Earlier this year, Wu Jiaxiang (吴稼祥), a noted political theorist and former CMP fellow, released his master work of Chinese political theory. The book, Gong Tian Xia (公天下), was reportedly an instant hit among Party officials in Beijing.
Gong Tian Xia explores 4,000 years of Chinese political history — a massive undertaking Wu says was a twenty-year labor of love — and derives (according to one summary) a “democratic macro-theory” based on polycentric governance (多中心治理) that Wu then applies to China’s present and future politics. (For a better introduction than that, readers will have to turn to the book itself, which we’ve only had time to glance at. You can also listen to Wu Jiaxiang talk about the book here.)

Wu Jiaxiang, it should also be noted, is perhaps the most prominent intellectual heavyweight to have maintained in recent months the faith that Xi Jinping is indeed a reformer, and that bolder (but calculated) moves are in the offing once China gets through the National People’s Congress now underway in Beijing.
Wu is interviewed for the most recent edition of Hong Kong’s Yazhou Zhoukan, and he remains solidly among the faithful. The following is a portion of his interview, which comes under the headline: “I think Xi Jinping can deliver” (我认为习近平能成事).

YZZK: How do you view the political climate inside the Chinese Communist Party between the 18th National Congress and the “two meetings” [of the NPC and CPPCC]?
Wu Jiaxiang: During his first month after taking the stage [as General Secretary of the CCP], he basically was a refurbished version of Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) and Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳). For example, he would keep his talk onstage to Deng Xiaoping, and he would talk about the road to [national] rejuvenation. His first trip out was to Shenzhen, and he invited along four people who had accompanied Deng Xiaoping [on his “southern tour” in 1992]. He laid flowers before the image of Deng Xiaoping. In all of his speeches three important political symbols were missing — Mao Zedong, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. He was perhaps too anxious to show himself [on the Shenzhen tour], and this resulted in some major problems.
YZZK: What do you mean by major problems?
Wu Jiaxiang: Immediately after the 18th National Congress, [Xi Jinping] did not have everyone — [Party] cadres at the middle, upper and foundational levels — in his corner. He was still under the shadow of the previous ten-year administration. In present-day China, we have at one [political] extreme what we can call the market faction (市场派) [or liberal pro-reformers]. At the other extreme we have the Cultural Revolution faction (文革派) [or “leftists”]. In the middle we have the [state] planning faction (计划派). [NOTE: Chen Yuan, who Wu mentions in a moment as a member of this faction, is generally regarded as part of the “princeling” faction, or powerful interest group comprising the sons and daughters of former top Party leaders. Here, what we have clumsily rendered the “state planning faction” should refer to those in favor of a strong role for state-run enterprises, many of which are controlled by vested interests like the “princelings.”]
Well, why was it that the planning faction linked hands with the Cultural Revolution faction, allowing the dying embers of the Cultural Revolution faction to be fanned again to life? It’s because the planning faction did not want to appear extreme [in their agendas]. By stirring up the Cultural Revolution faction [as an opposition on the extreme left] they could appear more moderate [relative to the market faction]. It’s the Cultural Revolution that you really despise, they could say — but me you can deal with. So for some time the planning faction faced no pressure at all. They were even praised. There was some criticism of Deng [from the left]. There was criticism of the Cultural Revolution [from the right]. But how much criticism was there of the planning faction? None at all, perhaps. When I talk about the planning faction, I’m talking about Chen Yun (陈云) and his son [Chen Yuan]. Given this environment, as Xi Jinping comes to power he wants to totally deny these two factions — that’s exactly what Hu Yaobang did back in the day. Openly, he must shift the larger political climate, otherwise everyone will feel disappointment. Within the Party, he must calm everyone’s nerves, suggesting he won’t push changes too rapidly, that everyone can just relax. I think this is a wise approach.

YZZK: Those internal speeches by Xi Jinping have created a lot of dissatisfaction. How do view this?
Wu Jiaxiang: My guess is that this is about [addressing] a sense among some prominent old politicians that says basically, look, this Xi Jinping cares only about Deng Xiaoping, he has no use for us — he denies Mao Zedong, he doesn’t mention Jiang Zemin, he talks even less about Hu Jintao. I believe Xi Jinping’s speech at the Central Party School already marked a major compromise, a huge back-step in comparison to how much Deng Xiaoping was willing to give. Deng Xiaoping essentially yielded nothing to the Cultural Revolution faction. Xi Jinping made this [compromise] because he recognised the fact that the Cultural Revolution faction had already made a comeback, that, moreover, this comeback was quite substantial, like a bunch of walking dead if you will. Faced with this situation, how could a General Secretary who has just come to power declare war against these monsters?
A wise politician won’t declare war before they’ve even managed to accomplish something. [Xi Jinping] has a major strategic consideration, and that is to first ensure that this year’s meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference proceeed smoothly. If he didn’t compromise, this would instantly drive a major wedge in the Party. The ripples would run across the internet and through the Party ranks. So Xi Jinping must seek the greatest common denominator. He must find broad consensus — and that comes on the issue of the past thirty years of reform, which no side rejects outright. Everyone may be unsatisfied, or not entirely satisfied, but we can say we all have a minimum level of satisfaction, that no one wants to reverse reforms, and no one is calling for the Five Don’ts (五不搞). [NOTE: The “Five Don’ts” represent a more conservative position within the Party in opposition to deeper political reform. They are opposition to 1) a multi-party system , 2) a diversity of guiding political ideologies , 3) separation of powers, 4) federalism and 5) privatization.] There is no criticism [vocally within the Party] of universal values (普世价值). And there is substantial progress, for example on the question of work style, on the question of lifestyle [among officials], on the need to make meetings shorter, on not simply following the [Party] script, on not being extravagant [for official events], and on the anti-corruption drive. No one is going to oppose these new policies, regardless of which faction they belong to. This is a political movement of the greatest common denominator, and it can garner the broadest possible support across the country — and of course the lowest level of opposition.
Besides this, there is [talk, of] the system of re-education through labor, and the household register system, and these are both institutional reforms that would ripple through the entire system. They are not at all insignificant. There may still be a strong autocratic flavor (人治色彩) [to many of these policies], but in a larger sense they give people confidence in reform, and make people feel that this crop [of leaders] is ready to act as well as think and talk. It might be that he talks about some things he won’t necessarily do. He may also do things he doesn’t necessarily talk about. There may also be things he’s thinking about that he can neither say nor do. This administration is like an iceberg, and right now we see maybe one-eighth. There are still seven-eighths we haven’t seen yet.
YZZK: So all in all, you have a favorable view of Xi Jinping’s leadership?
Wu Jiaxiang: I certainly believe that he can deliver. I would say he’s more steady than pro-reform leaders we have had in the past (以前的改革派领导人). His approach and character are not bad — his strategy is one of besting his opponents after they strike (后发制人). A politician’s strength comes not in what they say, but in having the courage to face the criticisms of others — that’s what makes a politician. It’s about having the determination to accomplish the ideas in your heart at all costs, not about ingratiating yourself with others.
Actually, there is another simple way of looking at this. After the Cultural Revolution, not one member of the princelings betrayed their own father. Whoever their fathers were, they were, and they were nothing else besides. Xi Jinping can sit where he is now chiefly because his father, Xi Zhongxun (习仲勳), was endorsed by powerful people within the Party. He would never betray his father [and his father’s ideas]. He will strive in all situations to be the leader for the greatest common denominator within the Party. Once the configuration of the Party ranks changes in his grip, he will be able to have a free hand.

