Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Party report suggests old guard is strong

Ahead of the 18th National Congress, which opened in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People today, I focused on 10 important terms in the Party’s political lexicon in my WATCHWORDS series (English and Chinese). Those terms were:

1. The “Four Basic Principles,” including Mao Zedong Thought (四项基本原则/毛泽东思想)
2. “Stability preservation” (维稳)
3. “Political reform” (政治体制改革)
4. “Cultural Revolution” (文革)
5. “Power is given by the people” (权为民所赋)
6. “Power of decision-making, power of administration and power of monitoring” (决策权,执行权,监督权)
7. “Intraparty democracy” (党内民主)
8. “Social construction” (社会建设)
9. “Scientific view of development” (科学发展观)
10. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义).

In the series, I looked at the origins of these political watchwords, their development through time (as seen in Chinese media and in past political reports), and explained how they can give us clues to how the Party is thinking or trending on various critical issues.


I have not yet had time to go carefully through the entire 64-page report delivered by President Hu Jintao earlier today, but I have studied a number of the key points. Here is the situation in Hu’s political report to the 18th National Congress with respect to the 10 terms I focused on in my series.
1. The “Four Basic Principles” (including “Mao Zedong Thought”). I have said before that this term, as a banner for the Maoist left in China, can be seen as a strong political indicator. In my series, I said that if both of these terms were abandoned, this would signify the leadership’s intention to push ahead with political reforms. But if the phrase Four Basic Principles is used to the extent that we saw in 2007, or its frequency is reduced only slightly, this signals a perpetuation of the status quo, with no substantive progress on political reform. Any increase in the frequency of use of either term would suggest a political turnabout.
In this political report, both the “Four Basic Principles” and “Mao Zedong Thought” continue to appear.
2. “stability preservation”. As I pointed out in my series, the appearance of this term in the political report to the 18th National Congress would mark a serious turnabout for China politically.
In this political report, the term “stability preservation” does not appear in the main points (要点).
3. “Cultural Revolution”. We want to look for any signs of soul-searching about the Cultural Revolution in the political report, which would be a positive sign pointing to possible political reform. This would mean emphasis of the term, but not simply in the context of praise for China’s progress (which would not be significant).
In the main topics of this political report, “Cultural Revolution” does not appear, in either its full or shortened forms (文革/文化大革命).
4. “Political reform”. As I pointed out, a positive sign would be the appearance of this term in a section header (章节标题) of the political report. The term did appear in a section header in every political report from the 13th National Congress to the 16th National Congress, but this did not happen in Hu Jintao’s 2007 political report. We also want to look at the term’s frequency — has it gone up? And have related negative signals gone down in frequency? The appearance of the phrase “protecting rights, checking power” would be a positive sign. The appearance, on the other hand, of hard-line language such as “opposing Westernization” or the “Five Will Nots” would be a negative sign.
In this political report, “political reform” is written into a section header. The header of the fifth section is: “Continuing on the Political Development Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting Political Reform” (坚持走中国特色社会主义政治发展道路和推进政治体制改革). I will look later at the frequency of use of the term “political reform” in the report. We do not see terms in the report like “opposing Westernization” or the “Five Will Nots”. But we do see the appearance of “[we will] resolutely not follow Western political systems” (绝不照搬西方政治制度模式), which did not appear in the 2007 political report. We also see a new term: “[We will] not take the wicked [or “heretical”] way of changing our banner” (不走改旗易帜邪路).
