenacious and meticulous [in our work], there are no difficulties concerning the development of our nation and peoples that cannot be resolved. In this way, each individual person would benefit, our nation as a whole would benefit, and all the peoples of our country would benefit.
For these reasons, we call on the State Council to submit a proposal to the 12th National People’s Congress concerning the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in accordance with Article 89 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. We hope that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress will, in accordance with Article 67 of the Constitution, immediately ratify this treaty. If, owing to time considerations, this task cannot be completed this year, we ask that you please be open and considerate [in this matter], offering the people of our country an explanation and at the same time providing an explicit timetable so that they understand and trust in their government’s good faith.
The signers of this letter follow:
SIGNED:
[SEE IMAGE FILE BELOW FOR FULL LIST OF VERIFIED SIGNATURES AND CHINESE VERSION OF THE LETTER]

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公民建言：呼吁全国人大尽快批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》
全国人民代表大会常务委员会：
在中华人民共和国第十二届全国人民代表大会即将召开、新一届中国政府即将成立之际，我们谨以中国公民身份，郑重公开倡议：尽快批准加入《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，以进一步推动和落实人权立国、宪行中国的原则。具体理由如次：
一、国际人权宪章对于人类基本人权的申明、确立和规范，符合中国政府和中国共产党一贯强调的立国与立宪的宗旨。
《世界人权宣言》、《经济、社会及文化权利国际公约》和《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》共同构成“国际人权宪章”的主要框架，成为国际社会人权保护的核心准则。其中《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》又被公认为是“当代得到普遍接受的最低人权标准的最权威表达”。该公约所确认的各项基本人权，作为第一代人权，具有更为根本的重要地位。从18世纪末以来，这些权利作为人类近现代宪政革命的可贵制度成果，已经成为大多数民族国家的宪法中不可或缺的基础性规定，它们代表了人类对于权利、自由和尊严的普遍诉求。
国际人权宪章所弘扬的价值和关怀，也是中国政府和中国共产党反复宣称的立国目标和立宪宗旨。建政之前，中国共产党提出“为人权自由而战”的号召，并落实到《中华苏维埃共和国宪法大纲》、《陕甘宁边区施政纲领》等宪法性文件当中，为此在边区专门颁布了一系列人权保障条例。上个世纪四十年代席卷全国的宪政运动，中国共产党也是主要推动者，人权保障则是题中要义。建政之后，1954年宪法即专章规定“公民的基本权利和义务”，奠定了我国宪法以人权为本的基调。尽管此后颇多曲折，我们在贯彻宪法、保障人权的问题上付出了巨大代价，但人权这一崇高目标已经成为今天转型事业不可分割的核心议程，其最新体现就是我国制定的第二个以人权为主题的规划《国家人权行动计划（2012-2015年）》。
二、尽快批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，以兑现中国政府的庄重承诺，满足中国人民的美好心愿，并展现中国作为一个负责任的世界大国的风范。
联合国在1966年通过《经济、社会及文化权利国际公约》和《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》时，就呼吁所有国家最好将两公约看成一个整体，同时予以签署和批准。截止2010年11月1日，在联合国193个会员国中，已有167个国家正式加入了《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》。2001年，我国批准了被称为“第二代人权”的《经济、社会及文化权利国际公约》；但自1998年中国政府签署《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》至今近十五年，我国仍然没有批准被视为“第一代人权”之《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》。尽管中国政府重视在批准前稳妥改进现有法律制度，使之尽量符合该公约要求的各项义务，但是，我们还是应把人权条约的签署与批准之间的间隔，保持在合理的范围之内，既推动公民权利和政治权利的进一步落实，亦避免国际社会不必要的猜度。
作为联合国安理会常任理事国，中国从来都是国际人权宪章的积极发起者和参与者。对《世界人权宣言》的制定，中国政府发挥了重要作用。世界人权标准因此决非舶来品，而有着中国文化和中国人民的贡献。十五年前签署《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，更表明我国作为负责任的世界大国，对于保障基本人权做出了庄严承诺。此后，中国国家主席胡锦涛、国务院总理温家宝，在不同场合多次向国内外公开郑重表示，一旦条件成熟，中国就将尽快履行批准公约的法律程序。2008年初，也曾有一万多位公民签名呼吁加入《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》。所以，我们再无必要犹疑徘徊，而须因应人权发展潮流，履行政府的承诺，回应人民的诉求，体现大国的风范，顺理成章地以积极果断的姿态加入公约。
三、签署《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》以来，中国的开放在深化，法治建设在进步，权利意识在觉醒，公民社会在发育，中国批准公约的时机已经成熟。
2011年，我国发布《中国特色社会主义法律体系》白皮书，宣布以宪法为统帅的完备、科学、和谐、统一的中国特色社会主义法律体系已经形成。尤其值得一提的是，2004年，“国家尊重和保障人权”入宪，人权保护上升为宪法原则。2013年，新修正的《刑事诉讼法》施行，引入许多符合现代人权法治精神的规定，比如非法证据排除规则、死刑复核程序的完善、不得强迫自证其罪、律师权利的扩大、严格逮捕和审批程序等。今年年初召开的全国政法工作电视电话会议则明确强调，要把以人为本、公平正义作为法治建设的灵魂，并具体提出将进一步推进劳动教养、涉法涉诉信访工作、司法权力运行机制、户籍制度的改革。可以说，30年来我国法治建设朝着人权方向不断迈进而取得的成就，完全是社会整体进步的自然逻辑结果。公民权利的扩大和政治地位的提高，客观上也为中国批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》创造了良好条件。
不可否认，我国的人权法治状况与国际人权公约的要求之间，还存在相当差距或不相吻合之处。然而，所谓的时机成熟，从来不是指要万事俱备，完美无缺，而是指为人权的保障和改进做了充分的准备，提供了坚实的基础，实现了对接的可能。人权事业是动态的、丰富的，必须在国内与国际、政府与社会、现在与未来、特殊与普遍之间形成良性互动的空间与机制。在这个意义上，如今恰是我国批准公约的最好时机。对于我国法律体系中现实存在并且有待时间加以调整的某些难处或不足，我们可以根据各国加入公约时的惯常做法，就具体条款作出合理限度内的保留、声明、通知或反对，但必须真诚、严肃而缜密，高度尊重人权事业的神圣性和经久性。
四、批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，有助于创新宪法的多元实施机制，确保宪法中人权条款的落实，捍卫宪法的生命和权威。
习近平先生在纪念现行宪法公布施行30周年大会上的讲话中指出：“宪法的生命在于实施，宪法的权威也在于实施。”这句话深刻表达了“宪行中国”的基本治国理念。我国现行宪法中的一些良法条款关于各项人权的规定，与《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》的基本原则和精神，具有内在的一致性。如何使宪法的这些良法条款真正成为塑造民族精神、凝聚政治共识、实现文明复兴的权威标志，关键就在于认真对待权利，贯彻落实宪法，为此我们必须积极探索多元的宪法实施机制。从各国宪政经验来看，这些宪法实施机制大体包括释宪机制、违宪审查机制、宪法司法化机制、宪法监督机制、宪法条款直接适用机制等。目前在我国，这些实施机制大都还停留在纸面规定上，需要通过更具体并且更具操作性的宪政实践来激活。
加入《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，其实就是创新多元宪法实施机制的一个切实可行的步骤。首先，该公约本身强调以约束政府和公权运作的方式，来达到尊重和保护人权的目的，因而可以间接理顺宪法的人民主权基础和权力制衡模式，提升政府的执政观念及执政能力；其次，国际人权公约在实施过程中，积累了非常丰富和规范的人权保护法治经验，其中的缔约国报告程序、国家及个人的来文程序、督促各国立法和司法行政当局采取人权补救措施的规定等，有助于缔约国履行人权承诺，实现广泛深远的宪政结构的改革和完善；第三，国际人权理事会在监督实施人权公约时，很好地做到了充分尊重各国的宪政和主权，其实践主要是建立在促成协商一致和开展建设性对话与合作的基础之上的，这在无形中为各国宪法的实施提供了必不可少的自主、理性、尊重、包容等前提条件的示范。
五、尽早批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，可以使我国更加坦率公开地明确人权立国、宪行中国的至上原则，实现中华民族复兴的伟大使命。
国际人权宪章有关人权的规范和实践日益表明，人类的这些基本人权具有普遍性、平等性、不可分割性和相互依赖性。这一点对于正在努力实现中华民族伟大复兴的当下中国而言，具有格外重大的意义。悠悠万事，人权最大。人权是目的，政权必须服务人权、保障人权始有合法性。人权立国、宪行天下的原则因此理当成为中国社会最大的共识。事实上，人权立国与宪行中国之间，存在着深刻而内在的关联，正如习近平先生所阐发的那样，“只有保证公民在法律面前一律平等，尊重和保障人权，保证人民依法享有广泛的权利和自由，宪法才能深入人心，走入人民群众，宪法实施才能真正成为全体人民的自觉行动。”我们担忧，由于缺乏人权素养，对人的自由、权利和尊严没有基本的敬畏和保障，在一旦遭遇全面危机时，会使整个社会陷入仇恨与暴戾，走向分裂和敌对的丛林状态；我们担忧，由于缺乏宪政素养，对宪法的权威和神圣性没有起码的体认和信奉，会导致国家工具主义盛行，执政者难以树立一整套符合现代文明的价值观，进而丧失执政合法性以及必要的尊严。
总之，对于公民、政府、国家和民族而言，唯有人权立国、宪行中国，才是成就光荣与梦想的根本尺度和不二法门。我们需要培育一个以中正、和平、理性和开放为根基的公民社会，也需要建立一个以爱和正义为基础的美好政治。人权立国、宪行中国的原则代表了我们最为诚挚善意的心愿，也表达了我们对于个人命运、共同体福祉、国家荣耀、人类文明的深切关怀。我们相信，只要能够做到以人为本，以宪为尊，我们就既能促进当下社会的和谐，也能以最小代价实现未来中国的繁荣强盛。我们也相信，只要以人权立国、宪行中国为努力的方向、重心和切入点，并坚定信心与信念，保持坚韧和细致，一切事关国家民族发展大计的难题都不难获解。如此，则个人幸甚，国家幸甚，民族幸甚。
基于此，我们恳切呼吁国务院依据《中华人民共和国宪法》第八十九条的规定，向第十二届全国人民代表大会提出有关缔结《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》的议案；希望全国人民代表大会常务委员会根据《中华人民共和国宪法》第六十七条的规定，立即批准该公约。如果确因时间仓促，今年不能完成这一工作，也请开诚布公，给全体国民一个解释，同时宣布一个确定的时间表，以求国民谅解，以昭政府大信。
为此，发起此次公民联署。
签名：

