January 25 — More than a week after top publishing officials in China announced a nationwide ban on eight books, drawing domestic and international criticism, Beijing Daily slipped an excerpt from one of those books, The Other Stories of History, by former People’s Daily journalist Yuan Ying (袁鹰), into a prominent place on its inner pages. The case underscored the complexity of China’s changing media environment, in which newspapers can push the envelope in surprising ways. While more daring coverage is most often seen in commercial newspapers (generally spin-offs of provincial and city-level party newspapers) Beijing Daily is an offical party newspaper controlled by top city leaders in Beijing.
January 25 — Two weeks after announcement by local leaders in Chenzhou, Hunan province, of a new “watchdog journalism prize” drew sharp criticism from newspapers across China, leaders in Chenzhou responded through a news report in the official People’s Daily. Chenzhou’s party secretary and top leader Ge Hongyuan (葛洪元) said that releasing news was a means and promoting the work [of the leadership] the end goal. Ge emphasized that the prize was not just for show. Ge’s wishes were paraphrased by People’s Daily: “[He] hoped that in the process of carrying out watchdog journalism, the information gathered by the media, the stories told, the problems discovered, could be organized and transmitted as quickly as possible to the party and government [in Chenzhou], to be gathered and considered.”

Two weeks ago, the announcement by local leaders of a new “watchdog journalism prize” in the city of Chenzhou, Hunan province, drew sharp criticism from newspapers across China. Today, leaders in Chenzhou sought to clarify their intentions through a news report in the official People’s Daily.
After the prize was included in Chenzhou’s “Opinion on Further Supporting the Work of News Media” on January 11, many commentators characterized it as an effort to impede media supervision by co-opting it. They called for better protections for journalism independent from official meddling, and noted that while the prize targeted provincial and national media, local media in Chenzhou had been left out.
“What is most regrettable,” said a January 15 editorial in Southern Metropolis Daily, “is that up to today there is still no definite legal relationship between the media and the monitoring of public power, and the right to conduct watchdog journalism has not been afforded adequate protection. When officials are happy, they can give out watchdog journalism prizes, when they are unhappy they can keep [news] from seeing the light of day”.
The latter portion of today’s news article in People’s Daily, in which the reporter paraphrases the words of a Chenzhou spokesperson, follows:
During the forum a spokesperson from the municipal party committee of Chenzhou said that in the last year Chenzhou had not only suffered its worst natural disasters in 500 years, but had also seen a series of corrupt actions by the former party secretary, Li Dalun (李大伦), that had a profound negative impact [on Chenzhou]. Prior to this the municipal propaganda department had issued its “Three Mustn’ts” in a document targeted at watchdog journalism, [saying] “outside media must not be provided with news sources; outside journalists must not be received; and outside media must not be joined or cooperated with”.
[Chenzhou] learned lessons from bitter experience. The party and government leaders of Chenzhou believe that to build a harmonious society requires taking further steps to emphasize and bring into play support for the news media and its monitoring role. Building a splendid and harmonious Chenzhou requires taking further steps to create an ideal environment for public opinion and the propagating of information. They [the Chenzhou leadership] said: it is inconceivable that Chenzhou, with a population of 4.6 million, will not give rise to problems. If we focus only on achievements and do not face real problems head on, if we listen only to praise and do not countenance criticism … then we cannot make forward progress in our work, and [social] conflict will grow worse and worse. Criticism shakes us from our complacency, [so] supervision is support. It was for these reasons that [the Chenzhou government] released its “Opinion”.
Facing the controversy brought on by the “watchdog journalism prize”, Chenzhou’s party secretary [top leader] Ge Hongyuan (葛洪元), said that releasing news was a means and promoting the work [of the leadership] the end goal. The “watchdog journalism prize” [he said] was not just for show … [He] hoped that in the process of carrying out watchdog journalism, the information gathered by the media, the stories told, the problems discovered, could be organized and transmitted as quickly as possible to the party and government [in Chenzhou], to be gathered and considered.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 25, 2007, 5:49pm]

If there’s one message to be taken away from the January 23 edition of Beijing Daily, the mouthpiece of top city leaders in China’s capital, it’s that Party newspapers can be feisty too. More than a week after top publishing officials in China announced a nationwide ban on eight books, drawing domestic and international criticism, Beijing Daily slipped an excerpt from one of those books, The Other Stories of History, by former People’s Daily journalist Yuan Ying (袁鹰), into a prominent place on its inner pages. [IMAGE: Page 15 of Beijing Daily, January 23, with exerpt (at top) of Yuan Ying’s recently-banned book/byline marked in RED].

