Author: CMP Staff

Six Decades of CCP Congress Reports

We are now just two weeks from the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. And while it is difficult to know what to expect from the meeting’s political report, a highly formalized document that will outline the priorities and accomplishments of General Secretary Xi Jinping and the Party he leads, we can familiarize ourselves with the political reports of China’s past — and the stilted discourse therein.
With that in mind, here are downloadable links to each political report since the 8th National Congress of the CCP in September 1956, spanning more than 60 years. Of the English-language reports at left, all are Word files with the exception of the file for the 13th National Congress, which is available only in PDF. We have so far not found easily accessible versions of the reports for the 8th and 9th congresses, for which we welcome input.
Good luck fishing through those CCP buzzwords!
8th CCP Congress Report
9th CCP Congress Report
10th CCP Congress Report       [CHINESE]
11th CCP Congress Report       [CHINESE]
12th CCP Congress Report       [CHINESE]
13th CCP Congress Report     [CHINESE]
14th CCP Congress Report       [CHINESE]
15th CCP Congress Report       [CHINESE]
16th CCP Congress Report       [CHINESE]
17th CCP Congress Report       [CHINESE]
18th CCP Congress Report       [CHINESE]
 

No Holiday for Censors

China’s National Day holiday is meant to be a time for celebration — and also for a good deal of propaganda about the glories of the Chinese Communist Party, the unity of the people, and all-around prosperity, equality and good feeling. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that censors on popular social media platforms like Weibo worked around the clock to ensure that dissenting voices, or just plaintive ones, were tucked out of view.
The following post by Weibo user Wen Jinrang was available for more than a day before being cut down by censors on the platform. It remarks on reports that some local authorities in China have ordered the National Day holiday, often referred to as “golden week,” shortened in order to prepare for the upcoming 19th National Congress of the CCP.
Reports this week have said that the National Day holiday was cancelled altogether China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang, reportedly out of fears that residents might use the break from school and work to launch protests ahead of next month’s congress.

USER: Wen Jinrang (汶金让)
DATE OF POST: September 30, 2017, 12:28:44
APPROXIMATE TIME OF REMOVAL: October 1, 2017, 15:14:37
CONTENT: 
For the eight-day National Day holiday, some places have issued certain orders and notices saying that only five days of holiday are permitted. . . This is just the way things are in China. A legally set holiday, and local [authorities] can just eliminate it with a single word. That’s the National Day holiday! What a great National Day, one long lament! [hurt]
国庆8天假,某地某办发通知,只准休5天,最后3天精准扶贫!中国的事情就是这样,法定假日,地方一句话就可以废了,这就是国情!好好的国庆,一片哀叹![伤心] ​

 

An image of the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Beijing and the words, “Happy National Day on October 1.”
 
 
 
 

All Hands for Cybersecurity

This cartoon, called “Joint Protection” (共同守护), was created by Xu Jun (徐骏) for China’s official Xinhua News Agency, and posted on September 20, 2017, to commemorate the national China Cybersecurity Week. The cartoon shows hands representing a number of different parties surrounding the internet, represented by the smiling “@” symbol (the internet being delighted, of course, to receive such positive restraint on its chaotic tendencies).
This laying on of hands around the internet creates a bright white zone labelled “cybersecurity.” The hands are labelled, clockwise from left, as “government,” “social organizations,” “internet masses” and “enterprises.”
Here is a brief excerpt of the text accompanying the cartoon:

Since the 18th National Congress of the CCP, under the leadership of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, our country has formulated and implemented the Cybersecurity Law, striking repeated blows to chaos in cyberspace, adhering to management of the internet in accord with the law and comprehensive governance, etc., fully erecting a dike of security in the protection of the cybersecurity of individuals and of the nation.  Of course, cybersecurity is not just about top-end design at the national level [NOTE: this refers to changing governance structures institutionally], but even more requires that the people come together to protect it. Therefore, “for the people” and “relying on the people” [NOTE: This is the theme of this year’s Cybersecurity Week] are the two central axes of cybersecurity . . .