Yesterday, CMP reported the story of a street-side peddler in Guangzhou’s Haizhu District handled roughly by urban management officers, or chengguan (城管), as they tried to make her clear off. Posts alleging that the officers were excessively rough with the woman as her toddler looked on in terror are still being shared widely on the internet and social media. The following cartoon, posted by artist “Johnny Won” (原子漫画) to Sina Weibo and shared widely by others, depicts chengguan as wolves (a rather common association) abusing the woman at the center of this week’s story. The artist drew the cartoon on top of one of the original photos from the scene.

Fairness has been one of the central themes at China’s ongoing National People’s Congress. There has been chatter about the country’s “inefficient growth model,” about the need for more equity in areas like income distribution, housing and education. Party leaders have pledged to “construct a fair social system and realize more efficient growth.”
Nearly all of these issues touch on the intractable question of how China will deal with its massive population of “rural” migrant workers, or nongmingong (农民工), who account for roughly half of China’s official figures on “urbanization” of its population (52%), but who really exist in an unstable no-man’s land between the city and the countryside, cut off from social services.
As often happens during the NPC, it’s the stories breaking on the margins that tell us the most about the real challenges facing China. And one of the top stories breaking in the newspapers and on social media today goes to the heart of the above-mentioned set of challenges about urbanization and China’s migrant population.
According to reports today by Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily, a conflict broke out in Guangzhou’s Haizhu District yesterday between a migrant woman selling guava on the street-side and urban management officers, or chengguan (城管) who were trying to get her to clear off.
For those who aren’t familiar with them, chengguan are non-police urban enforcers set up by local city governments across China to deal with issues of urban order and cleanliness, such as illegal building structures and unlicensed commercial activity. They are known for their violence, particularly against migrants, and are generally despised by the public.
Reports have widely circulated alleging that one of the officers — even his badge number, X080324, has been shared — grabbed the woman by the throat as her terrified toddler looked on. While authorities in Guangzhou have denied these reports, images like these are rapidly making their way across social media today.

The above post from the “Breaking News” Weibo — one among thousands — had drawn more than 36,000 reposts and more than 14,000 comments by early afternoon. The post linked to a Sina slideshow that had drawn more than 80,000 viewers.
The Guangzhou story has naturally brought fevered discussion about the issue of social fairness. It has also drawn remarks about the National People’s Congress. Invoking the recent case of a baby in the city of Changchun who was found dead after the SUV in which his parents had left him was stolen from a rest stop [See Chinese report here
], one user wrote on Weibo:

Who is more fortunate? Is it Little Hao Bo in Changchun, or is it this child in Guangzhou? Wake up, you sleeping delegates!

The post is accompanied by images of the Changchun child, “Little Hao Bo”, and the Guangzhou child, followed by a composite (originally from Reuters) of delegates sleeping during Premier Wen Jiabao’s government report to the NPC.

In another post, a user wrote: “This kind of violence, this kind of inhumanity, fills one with terror. People have the freedom to set up a stall and make a living for themselves, so long as they respect environmental hygiene!”
“For the system to tacitly approve this kind of inhumanity is the worst evil of all,” read one comment underneath the post.
“The Guangdong delegates to the ‘two meetings’ should respond to this and tell us what they think,” read another.
Another suggested solving the domestic issue of chengguan violence and a festering territorial dispute with Japan all in one stroke: “I encourage the NPC to draft a proposal for the sending of all urban management officers to the [disputed] Diaoyu Islands, where they can be responsible for environmental work!”

Understanding that all eyes are now turned to the annual “two meetings” (两会) of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), we turn to different story — the 10-year anniversary of the SARS epidemic.
It was in March 2003 that the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS, became international news. Hong Kong announced on March 11 that it was in the midst of a crisis. A few days later the World Health Organization confirmed cases in other countries. China, meanwhile, kept a lid on information about the outbreak within its own borders.
Bowing to international and domestic pressure, China finally changed course on SARS in late April. Beijing mayor Meng Xuenong was sacked on April 21, and the dismissal of China’s health minister, Zhang Wenkang, came soon after.
Through May and June 2003 there was a sense (and a hope) that China’s leadership was heading in a new direction, toward greater openness and transparency. There was even talk of a “media spring” in China as a new generation of commercial media hit hard on SARS and other stories, like the beating death of young migrant Sun Zhigang.
Those hoping for bigger and bolder political change in the wake of the SARS epidemic were setting themselves up for disappointment. Once the crisis had passed, Party leaders reasserted control. Media that had been bolder in their reporting of SARS and other stories were disciplined that summer.
But how did SARS change China? Has progress been made on issues like crisis preparedness?
In recent weeks a number of Chinese media have used the occasion of the SARS anniversary to take a broader look at China since SARS. The epidemic and its impact took the cover of the last edition of China Newsweekly magazine.