5. “Intraparty power separation” or the “Power of Decision-Making, Power of Administration and Power of Monitoring”. I said before that full 2007 phrase to look for in this report was: “[The Party] must build and improve power structures for mutual conditioning and mutual coordination of the powers of decision-making, administration and monitoring, improving oversight mechanisms” (要建立健全决策权、执行权、监督权既相互制约又相互协调的权力结构,完善监督机制). If we did not see this phrase repeated in this year’s political report, I said, this would be a negative sign. On the other hand, if the phrase was altered to include the idea of these powers operating independently of one another, this would be a positive sign.
In this political report, the 2007 does appear, but there is no further language to suggest powers operating independently of one another.
6. “Power is given by the people”. As I explained in my fifth article in the series, Xi Jinping introduced this phrase after the 17th National Congress. I argued that any appearance of this term at all in this year’s political report would be a positive sign.
In this political report, the term does not appear.
7. “social construction”. I noted in my series that the critical thing to watch was whether the phrase “expanding the scope for self-governance at the grassroots,” which appeared in 2007, reappeared in this year’s report. If it disappears (and is not replaced by “social self-governance”) that would be a negative sign, I argued.
In this political report, the term does disappear, and it is not replaced by “social self-governance.” The term used instead is “self-governance according to the law” (依法自治), and this appears in the following context: “. . . improving [our] mechanisms for strategy and work on national security, remaining highly vigilant against and resolutely on guard against separatism, infiltration and subversive activities by hostile forces, ensuring national security.” This is a term from the politics and law committee to talk about “social management,” and marks a very hardline position.
8. “Intraparty democracy”. This term appeared five times in the political report to the 17th National Congress, a relatively high frequency. As I wrote before, we want to look at how often this term appears in this year’s political report as well as at whether or not it is accompanied by language about more concrete measures, such as “open nomination and direct election,” “differential election” and “fixed tenure.”
Judging from the main points (要点) of this year’s report, it seems that “intraparty democracy” appears less frequently than in the report to the 17th National Congress. There is no mention of “open nomination and direct election,” and as for “differential election” and “fixed tenure” no concrete measures are raised.
9. Scientific View of Development”. The term, President Hu Jintao’s “banner term,” or qihao, appeared 21 times in the 2007 political report. I said in my series that if the term appears the same number of times or marginally less often in this year’s report, this will be normal. Appearance with greater frequency, however, would signal that Hu intends to extend the influence of his banner term beyond the 18th National Congress. Also worth looking at is whether the meaning of the Scientific View of Development changes in any way in the political report. Is there any stress, for example, on “people-based” governance? Is there mention of civil and political rights along the lines of what we saw in China’s National Human Rights Action Plan (2012-2015)? Any changes like this to the content of Scientific View of Development would be positive.
