Since 2018, Chinese state media have pushed the idea that the country, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has entered a “Great Era.” Used under Mao Zedong — but also even before the CCP came to power in China — the term has often been a coded demand for unquestioning loyalty and uncomplaining perseverance in the face of clear and present challenges that only a strongman can face. And history teaches that behind its facade, there has often been calamity.

“Chinese-style modernization,” also referred to in English as the “Chinese path to modernization,” is a catchphrase formally introduced by Xi Jinping in early 2021 to encapsulate the political assertion that modernization as pursued by China abides by such principles as the equitable income distribution, peaceful national development, and ecological sustainability that distinguish it from modernization as it unfolded historically in the developed countries of the West. Simultaneously, it makes the political claim that the prerequisite of such modernization is the rule of the CCP.

A globally shared view holds modernity as closely linked to progress. Modernisation is the process of development from a “pre-modern” or “traditional” to a “modern” society. In Western thought, modernization has been associated not only with technological advancement but also with secularization, democratization, and advancement of human rights. It is intimately linked to the ideas of enlightenment and rationality. According to the CCP, however, modernization includes the advancement of industry, agriculture, defense, and science and technology — while precluding political liberalization or democracy.

First introduced in its current form in Xi Jinping’s political report to the 20th National Congress of the CCP in October 2022, the phrase describes the core concepts meant to guide the worldview and methods of the Chinese Communist Party under the overarching governing concept of “Xi Jinping Thought.” However, three other distinct sets of “Six Adheres” have been defined within CCP discourse in the past — all but one articulated during Xi’s rule — showing how specialized vocabularies can be deconstructed and reinterpreted over time by the CCP, as the leadership and its priorities change.