[ABOVE: The cover of the February 28 edition of China Newsweekly magazine: “Remembering and Reflecting Back on SARS Ten Years On.”]
Unfortunately, we can’t tackle translation of the entire report, but here is a taste, starting with the section about changes to China’s public health infrastructure:

Putting Public Health on the Fast Track
Once we “bid farewell” to SARS . . . it put China on the fast track to public health development. Zeng Guang (曾光) and other public health experts interviewed [for this story] all said that in the 10 years since SARS spending on public health in various areas has gone up by multiples of 10 or in some cases 100.
“SARS was a disaster,” says Hu Yonghua (胡永华), a professor in the School of Public Health at Peking University. “But it was also an opportunity, an opportunity for development of public health in China.”
Before SARS, the entire public health system, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, were in a state of transition — from fully subsidized state-run institutions to partially state-run institutions. This meant that they no longer served merely a public health role, but had to go out an make money for themselves as well.
Given this environment, says Hu Yonghua, public health organisations devoted most of their energy to survival through profit-making endeavours. “Before, the strongest [providers] were focused on operation [in various health services], but now the strongest were focused on income-generation. As funds were in short supply, many areas of operation fell by the wayside, existing only in name,” he said.
“SARS was like a mirror, reflecting all at once many public health problems that for a long time had been ignored,” said Hu Honghua.
Zeng Guang told China Newsweekly that after SARS the entire public health system entered a capacity building phase such as had never before been seen. The government spent 11.7 billion yuan to address deficiencies in hardware for the disease control and prevention system at the national and provincial levels. One classic example of hardware upgrades came in the building of negative pressure isolation wards.
Now these wards built especially to receive contagious patients suffering from respiratory issues are not only a common feature in [Chinese] hospitals, but a number of cities are now equipped with pressure isolation ambulances. These allow maximum prevention of infection when patients are being transferred [to healthcare facilities]. But 10 years ago when SARS struck hardly a single up-to-standard negative pressure isolation ward could be found in all of China!
In Zeng Guang’s view the most effective hardware upgrade was the building of an information and reporting system. Here is how he described the information and reporting system in the 1990s to China Newsweekly: “At that time, a national conference on epidemic disease was held just once a year. It was tallying of accounts (算账会) in which each representative from various provinces would bring their own tally. It was very backward.”
In fact, before the outbreak of SARS, China’s information and reporting system for public health was in effect non-existent. At that time [of SARS], the acting minister of health, Gao Qiang (高强), [who had taken over from sacked health minister Zhang Wenkang], had to check with each and every one of Beijing’s 175 [level-one] and [level-two] hospitals to arrive at numbers for [SARS] cases in the Beijing area, and this took a full week.
In the years following SARS, the Ministry of Health took the lead in building a public health monitoring and warning system (公共卫生监测预警系统), creating a comprehensive and strict information reporting system. Drawing particular attention was an epidemic network reporting system (疫情网络直报系统). Talking about this system, Zeng Guang calls uses two superlatives, calling it “definitely the world’s fastest, and definitely [the world’s] most advanced.”
. . .
The Bonus Benefits of SARS
When talking to China Newsweekly about the impact of SARS on public health in China, public health experts across the board also talked about the creation of emergency response plans (应急预案).
Among the many reasons behind the early failure to deal with SARS, says Zeng Guang, the first was that no plan existed for responding to a sudden-breaking public health incident.
Before SARS, China had no emergency response plan, no threat-level standard for sudden-breaking public health incidents, and no chain of command [for response] in the event of a public health crisis. It also had no system of responsibilities in place [outlining the responsibilities of various officials in the event of a crisis]. Moreover, there were no stipulations whatsoever about how information should be released, how to deal with news media, how various government offices should coordinate, how society should be mobilised or what major control measures should be taken in the event of a public health crisis.
So in the early stages of SARS, the response was chaos. Only on April 21 [when the health minister was sacked], did the Ministry of Health create a system for daily release of information about the epidemic. It was only two days later, on April 23, that the State Council created its SARS Prevention Command Center (防治SARS指挥部) to coordinate SARS prevention and response nationwide. It was only after this that the work of battling SARS got on the right track.
Visiting the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on April 1, 2003, vice-minister Wu Yi (吴仪) said that one of the major goals of her visit was to promote the building of a comprehensive system for [dealing with] sudden-breaking health crises in China. This was the first time a Chinese leader publicly addressed the issue of an emergency response system.
On May 9, 2003, the State Council released its “Ordinance on Response to Sudden-Breaking Public Health Incidents” (公共卫生突发事件应急条例). This regulations, which was seen as a “turning point in public health,” had taken only two weeks from drafting to final approval. . .
The year after the Ordinance took effect, the Ministry of Health created its Health Emergency Response Office (卫生应急办公室), responsible for monitoring and warning on sudden-breaking public health incidents, as well as response preparedness and other work. By [the end of] 2005, 24 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities had created health emergency response offices.

China’s annual legislative session, the National People’s Congress, will open in Beijing tomorrow, March 5. Topping the agenda at the meetings will be the formal installation of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang as president and premier respectively. But some expect a number of reform initiatives to come to vote at the NPC session as well. How strong initiatives at the NPC are, of course, will depend on the Party leadership, as the legislative body has no real lawmaking power and serves largely as a rubber-stamp for Party initiatives. The above cartoon, posted by artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to Sina Weibo, shows the fat pig of the National People’s Congress, bloated with wealth and privilege, tied up with red restraints (symbolizing Party power). A tag on the pig’s ear says “5”, a reference to the May 5 opening of the NPC.

The doyen of Chinese investigative reporting, Wang Keqin, is once again on the move. Editors pressured Wang into resigning earlier this week after his newspaper, the Economic Observer, came under pressure from authorities for a series of hard-hitting reports. [READ Wang’s review of investigative reporting in China].
A former CMP fellow, Wang is China’s best-known investigative reporter. Over the past decade he has tackled scores of sensitive stories, from systematic corruption in China’s taxi industry to the spread of HIV-AIDS through careless and unnecessary blood transfusions. He was forced out of his previous newspaper, the China Economic Times, in 2011 after a spate of hard-hitting reports, including a 2010 expose about the mishandling of tainted vaccines in Shanxi province.

Pressure over Wang Keqin’s reports has reportedly been mounting at the Economic Observer in recent months. Officials were particularly upset about a report the paper ran last summer exploring disastrous effects of record floods that hit Beijing in July.
According to the Weiboscope, a tool created by researchers at the University of Hong Kong’s Journalism & Media Studies Centre that measures trending topics on the Sina Weibo platform, Wang Keqin’s exit from the Economic Observer is among the top topics being discussed in the past 24 hours.

In a post made to Sina Weibo yesterday, Wang Keqin shared details with his more than 400,000 followers about the clearing out of his desk at the Economic Observer the day before:

Yesterday I cleared out of the @EconomicObserver. These are the petitioning materials I received over a period of ten years at the China Economic Times, two tons of them. For other people these might just be waste paper; for me, they represent the trust and hope the people place in me. The things stacked here are misery, blood and tears, but I’ve always seen them as treasures. They go with me wherever I go. I can throw away my furniture, but these cannot be discarded!
昨日我搬离@经济观察报 ，这是过去十多年我在@中国经济时报 时，全国各地上访者给我的上访村料，足有两吨重。对别人而言，可能视为废纸；对我而言，却是民众对我的信任与期盼，虽然堆着的全是苦难与血泪，但我一直视其为宝贝，走到哪里带到哪里。家俱可以扔，信任不能丢！

The following post by RC-ZSD-MZ Li Xin Tu Zhi (RC-ZSD-MZ历心图志), a user with more than 7,000 followers, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 8:37am today, February 27, 2013. The deleted material is in fact a re-post of images that still remain public on this user’s account showing protests in various places in China calling on officials to make their assets public. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The original post reads:

Citizens are taking action: demanding that officials reveal their assets!
公民在行动：要求官员公开财产！

The image strip included in the post is below:

It is not clear why the original post would be allowed to remain on the Sina Weibo platform while the re-post is deleted. The answer could lie in the extended follower network of the re-poster.