In this political report, the Scientific View of Development makes a strong showing. Most importantly, this term’s rank has been elevated. Along with “Deng Xiaoping Theory” and the “Three Represents,” it has become a guiding ideology (指导思想) of the Party. There is no mention at all in the political report of the term “civil rights.”.
10. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In my analysis of the political report five years ago, I found that this watchword appeared 51 times. A hypothesized on the basis of Hu Jintao’s speech on July 23, 2012, that this watchword, actually a changing medley of political terms, would at this year’s congress become a term representing the banner terms for the last three generations of Chinese leaders — Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. As I pointed out in my series, it is important to look at how socialism with Chinese characteristics is defined in this year’s political report. Specifically, does the term still include the “Four Basic Principles” or “one core, two basic points” (一个中心, 两个基本点) — this second term being a phrase that includes the “Four Basic Principles.” If socialism with Chinese characteristics continues to includes these ideas, I said, that could be read as a discouraging sign.
This year’s political report does show us that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has indeed become a common banner term including three generations of leaders — Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Moreover, the Four Basic Principles is still included in the definition of the phrase.
My preliminary conclusion: conservative forces within the Party are still very powerful. According to the line marked out by the political report to the 18th National Congress, there is very little prospect that substantive moves will be made on political reform.
————————–
10个“提法”在18大的表现
18大召开前,笔者曾在CMP网站和纽约时报中文网撰文,分析了中共的10个关键词语:1,“四项基本原则”(含毛泽东思想);2, “维稳”;3, “政治体制改革”;4, “文革”;5, “权为民所赋”;6, “决策权,执行权,监督权”;7, “党内民主”;8, “社会建设”;9, “科学发展观”;10, “中国特色社会主义”;比较它们在历次党代大会、特别是文革后7次党代大会政治报告中的表现;分析17大以来5年间这些提法在党报和其他媒体传播中的最新变化;试图通过话语体系,对18大后的政治走向作模式识别。
18大现已召开,胡锦涛已做报告(虽未念全文,只讲了“要点”)。笔者根据收看电视直播的记录,整理出上述10个关键词语在18大报告中的表现如下:
1,“四项基本原则”(包括“毛泽东思想”)。笔者曾说,这个提法,具有极大的政治风向标意义(它们是毛左的旗帜),如两者均被弃用,说明政改号角吹响。如任何一个的出现频率与17大同,或虽然减少依然存在,意味政治发展止步不前。出现频率若再增加,是严重的政治退步信号。
18大报告要点中,“四项基本原则”和“毛泽东思想”均出现了。
2,“维稳”。笔者曾指出,这个烈性口号如在18大被启用,是严重的政治退步信号。
18大报告的要点中,这个词没有出现。
3,“文革”。笔者曾指,2012年,在薄熙来案发后,这个提法的重新启用有特别意义。如果18大报告中出现对文革的反思,是政治改革的积极信号。如果仅在颂扬改革开放历史背景时被一笔带过,意义不大。
18大报告的要点,没有涉及“文革”或“文化大革命”。
4,“政治体制改革”。笔者此前的文章指出,与17大报告比较,正面信号是这一提法被写入报告的章节标题(从13大到16大都写入了章节标题,但17大没有),或出现频率增加,负面信号是频率继续下降。“制约权力,保障权利”这个八字口号如出现,是正面信号。反对政改的“强硬派表述”:如“反对西化、分化”或“五不搞”出现,是负面信号。
18大报告,将“政治体制改革”写入了章节标题,其第五部分的标题是“坚持走中国特色社会主义政治发展道路和推进政治体制改革”,出现频率待统计。“制约权力,保障权利”的八字口号未出现。“反对西化、分化”或“五不搞”也没有出现。但出现了一个新提法:“不走改旗易帜邪路”。
5,“党内三权”(“决策权、执行权、监督权”)。笔者此前的文章认为,观察的关键,是“要建立健全决策权、执行权、监督权既相互制约又相互协调的权力结构,完善监督机制”这段17大报告中已有的话,是否继续出现?“党内三权”的提法如果被弃用,是负面信号。如果具体阐述中增加了三权各自独立运行的含义,是正面信号。
18大,这个提法出现了,但没有增加“各自独立运行”的含义。
6,“权为民所赋”。这是17大后习近平的新提法。笔者认为,在18大政治报告中只要出现,是积极信号。
18大,这个口号没有出现。
7,“社会建设”。笔者曾指,观察的关键,是“扩大基层群众自治范围”这个17大报告已有的提法。这个提法如消失(也并未代之以“社会自治”),是负面信息。
18大报告的要点中,这个提法消失,也没有代之以“社会自治”,而是用“依法自治”。相关段落中还称“完善国家安全战略和工作机制,高度警惕和坚决防范敌对势力的分裂、渗透、颠覆活动,确保国家安全”——这是政法委对“社会管理”的提法。
8,“党内民主”。笔者曾说,这个提法,17大报告的出现频率高,观察18大,频率的变化仍然值得注意,重点是政治报告是否对“公推直选”、“差额选举”等选举制度改革和“党代表常任制”提出明确的推进举措。
收看胡锦涛18大报告“要点”,感觉“党内民主”的出现频率不如17大。他没有提到“差额选举”、“公推直选”、“党代表常任制”。
9,“科学发展观”。笔者曾分析,这一提法在17大报告中出现21次。18大报告中,如果其频率相同或略微下降,是正常的。如果大幅上升,则反应胡在18大后还将延伸其影响力。值得观察的,是18大对“科学发展观”是否有新的定义,如果比此前更强调“以人为本”,使用了《国家人权行动计划(2012-2015年)》中关于公民权利和政治权利的表述,是正面信息。
18大报告,对“科学发展观”浓墨重抹。最重要的是,该提法级别提升,已和“邓小平理论”、“三个代表”并列,成为党的指导思想。在收看直播时,似乎没有听见“人权”、“公民权利”。
10,“中国特色社会主义”。笔者曾分析:这一提法在17大政治报告中出现51次。从18前胡锦涛“7.23”讲话透露的信息看,它将成为邓、江、胡的共用旗号,所以18大它的出现频率一定居高。这个提法居高,是政治力量平衡的产物,未必是政治发展的正面信息。值得观察的,是18大对“中国特色社会主义”的定义,要看18大的定义中,是否还包括“四项基本原则”或“一个中心,两个基本点”(此提法包含了“四项基本原则”)。如果依然包括,说明前景不乐观。
18大可以证实,“中国特色社会主义”将成为邓、江、胡共同旗号。在其定义中,依然有“四项基本原则”。
初步结论: 保守势力依然强大,按照18大报告所确定的路线,中国政治体制改革难有实质推进。