The trial last week of a man accused of murdering a doctor during the Cultural Revolution has generated some interesting discussion of this sensitive episode in China’s history, both on social media and in traditional media.
Approved by the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in June 1981, the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the Republic offered a review and assessment of the first 32 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The resolution rejected the Cultural Revolution, saying it had been “initiated in error by [Party] leaders and manipulated by counterrevolutionary cliques, bringing grave disaster and internal chaos to the Party, the nation and our people.”
But the resolution’s formal rejection of this painful decade was not an invitation for Chinese to reflect back on its evils and their political, cultural or institutional causes. The Cultural Revolution has remained a highly sensitive issue ever since, and coverage by the news media is carefully controlled, particularly around the May anniversary of its inception.
On February 20, the official China News Service reported that an elderly man in Zhejiang province, identified only by his surname, Qiu, was facing trial for his alleged murder in 1967 of a doctor accused at the time of being a spy.
The news of Qiu’s trial generated a great deal of discussion on Chinese social media. While some Chinese welcomed the action, many felt is was too little too late, the petty scapegoating of a helpless old man while senior Party officials with unclean hands were shielded from responsibility.

[ABOVE: Two among many posts this week dealing with the Cultural Revolution and the recent trial of Mr. Qiu in Zhejiang province. On top the text leads readers to an important piece by former CMP fellow Zhang Ming (SEE BELOW), and the Sina Weibo service adds links to news about the Zhejiang case.]
One of the most important recent pieces in the traditional media came the very same day the China News Service reported news of the Zhejiang trial. On February 20, China Youth Daily published a piece on page two by Zhang Ming (张鸣), a former CMP fellow and a professor of political science at Renmin University of China. Zhang’s piece argued China must reflect back openly on the Cultural Revolution if Chinese hope to regain a sense of humanity and dignity.