Front Page: September 19, 2017

This week is China Cybersecurity Week, an occasion for Party and government officials across the country to mobilize the population on a range of cyber issues — and, importantly, for them to demonstrate that they are falling into line in implementing the policy drives conceived at the top. So media everywhere are placing Cybersecurity Week on their front pages, highlighting their local ceremonies, and signaling the importance of President Xi’s related utterances.
Here is the front page from today’s Guangzhou Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Guangzhou Party Committee:

Ren Xuefeng Tours Cybersecurity Technology and Achievements Exhibition: Deeply Implementing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Internet Power Strategic Ideas
Guangzhou Daily (Multimedia reporters Bi Zheng and Jing Huaiqiao, correspondent Yue Zong) — Yesterday, the opening ceremony of the Fourth Guangdong Cybersecurity Propaganda Week and the 2017 Cybersecurity Technology and Achievements Exhibition were held in the No. 3. Hall of Guangzhou’s Poly World Exhibition Center. Deputy provincial secretary, Guangzhou Party Secretary, and provincial deputy director of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, Ren Xuefeng (任学锋) was in attendance. . .


He emphasized that [we] must deeply implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s ideas strategic ideas on [China as an] internet power, adhering to the step-in-step progress of cybersecurity and cyber-development, accelerating the universalization of information services, advancing the building of smart cities, allowing the people to all enjoy the fruits of the development of informatization.
We must fully unleash the role of internet enterprises in research and development and innovation, greatly advancing strategic advances in core internet technologies, standing at the summit of innovation and development, injecting new vitality into economic and social development in Guangdong.
We must deeply develop the universalization of knowledge about cybersecurity, fully raising our capacity to protect the internet, prioritising information content and technical security, governing the internet in accord with the law, striking severe blows to illegal activities online, building a protective screen for cybersecurity, creating a favorable online environment for victoriously convening the 19th National Congress of the CCP.

Censor thyself

We are exactly one month away from the opening of the 19th National Congress of the CCP, the meeting during which key leadership decisions and agendas will be introduced to the public. But for now, the process of deliberating these decisions is cloaked in utmost secrecy. Even the date of the Congress was a mystery until a few short weeks ago.
The political and media atmosphere ahead of the Party’s national congresses, which are held once every five years, tends to be extremely tense. And that often means those exercising control over the media must be extra careful and extra diligent.
This fact may explain why social media posts based on an official news release from Xinhua News Agency yesterday — broadcast, no less, on the nightly official Xinwen Lianbo program on CCTV — are being deleted en masse from Weibo, despite the fact that the story remains on many, if not all, websites where it was originally posted. Here is the release at QQ.com. Here it is again at China News Service. At Caijing. On the Xinhua News Agency website itself.
The gist of the report is that the Politburo has met in preparation for the 19th National Congress, and has discussed draft amendments to the Party’s constitution. The report is nonspecific, but this probably signals changes to the constitution that would incorporate the ideas of President Xi Jinping, perhaps even elevating his leadership status.
So why would posts like this one simply regurgitating the official news report be removed from social media?

USER: Henan Traffic Radio 河南交通广播
DATE OF POST: September 18, 2017, 18:03:31
APPROXIMATE TIME OF REMOVAL: September 18, 2017, 19:25:13
CONTENT: 
FM 1041 News Brief [Appropriate Amendments to be Made to Party Constitution at 19th National Congress] CCP Politburo Conference: The Party’s 19th Congress will make appropriate amendments to the Party Constitution according to the new situation and new tasks. The important theories and viewpoints and important strategic ideas established by the 19th Congress must be written into the [CCP] Constitution.
#1041快讯#【党的十九大将对党章进行适当修改】中共中央政治局会议:党的十九大根据新形势新任务对党章进行适当修改。要把党的十九大报告确立的重大理论观点和重大战略思想写入党章。 ​
IMAGE:

The likely reason is that the authorities wish to put the brakes on any online discussion that might be prompted by the sharing of this news across social networks.
It’s an unfortunate Catch 22 for the Party. Those messages it would most like to make viral bear a certain risk of going viral with subtle modifications of meaning that could be detrimental to the message itself. The answer: push the messages through traditional media and officially sanctioned social media accounts while restraining them on social networks.
We can see the same paradox at work in the names of top Party leaders, which are often right at the top of lists of banned keywords in China.
 
 

Mention of 1933 truce deleted from Weibo

The following post making a seemingly casual reference to the Tanggu Truce of May 31, 1933, during which the Republic of China negotiated with Japanese representatives to end the conflict in Manchuria, was deleted from Sina Weibo just after midnight on September 5, 2017.
The post was made about two hours prior to its deletion by “Weiyue Qinyu” (巍岳钦禹), an account holder routinely posting about Chinese military history. “Weiyue Qinyu” currently has more than 6.8 million fans on Weibo, and also operates a WeChat public account.
It is not clear exactly what the authorities, or eager censors working within Weibo, saw as problematic about the post. But the deletion is a reminder of just how sensitive historical issues remain in mainland China.
The post simply read:

The signing of the Tanggu Truce.
《塘沽协定》签订现场

And the post included a black-and-white image of the signing, an image readily available on the internet outside China, including at the Wikipedia entry for the Tanggu Truce.