CCP congress enters the Weibo era

We are working conscientiously on the finer points of Hu Jintao’s political report, and we hope to have a preliminary analysis to share with everyone this afternoon. In the meantime, we want to point out one important fact that distinguishes the 18th National Congress of the CCP from congresses past — and that is the controlled but nonetheless groundbreaking development of social media in China.
Remember, Chinese microblogs, or weibo (微博), did not come onto the domestic information scene in China until nearly two years after the last Party congress, held in October 2007. But by 2010, which many dubbed the “year of the Weibo,” these platforms had already become immensely popular and influential.


Obviously, conversation about the 18th National Congress will be watched carefully by China’s social media minders. It is interesting to see already, however, just how much discussion there is about Hu Jintao’s political report this morning. Here are a few examples that flitted across our screen.
In this post, University of Wisconsin scientist Yi Fuxian (易富贤) writes:

“Watching the report to the 18th National Congress, it seems they’ve not raised the ‘one-child policy’ (计划生育). I’m not sure if I missed it, or whether ‘one-child policy’ really isn’t in there. If ‘one-child policy’ isn’t there, that’s a great thing!


“It’s really not there,” one user (皱眉公子) responded. “Even the word ‘population’ was put only in the section on resources and the environment.”
Another user (@刘毅Kevin) questioned the significance of the term’s appearance, or not, in the report: “It’s not important whether it was in there or not. They key is whether this policy will be continued or not.”
A third user (郑_长一些) wrote: “From front to end, it really wasn’t there. But nor was there anything at all about land policy.”
User Wan Qingtao (万庆涛) focused on another phrase in the report to ask whether the one-child policy might be phased out: “[The report] talked about the ‘sustainable development of the Chinese people (中华民族永续发展). If the Chinese population were to go into decline because of the one-child policy, that would mean it was the enemy of the people. So I wonder if raising this ‘sustainable development of the Chinese people’ in the report implies that the one-child policy will be cancelled?”
Wang Xiaoshan (王小山), a writer and publisher, included a whole section of the political report in a post on Sina Weibo, labeling it “madness”:

Madness . . . Raising high the glorious banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, with Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important ideology of the “Three Represents” and the Scientific View of Development as the guide, emancipating our thinking, [pushing ahead with] reform and opening, uniting our strength, mastering difficulties, moving forward while sticking firmly to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, struggling for the full construction of a well-off society.


Many of the responses to Wang Xiaoshan’s post were emoticons — laughing faces, sarcastic applause, thumbs pointing down. “Ha ha ha ha ha,” wrote one user. “I can’t stop laughing,” wrote another.
Veteran Chinese journalist Luo Changping (罗昌平) seized on one particular phrase in Hu Jintao’s political report:

We cannot take the old road of seclusion and stagnation, nor can we take the wicked way of changing our banner.” (既不走封闭僵化的老路、也不走改旗易帜的邪路). Now how are we to understand that?


The guess from user “shichensu”: “[It means] continuing to [cross the river by] feeling the stones.”
And from “Free Foundation 012” (自由基012): “[It means] maintaining the status quo, more rocking and swaying.”
“[It means] they want to lie down while making money, and then take the road overseas,” said a user called “A Big Gold Ingot” (一个大元宝), alluding to corrupt officials who get rich and then send their assets and family members overseas.
Another user, “Mac’s Weibo” (Mac的围脖) saw only more of the same: “[It means] continuing with the river crab [ie., Hu Jintao’s enforced “harmony”], with [Wu Bangguo’s] “Five Don’ts”, with stability preservation, with [socialism with] Chinese characteristics.” [Note: Wu Bangguo said there would be 1. no multiparty system, 2. no diversity of guiding ideologies, 3. no separation of powers, 4. no federal system, and 5. no privatization in China].
Whether or not the 64-page political report offers anything new is a question that may take days to answer. But it is interesting indeed to see Chinese discussing its language on social media platforms, searching for clues about the direction of domestic politics and making their own feelings and criticisms known (however ephemerally).

Obama victory tops Chinese social media

As US media reported the re-election of President Barack Obama today, the election results were shared and discussed widely across Chinese social media networks. On Sina Weibo, one of the country’s leading social media sites, Obama’s re-election was far and away the top topic of discussion, with close to 25 million posts by 3:45 p.m. Beijing time. [Frontpage photo by Becker1999 posted to Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]


[ABOVE: A screen capture of the right-hand side of the homepage at Sina Weibo shows close to 25 million posts for “Obama wins American presidential election”.]
Here are a few of the posts and comments made to Sina Weibo.
At around 1 p.m., Liu Xiangnan (刘向南), a reporter for the Economic Observer, posted simply:

[Four more years. (Four more years!) — After victory, Obama quickly makes this post to Twitter.]
Four more years.(再干四年!)— 获胜后的奥巴马在第一时间在他的推特上说。]