[ABOVE: A re-posted version of Zhang Ming’s Cultural Revolution article for China Youth Daily at Phoenix Online drew more than 300,000 visits by February 25. The article is accompanied by an image of the victim of a Cultural Revolution struggle session. We’ll let readers parse the significance of the Buick advertisement to the right of the coverage.]
The language of Zhang’s piece — printed in China Youth Daily‘s “speaking freely” column — is strong and direct, not shrinking from brutal characterization of the acts committed during the Cultural Revolution.
Cannibalism is Zhang’s overarching metaphor, built atop very real (and apparently quite common) acts of human flesh-eating that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. At one point, Zhang writes that if China cannot reflect back, then “we are still a den of cannibals.”
Below is a partial translation of Zhang Ming’s February 20 piece.

“Without Reflection Humanity Cannot Be Recovered” (没有反思就没有人性的复苏)
China Youth Daily
February 20, 2013
By Zhang Ming (张鸣)
There are many people [in our country] who yearn for a repeat of the Cultural Revolution, for another violent convulsion. This should send shivers through us all. If we refuse to review and reexamine the Cultural Revolution, we might still be a society of cannibals. And if we are such a society, it doesn’t matter how bright we might seem on the outside, or how fully we enjoy the fruits of civilisation — we are still a den of cannibals.
It has been more than 30 years since the end of the Cultural Revolution, but this [historical episode] has never quite gone from us. In both the real and virtual worlds, those, old and young, who praise and support the Cultural Revolution can be found everywhere. On a taxi ride recently I was talking with the elderly driver and he said with profound hatred that if we just had another round of the Cultural Revolution officials wouldn’t be let off the hook so easily — we would peel them alive, he said.
In official [Party] documents the Cultural Revolution has been thoroughly rejected. But remembering, recording and reflecting back on the Cultural Revolution remains taboo. Meanwhile, praise and affirmation for the Cultural Revolution decade [is allowed to] quietly thrive. It’s as though we’ve been able to completely dissociate the Cultural Revolution [as officially condemned] from the events of that decade. In all of human history encompassed by the twentieth century, spanning all nations, was there any event like our Cultural Revolution? The only possible comparison is the Nazi period in Germany. But to this day, we have had no historical commemoration, no reflection of the kind [Germany has had].
Looking back on that period today, the most ghastly thing was the way the Cultural Revolution trampled on human beings and their dignity. Humiliation, physical abuse, murder, death through negligence and maltreatment — these became like a daily meal regimen. Things worked this way during the height of chaos, and in more or less the same way once normalcy returned.
The popular tyranny of the Cultural Revolution extended through to the public security system once it was restored. No matter who a person was, once they entered the “police station” (局子), a beating was to be expected, and being beaten to death was always possible.
During the Cultural Revolution, we had the Guangxi Massacre (广西大屠杀), the Dao County Massacre (道县大屠杀) and the Daxing Massacre (大兴大屠杀). You might say those were special cases. But during struggles in many areas is was quite common for one or the other side to use rifles, or even cannons and machine guns, for indiscriminate slaughter.
Were any places spared the constant struggle, the popular tyranny, the death and persecution that went on without rest over those ten years? No one, not a person, was given the slightest bit of dignity. So it was for those in the “five black categories” (landlords, wealthy peasants, counter-revolutionaries, evildoers and rightists, and their sons and daughters). So it was for the capitalist roaders. . . With my own eyes I saw people struck down and beaten within an inch of their lives who had the day before murdered others with their own hands. Forced prostration, “jet propulsion” struggle sessions [in which victims were suspended with their arms out and behind like wings], “yin-yang head” [humiliations in which half the head was shaved clean] . . . Humiliations and abuses like these never ceased during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution.
Some people find it strange that an adolescent girl could wield a leather belt and beat her own teacher to death. Or that red guards could take the elderly, women and children and flog them to death, scald them to death with boiling water, drown them in toilets, and even cut them to ribbons while they were alive. In some places, like Guangxi province, after people were beaten to death, their hearts were eaten. In that area, eating people in this way was actually very common!
There is only one explanation — those people who were persecuted and murdered were all class enemies. The Cultural Revolution was a war of one class against another, and class enemies were not seen as human beings. That meant it was reasonable and normal to kill any number of people in any way possible. The problem is that there was no war at the time, and the time who were seen at the time as enemies were simply living their lives with their families when they were dragged out, not offering up the least resistance. Regardless of anything else, these were human beings. No matter what class rationalisations you us, the act of torturing and beating to death people who offered no resistance was one that decimated the humanity of the perpetrator. No matter what the revolutionary doctrines and justifications are, a class struggle of this kind is only ultimately violence of the strong against the weak.
. . . In China today, the abuse of domestic cats is enough to infuriate many people. How is it possible people can hope for a replay of the Cultural Revolution? But this desire is very real. A person can shed tears of sympathy over a cat that has been crushed to death, but this does not deter them from wishing for another Cultural Revolution, in which they imagine skinning those in power.
Of course, many of those who wish for another Cultural Revolution don’t really understand the true horrors of that decade. They don’t know the real Cultural Revolution. They think the Cultural Revolution was just as leftists now describe it, a period of great democracy in which there was struggle against pro-capitalists.
One fact cannot be denied — many Chinese, including those experienced the Cultural Revolution, have not regained their humanity.
One researcher who studied the Guangxi Massacre thought it was very strange that of all those he interviewed who had cannibalised others at that time none whatsoever said they regretted their actions. They all said that back then it was a life-and-death class struggle, that those they killed might have killed them. In fact, the vast majority of those they murdered were of the so-called “five black categories.” Even as they were killed, raped, gang-raped, they did not put up a struggle. They were abused until death ended their suffering, and then their hearts were eaten. If their spirits were here today, they would no doubt be surprised to find their persecutors acting with the same stubborn sense of having been right.
It goes without saying that these people have not yet recovered their sense of humanity. Perhaps it could be said that these self-righteous murderers are better than many of their fellows in the sense that they at least have owned up to their deeds. Many people who committed innumerable murders have simply wiped their faces clean and pretended nothing ever happened . . .
The world has already entered the twenty-first century. Many of those who committed acts of violence during those years are already old and feeble. If they wish to bear their savageness with them to their graves, that is their own choice. There are many people [in our country] who yearn for a repeat of the Cultural Revolution, for another violent convulsion. This should send shivers through us all. If we refuse to review and reexamine the Cultural Revolution, we might still be a society of cannibals. And if we are such a society, it doesn’t matter how bright we might seem on the outside, or how fully we enjoy the fruits of civilisation — we are still a den of cannibals. If having experienced the Cultural Revolution, the people of our nation do not reflect [on that episode in our history], we will have no way of leaving this den of cannibals. Any one of us might eat others, and any one of us might be eaten.