The particular essay chosen by Beijing Daily, in which Yuan Ying discusses his various pen names of the past, is not itself sensitive. But the “Yuan Ying” byline is clear, and clearly a shot across the bow of officials at the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), particularly deputy director Wu Shulin (邬书林).
CMP has written repeatedly about the way commercial newspapers (generally spin-offs of provincial and city-level party newspapers) push the envelope on various issues, both in news coverage and editorials. This latest case at Beijing Daily, a newspaper strictly controlled by top city leaders in Beijing, is a reminder of the complexity of China’s media environment.
Yuan Ying’s latest collection of essays, The Other Stories of History: My Days at the Supplement Division of People’s Daily (风云侧记 — 我在人民日报副刊的岁月), looks back with a level head on three decades of turmoil facing intellectuals in China, from the Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 to the Cultural Revolution. While the book deals with many tragic episodes top Chinese leaders faced head-on in the early 1980s, Wu Shulin recently accused the book of “revealing state secrets”.
More Sources:
“Book Ban Violates My Rights, Says Author”, SCMP, January 20, 2007
“Denial of the Past Will Impede China’s Future“, SCMP, January 19, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 25, 4:37pm]

China Economic Times, a newspaper published by the Development Research Center of the State Council, published a lengthy story yesterday on the Lan Chengzhang case by former CMP fellow Wang Keqin, one of China’s leading investigative reporters. Wang Keqin’s report is the most thorough to appear so far on the controversial case, in which Lan, who was working as a reporter for China Trade News, was attacked while reportedly working on a story about an illegal mine in Shanxi province. The case has drawn strong attention from the Chinese public, top officials and domestic and foreign media since the first report appeared in Southern Metropolis Daily on January 16. (Kudos to Hong Kong blogger Roland Soong for translating the entire Wang Keqin report).
More on Wang Keqin and his work is available through the CMP site, including a case study on one of Wang’s earlier reports on corruption in Beijing’s taxi industry.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 25, 2007, 12:47pm]

City law-enforcement officials in Datong, Shanxi Province, announced at a press conference yesterday that they had made a breakthrough in the case of murdered reporter Lan Chengzhang, taking seven suspects into custody. Datong police launched a probe into the reporter’s murder under pressure from national and provincial officials, who reportedly ordered an investigation be carried out “swiftly”. [More coverage translated at ESWN]. [BELOW: Screen capture of news coverage on Lan Chengzhang investigation, Sina.com].

A report from China News Service, available through major Web portals, said that after the incident happened “central, provincial and city leaders gave the case top priority”.
“CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), CCP Politburo Standing Committee Member Li Changchun (李长春), CCP Politburo Committee Member … Public Security Bureau Chief Zhou Yongkang (周永康), and Public Security Bureau Vice Chief Bai Jingfu (白景富) issued in succession formal instructions calling for a swift determination of the situation [in the Lan Chengzhang case] and the release of a report at the earliest possible moment”, the China News Service report said, noting that provincial officials had issued similar orders.
China’s domestic media have continued to report heavily on the Lan Chengzhang case since news broke in Southern Metropolis Daily on January 16. The story has prompted some newspapers to call for better protections for journalists in China.
In a January 22 editorial, Kunming’s Spring City Times used the Lan Chengchang story and other recent media stories, including a sketchy new watchdog journalism prize in Hunan province and watchdog journalism-related language in an anti-corruption legislation in Zhengzhou, to discuss the need for “specific laws” protecting the press:
These three [abovementioned] events, taken together, reveal a “love-hate” dynamic in the relationship between the government and news media in China, like that between “lovers”.
In a democratic society, the right of the people to monitor the government is in large part realized through the news media. If this principle is carried out [in deed], the relationship between the media and government should be one of monitor and monitored. Naturally, to the extent the media is an industry, the government has a duty to regulate it. Here we glimpse the [seemingly] contradictory relationship in which [the media and government] are both united and oppositional.
No matter what country’s mainstream media, the emphasis is on the interests of the nation and the people, and this means that in most instances the goals of media and government are one and the same. Their relationship should be one of mutual reliance and counter-valence, maintaining a state of balance. If one side takes pains to upset this balance, this will cause significant damage to both sides — during last year’s Typhoon “Saomei” in Fujian Province, reported numbers of dead showed considerable variance among the people because news media were strictly controlled [by local Party officials] …
For the media, having an atmosphere suited to watchdog journalism is much more meaningful than watchdog journalism prizes of any kind. For Zhejiang Province to emphasize the media’s right to conduct watchdog journalism through local legislation is progress. But while in a modern democratic society the fact that the “news media carry out watchdog journalism in accordance with the law … on government employees as they perform their official duties” is common knowledge, we still lack specific laws for [protecting] the exercising [of watchdog journalism], and when the rubber meets the road it is hard to ensure journalists are free to report.
The realization of watchdog journalism depends on good-faith interaction between media and the government. Officials have no need for teeth-grinding hate of the press, nor must they love them wholeheartedly.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 24, 2007, 4:36pm]