User “Ling Feng KO” (零封KO) commented: “Obama gets another term. I’m not sure what influence this will have on China and the world. We’ll just have to see.” [奥巴马连任了。不知道对今后的中国和世界有什么影响,拭目以待]
User Yu Shukuan (于树宽) commented, wryly avoided the issue of the Party’s 18th National Congress, which opens in Beijing tomorrow: “This week both the United States and China will have major events happening. The first is that the people of America will decide one-person-one-vote on their next president. The second is that the ‘citizens’ of China, which doesn’t have even the most basic right to vote, will watch anxiously as the citizens of the United States vote to elect their next president. [本周中美两国都将有一件大事发生。一件是美国人民一人一票选举他们的总统。另一件是连最基本的投票权都没有的中国“公民”眼巴巴地看着美国公民投票选举他们的总统.]
User Jing Ting Shan Idler (敬亭山闲人) commented: “The news on the street is that a handful of people in China also want to let our highest-level leaders have another five years. [敬亭山闲人:小道消息,好像中国有一撮人,也想让我们的最高领袖再来五年]
Liu Xiangnan’s post was deleted by 1:19 p.m., yielding an error page reading: “We’re sorry! The page you are visiting is an erroneous address, or the page no longer exists.”

Another Weibo user, Wei Tian Xia (微天下), posted:

[#US Election# – Report from the frontline in Washington] Obama successfully wins re-election. Together with former president Bill Clinton and George W. Bush before him, he makes American history: this is the second time in American history — since Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and James Monroe — that three consecutive presidents have won second terms in office, each spending eight years in the White House.
微天下:【#美国大选#-华盛顿前方报道】奥巴马此次竞选连任成功,他和前任总统克林顿,小布什共同刷新另外一项美国历史:成为继托马斯-杰弗逊,詹姆斯-麦迪逊和詹姆斯-门罗总统之后,第二回美国历史上,出现三任总统均连续赢得连任,各自坐镇白宫八年的景象.


To this post, user “YouYouisme” responded: “So when will we, in our Great Mother Country, be able to elect our own leaders?” [什么时候我们伟大祖国的领导人也可以被选举而生呢]
“NuanNuan ElaineYu” (暖暖ElaineYu) wrote: “In comparison to the 18th National Congress, we are always far more interested in the politics of other nations, have more views [on their politics], have more belief [in their politics], and perhaps even have a greater sense of happiness [in watching their politics].” [相对于十八大,咱们永远对干涉他国政治更有兴趣,更有灼见,更有信念,仿佛更有幸福感!]
User “Flower in the Sky” (天里开的花) wrote: “So China, which was alone in its support of Romney, will hereafter be facing Obama again! [唯一支持罗姆尼的中国今后还要面对奥巴马了!]
The US presidential election has also been an occasion for the kind of whimsy that would never be accepted (for very long) in reference to Chinese leaders. This afternoon, for example, one of the most popular posts on Sina Weibo (tagged as a “hot topic” post) was this one, re-posted nearly 7,000 times within three hours:

Last night, as Romney saw victory within his grasp, he turned, brimming with confidence, to his wife and said: “Tomorrow night, you can sleep in the president’s bed.” Tonight the results were announced on television: a victory for Obama. [Romney’s] wife turned to him and said excitedly: “Are we inviting Obama over to our house, or should I just go over there?”
昨晚,罗姆尼觉得胜券在握,信心十足地对妻子说:“明天晚上你就可以和美国总统睡觉了。”今天电视上公布了选举结果:奥巴马获胜。妻子激动的说:“是请奥巴马到咱家来,还是我到他那里去?

The post was accompanied by the following image:

Censored: speculation on top Party lineup

The following post by Lin Yongfang (林永芳), a Sina Weibo user based in Fujian province, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 1:37 p.m. today, November 5, 2012. The post speculates about the new lineup of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which will not be formally announced until the 18th National Congress, which begins on Thursday this week. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

According to speculation the day before yesterday: [the Standing Committee lineup is] Xi [Jinping], Li [Keqiang], [Wang] Qi[shan]、Yu [Zhengsheng], Li [Yuanchao], Zhang [Gaoli], Wang [Yang]. It’s said this is 70 percent reliable. Here, the Will of Heaven has always been hard to ask after. We’ll just have to wait and see.

The original Chinese-language post follows:

前天传闻曰:习、李、岐、俞、李、张、汪。号称70%可靠度。此地天意从来高难问,唯拭目以待而已@盛大林 @马九器


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

On eve of Party Congress, Chinese media focus on U.S.

This post made to Sina Weibo by Ma Qiji (马旗戟), former vice-president of CR-Nielsen, a joint venture of the global market research firm Nielsen in China, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 3:45 a.m. today, November 5, 2012. The post points out that while China’s new generation of leaders will take the stage in just days, Chinese media can only focus on the presidential elections in the United States because the 18th National Congress of the CCP is shrouded in secrecy. Ma Qiji currently has more than 41,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].[Homepage image by “vectorportal” posted to Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

We are just about to Sparta ourselves [NOTE: This is Chinese web slang for “go crazy” or “slide into hysteria”], to choose the new boss for our secret society [NOTE: Ma is referring to the Chinese Communist Party], but our media can only show interest in and dramatize the American presidential elections.