[ABOVE: Page two of the February 20, 2013, edition of China Youth Daily. The article by Zhang Ming is on the right-hand side.]

Imagine waking up one morning with a nagging compulsion to understand ideas that up to now have been entirely alien to you — concepts like democracy, freedom of speech or separation of powers. Perhaps, the night previous, there were whispers at the next table about a man named “Liu Xiaobo” who harbored “dangerous” ideas of this sort. Liu who?
But, pshaw!, how dangerous can ideas really be?
You reach over to the bedside table and grab your mobile, knowing full well (as an internet literate Chinese “netizen”) that the answers are at your fingertips thanks to the miracle of search engine technology.
Let’s say, for the purposes of this story, that your first gateway to knowledge and discovery looks like this:

Jike.com is a state-controlled search engine launched in 2010 by the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, and its listed internet arm, People’s Daily Online. (You’re not aware of this, but Kai-Fu Lee, the former president of China operations for Google.com, the world’s leading search engine service, had his social media account blocked a few days earlier after making unfavorable remarks about Jike.com and its president, former Chinese table tennis champion Deng Yaping.)
With a slight blush of guilt you enter your first search term: “separation of powers” (三权分立). Your results come back instantly.

The results are topped by the usual basics offered by the encyclopedia service at Baidu.com, Baidu Baike (百度百科), and the Chinese version of Wikipedia. These give you some decent background on the basic concept. But the meatier results that follow explain why “separation of powers” is a terrible idea for China.
First, there’s an April 2009 piece from the official China Central Television under the marathon headline, “Why We Must Cleave to the National People’s Congress System and Must Not Do ‘Separation of Powers'” (为什么必须坚持人民代表大会制度而不能搞“三权分立”). The piece offers a lengthy historical reading of China’s “unique situation” and how it is unsuited to Western political systems:

What political system a country implements is ultimately decided by that country’s national circumstances and nature. The democracy talked about in capitalist societies is bourgeois democracy, a democracy that in fact monopolizes capital, no more than multi-party elections, separation of powers and a bicameral system. The national people’s congress system in practice in our country is a people’s democratic system under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. We cannot put that Western system [into practice].

That sounds reasonable enough. Every country is different, right? You have to do things your own way. The monopolization of capital — how can that be fair?
But this is just one view, and your natural skepticism bids you on. You turn to the next search result, a video from March 2011 in which Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), a senior Party leader and then secretary of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, says categorically that separation of powers and privatization of property are off the table for China because they are not, again, suited to its “unique circumstances.”
The next result, an article from China Youth Daily, published by the Communist Youth League of China, reassures you that while your country will not practice separation of powers, “democracy” remains a priority. An interview with a senior Party official from Hunan province, the article (“Not Doing Separation of Powers Does Not Mean Not Doing Democracy and Rule of Law“) argues that “the people decide on major matters through the people’s congresses at various levels and their standing committees.”

[ABOVE: A Chinese internet cafe superimposed with Jike.com search logo. Photo by Kai Hendry posted to Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
This article furrows your brow. You’ve never voted for a single people’s congress delegate, and everybody knows they’re appointed by Party officials. Where do the people come in at all? This local official must be pulling your leg. You’re better off drawing your wisdom from the “center,” from the senior levels, where officials are kinder and more mindful of the people’s needs than entrenched local tyrants like the one who demolished your uncle’s house to build another shopping mall.
Fortunately, just a few search results down — after an article about Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-Shing and “separation of powers” within his family — there is an article from the “theory” section of People’s Daily Online. Its original source is the Party’s official People’s Daily. That should give you a more “central” perspective on this concept.
The article, “There are Fundamental Differences Between the ‘Separation of Powers’ System and the National People’s Congress System” (人民代表大会制度与“三权分立”制度有根本区别), begins with refreshing straightforwardness, cutting straight to its core point:

In order to gain a clear understanding of why we must keep to the people’s congress system and not do ‘separation of powers,’ the problem we first come to is one of how to understand freedom, democracy and human rights.

And, once again, you come up against this irresistible point about cultural relativism:

Under different historical circumstances, in different countries, in different ethnic groups, in different classes, understandings of these problems [of freedom, democracy and human rights] are different.

Well, that must be true, no? Chinese are not Westerners, after all. And the other way around. They eat beefsteaks on separate dinner plates and separate their powers. We keep our powers all mixed together, like Sichuan hot pot.
Scrolling through other pages of search results, you notice most are papers, or lunwen (论文), of a theoretical nature, the majority from official sources or journals. It’s time to move on.
You plug “Liu Xiaobo” (刘晓波) into Jike.com. Who is this guy anyway?