Chinese broadcast officials announced over the weekend that only television dramas cleaving to the Party’s “main theme” would air during prime time this year. The measure, announced under the banner of China’s self-proclaimed “Year of Quality Television Dramas”, masks a campaign to keep threatening content out of prime-time television during what Party leaders regard as an especially sensitive year, marking the 50-year anniversary of the Anti-Rightist Movement and the start of the crucial 17th Party Congress. [Below: Headline in Jinghua Times announces the new SARFT regulations].

The language “carry forward the main theme” (弘扬主旋律) is an unambiguous Communist Party buzzword, encapsulating the notions of Party control, the supremacy of Marxism, the central position of heroic Party figures, and other key concepts, in an analogy to orchestral music. In recent years, the idea of the “main theme” has persisted as a term of some importance in China, complemented under commercialization with the notion of “promoting pluralism”. In television programming, the marriage of the two concepts suggests a CCP-style political correctness enlivened with themes more relevant to viewers — love stories, emotional turmoil, etc.
During a January 20 meeting, top leaders from the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT) announced that “beginning next month and for a period lasting at least eight months” — stretching through the Party Congress in October — satellite television stations in China would “without exception” broadcast “main theme television dramas” (主旋律电视剧).[Coverage from Jinghua Times via Sina.com].
Characterizing the new regulations as an effort to emphasize quality over quantity, SARFT officials said a 2003 relaxation of restrictions on television production had brought a flood of low-quality content into the industry. “This is a special year for all television programming,” said SARFT Deputy Director Wang Weiping (王卫平), quoted in Jinghua Times today. “In order to create good conditions and a favorable environment, SARFT declares that: from February and lasting for a period of eight months, all satellite channels will without exception broadcast main theme television dramas”.
Wang said SARFT had established a four-tier inspection and approval system for television dramas, in which they would first be submitted to the provincial office of SARFT and from there go to provincial propaganda authorities, the national SARFT office and finally to the Central Propaganda Department.
The move drew scorn and sarcasm from Chinese Web users.
“What is main theme television?” one user asked on the popular Chinese Web portal Sina.com. “Is it singing the praises of officials and their achievements? Or is it about things relevant to people’s lives, getting rid of corruption, fighting dirty power?”
Another Web user pointedly suggested China should share its policies with the world: “Shouldn’t we have the United Nations issue a decision: We cannot let Chinese people enjoy this happy [policy] on their own — the whole world must broadcast China’s main theme television? That would make it really fantastic!”
Many users hearkened back to the Leftist propaganda classics of the Cultural Revolution, suggesting bitingly that there was no reason for new productions if these were available: “It’s good enough just to re-air the eight exemplary plays [of the Cultural Revolution]. That’ll be flavorful enough. Why film new television dramas? I agree [with this policy].” And: “I support the State Administration of Radio Film and Television! It’s enough if we just film a few exemplary films each year. That way we won’t need to spend so much money!”
In a country where the popularity of video file-sharing has taken off in recent months, another Web user gave a verbal shrug, suggesting everyone should scrap their televisions and go with online broadcasts: “I’d like to ask — do I have the right during prime time to not, not, not to watch TV? I’d like to ask — the ‘main theme’ television you are talking about, if it is ‘main’, why doesn’t it have the guts to compete on level ground with other TV programs, but instead has to make use of monopoly power? …You guys go ahead with your making of regulations and carrying them out — you have a monopoly after all! As for myself, my prime time comes a bit later. It’s not affected. Ha ha! … From now on, those who set up new homes shouldn’t bother buying televisions. If you have a computer, there no sense in having a TV”.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 22, 2007, 4:21pm]