The original post in Chinese follows:

我们马上就要斯巴达,要确定帮会新大哥,但我们的媒体却只能好奇和只敢渲染美国总统谁会当选。我朝带表党的威势,真牛逼。


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The fruitless search for the 18th Party Congress

The 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, a gathering of China’s top leaders that will decide the country’s direction for the next five years and beyond, will kick off in Beijing on November 8. This meeting is a big, big deal. But if you want to talk about it online beyond your personal network, tough luck.
Searches for “18th Congress” using both numerals and Chinese characters are blocked on Chinese social media sites. Apparently, it is possible to make posts using the terms, but it is not possible to see what others have posted unless you are following them. The goal, it seems, is to restrict conversation about the meeting while not outright banning the terms.
Searches for the terms yield a message that reads: “We’re sorry, results related to ’18th Congress’ cannot be found.”


I should note that while my own post this morning using the term “18th Congress” (and talking about ping pong balls) was apparently allowed, it has had no re-posts and no comments over a two-hour period. That usually suggests a post has been made invisible, and perhaps has been removed.
I’ll update here if my post shows up in our deleted posts archive.

Hurricane Sandy, an opportunity for Chinese media?

Chinese media have been blanketed this week with coverage of Hurricane Sandy, the storm that battered the mid-Atlantic region of the United States on October 29 and 30. Since October 30, 1,290 articles on Hurricane Sandy have appeared in mainland media. That includes 709 newspaper stories, 171 wire stories and 410 web stories [Source: WiseNews].
Coverage of the hurricane in China has prompted some discussion of how, whether and why Chinese media should cover a storm on the other side of the world. Has reporting focused too much on America’s woes and sensationalized the story? How much reporting should there be? Does the story need to be told at all?
For a quick taste of Chinese coverage, here is an example on the more sensational end of the spectrum. This is the Metro News, a free publication launched in December 2011 and distributed on the subway in the city of Chongqing. The headline on its front page yesterday read: “Right Now New York Looks Like a Necropolis.”


[ABOVE: The November 1, 2012, edition of Chongqing’s Metro News strikes a macabre tone in its coverage of Hurricane Sandy.]
Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily led with a jarring image of a flooded residential area and the popping headline: “51 Already Dead in [Wake of] Hurricane Sandy.” The smaller headline conveys other information, such as the estimated 30 billion dollars in damage.

[ABOVE: The November 1, 2012, edition of Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily leads with the number of reported dead in its front-page coverage of Hurricane Sandy.]
In yesterday’s edition of the Chinese-language Global Times, He Hui (何辉), head of the Public Relations and Public Opinion Institute of the Communication University of China, writes that, yes, Hurricane Sandy is an important story for Chinese media.
He’s discussion turns quickly to the issue of the international “going out” of Chinese media, which has been a strategic priority for the Chinese Communist Party since October 2007, when President Hu Jintao said in his political report to the 17th National Congress that China needed to enhance its “soft power.” Hu Jintao further elaborated these ideas in a speech during a visit to the official People’s Daily in June 2008.
The Global Times editorial makes a rather typical, out-of-the-box Party argument (in line with the CCP “soft power” mainstream) that Chinese media should try to accommodate the demands of foreign audiences in order to expand their reach while at the same time maintaining “a Chinese position.”
This, in my view, is the greatest internal contradiction in China’s “soft power” push. The need to break out of the box but remain obediently inside it. To have one’s own views, so long as they are in harmony with those of the Chinese state.
Reading He Hui’s remarks about the strengths of the Economist as a publication, one has to wonder whether he — and indeed, many Chinese communications scholars — actually understand what makes this and other “first-rate international media” tick. Certainly, the Economist has a strong and unmistakable psychographic [READ THIS]. It has a “decidedly singular worldview.” But it is most definitely not held back by state agendas or ideologies.
But anyhow, here we go.