It becomes instantly clear to you that Liu Xiaobo isn’t just dangerous, he’s a convicted criminal, according to result after result thrown up by the Jike.com search engine.
The first news article result, directly from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is a response to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to this man, which was “an interference in China’s internal affairs.”
The next result, from China’s official Xinhua News Service, vehemently attacks the Nobel Committee, saying that “the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo is absolutely wrong.”
Up next is a People’s Daily article re-run by Sina.com, that says “the actions of the Nobel Committee cannot erase the fact of Liu Xiaobo’s crimes.”
Wait. There is no mention of what those crimes were. . . You scroll through several pages of search results. There are more articles, the bulk from People’s Daily online, labeling the Nobel decision a “mistake” and a “joke.”
Something’s not right. You’re on page 10 of the search results and still you can find nothing but one-sided recriminations. There’s a Xinhua News Agency article saying Malaysian media have called the Liu Xiaobo Nobel decision a “mistaken choice,” but it cites only one Malaysian newspaper. That’s a bit dirty. And there’s an article from the official government website in Tibet calling both Liu Xiaobo and the Dalai Lama “political games of the West.”
There are endless repeats of the response from the foreign ministry. . . But there has to be more.
Now curious about search engines and their limitations, you search Jike.com to learn more. You eventually stumble across this Chinese Wikipedia entry. It mentions that Google.com is currently the world’s leader in the search engine sector. Well, that should give you something.

You plug in “Liu Xiaobo” and suddenly the results look very different. There are news reports and in-depth features from Hong Kong media such as Ming Pao and Apple Daily. There are whole collections available online of Liu’s essays. There are open calls for his release. Even the President of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, is talking about his case as an injustice.
Knowing full well that bias can work both ways, you search for the Jike.com results through Google. You add the search term “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” to “Liu Xiaobo” (刘晓波 + 外交部) and right away you get the foreign ministry’s official statement saying the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo is an “interference in China internal affairs.”
That seems fair. You add Google to your favorites.
Clearly, the first search engine was taking you for a ride. Someone was playing political ping-pong with your search results. For the first and last time, you were Jiked.

The following post by Commander Xi Dada (习大大司令) voicing frustration over the blocking of the Weibo account of former Google China founding president Kai-fu Lee after he scoffed online the People’s Daily-run search engine Jike.com and its president, former table tennis star Deng Yaping (邓亚萍), was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 8:40am today, February 18, 2013. Commander Xi Dada currently has just under 8,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
Commander Xi Dada wrote:

Just for mentioning Deng Yaping, Kai-fu Lee gets gagged! I’d like to know: 1) Why is taxpayer money used for commercial operations [in running the Jike.com search service]? They can use two billion yuan in taxpayer money to play ducks and drakes? 2) If you provide a search engine service with no ideas about the [free] flow of information, is that going to work? How is it she doesn’t even have her own Weibo account? 3) How is it that the post of president of a search engine company is appointed by the Chinese Communist Party? 4) If back in the day the Democratic Party in the U.S. had appointed Michael Phelps as the CEO of Google, would the search engine ever have ousted Yahoo! as top dog?

The original Chinese-language post follows:

就说了邓亚萍，Li开FU被禁言！试问 1）为何要用纳税人钱来做商业运营？花了纳税人20亿打水漂黑了点吧？2）做搜索引擎，却没有信息通畅开放信念，可能有戏吗？她咋连微博也没？3）一个搜索引擎公司老总，为何由党任命？4）如果当年美国民主党任命菲尔普斯出任谷歌CEO，谷歌能打败雅虎成为搜索老大吗？

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The following is a partial translation of an article by Xiao Shu appearing on the Chinese website of the New York Times on January 29, 2013.
Social harmony and peaceful social transition can be achieved in China today only through the remaking of state-society relations. The recent Southern Weekly incident, in which people from diverse social backgrounds rallied behind one of China’s leading newspapers and called for an end to censorship, provides a constructive example of how social movements might promote such a transition.
There are five basic conditions oppositional politics (抗争政治) or social movements in China must satisfy in order to have farther-reaching consequences. They must be:
1. mass in scale (大规模)
2. organized (有组织)
3. non-violent (非暴力)
4. low-cost (低成本)
5. sustainable (可持续)
The Southern Weekly incident marked an important breakthrough on the first of these conditions. The incident was mass-scale, drawing support from across the country.
A popular message shared recently across China’s social networks encapsulates quite well the significance of mass scale in social action:

When there are 10 of you, we will destroy you; when there are one-hundred of you, we will detain you; when there are a thousand of you, we will drive you away; when there are ten-thousand of you, we will do nothing; when there are one-hundred thousand of you we will join you.

In China, scale has long been a bottleneck issue facing oppositional politics or social movements. What does it mean for a movement to be mass-scale? It means that the movement must have involvement from ordinary citizens. If ordinary citizens do not become involved, if a movement is sustained only be a handful of leaders, scale cannot be achieved and demands cannot gather momentum.
For rulers having substantial resources with which to constrain social activism, such actions do not pose a clear and present danger. Rulers can simply mobilize their resources and give the order to strike. In such cases, a small minority of dissenters bear the brunt of the repressive force, and the price they pay in turn serves as a general deterrent to other members of the society. Terror will cause the vast majority of people to lose the will to resist, and there will be fewer leaders to sustain action. The bottleneck of scale remains impossible to break through.
China has never been short of individual heroes having the courage to resist. But no matter how many individual heroes emerge, the problem of scale remains. If we assume that the peaceful transition of Chinese society relies on oppositional politics or on social movements, the question then arises: How can isolated instances of resistance by the few be elevated to mass-scale movements drawing the support of large numbers of ordinary citizens?
The question of how oppositional politics can enter Chinese society has become integral to the success or failure of China’s peaceful transition.
Herein lies the significance of the Southern Weekly incident. If we look for similar examples of resistance after 1989 in China, we have only the Wukan incident in Guangdong province in 2011. We could say that the Southern Weekly incident was a media Wukan.
One of the most important reasons violent suppression was avoided in the case of Wukan was that the movement was mass-scale. Nearly all the villagers in Wukan were united in resistance against corrupt local officials. The suppression by force of such a mass-scale movement would have meant paying a high price politically. Fearful of the consequences, provincial authorities relented and opted for negotiations.
This happened too with the Southern Weekly incident. Even generally reticent personalities like Ren Zhiqiang (任志强) and Kaifu Lee (李开复) stepped out to speak for Southern Weekly, along with artists like Yao Chen (姚晨), Li Bingbing (李冰冰), Yi Nengjing (伊能静). Speaking out too were ordinary college students, urban white collar professionals, and even civil servants. Nationwide, those voicing support for Southern Weekly numbered at least in the tens of millions.
How was this significant? The Southern Weekly incident drew participation from the middling masses (中间人群), from those typically alienated from politics. Masses of ordinary people stood up and resisted. They did not do so out of concrete, personal interests, but rather for more general rights such as freedom of speech and the right to know.
This incident marked the first time a social consensus was formed, and collective social action taken, around the pursuit of rights in a more general sense. This was the real breakthrough we saw in the case of the Southern Weekly incident.
If we understand the event’s significance in this way, it’s not difficult to see why it occasioned so much fear on the part of the authorities. Why would the authorities take a heavy-handed approach to famous people like Ren Zhiqiang, Kaifu Lee, Yi Nengjing and others? Why would they seek them out for questioning (“drinking tea”) or shut down their social media accounts?
The fear of the authorities has three root causes:
First, resistance by the middling masses, by ordinary citizens, entirely surpassed anything they had expected. The arrogance and confidence of power was such that they cared little for the feelings of journalists and saw their resistance as insignificant in the scale of things. In their eyes, the worst case scenario might have been the shutdown of the newspaper.
The authorities never supposed that the question of a single media’s fate would stir up such mass support, that the media would form a community of resistance with people from all walks of life that would send ripples through society. This caught them entirely off guard.
Secondly, this incident was one the authorities could not purchase their way out of. The masses driving this social movement could not be bought because the demands they made did not center on concrete claims of interest. One of the most typical stability preservation (维稳) responses, paying off the aggrieved party with Renminbi, was of no avail in this case.
Thirdly, this incident crossed over geographic boundaries. When officials in Beijing ordered media to re-run the editorial from the Global Times making false claims against Southern Weekly staff, this prompted fierce objections from journalists at other media and from a broader segment of society. When staff at another newspaper, The Beijing News, stood their ground and refused to run the Global Times editorial, the fire was burning rights at the steps of Zhongnanhai.
The apprehension of the authorities over the Southern Weekly incident was not without cause. One of the chief reasons the situation did not escalate further was that Southern Weekly staff limited their demands to immediate concessions. Another concrete reason was the fact that Guangdong’s Party secretary, Hu Chunhua (胡春华), was newly in his post and wanted a quick resolution to the stand-off and a return to normalcy. The limited victory by Southern Weekly staff put everyone back to work and calmed the situation.
[The full version of Xiao Shu’s article in Chinese is available at the New York Times.]