The image of the truce signing is available still on quite a number of websites inside China dealing with Chinese history, and as the China Daily noted in August 2011, the image appears in the exhibition at the “Road to Rejuvenation” exhibition at the National Museum of China — the same exhibit Xi Jinping visited in 2012 when he outlined his vision of the “Chinese dream.”
 
 

Why news extortion is so hard to uncover

The recent investigation by Shanghai police into alleged news extortion (新闻敲诈) by the website of the 21st Century Business Herald (21cbh.com) went off like a public opinion bomb, shuddering through the media and through society.

The tactic of using investigative reporting — what in China is called “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督) — in order to extort money from businesses is not unfortunately a new one. But in this case, the sheer scale and organizational nature of news extortion as a business model for internet media is astonishing.

The 21st Century Business Herald web case is still under investigation, and it’s too early to determine the exact nature of these alleged crimes. But judging from the so-called “confessions” we have seen from the suspects involved, it seems likely there is merit to the accusation that negative reports were used for revenue generation at the website.

envelope
Money in a red envelope, posted by SkyFireXII to Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.


Within media circles, this tactic has been something of an open secret for a long time, the most recent high-profile case being that of New Express reporter Chen Yongzhou (陈永洲).

According to the police bulletin for this most recent case, the chief editor of 21cbh.com and others have already been detained, and the case deals with scores of companies in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong and other cities and provinces. While a large number of companies seem to have been affected, few have openly come forward. Police have now publicized a hotline number, and they are encouraging other companies that might have been targeted to file charges. This gives us a rough idea of the impact this case is likely to have.

In its earliest stage, news extortion involved upfront demands for cash by journalists. But as this conduct came under fire, the practice was developed and refined and payments to journalists and media to make negative reports disappear were “whitewashed” as advertising buys, circulation income, publicity fees and all manner of things. As the practice evolved, cooperation between the people on the business side who handled advertising contracts and the reporters in the field became more and more intimate, until everyone was involved — with the editor-in-chief and president pulling the strings behind the curtain.
From what we can see of the 21cbh.com case, it seems to be a perfect illustration of how news extortion in China has become institutionalized and industrialized. The danger in this situation is that some media outfits engage in the practice without compunction, knowing that in most cases enterprises will simply give in just to avoid trouble.

From time to time, the government launches a campaign against news extortion (新闻敲诈) and fake news (虚假新闻), and the problem once again comes to the attention of the public.

Even so, the number of those committing acts of news extortion who eventually face prosecution is still very small. The reason is for this is that the practice is largely concealed with the idea that “flies don’t swarm around eggs without cracks.” In other words, there often are problems at the business and government offices targeted by these acts of news extortion. And the so-called victims generally go into self-preservation mode, not wanting allegations that may have some basis to be aired out publicly.
Another aspect of this practice is that it has become a guns-for-hire atmosphere, in which one side effectively engages a media outfit to dig around the foundations of another — [a business competitor or political rival, for example.] The media in this case are often in alliance with or hired by one party, and the other party has no idea what the situation is behind the scenes.

So the case in recent years has been that media and journalists are keen on involving themselves in commercial spats and business disputes, in which they can enjoy the guts and glory associated with watchdog journalism but at the same time enrich themselves behind the scenes.

According to a report from Xinhua News Agency, 21cbh.com has been “doing business independently” (独立运营) — meaning, carrying out news extortion — since 2010. But the case against the website was only pursued this year, and revenues from its “pay for no play” (有偿不闻) business were massive during this time.

Ten years ago in China, there was a strong current of investigative reporting with a very good reputation. In recent years, however, a number of journalists, editors and senior media managers have been embroiled in media corruption scandals, driving down the prestige of watchdog journalism and casting a shadow over its future prospects. As a result, the general public attitude toward the news media has worsened.

At some media, unscrupulous management by bosses exploiting the power of reporting for their own benefit has destroyed professional ideals and resulted in an ethical free-for-all.

Strengthening resistance to corruption in the media requires an emphasis on “rule of law.” Only when illegal conduct is addressed in a timely and effective manner can the news industry move toward a cleaner and better future.

This article was originally published in Chinese in the September 13 edition of
China Youth Daily. The author is a former CMP fellow and a veteran reporter at China Youth Daily. He won a journalism prize in 2003 for his report exposing Xinhua News Agency journalists who had accepted bribes from a Shanxi mining company in exchange for keeping silent about an explosion at one of their mines.