A decision by publishing censors in China to ban eight books has angered many Chinese and brought a wave of online criticism, demonstrating again the power of the Internet as a form of expression in China.
Controversy over the decision to ban the eight books [list from SCMP], announced last week by Wu Shulin (邬书林), deputy director of the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), comes on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the party’s shutdown of the Freezing Point supplement of China Youth Daily newspaper. [Summary of book ban by Danwei.org].
As was the case in the Freezing Point episode last year, in which intellectuals, officials and industry colleagues came to the supplement’s defense via the Web, resulting in its eventual re-launch, a number of prominent figures have stepped forward to criticize this most recent high-profile censorship case. Zhang Yihe (章诒和), the well-known author of one of the banned works and a recipient of the 2004 Freedom to Write Award from the Independent Chinese PEN Center (ICPC), has pledged in an open statement to defend her work to the end: “When my last two books were killed, I responded that I ‘didn’t care’ … This time, I do care, I care very much! Mr. Wu, let me tell you: I’ll face this gravely illegal behavior of yours with my life. Zhu Yingtai [a story character] gave her life to protect her love. I am prepared to give my life to protect my work” [Full translation of statement from ESWN].
On a popular Chinese bulletin board site, Zhang’s statement was introduced by Beijing lawyer and former CMP fellow Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强), who has served as defense counsel for a number of high-profile press freedom cases in China. Pu Zhiqiang also criticized Wu Shulin in a blog entry.
But while the Freezing Point episode concerned actions taken by the Party against news media via the Central Propaganda Department, opposition to the book ban is now directed toward a government office under the State Council, China’s highest administrative authority. Critics, including Zhang Yihe, say the actions of GAPP go against the stated goals of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and the State Council. As Zhang Yihe wrote: “Mr. Wu, what camp to you belong to? Not long ago, Premier Wen Jiabao said publicly that he hoped and demanded that Chinese writers and artists could speak the truth … GAPP is a subordinate office of the national government, under the State Council. Is this [GAPP action] not going directly against the State Council?”
The book ban controversy is also backgrounded by another upcoming anniversary — the fiftieth anniversary of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, launched in July 1957. Reference to this historical event, in which tens of thousands were purged as “rightist” elements critical of the policies of Mao Zedong, is apropos because the language of the GAPP ban targets not just content deemed unacceptable, but the writers themselves. GAPP Deputy Director Wu Shulin used the words “this person” to refer to Zhang Yihe in particular. Which is why Zhang Yihe, the daughter of a prominent “rightist” purged in 1957, alludes to factionalism in her public statement: “I understand that in Mr. Wu’s eyes, Zhang Yihe is a rightist. OK, let’s say I am a rightist. I’d like to ask: Isn’t a rightist a citizen [with a constitutional right to free speech/Chapter II, Article 25] all the same?”.
On top of this, the book ban controversy underscores the sometimes puzzling lack of uniformity in policy decisions and their execution that marks a China in transition. While the GAPP ban was issued on January 11, the January 14 edition of the official People’s Daily included a brief item about one of the books on the list, Yuan Ying’s (袁鹰) memoir titled Other Stories of History: My Days at the Supplements Division of the People’s Daily (风云侧记:我在人民日报副刊的岁月). Reviews of other books on the list, including Zhang Yihe’s, have appeared in various newspapers since the GAPP ban.
Web postings on the GAPP book ban multiplied at a rapid rate over the weekend on China’s KDnet. While postings were progressively deleted by Web censors — leaving the message: “This user’s post has already been removed by managers” — thousands of Web users voiced their opinions on the government move and shared information about the writers whose work was targeted.
A user called “No Tolerance” wrote: “I support the efforts of Zhang Yihe and the others to defend their rights”. Another, “guangli203”, re-posted Zhang Yihe’s pledge to stand up to GAPP Deputy Director Wu Shulin: “What earth-shaking words,” they wrote. “I support them!”
A user called “Northern Sky” wrote: “I support Zhang’s efforts to take action against them [in the GAPP]. Take action against them? Where does one go to take action against them? The United Nations?”
Wrote user “Tao Tie”: “Even a book that simply describes the pasts of Beijing Opera stars gets banned. The General Administration of Press and Publications is even stricter than during the Republican Era [under the Kuomintang] — is this what is meant by [Hu Jintao’s] Harmonious Society?”
One user, “Gong Buo”, included in “Post #8” a list of works by Zhang Yihe, to which another user subsequently responded: “Please go quickly and fill your prescription [buy books] according to Post #8. Supplies are limited!”
More Links:
“History Books Get the Axe“, Danwei.org, January 19, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 22, 2007, 1:59pm]