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

In an open letter circulating on Chinese social media today, a group of more than 100 prominent individuals — including academics, journalists, lawyers, economists and former Party officials — call on China’s government to immediately ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or ICCPR. The treaty, one of three main components of the UN’s International Bill of Rights, commits ratifying parties to a series of core individual civil and political rights, including freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and due process.
Addressed directly to the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC), the open letter poses a strong challenge to China’s incoming leadership ahead of the annual “two meetings” of the NPC and CPPCC, which are scheduled to convene on March 5 and March 3 respectively.
The language of the open letter is reasoned and constructive, outlining China’s past achievements on human rights, including the Chinese Communist Party’s early pledge to “fight for human rights and freedom.”
We understand from inside sources that this letter was originally intended for a Thursday release through a prominent Chinese newspaper. Authorities, however, learned of the letter by late Monday and the authors had no choice but to release it to the public today.
Current signers of the letter include prominent legal scholar He Weifang (贺卫方), economist Mao Yushi (茅于轼), activist and scholar Ran Yunfei (冉云飞), well-known lawyers Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强) and Xu Zhiyong (许志永), investigative reporter Wang Keqin (王克勤), author Wang Lixiong (王力雄) and many, many others. This is a laundry list of some of China’s most prominent and influential pro-reform figures.

Our translation of the document is still in progress, but we are including the draft here so that readers can grasp its significance. We apologise for any translation errors and direct readers to the full-text Chinese version at the end of the translation.