On Hurricane Reports, Chinese Media Should Compete with Overseas Media
By He Hui (何辉)
November 1, 2012
Global Times
Hurricane “Sandy” has recently caused heavy damage in the eastern United States. Concerning the impact of this hurricane, Chinese media have done heavy and dense reporting. Some have pointed fingers, asking whether Chinese media have gone overboard in their response to hurricane Sandy. Most of these doubts and concerns are well-intentioned. To answer them, we must understand how the “going out” of Chinese media should go forward, and how it can best be adapted to and accepted by audiences at home and abroad.
For Chinese media there is a real need for reporting on hurricane Sandy. This is not as some have suggested a case of China intentionally exposing America’s problems and dramatizing its woes, because from the perspective of the media all major events should get attention. Aside from issues of politics, economics and military affairs, natural disasters are also often the focus of world media attention. Because emergency situations often profoundly influence people’s lives and work, and they touch on life and death and the deepest human emotions. This means that in the case of relatively large-scale emergencies, not only local media but also non-local media will often report actively on them. This could be seen in domestic and international reporting in the case of the Asian tsunami, the earthquake in Japan and the Sichuan earthquake.
This storm striking America’s east coast caused the cancellation of many international flights, massive transportation paralysis, fires in Manhattan, two days of suspended trading on the New York Stock Exchange, and a large number of deaths. Owing to the important political and economic position of the United States in the world, this disaster not only influences the lives of Americans but touches other regions of the world as well. In “going out” and expanding their international influence, Chinese media need to not only to keep up with reporting of this kind of major story, but they need as much as possible to be faster, fresher and more insightful than other mainstream media in reporting on this event.
In recent years, Chinese media have gradually moved out into the world. In this process, we cannot simply report on China’s bright spots, nor can we simply choose the worst things in foreign countries to report about. The key to the success of reports does not lie in the news per se, but rather in whether or not they offer clear insight to the audience.
Moreover, if Chinese media wish to earn international prestige, they must respond on the one hand to the varying demands different audiences around the world have toward information, and on the other hand must maintain a Chinese position. Right now there is one view that holds that in order to attain to the level of international media [we] must set aside our own position. In fact, this is a conceptual error. Britain’s Economist magazine is without a doubt a mainstream publication with international prestige. But while its position on a number of issues still invites controversy internationally, this does not damage its standing as a media of international standards. Why? Because it has long maintained a wide vision, and it steadily offers an insightful perspective on political, economic, cultural and technological issues. Even as it maintains its own position, it does not oppose serious thought and discussion.
As they move out into the world, Chinese media need to study the broad visions and persevering insight of first-rate international media.

Download CMP's 18th National Congress Series

The 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is just around the corner. And for those of you who want a handy reference in hand to help understand the ins and outs of this political gathering, the China Media Project is pleased to offer a downloadable PDF version of our WATCHWORDS series.
CLICK HERE to download WATCHWORDS_Reading China Through its Party Vocabulary, by QIAN GANG.
WATCHWORDS is a new commentary series unpacking the most important political watchwords to watch in present-day China and explaining how they are critical to any understanding of China’s political past, present and future.

GDP: Killing the Hen to Get the Egg


China has maintained rapid economic growth for three decades, and from 1992 to 2011 annual GDP growth surpassed 8 percent. But as social unrest and inequality are on the rise — and as the country faces a host of other problems, from poor food safety and substandard construction to dangerous pollution levels and environmental destruction — some people have argued that the cost of maintaining rapid economic growth is too high. Are the costs now outweighing the benefits? In the following cartoon, posted by artist Zhu Senlin (朱森林) to Sina Weibo, a hen is squeezed violently with a rolling pin simply to extract a single egg labeled “GDP.” The cartoon is titled: “Just for One Egg.”

Clubs and cameras: stability preservation in the age of Weibo

Following several days of mass protests against two proposed petrochemical projects amid environmental and health concerns, officials in the coastal city of Ningbo announced late Sunday that the projects would be halted. The government’s announcement failed to deter protesters, however, who continued to gather outside the government offices Monday and demand that the city’s mayor step down.
Online, suspension of the projects was formally announced through the official social media account of the Ningbo government at 6:45 p.m. yesterday, October 28, 2012. The post read: “[We have] learned from a news spokesman from the Ningbo City Government that the city government has been decided after research with the project investor that: (1) the PX project will definitely not go forward; (2) preliminary work for the chemical refinery project will be halted and a scientific assessment redone.”


[ABOVE: Protesters outside the government offices in Ningbo on Sunday, October 28, 2012. Image shared by a Guangdong-based user on Sina Weibo.]