In a recent meeting of China’s top discipline inspection leaders, the Party officials charged with monitoring corruption within the Party, Xi Jinping pledged to “strike the tigers as well as the flies” (high officials as well as low) and “shut power in the cage of regulation” (or “cage of the system”). This was some of Xi’s most evocative anti-corruption language yet. On his blog, CMP fellow Yang Hengjun shared his thoughts on Xi’s remarks, anti-corruption and political reform in a dialogue with web users.

Web User: In his speech to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission on the 22nd, Xi Jinping emphasized that [the Party] needs to strengthen controls and monitoring of public power, that power must be shut into the cage of regulation (制度的笼子里) – so a system is created that deters corruption . . . What are your views on this?
Yang Hengjun: It’s all very well said. My impression is that the last time we heard something like this was from U.S. President George W. Bush [in his farewell speech] (“putting leaders into cages” “把统治者关进笼子里”). At the time this phrase really took off online [in China], and I used the phrase a number of times too on my blog. I remember some internet users at the time added comments to my post saying, Aye, when can our leaders talk that way? So, our Party Secretary Xi has now said it.
Web User: Yes, Xi Jinping said it, but how big do you think the gap is between words and deeds here? Things are easier said than done. I’d like to know – what needs to be done in order to shut power into the cage of the system?
Yang Hengjun: It’s very simple. You must use the system to shut power into a cage. Given China’s circumstances, perhaps this means progressing step by step like other authoritarian regimes that have undergone transition (Taiwan, for example). The first step would be the immediate institution of rule of law, using the legal system to control power, to limit power. The second step would be to implement a system of constitutional democracy, giving power back to the people, which would mean allowing the people to use this “democratic system” to put power into the cage of the system.
Web User: I’m sorry, you’ve taken me for a loop. Can you explain what you mean by what you just said? I didn’t understand the difference between the two.
Yang Hengjun: Hah hah. I’m not taking you for a loop. What I’m doing is trying to use just a few sentence to explain clearly a very complicated political question.
Let’s put it this way. When General Secretary Xi talks about stuffing power into the cage of the system, this raises an important question — and that is, who is going to stuff power into this cage? Is there someone higher than the system itself, such that they have the power to stuff the power in the hands of others into this cage? If you note that Xi Jinping made these remarks before a full session of officials from the Discipline Inspection Commission, you might feel a bit disappointed by that, because according to the standards of those civilized nations that have already successfully stuffed power into the cage, an organization like the Discipline Inspection Commission isn’t a particularly good example of rule of law in action. The Commission itself is obligated to first be stuffed inside the cage of the system.
However, in an authoritarian era, this is something that probably cannot be done instantly. So I can only hope that all of you discipline inspection officials present understand General Secretary Xi’s words, that you first put the power in your own hands inside the cage. Anti-corruption has to happen according to the law. It must not go around the law, using the courts and prosecutors as tools. That kind of anti-corruption is in fact the most dreadful form of corruption — corruption of power. Of course, really answering this question requires me talking about step two, and that is the step from rule of law to constitutional democracy. Once that step is made, we can remove the quotation marks from “rule of law.” Once that step is made, it’s no longer about the nation’s ruler shutting power into the cage, it’s about giving power back to the people, about a democratic system that puts rulers in the cage.
Web User: I think I sort of understand. What you mean is that there’s a long way to go before absolute power can be truly shut in the cage. It’s no wonder that while many web users were supportive after reading the news and commentary about Xi’s words, quite a number were also taking a wait-and-see attitude, and some even refused to believe it. How do you see this situation?
Yang Hengjun: I think the vast majority of web users rejoiced after hearing about Xi’s speech, though you can understand why some would remain skeptical. Some Chinese leaders are all talk and no action, and this causes disappointment. But even through disappointment after disappointment, I don’t stand with those persistent deniers. Remember, Rome wasn’t built in a day, and tyranny was not made by one single individual or political party. If it wasn’t for minions and numbly callous bystanders, we wouldn’t have so many evil systems on earth. What I mean to say is that your parents, brothers, sisters and friends, even you yourself, everyone must take responsibility for a bad system and the situation we face today. If you want to change it, you have to act. Even if acting means doing something seemingly insignificant . . . this has far more benefit than all of those who just stand by. Fighting for our rights and freedom is our own business.