A Citizen Proposition: Calling for Immediate Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the NPC
To the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress:
On the eve of the opening of the 12th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, as China’s new government prepares to take the stage, we solemnly and openly propose the following as citizens of China: that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights be ratified, in order to further promote and establish the principles of human rights and constitutionalism in China. Our concrete reasons are as follows:
1. The International Bill of Human Rights, as the basic declaration, establishment and standardization of basic human rights principles, accords with the tenets of national establishment and constitutionalism that the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party have always emphasized.
Together, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which together form the main structure of the International Bill of Human Rights, have become the core principles of human rights protection for the international community. Among these, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is regarded as “the most authoritative expression of the most basic human rights standards generally accepted today.” The various basic human rights formulated in this treaty, as the first generation of human rights, are of fundamental importance. Since the end of the 18th century, these rights, as precious institutional fruits of humanity’s modern constitutional revolution, have become basic and indispensable provisions for the constitutions made by the vast majority of nations and peoples – they represent humanity’s universal appeal for rights, freedom and dignity.
The values and solicitude promoted by the International Bill of Human Rights have also been declared continuously by the government of China and by the Chinese Communist Party, and are the goals and tenets upon which the nation was founded and constitutionalism established. Before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party issued an appeal to “fight for human rights and freedom,” and this was entered into documents of a constitutional nature, including Draft Constitution for the Constitution of the Soviet Republic of China (中华苏维埃共和国宪法大纲) and Administrative Program for the Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia Region (陕甘宁边区施政纲领), and for this purpose a whole series of ordinances were promulgated in Communist Party-controlled areas in order to guarantee [these principles]. In the constitutional movement that seized the entire country in the 1940s, the Chinese Communist Party also was a principal promoter [of these values], and human rights protection was one of the essential issues. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the 1954 Constitution included a special clause stipulating the “basic rights and responsibilities of citizens,” and this established the basic tone of our country’s constitution, with a foundational role for human rights. While [China] afterwards suffered many turns and setbacks, and paid a steep price on the issues of constitutionalism and human rights protection, the great goal of [establishing] human rights has already become a core agenda inseparable from the project of [national] transition in which we are presently engaged. This can be seen most recently in the second human rights plan formulated by our country, the National Human Rights Action Plan (2012-2015).
2. Immediate ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights will honor the solemn pledge of the Chinese government, satisfy the fondest hopes of the Chinese people, and demonstrate China’s commitment to be a responsible world power.
When the United Nations passed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966, it called on all nations to see both treaties as part of a whole, signing and ratifying both together. As of November 1, 2010, 167 of the 193 United Nations member countries had formally joined the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 2001, China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which has been referred to as the “second generation of human rights.” But today, 15 years after our country signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998, it has still not ratified this treaty, which is regarded as the “first generation of human rights.” China’s government has placed its emphasis on the gradual improvement of China’s existing legal system in advance of ratification, so that it can accommodate the demands and various responsibilities of the treaty. However, the gap between the signing of human rights treaties and their ratification must still be kept within the realm of reason, in order to promote further progress on civil rights and political rights, and in order to avoid unnecessary conjecture from the international community.
As a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, China has always been an active initiator and participant in the International Bill of Human Rights. China’s government played an important role in the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). International human rights standards are therefore not imported products but in fact include the achievements of Chinese culture and the Chinese people. The signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 15 years ago demonstrated even more our country’s serious commitment to the protection of basic human rights as a responsible world power. Afterwards, both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao said openly on numerous occasions both at home and overseas that China would immediately take the legal steps to ratify the treaty once the conditions were right. In the beginning of 2008, more than 10,000 Chinese citizens signed a call for the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And so there is no longer any need to vacillate. In order to adapt to trends in human rights development, live up to our government’s pledges and answer the demands of the people, in order to behave in a manner consistent with a major power, we must join the treaty without hesitation, with a positive and decisive attitude.
3. Since China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the country’s reform and opening process has deepened, its building of rule of law has advanced, a general rights awareness has awakened, and a civil society is developing – the time is right for China to ratify the treaty.
In 2011, China released its White Paper on the Socialism With Chinese Characteristics Legal System (中国特色社会主义法律体系), declaring that a complete, scientific [or “rational”], harmonious and unified legal system of socialism with Chinese characteristics had already been achieved [in China] under the command of the Constitution. Especially deserving of mention is the fact that in 2004 the language “our nation respects and guarantees human rights” was added to the Constitution, so that the protection of human rights was elevated to a constitutional principle. In 2013, the newly amended Criminal Law (刑事诉讼法) took effect, introducing many stipulations in line with the spirit of modern human rights and rule of law – for example, the exclusion of illegal evidence, the improvement of procedures for reviewing capital punishment cases, the right against self-incrimination, the expansion of lawyers’ rights, stricter procedures for the arrest of suspects, etcetera. At the National Politics and Law Work Teleconference held at the beginning of this year, it was clearly emphasized that a people-based [approach], justice and fairness were to be taken as the heart and soul of rule of law development. Moreover, there was specific mention of the further advancement of reforms to the re-education through labor system, legal and petitioning work (涉法涉诉信访工作), the operating mechanisms of judicial power (司法权力运行机制) and the household registration system (户籍制度). It can be said that the building of rule of law in our country over the past 30 years has moved steadily in the direction of human rights, and the results we have achieved are entirely the natural and logical result of overall social progress. The expansion of civil rights and the elevation of the political status [of citizens] has also, objectively speaking, created favorable conditions for the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
It cannot be denied that there remains a substantial gap between the requirements of international human rights treaties and the situation in China with respect to human rights and rule of law. But when we speak of the right moment, this has never meant that everything is as ready as it could possibly be, or that perfection has been achieved; it means that we have made full preparations for the protection and advancement of human rights, that we have provided a stable foundation making it possible to join up [with the requirements as stipulated in international treaties].
Human rights work is dynamic and diverse, and the proper space and mechanisms for constructive interaction must be created between the domestic and the international spheres, between government and society, between the present and future, between the particular and the general. In this respect, now is the best time for our country to ratify the treaty. As for remaining difficulties or inadequacies in China’s present legal system that may require time to address, we can do as other countries have routinely done in ratifying the treaty; we can make appropriate compromises (保留), issue statements, notices or opposition/demurs (?). But we must be sincere, serious and deliberate, showing the utmost respect for the sacred and long-lasting nature of human rights work.
4. Ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would be a constructive step toward renewing. . . safeguarding the life and authority of the Constitution.
In his speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of the promulgation of the current Constitution, Mr. Xi Jinping said: “The life of the Constitution is in its actualization; the authority of the Constitution is in its actualization.” These words profoundly express the basic governing idea of a “constitutional China” (宪行中国). A number of the more favourable clauses in our current Constitution are intrinsically consistent with the basic principles and spirit of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The critical factor in ensuring that these favourable clauses truly become authoritative signs for the fashioning of the national spirit, for the consolidation of political consensus and the realisation of a revival of civilisation, is the taking seriously of civil rights and the implementation of the Constitution — and to this end we must actively seek [to create] pluralistic mechanisms for the implementation of the Constitution.
From the constitutional experiences of various nations we can see that these implementation mechanisms largely comprise systems of constitutional interpretation (释宪机制), mechanisms for constitutional review (违宪审查机制), mechanisms for the judicial [application] of the constitution (宪法司法化机制), constitutional supervisory mechanisms (宪法监督机制) and mechanisms for the direct application of constitutional clauses (宪法条款直接适用机制). In our country at present, all of these mechanisms exist only on paper — they must be given real force through more concrete and workable constitutional practices.
Ratifying the the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would in fact be a feasible step toward the innovation of multiple constitutional implementation mechanisms. First of all, this treaty itself emphasises the use of measures to check the government and limit public power in order to reach the goal of respecting and protecting human rights, and these can indirectly help to lay the foundation for popular sovereignty and models of checking and balancing power, thereby improving the governing ideas and governing capacity of the government. Next, through the process of implementation of the International Bill of Rights, a rich and normalised body of experience has been accumulated in terms of rule of law for human rights protection. This includes reporting procedures for treaty parties, procedures for petition by nations or individuals, stipulations concerning monitoring and encouragement of the legislative and judicial authorities in various [party] nations to apply remedial measures for human rights [protection], etcetera. These assist treaty party nations in fulfilling their human rights pledges, and enable deep and far-reaching reforms and improvements to constitutional structures. Third, as the United Nations Human Rights Council monitors the implementation of the human rights treaties, it respects the autonomy and the constitutions of various nations. This takes shape primarily through the promotion of consensus and on the basis of constructive dialogue and cooperation. Imperceptibly, this provides a model of requisite autonomy, rationality, respect, tolerance and other prerequisites in the process of constitutional implementation in various countries.
5. Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at the earliest possible date could prompt our country to deal more candidly, openly and unequivocally with the supreme principles of human rights and constitutionalism, realising the great mission of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
The standards and experience of the International Bill of Rights on human rights continue to show that these basic human rights are universal (普遍性), equal (平等性), inalienable (不可分割性) and interdependent (相互依赖性). For a China which at present is working to realise the great mission of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation this is of particular significance. Among our myriad priorities, human rights is paramount. The goal is human rights, and political power must serve human rights, for human rights are the origin of legitimacy (保障人权始有合法性). The principles of human rights and constitutionalism should therefore become an overarching consensus in Chinese society. In fact, human rights and constitutionalism are inherently connected, just as explicated by Mr. Xi Jinping: “Only by ensuring that all citizens are equal before the law, by respecting and protecting human rights, by ensuring that the people enjoy broad rights and freedom according to the law, only then can the Constitution enter deep in the people’s hearts, only then can it move among the masses, and only then can the implementation of the Constitution truly become a conscious action on the part of all the people.” We worry that — as we [as a society] lack a proper sense of human rights, and as we lack basic protections for personal freedom, rights and dignity — our entire society risks sliding into [a chaos of] hatred and violence, moving toward separatism and hostile division, in the event that we face a comprehensive crisis. We worry that — as we lack proper knowledge of constitutionalism, as we lack the most basic understanding and faith in the sanctity and authority of constitutionalism — our country might give way to an instrumentalism (工具主义) [that sees politics only as a means to an end], that our leaders will find it difficult to establish a set of values that accord with modern civilisation, and that they will then forfeit all governing legitimacy and all necessary dignity.
In summary, for citizens and the government, for our nation and peoples, the establishment of a nation of human rights, of a China in which constitutionalism is in force, this is the only true and fundamental measure of the gloriousness of our achievements and of our dreams [CHECK]. We must foster a civil society rooted in fairness, peace, rationality and openness, and we must build a decent politics founded on love and justice. The establishment of human rights in our country and the achievement of constitutionalism are principles representing our most sincere and well-intentioned hopes, and they express our profound concern for personal fortunes, community welfare, national honor and [the fruits of] human civilization. We remain confident that if people can become the foundation [of our country] in practice, and if the constitution can guarantee their dignity (以宪为尊), we can promote harmony in our society today, and we can achieve national strength and prosperity for China’s future at the lowest possible cost. We also believe that if we work with human rights and constitutionalism in China as our direction, focus and point of entry, and if we proceed with determination and belief, remaining tenacious and meticulous [in our work], there are no difficulties concerning the development of our nation and peoples that cannot be resolved. In this way, each individual person would benefit, our nation as a whole would benefit, and all the peoples of our country would benefit.
For these reasons, we call on the State Council to submit a proposal to the 12th National People’s Congress concerning the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in accordance with Article 89 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. We hope that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress will, in accordance with Article 67 of the Constitution, immediately ratify this treaty. If, owing to time considerations, this task cannot be completed this year, we ask that you please be open and considerate [in this matter], offering the people of our country an explanation and at the same time providing an explicit timetable so that they understand and trust in their government’s good faith.
The signers of this letter follow:
SIGNED:
[SEE IMAGE FILE BELOW FOR FULL LIST OF VERIFIED SIGNATURES AND CHINESE VERSION OF THE LETTER]

