Outside China, the idea of “media convergence,” the joining together of communication technologies on handheld devices, is now so much a way of life that few even talk about it. But for China’s leadership it is a concept with era-defining significance — having far-reaching consequences for the current and future exercise of power.
“One institution with two names” describes the frequent practice in China of giving a single Party-state body, such as a government ministry, bureau, or work unit, two distinct names. This practice is often used to distinguish in principle (if not in practice) between the work of the Party and the work of the state, or to avoid negative perceptions audiences outside China might have of the body’s work if it is clearly affiliated with the CCP.
One of the pioneers of China’s feminist movement opens up about her experience as a journalist for state media and how the movement has adapted in the years since her outlet Feminist Voices was shut down by authorities.
While there has been growing attention and concern in recent years about the impact of China’s charm offensive in the countries of the Global North, less attention has been paid to how these efforts have played out in Latin America.
“Zero-dollar shopping” videos depicting America as a lawless hellscape where woke politics mean criminals now go unpunished have been going viral for years within China and on Chinese-language social media abroad. What lies behind this strange trend?
First introduced by Xi Jinping at the third session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on January 8, 2024, these nine principles are meant to encapsulate the basic means toward “self-revolution within the Party” (党的自我革命), a phrase closely linked with the fight against corruption, but ultimately exposing Xi’s anti-corruption efforts as fundamentally about the preservation of his personal power — in the absence of real public scrutiny.
First introduced in the 1990s by Jiang Zemin as a means of asserting the imperative of Chinese Communist Party control over public opinion through active constraint of media and culture more broadly, this phrase asserts that the CCP’s control of ideas equals prosperity for China while its loss of control equals chaos. It has been applied in varying forms under Jiang’s successors, including by Xi Jinping since 2016.
The latest targets in China’s ongoing — and seemingly never-ending — internet rectification campaign include content that “incites class antagonism.” How did a Communist Party that lived and breathed class struggle for decades get to this point?
In cities and villages across China, young and old gathered in places like Hefei’s Patriot Lane last week to mourn the passing of China’s former premier, Li Keqiang. Who they were mourning mattered less than the idea that he had been a good man.
This criminal charge, as provided in Article 293 of the PRC Criminal Code, has historical roots in the notorious Mao-era crime of ‘hooliganism’ (流氓罪). It is now broadly and arbitrarily applied in China to suppress speech and behaviors perceived by the authorities as threats to the political and social order. Since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012, this charge has been applied expansively. It is not limited to targeting rights defense actions like petitioning and organized protests; rather, it encompasses a much wider range of public discussions on topics that were previously not considered politically sensitive.