The following post by Zuo Yeben (作业本) responding to Xi Jinping’s statement that he would “shut power up in the cage and strike the tigers [of corruption] as well as the flies”, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:02am today, January 23, 2013. Zuo Yeben currently has just over 4.9 million followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]

I’m begging you [Xi Jinping] not to throw power into the cage first!!!! We are all still here inside the cage!!! If you let them in without letting us out first they’ll bite us to death!!!

The original Chinese-language post follows:

求先别把权力关进笼子！！！！我们都还在笼子里！！！不把我们先放出去就把他们关进来会把我们咬死的！！！[泪]

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Last week, a book tour by celebrity blogger and social critic Li Chengpeng (李承鹏) was hijacked by local authorities, and by vocal leftists who oppose his critical writings on China [Summaries by TIME and SCMP].
Ahead of his first signing in his hometown of Chengdu to promote his new book, Everybody in the World Knows, Li was ordered not to say a word. In a now widely known act of silent protest, Li appeared at the signing wearing a black mask and then opened his coat to reveal the words, “I love you all,” written on his undershirt.

[ABOVE: Li Chengpeng appears before thousands of readers in Chengdu wearing a black mask after he was ordered not to say a word.]
In Guangzhou, the final leg of Li’s tour, the signing was cancelled at the last minute because the building where it was being hosted was closed for fire safety inspections.

[ABOVE: An image posted to Sina Weibo shows the notice of fire safety inspections to be carried out at the offices of Tianya in Guangzhou, where Li Chengpeng’s book signing was to take place on January 17.]
Li Chengpeng apologized to his readers for the Guangzhou cancellation with a tongue-in-cheek post to his Sina Weibo account playing on the title of his book: “Once again I apologize to everyone: Because fire safety inspections are happening at the Tianya Building, outsiders cannot go in, and therefore my book signing for readers is cancelled. I’m accepting this fact, because this place is really in need of a fire safety inspection. Everybody in the world knows, fire safety is really important.”
For all of its hitches and hijinks, Li Chengpeng’s book tour illustrates the limitations of control in the era of social media. Li’s “silent” signing in Chengdu was anything but silent — it was broadcast loudly across the internet. Every leg of his tour became the subject of fevered discussion online, pitting the values of speech and openness against controls that appeared foolish and anachronistic.
Yesterday, Li Chengpeng reflected back on his book tour with an interview published on Sina Weibo addressing some of the questions he has faced since it all began in Chengdu. The following is a partial translation:

There are some strange questions that deserve answers. These are not responses. They are not counterattacks. I just want to explain exactly what happened. I hope I can answer lingering doubts people have. Here are my answers:
QUESTION: I really don’t understand why the government would allow you to publish [your book], but not permit you to say anything at book signings. That seems like a huge contradiction.
ANSWER: This is what they call special characteristics (特色) [NOTE: Li is playing here on the Party term “socialism with Chinese characteristics”]. Here [in China] only publishing houses under the leadership of the Party can issue publishing numbers (书号). Because for many years they’ve been trained a certain way, many harmful works are refused publishing numbers and cannot circulate. But there are also some bolder publishing houses, the ones that haven’t been trained so well, that go against the grain and publish works [others will not].
But the publishing of a book is just the beginning. Because of the post-publication censorship, some books are banned from sale after they’ve been quietly published despite this high-pressure environment. For example, the book Urban Dirge (城市挽歌). There are also books that [authorities] got wind of only after they were published, and which to this day sit in the warehouse — for example, Mr. Yu Jianrong’s (于建嵘) True Account of Anyuan (安源实录). . . . There are plenty of examples like this. . . For a book to be published is just the beginning. After that there is still a tortuous road ahead. And who can say that one day someone might just deal the final blow [to your book]. Under this sort of situation, you have to understand the fact that although Everybody in the World Knows has been published I cannot speak at signings as a part of the normal process of publishing [in China].
Authorities in Chengdu were worried because I have a lot of readers, and [they thought] if they weren’t careful they might have a mass incident on their hands. So it was out of a concern for stability that they made their decision. It makes no difference that in my view there is no connection whatsoever between these two.
When the several heavy-fisted orders came down that I sign in silence, the poet Li Yawei (李亚伟) and the scholar Ran Yunfei (冉云飞) were both there to witness it. In case you suppose these two, who are my friends, might speak untrue then let me tell you I also have an audio recording. I don’t think recording the unreasonable demands of public power is a base act at all. In any case, it is a good way to avoid these strange questions I’m now getting.
In all likelihood, you will find it base of me to have done so. I can only say by way of comparison that after suffering a rape it is a shame if you decide to destroy the physical evidence.
QUESTION: If things were that unreasonable, couldn’t you just have avoided book signings altogether?
ANSWER: My first response was to not go through with it. Everyone who was there at the time can vouch for what I said — basically, that this was an insult, and one’s dignity is more important than the selling of books. Why, otherwise, would I have said no to a substantial advance of the kind Lu Jinbo (路金波) gets? Why would I have opted for the Xinxing Publishing House (新星出版社), which couldn’t offer a cent but could promise to preserve the draft in relatively complete form? However, one of my friends made the compelling point that avoiding the signing was improper, that I had to consider my readers. A sudden cancellation of the book signing, they said, was irresponsible to my readers. How many readers had come from other places to take part? (Indeed, there were readers from Xi’an, Chongqing and even Shanghai there).
I remember very clearly that that night when I posed this question on Sina Weibo and asked, “What should I do?”, the majority of readers supported signing in silence as a form of silent protest . . . Some people even suggested that I hold the signing instead on the side of the street next to the bookstore. When I considered that suggestion my feeling was that this would seem to the authorities like a provocation. There was the risk that readers could come to harm. And I couldn’t turn an ordinary book signing into a street movement. This just wasn’t my character. Late that night a reader from Shanghai even went to a hotel near the bookstore to see if the signing could be held in the lobby. I wouldn’t agree to that. It would impact the normal business of the hotel, and people with sensitive nerves would claim I had orchestrated it this way, wanting purposely to cause trouble . . . I worried this problem over until very late and finally sought the advice of Tu Jia Ye Fu (土家野夫), who was far off overseas. He said, first ensure that your book gets out there and your ideas reach an audience, then see how it goes from there. This is the most important work of the writer, he said. What do other indignities matter?
In the balance, my decision was to sign in silence (默签). I don’t have powerful backing from anyone. I don’t have the support of insiders. I don’t have high-level leaders giving me the green light. All I could do was sign in silence. . .
QUESTION: Even though they didn’t allow you to speak, I don’t believe that if you had said something they really would have done anything. I still think you were just trying to put on a show.
ANSWER: This question is logically unsound. The forces that be were very strong in their insistence that I sign in silence. How is there any problem in my complying? But another important reason was that the two people responsible at the bookstore repeatedly pressed us on this point: if we violated the orders, even speaking a single sentence, they would both be let go from their jobs. This was a hard order sent down from the leaders. I didn’t entirely believe it, so I said, look, it can’t be that serious. They said very seriously to me: you can’t say a single word. The leader is waiting . . . for your answer right now. . . Li Yawei and Ran Yunfei also asked me to consider their situation [as well–known local dissidents who could face punishment or intimidation]. At around midnight that night, I asked one final time whether I could just say, “Happy New Year!”, or just introduce [the poet] Liu Shahe (流沙河), [who planned to attend the signing]. We pledged not to say a single thing having to do with ideology. But this boss from the bookstore said: No, if you say a single thing I’ll lose my job. Brother, please consider my position . . .