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公民建言：呼吁全国人大尽快批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》
全国人民代表大会常务委员会：
在中华人民共和国第十二届全国人民代表大会即将召开、新一届中国政府即将成立之际，我们谨以中国公民身份，郑重公开倡议：尽快批准加入《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，以进一步推动和落实人权立国、宪行中国的原则。具体理由如次：
一、国际人权宪章对于人类基本人权的申明、确立和规范，符合中国政府和中国共产党一贯强调的立国与立宪的宗旨。
《世界人权宣言》、《经济、社会及文化权利国际公约》和《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》共同构成“国际人权宪章”的主要框架，成为国际社会人权保护的核心准则。其中《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》又被公认为是“当代得到普遍接受的最低人权标准的最权威表达”。该公约所确认的各项基本人权，作为第一代人权，具有更为根本的重要地位。从18世纪末以来，这些权利作为人类近现代宪政革命的可贵制度成果，已经成为大多数民族国家的宪法中不可或缺的基础性规定，它们代表了人类对于权利、自由和尊严的普遍诉求。
国际人权宪章所弘扬的价值和关怀，也是中国政府和中国共产党反复宣称的立国目标和立宪宗旨。建政之前，中国共产党提出“为人权自由而战”的号召，并落实到《中华苏维埃共和国宪法大纲》、《陕甘宁边区施政纲领》等宪法性文件当中，为此在边区专门颁布了一系列人权保障条例。上个世纪四十年代席卷全国的宪政运动，中国共产党也是主要推动者，人权保障则是题中要义。建政之后，1954年宪法即专章规定“公民的基本权利和义务”，奠定了我国宪法以人权为本的基调。尽管此后颇多曲折，我们在贯彻宪法、保障人权的问题上付出了巨大代价，但人权这一崇高目标已经成为今天转型事业不可分割的核心议程，其最新体现就是我国制定的第二个以人权为主题的规划《国家人权行动计划（2012-2015年）》。
二、尽快批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，以兑现中国政府的庄重承诺，满足中国人民的美好心愿，并展现中国作为一个负责任的世界大国的风范。
联合国在1966年通过《经济、社会及文化权利国际公约》和《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》时，就呼吁所有国家最好将两公约看成一个整体，同时予以签署和批准。截止2010年11月1日，在联合国193个会员国中，已有167个国家正式加入了《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》。2001年，我国批准了被称为“第二代人权”的《经济、社会及文化权利国际公约》；但自1998年中国政府签署《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》至今近十五年，我国仍然没有批准被视为“第一代人权”之《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》。尽管中国政府重视在批准前稳妥改进现有法律制度，使之尽量符合该公约要求的各项义务，但是，我们还是应把人权条约的签署与批准之间的间隔，保持在合理的范围之内，既推动公民权利和政治权利的进一步落实，亦避免国际社会不必要的猜度。
作为联合国安理会常任理事国，中国从来都是国际人权宪章的积极发起者和参与者。对《世界人权宣言》的制定，中国政府发挥了重要作用。世界人权标准因此决非舶来品，而有着中国文化和中国人民的贡献。十五年前签署《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，更表明我国作为负责任的世界大国，对于保障基本人权做出了庄严承诺。此后，中国国家主席胡锦涛、国务院总理温家宝，在不同场合多次向国内外公开郑重表示，一旦条件成熟，中国就将尽快履行批准公约的法律程序。2008年初，也曾有一万多位公民签名呼吁加入《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》。所以，我们再无必要犹疑徘徊，而须因应人权发展潮流，履行政府的承诺，回应人民的诉求，体现大国的风范，顺理成章地以积极果断的姿态加入公约。
三、签署《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》以来，中国的开放在深化，法治建设在进步，权利意识在觉醒，公民社会在发育，中国批准公约的时机已经成熟。
2011年，我国发布《中国特色社会主义法律体系》白皮书，宣布以宪法为统帅的完备、科学、和谐、统一的中国特色社会主义法律体系已经形成。尤其值得一提的是，2004年，“国家尊重和保障人权”入宪，人权保护上升为宪法原则。2013年，新修正的《刑事诉讼法》施行，引入许多符合现代人权法治精神的规定，比如非法证据排除规则、死刑复核程序的完善、不得强迫自证其罪、律师权利的扩大、严格逮捕和审批程序等。今年年初召开的全国政法工作电视电话会议则明确强调，要把以人为本、公平正义作为法治建设的灵魂，并具体提出将进一步推进劳动教养、涉法涉诉信访工作、司法权力运行机制、户籍制度的改革。可以说，30年来我国法治建设朝着人权方向不断迈进而取得的成就，完全是社会整体进步的自然逻辑结果。公民权利的扩大和政治地位的提高，客观上也为中国批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》创造了良好条件。
不可否认，我国的人权法治状况与国际人权公约的要求之间，还存在相当差距或不相吻合之处。然而，所谓的时机成熟，从来不是指要万事俱备，完美无缺，而是指为人权的保障和改进做了充分的准备，提供了坚实的基础，实现了对接的可能。人权事业是动态的、丰富的，必须在国内与国际、政府与社会、现在与未来、特殊与普遍之间形成良性互动的空间与机制。在这个意义上，如今恰是我国批准公约的最好时机。对于我国法律体系中现实存在并且有待时间加以调整的某些难处或不足，我们可以根据各国加入公约时的惯常做法，就具体条款作出合理限度内的保留、声明、通知或反对，但必须真诚、严肃而缜密，高度尊重人权事业的神圣性和经久性。
四、批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，有助于创新宪法的多元实施机制，确保宪法中人权条款的落实，捍卫宪法的生命和权威。
习近平先生在纪念现行宪法公布施行30周年大会上的讲话中指出：“宪法的生命在于实施，宪法的权威也在于实施。”这句话深刻表达了“宪行中国”的基本治国理念。我国现行宪法中的一些良法条款关于各项人权的规定，与《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》的基本原则和精神，具有内在的一致性。如何使宪法的这些良法条款真正成为塑造民族精神、凝聚政治共识、实现文明复兴的权威标志，关键就在于认真对待权利，贯彻落实宪法，为此我们必须积极探索多元的宪法实施机制。从各国宪政经验来看，这些宪法实施机制大体包括释宪机制、违宪审查机制、宪法司法化机制、宪法监督机制、宪法条款直接适用机制等。目前在我国，这些实施机制大都还停留在纸面规定上，需要通过更具体并且更具操作性的宪政实践来激活。
加入《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，其实就是创新多元宪法实施机制的一个切实可行的步骤。首先，该公约本身强调以约束政府和公权运作的方式，来达到尊重和保护人权的目的，因而可以间接理顺宪法的人民主权基础和权力制衡模式，提升政府的执政观念及执政能力；其次，国际人权公约在实施过程中，积累了非常丰富和规范的人权保护法治经验，其中的缔约国报告程序、国家及个人的来文程序、督促各国立法和司法行政当局采取人权补救措施的规定等，有助于缔约国履行人权承诺，实现广泛深远的宪政结构的改革和完善；第三，国际人权理事会在监督实施人权公约时，很好地做到了充分尊重各国的宪政和主权，其实践主要是建立在促成协商一致和开展建设性对话与合作的基础之上的，这在无形中为各国宪法的实施提供了必不可少的自主、理性、尊重、包容等前提条件的示范。
五、尽早批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》，可以使我国更加坦率公开地明确人权立国、宪行中国的至上原则，实现中华民族复兴的伟大使命。
国际人权宪章有关人权的规范和实践日益表明，人类的这些基本人权具有普遍性、平等性、不可分割性和相互依赖性。这一点对于正在努力实现中华民族伟大复兴的当下中国而言，具有格外重大的意义。悠悠万事，人权最大。人权是目的，政权必须服务人权、保障人权始有合法性。人权立国、宪行天下的原则因此理当成为中国社会最大的共识。事实上，人权立国与宪行中国之间，存在着深刻而内在的关联，正如习近平先生所阐发的那样，“只有保证公民在法律面前一律平等，尊重和保障人权，保证人民依法享有广泛的权利和自由，宪法才能深入人心，走入人民群众，宪法实施才能真正成为全体人民的自觉行动。”我们担忧，由于缺乏人权素养，对人的自由、权利和尊严没有基本的敬畏和保障，在一旦遭遇全面危机时，会使整个社会陷入仇恨与暴戾，走向分裂和敌对的丛林状态；我们担忧，由于缺乏宪政素养，对宪法的权威和神圣性没有起码的体认和信奉，会导致国家工具主义盛行，执政者难以树立一整套符合现代文明的价值观，进而丧失执政合法性以及必要的尊严。
总之，对于公民、政府、国家和民族而言，唯有人权立国、宪行中国，才是成就光荣与梦想的根本尺度和不二法门。我们需要培育一个以中正、和平、理性和开放为根基的公民社会，也需要建立一个以爱和正义为基础的美好政治。人权立国、宪行中国的原则代表了我们最为诚挚善意的心愿，也表达了我们对于个人命运、共同体福祉、国家荣耀、人类文明的深切关怀。我们相信，只要能够做到以人为本，以宪为尊，我们就既能促进当下社会的和谐，也能以最小代价实现未来中国的繁荣强盛。我们也相信，只要以人权立国、宪行中国为努力的方向、重心和切入点，并坚定信心与信念，保持坚韧和细致，一切事关国家民族发展大计的难题都不难获解。如此，则个人幸甚，国家幸甚，民族幸甚。
基于此，我们恳切呼吁国务院依据《中华人民共和国宪法》第八十九条的规定，向第十二届全国人民代表大会提出有关缔结《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》的议案；希望全国人民代表大会常务委员会根据《中华人民共和国宪法》第六十七条的规定，立即批准该公约。如果确因时间仓促，今年不能完成这一工作，也请开诚布公，给全体国民一个解释，同时宣布一个确定的时间表，以求国民谅解，以昭政府大信。
为此，发起此次公民联署。
签名：