January 17 – The beating death of China Trade News reporter Lan Chengzhang (兰成长) sparked a controversy in China over press safety and media corruption as local party officials in Datong, Shanxi Province (where the reporter was killed), insisted Lan was a “fake” reporter out to extort money from local coalmines, and representatives from China Trade News confirmed they hired Lan on a provisional basis. [Coverage from ESWN here and here].
January 17 — Thousands of Chinese web users responded as Guangzhou’s top law-enforcement official, Zhang Guifang (张桂芳), blasted the media as the primary source of a worsening sense of public safety in the city. By late afternoon, Web censors were working to contain the story, and thousands of postings suddenly vanished from one major Web portal.
January 22 – A decision by publishing censors in China to ban eight books angered many Chinese and brought a wave of online criticism, demonstrating again the power of the Internet as a form of expression in China. The controversy came on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the party’s shutdown of the Freezing Point supplement of China Youth Daily newspaper. As was the case in the Freezing Point episode in 2006, in which intellectuals, officials and industry colleagues came to the supplement’s defense via the Web, resulting in its eventual re-launch, a number of prominent figures stepped forward to criticize the book ban.
January 22 — Rui Chengang, a well-known anchor at China Central Television, drew international attention as he wrote a criticism on his personal Weblog about the presence of a Starbuck’s coffee in the Forbidden City. [More coverage from ESWN]. [Coverage from IHT]. [Coverage from Shanghai Daily].
January 22 — Chinese broadcast officials announced that only television dramas cleaving to the Party’s “main theme” would air during prime time this year. The measure, announced under the banner of China’s self-proclaimed “Year of Quality Television Dramas”, masked a campaign to keep threatening content out of prime-time television during what Party leaders regard as an especially sensitive year, marking the 50-year anniversary of the Anti-Rightist Movement and the start of the crucial 17th Party Congress. The language “carry forward the main theme” (弘扬主旋律) was an unambiguous Communist Party buzzword, encapsulating the notions of Party control, the supremacy of Marxism, the central position of heroic Party figures, and other key concepts, in an analogy to orchestral music. In recent years, the idea of the “main theme” has persisted as a term of some importance in China, complemented under commercialization with the notion of “promoting pluralism”. In television programming, the marriage of the two concepts suggests a CCP-style political correctness enlivened with themes more relevant to viewers — love stories, emotional turmoil, etc. Characterizing the new regulations as an effort to emphasize quality over quantity, SARFT officials said a 2003 relaxation of restrictions on television production had brought a flood of low-quality content into the industry.

China’s top administrative authority, the State Council, passed “in principle” yesterday the long-awaited ordinance on information disclosure [中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例（草案)], which some experts believe could give the public and media better access to a whole range of government information.
The ordinance, which could pave the way for a more powerful law on information disclosure, has been in the works since the National People’s Congress submitted a proposal for creation of a draft in March 2006. The draft was to make its debut by the end of last year, but was reportedly held up by internal wrangling between top government officials and elements within the propaganda apparatus, and many local officials, who felt it might give the media too much power.
A number of local governments in China, including Shanghai, Guangzhou and Zhengzhou, have come out with their own disclosure ordinances over the last few years. Isolated cases of journalists or citizens attempting to use these regulations to access government information have been unsuccessful, but some experts believe the national ordinance, once it takes effect, could put local governments under greater pressure to comply.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 18, 2007, 12:28pm]

Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily was silent today on Guangzhou’s top law-enforcement official, Zhang Guifang (张桂芳), the day after its simple news report on the official’s unpopular suggestion that media were the cause of worsening public safety in the city drew sharp criticism from Chinese Internet users. Other media from across China expressed disapproval of Zhang Guifang’s comments.
Zhang, secretary of Guangzhou’s Politics and Law Committee, said on Tuesday that while “the media and information industry in Guangzhou has played a major role in economic development, it has rapidly worsened some public safety issues”. Southern Metropolis Daily included the comments in a news story that ran yesterday on the popular Beijing-based Web portal Sina.com and drew biting comments from readers. CMP has now learned that postings for the Zhang Guifang story were being deleted by the thousands throughout the day yesterday.
Given Southern Metropolis Daily‘s characteristic outspokenness, it is unusual for the newspaper to stay mum on what is clearly a popular news topic today. While Zhang Guifang is a high-level official in Guangzhou, the newspaper, as a spinoff of Guangdong’s official Nanfang Daily, is controlled by top party officials in the province, and enjoys their protection. So what is going on here? The likely explanation is that, seeing how much noise the Zhang Guifang story was getting yesterday, top editors at Southern Metropolis Daily decided to lay low and let the storm blow over. As CMP noted yesterday, the politics between Zhang Guifang and top provincial leaders, particularly Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, are reportedly somewhat disharmonious. Top leaders in Guangdong are likely to find the press generated by Zhang Guifang’s comments highly embarrassing.
Newspapers outside the bureaucratic bickering of Guangdong did seize on Zhang Guifang’s comments today. Beijing Youth Daily, a newspaper run by the Beijing chapter of the Chinese Communist Youth League, ran a commentary by a member of the Chinese military named Guo Songmin (郭松民) — further attesting to the growing diversity of editorial opinion in the Chinese press — that expressed some sympathy with Zhang’s views, but felt nevertheless that they were misguided:

I understand Secretary Zhang’s speech and that he was not actually arguing that the media had worsened the public safety situation (for example, increases in the actual crime rate), but rather that the media had affected the perception of city residents and outsiders of the safety situation in Guangzhou. If this was his purpose, I believe there was actually no need for Secretary Zhang to blame the media. Media reports are secondary. If there are bubbles and those bubbles are broken, there is still water and not merely air. Media reports might affect the perception of the safety situation in Guangzhou among residents and outsiders, but objectively speaking they are advantageous to the improvement of public safety in Guangzhou.
More, said the writer, should be done to ensure media could cooperate fully in the task of improving public safety:
Summing up, no matter how you look at it, media are all constructive forces in pushing for the improvement of public safety. Officials responsible for coordinating and managing public safety should think more about how to work together with the media, how to help the media in mobilizing public participation and improving the relevant mechanisms. The media should not be regarded as inhibiting forces to be pushed off into the margins. Here we have, in fact, the proper attitude toward the media and its relationship to the handling of public safety.
An editorial in today’s Shanghai Securities News related Zhang Guifang’s comments to the issue of “watchdog journalism”, which has been much discussed in the Chinese media of late. It added to the mix a number of recent media-related news stories, including the beating death of Lan Chengzhang and recent comments from the director of Guangzhou’s Agricultural Standards and Inspection Center, Peng Zongzhi (彭聪直), who said concerns about food safety were the “media’s error”:
　　
If ones says these denials of the utility of watchdog journalism are merely verbal statements, well then, there is the issue of a number of areas passing specific measures that seek to restrict watchdog journalism. For example, at the end of last year, Anhui Province’s Congyang County (枞阳县) “raised” an “opinion” concerning the correct treatment of the work of watchdog journalism — they say that when central or provincial media conduct reporting on serious problems, reporting with rather large implications, those in charge of the offices concerned must receive [these journalists] in person, accompanying them for the whole process. If there are leaders “accompanying them for the whole process”, who will dare speak a word of truth to the reporters? Watchdog journalism becomes meaningless … Even more terrifying is the beating death on January 9 of journalist Lan Chengzhang, in which China Trade News has confirmed Lan is a reporter hired by their paper and sought to defend his rights.
The editorial concludes:
Watchdog journalism is essentially the people exercising through the media their right to monitor public affairs and the affairs of the state. It is an important channel through which to preserve the fundamental interests of the people. Any attempt to inhibit watchdog journalism goes against the central spirit of the people’s interests, and the trends in a number of areas to fend off watchdog journalism are warning sirens. We must fight against the spread of this trend.

[Posted by David Bandurski, January 18, 2007, 11:30am]