Months after he formally became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, we still know virtually nothing about Xi Jinping. As Elizabeth Economy noted recently, “the sound of speculation around Xi [Jinping] has become deafening.”
Most everything we do know about Xi Jinping is “style” over substance. He has tried to project a more casual image, suggesting he is a new kind of leader — the kind that repudiates overabundance, whether on his dinner table or in his official speeches.
But how new and extraordinary is this really?

[ABOVE: China’s new propaganda chief, Liu Qibao, on a visit to the official People’s Daily on January 17.]
When I read the news in the official People’s Daily today that China’s new propaganda chief, Liu Qibao (刘奇葆), had visited the newspaper to promote the “innovation of reports” and urge state journalists to “improve their writing style,” it all felt very familiar. And of course it is. These are all things we heard 10 years ago after China’s last leadership succession.
Click here for the soundtrack to accompany the rest of this post:

Meet the new boss.
Same as the old boss.

Remember the “Three Closenesses“? Anyone?
Here is Li Changchun, the Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of ideology from 2002 to 2012, talking about Hu Jintao’s “Three Closeness” — closeness to 1. reality/fact (实际), 2. life (生活) and 3. the masses (群众) — in the Party’s official journal Qiushi in 2003. Let’s listen:

Closeness to reality demands that we follow the epistemology of Marxism, uphold [the principle] that all must begin with reality and [we] cannot, fundamentally, begin with concepts and not resolve real issues. Closeness to reality demands that we accommodate the receptive abilities of the masses, generating ideas and concepts that sit the basic economic system of the primary stage of socialism. [We] cannot jump beyond [our present] stage, forcing moralistic lessons on others that depart from [prevailing] reality. Closeness to reality means . . . [we] cannot depart from the main battlefield of reform and opening and modernization . . . Closeness to reality means speaking the truth (说实话), acting according to real principles and seeking real results. [We] cannot simply seek a surface vigor and vitality, engaging in formalism (搞形式主义).

Li Changchun is giving us a ten-course meal of Party-speak. But what he means to say is pretty much exactly what Xi Jinping has said. The Party needs to start talking the people’s talk, and it needs to put practical deeds ahead of pretense. Why? Because it needs to stay relevant and make a compelling case for its relevance.
So here is Liu Qibao at the People’s Daily in the People’s Daily, delivering the “spirit of the 18th National Congress” and saying in essence that things will now be as different as they have always been. And we must note that the report of his visit is itself unapologetically old-style, beginning with a breathless description of Liu Qibao’s rank and position:

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, January 17, [2013] — On January 17, Political Bureau of CCP Central Committee Member, Secretariat of the Central Committee Member and Minister of Propaganda Liu Qibao made an inspection visit of the People’s Daily, emphasizing that [all] must center on the principal line of studying the spirit of the 18th National Congress, adhering to correct guidance (坚持正确导向), innovating [news] reports, improving the style of writing, raising the reach (传播力), credibility (公信力) and influence (影响力) of the news media, and strengthening the focus and effectiveness of public opinion channeling (舆论引导).

Essentially, Liu Qibao’s speech is an elaboration of the propaganda policy outlined by Hu Jintao back in June 2008. The foundation is Jiang Zemin’s “correct guidance of public opinion,” or zhengque yulun daoxiang (正确舆论导向), which is Party code for media control.
But in addition to “guidance,” the Party must recognize that the game has changed. Restricting information is no longer enough. The Party must drive the agenda actively, what Hu Jintao in 2008 called “channeling public opinion,” or yulun yindao (舆论引导). State media have to be on top of news stories and issues that people are concerned about, “channeling” information and discussion in line with the Party’s strategic objectives.
To “channel” public opinion effectively, of course, state media have to be more accessible and relevant, just what Li Changchun was talking about in 2003.
Here is Liu Qibao again at the People’s Daily:

Liu Qibao said the [we] must establish a news concept with people at the center (人民为中心的新闻理念), writing for readers, reporting for readers, making reports cleave closely to the demands of the reader (贴近读者需求) . . .

Once again, “closeness” and putting the people at the core. Things Party media have struggled to do for years as commercial media have made advances and the internet has upended the media environment.
There are some interesting specifics in Liu Qibao’s remarks. He says, for example, that the People’s Daily must develop its editorial page in order to strengthen its influence. But the Party’s elusive desire to get “close” to the people while putting news controls first is what we have seen now for more than a decade in China.
Is anything really changing on the propaganda front? We’ll have to wait and see.
Are China’s Party media kidding themselves. Will they get fooled again?