The trial last week of a man accused of murdering a doctor during the Cultural Revolution has generated some interesting discussion of this sensitive episode in China’s history, both on social media and in traditional media.
Approved by the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in June 1981, the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the Republic offered a review and assessment of the first 32 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The resolution rejected the Cultural Revolution, saying it had been “initiated in error by [Party] leaders and manipulated by counterrevolutionary cliques, bringing grave disaster and internal chaos to the Party, the nation and our people.”
But the resolution’s formal rejection of this painful decade was not an invitation for Chinese to reflect back on its evils and their political, cultural or institutional causes. The Cultural Revolution has remained a highly sensitive issue ever since, and coverage by the news media is carefully controlled, particularly around the May anniversary of its inception.
On February 20, the official China News Service reported that an elderly man in Zhejiang province, identified only by his surname, Qiu, was facing trial for his alleged murder in 1967 of a doctor accused at the time of being a spy.
The news of Qiu’s trial generated a great deal of discussion on Chinese social media. While some Chinese welcomed the action, many felt is was too little too late, the petty scapegoating of a helpless old man while senior Party officials with unclean hands were shielded from responsibility.

[ABOVE: Two among many posts this week dealing with the Cultural Revolution and the recent trial of Mr. Qiu in Zhejiang province. On top the text leads readers to an important piece by former CMP fellow Zhang Ming (SEE BELOW), and the Sina Weibo service adds links to news about the Zhejiang case.]
One of the most important recent pieces in the traditional media came the very same day the China News Service reported news of the Zhejiang trial. On February 20, China Youth Daily published a piece on page two by Zhang Ming (张鸣), a former CMP fellow and a professor of political science at Renmin University of China. Zhang’s piece argued China must reflect back openly on the Cultural Revolution if Chinese hope to regain a sense of humanity and dignity.

