Talk of wealth redistribution is in the air in China. And two words, “common prosperity,” have condensed hopes and fears over the changes to come. Where does the phrase “common prosperity” originate within the history of CCP discourse, and what can this history tell us about the present struggle to define the direction of China’s development?
The phrase “community of common destiny for mankind,” or renlei mingyun gongtongti (人类命运共同体), is central to the notion of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想), the phrase encompassing Chinese foreign policy in the so-called “New Era.” While the term seems to appeal to a set of shared values and goals as the core of international relations – and resembles, for example, ideas at the heart of the formation of the European Union – it is important to note that the phrase incorporates traditional elements of Chinese foreign policy that prioritize a state-centered approach to human rights, while subordinating individual rights to the basic question of national interest. Various translations of the phrase have been introduced, including “community of shared destiny” and “community of shared future,” the latter being a more recent official translation introduced around 2017 to avoid unfavorable associations outside China with expansionist notions of co-prosperity.
The tough brand of foreign engagement that has become known as “wolf warrior diplomacy” has certainly drawn attention to China. But is it the right kind of attention? And can “wolf warrior diplomacy” effectively tell the China story?
As plans by Shanghai’s Fudan University for a new international campus in Budapest’s ninth district meet staunch local opposition, with fears the project is a Trojan horse, it is unclear what lessons the university’s efforts in Hungary will have for the global future of Chinese higher education.
In an article topping the latest edition of the official journal Seeking Truth, Xi Jinping argues that history is a valuable teacher, a mirror and a source of sustenance. But what does the Chinese Communist Party mean today when it talks about history?
Language emerging from a recent collective study session of China’s Politburo has prompted some observers to ask whether China might be softening its diplomatic tone. A more careful look at the context is in order.
The term “people’s leader” (人民领袖) is a rare title of praise in China’s political discourse, reminiscent of the personality cult that prevailed during the Mao Zedong era. The term was used for a wider range of leaders through the 1940s, including “people’s leader Mao Zedong” (人民领袖毛泽东), “Soviet people’s leader Stalin” (苏联人民领袖斯大林) and “Vietnamese people’s leader Ho Chi Minh” (越南人民领袖胡志明). But after 1949 the phrase came to be used increasingly for Mao alone. In the reform era after 1978, “people’s leader” was used only as a historical reference to Mao Zedong. This pattern, however, has changed under Xi Jinping as he has increasingly concentrated power around himself.
First launched 12 years ago, government social media accounts were meant to help China’s leadership set the agenda and interact with the masses. They have now become another headache crowding out the Party’s message and demanding official action.
Article 35 of China’s Constitution states that “[c]itizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.” Formally speaking, this language seems to accord with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.” In practice, however, the ruling Chinese Communist Party places substantial restrictions on the exercise of freedom of speech, which is regarded as potentially destabilizing to the regime.
Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution grants Chinese citizens the right to freedom of assembly and association. The language is strikingly similar to Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which sets the precondition for the development of a civil society comprised of non-governmental organizations. The EU defines as civil society “all forms of social action carried out by individuals or groups who are neither connected to, nor managed by, the state”. This independence is not to be found in China, as it would contravene the overarching political maxim that the CCP has absolute leadership over all political and societal affairs, as codified in Article 1 of the Chinese Constitution.