The halting of the project was also announced on the front page of today’s Ningbo Daily, the city’s official Party-controlled “mouthpiece.” Carried at dead center, the announcement read:

[After going] through [a process of] research
Ningbo Has Decided Not to Go Ahead with PX Project
经研究决定
宁波坚决不上PX项目


[ABOVE: The front page of today’s Ningbo Daily with an announcement of the termination of a PX project opposed by many residents.]
A second article on the front page did its best to frame the termination of the unpopular projects as an act of government grace.
After learning late Sunday of the government’s announcement, the article began, many residents “bounced off to pass the news along to their friends and relatives,” and “mass representatives” (群众代表) interviewed by the paper’s reporter felt “gratified” by the news, “feeling that the Party and government leadership had deeply listened to the voice of the people.”
These “mass representatives,” said the newspaper, also said they were certain the Party’s decision would “win the understanding and support of the masses.” They “hoped that everyone would as soon as possible return to normal, productive and orderly lives, working together for the economic and social development of Ningbo.”
A keyword search of “Ningbo” + “PX” in the WiseNews database returned just 10 articles in mainland Chinese newspapers today. Nine of these, including a report from the official China News Service, were based entirely on information provided by the Ningbo government. The tenth was an editorial in the Chinese-language Global Times newspaper sounding a worrying tone about the rise of street politics in China:

Some say that the people of Ningbo have won. But in our view, there can be no winners in a situation where this method of resistance by the masses on the streets and in the public square comes to decide such a complex matter as that of the fate of a major chemical project — and it seems even more that all of China is the loser.

In the second front page report today, the Ningbo Daily suggested local leaders had recognized to some extent that the recent protests were the result of a failure of communication. Leaders pledged to “increase the strength of information release [in the future], offering more explanations and removing the doubts and concerns of the masses.”
But as the limited choice of newspaper reports indicates, precious little information is still available on what is happening in Ningbo, and why. The “masses,” whether in Ningbo or anywhere else in China, are now left mostly in the dark on this story.
The difference between darkness and “mostly in the dark,” of course, is the sum total of shifting content on Chinese social media.
Many images and video posted to Chinese social media from the scene in Ningbo have already been deleted — and some users reported Sunday that Ningbo-based users were unable to post content. But Sina Weibo and other platforms remain the primary source of information on this story.
In a further illustration of how the propaganda game is shifting in China, Chinese authorities have found themselves levering the strength of social media to attack the reliability of social media — even as they choke off all reliable information not of government origin, thereby further fueling demand for “rumors” (true or not).
At 12:42 p.m. today, October 29, 2012, the following message was posted to Ningbo Public Security (宁波公安), the official social media account of the Ningbo police:

In recent days, in Ningbo’s Zhenhai District (镇海区) and Haishu District (海曙区), a number of persons have illegally assembled, blocking traffic. The city’s public security bureau organized police to encourage people to leave and get transportation flowing. In the midst of this, no malign incidents occurred. There were absolutely no deaths of any persons [as a result], and certainly not university students who died. The police once again call on the residents of the city not to believe rumors or spread them. In cases where the spread of rumors does harm to public order, the police will handle this firmly in accordance with the law.
近日,宁波市镇海区、海曙区有部分人员非法聚集、堵塞交通。市公安局组织警力劝离人员,疏导交通,全力维护社会秩序。期间,没有发生恶性事件,绝对没有人员死亡,更没有大学生死亡。警方再次呼吁,广大市民不信谣不传谣。对于散布谣言,扰乱公共秩序的,警方将坚决依法处理。 今天 12:42 来自 360安全浏览器 转发 (4659) | 收藏 | 评论 (2749)


[ABOVE: A post made to the official police microblog in the city of Ningbo on October 29 urges citizens not to believe rumors that people were killed in clashes with police over the weekend.]
Among the rumors circulating on Weibo is one claiming that local “stability preservation” authorities in Ningbo have said the order to suspend the PX project came down Sunday from China’s security chief, Zhou Yongkang (周永康). There is no way to know whether this is true, but it certainly speaks to the sensitive timing of the Ningbo protests. With the 18th National Congress just around the corner, national leaders are no doubt eager to ensure that China looks to itself and to the rest of the world like a happy and harmonious place.
One of the most interesting dynamics we see again in the Ningbo PX case is the face-off between social media and “stability preservation,” in recent years the Party’s most robust method of dealing with social instability.
Rapid economic development in the absence of transparent and inclusive institutions in China has generated an upswell of social unrest. Party leaders have tried to balance this equation with massive spending on “stability preservation,” the mobilizing of domestic security forces against the population. But in some sense, social media are now upsetting this equation. Thanks largely to social media, the tactics of “stability preservation” are increasingly under scrutiny.
Perhaps nothing better expresses this dynamic than a cartoon shared on Sina Weibo in recent days, in which mobile phones face off against a phalanx of armed police with shields, clubs and rifles.

Mao Zedong famously said that “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Surely, though, he never envisioned the mobile phone glaring back, the eye connected instantly to millions of others.