[ABOVE: A re-posted version of Zhang Ming’s Cultural Revolution article for China Youth Daily at Phoenix Online drew more than 300,000 visits by February 25. The article is accompanied by an image of the victim of a Cultural Revolution struggle session. We’ll let readers parse the significance of the Buick advertisement to the right of the coverage.]
The language of Zhang’s piece — printed in China Youth Daily‘s “speaking freely” column — is strong and direct, not shrinking from brutal characterization of the acts committed during the Cultural Revolution.
Cannibalism is Zhang’s overarching metaphor, built atop very real (and apparently quite common) acts of human flesh-eating that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. At one point, Zhang writes that if China cannot reflect back, then “we are still a den of cannibals.”
Below is a partial translation of Zhang Ming’s February 20 piece.

“Without Reflection Humanity Cannot Be Recovered” (没有反思就没有人性的复苏)
China Youth Daily
February 20, 2013
By Zhang Ming (张鸣)
There are many people [in our country] who yearn for a repeat of the Cultural Revolution, for another violent convulsion. This should send shivers through us all. If we refuse to review and reexamine the Cultural Revolution, we might still be a society of cannibals. And if we are such a society, it doesn’t matter how bright we might seem on the outside, or how fully we enjoy the fruits of civilisation — we are still a den of cannibals.
It has been more than 30 years since the end of the Cultural Revolution, but this [historical episode] has never quite gone from us. In both the real and virtual worlds, those, old and young, who praise and support the Cultural Revolution can be found everywhere. On a taxi ride recently I was talking with the elderly driver and he said with profound hatred that if we just had another round of the Cultural Revolution officials wouldn’t be let off the hook so easily — we would peel them alive, he said.
In official [Party] documents the Cultural Revolution has been thoroughly rejected. But remembering, recording and reflecting back on the Cultural Revolution remains taboo. Meanwhile, praise and affirmation for the Cultural Revolution decade [is allowed to] quietly thrive. It’s as though we’ve been able to completely dissociate the Cultural Revolution [as officially condemned] from the events of that decade. In all of human history encompassed by the twentieth century, spanning all nations, was there any event like our Cultural Revolution? The only possible comparison is the Nazi period in Germany. But to this day, we have had no historical commemoration, no reflection of the kind [Germany has had].
Looking back on that period today, the most ghastly thing was the way the Cultural Revolution trampled on human beings and their dignity. Humiliation, physical abuse, murder, death through negligence and maltreatment — these became like a daily meal regimen. Things worked this way during the height of chaos, and in more or less the same way once normalcy returned.
The popular tyranny of the Cultural Revolution extended through to the public security system once it was restored. No matter who a person was, once they entered the “police station” (局子), a beating was to be expected, and being beaten to death was always possible.
During the Cultural Revolution, we had the Guangxi Massacre (广西大屠杀), the Dao County Massacre (道县大屠杀) and the Daxing Massacre (大兴大屠杀). You might say those were special cases. But during struggles in many areas is was quite common for one or the other side to use rifles, or even cannons and machine guns, for indiscriminate slaughter.
Were any places spared the constant struggle, the popular tyranny, the death and persecution that went on without rest over those ten years? No one, not a person, was given the slightest bit of dignity. So it was for those in the “five black categories” (landlords, wealthy peasants, counter-revolutionaries, evildoers and rightists, and their sons and daughters). So it was for the capitalist roaders. . . With my own eyes I saw people struck down and beaten within an inch of their lives who had the day before murdered others with their own hands. Forced prostration, “jet propulsion” struggle sessions [in which victims were suspended with their arms out and behind like wings], “yin-yang head” [humiliations in which half the head was shaved clean] . . . Humiliations and abuses like these never ceased during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution.
Some people find it strange that an adolescent girl could wield a leather belt and beat her own teacher to death. Or that red guards could take the elderly, women and children and flog them to death, scald them to death with boiling water, drown them in toilets, and even cut them to ribbons while they were alive. In some places, like Guangxi province, after people were beaten to death, their hearts were eaten. In that area, eating people in this way was actually very common!
There is only one explanation — those people who were persecuted and murdered were all class enemies. The Cultural Revolution was a war of one class against another, and class enemies were not seen as human beings. That meant it was reasonable and normal to kill any number of people in any way possible. The problem is that there was no war at the time, and the time who were seen at the time as enemies were simply living their lives with their families when they were dragged out, not offering up the least resistance. Regardless of anything else, these were human beings. No matter what class rationalisations you us, the act of torturing and beating to death people who offered no resistance was one that decimated the humanity of the perpetrator. No matter what the revolutionary doctrines and justifications are, a class struggle of this kind is only ultimately violence of the strong against the weak.
. . . In China today, the abuse of domestic cats is enough to infuriate many people. How is it possible people can hope for a replay of the Cultural Revolution? But this desire is very real. A person can shed tears of sympathy over a cat that has been crushed to death, but this does not deter them from wishing for another Cultural Revolution, in which they imagine skinning those in power.
Of course, many of those who wish for another Cultural Revolution don’t really understand the true horrors of that decade. They don’t know the real Cultural Revolution. They think the Cultural Revolution was just as leftists now describe it, a period of great democracy in which there was struggle against pro-capitalists.
One fact cannot be denied — many Chinese, including those experienced the Cultural Revolution, have not regained their humanity.
One researcher who studied the Guangxi Massacre thought it was very strange that of all those he interviewed who had cannibalised others at that time none whatsoever said they regretted their actions. They all said that back then it was a life-and-death class struggle, that those they killed might have killed them. In fact, the vast majority of those they murdered were of the so-called “five black categories.” Even as they were killed, raped, gang-raped, they did not put up a struggle. They were abused until death ended their suffering, and then their hearts were eaten. If their spirits were here today, they would no doubt be surprised to find their persecutors acting with the same stubborn sense of having been right.
It goes without saying that these people have not yet recovered their sense of humanity. Perhaps it could be said that these self-righteous murderers are better than many of their fellows in the sense that they at least have owned up to their deeds. Many people who committed innumerable murders have simply wiped their faces clean and pretended nothing ever happened . . .
The world has already entered the twenty-first century. Many of those who committed acts of violence during those years are already old and feeble. If they wish to bear their savageness with them to their graves, that is their own choice. There are many people [in our country] who yearn for a repeat of the Cultural Revolution, for another violent convulsion. This should send shivers through us all. If we refuse to review and reexamine the Cultural Revolution, we might still be a society of cannibals. And if we are such a society, it doesn’t matter how bright we might seem on the outside, or how fully we enjoy the fruits of civilisation — we are still a den of cannibals. If having experienced the Cultural Revolution, the people of our nation do not reflect [on that episode in our history], we will have no way of leaving this den of cannibals. Any one of us might eat others, and any one of us might be eaten.

[ABOVE: Page two of the February 20, 2013, edition of China Youth Daily. The article by Zhang Ming is on the right-hand side.]