Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Commercial papers in China express diversity of views on Saddam Hussein’s execution

News from the Middle East today speaks of continued controversy over the execution of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. CMP has learned from sources in China that television stations there have been warned to tread carefully around news of Saddam’s execution, making reports only according to Foreign Ministry statements and without expressing sympathies for any particular party. This does not necessarily reflect the situation at print media, but it is safe to suppose they were also warned to keep things cool, and particularly not to inflame religious tensions in China. [pdf_hussein-execution-editorial_the-beijing-news.pdf: January 7 editorial in The Beijing News opposes manner of Saddam Hussein’s execution].
Notwithstanding, there has been notable diversity of opinion in the Chinese media over the execution of Saddam Hussein. Once again, we have the usual suspects — the editorial pages at more independent-minded commercial newspapers, mostly those in south China, farthest from the ministers in Beijing. CMP found editorials from, among others, 21st Century Business Herald, Southern Metropolis Daily, The Beijing News, New Express, and Beijing Youth Daily. While coverage from the party papers (the X Dailies) focused on the barest facts of Saddam Hussein’s execution, and offered only quoted opinions from various state leaders outside China, the commercial newspapers sought to represent a broader cross-section of views in editorials from academic experts and engaged readers. CMP has noted before that one can look to the commercial newspapers for dissenting opinion on issues of domestic importance in China, but editorial coverage of this most recent news story suggests at least some of these newspapers are pursuing a professional goal of representing diverse opinion rather than simply offering a single dissenting opinion.
CMP has translated three editorials below. The first, written by U.S.-based scholar Shen Rui, ran in The Beijing News on January 7, but appeared on the author’s blog on January 1. The next two editorials appeared in Southern Metropolis Daily on January 3 and 4,and take sharply different views on such issues as democracy, justice and capital punishment. In the matter of context, it should also be remembered that China dealt recently with its own high-profile death penalty case.
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“I Am Angry: Opposing the Execution of Saddam Hussein”
Shen Rui (U.S.-based scholar)
The Beijing News
January 7, 2007 [available from January 1, 2007, at Shen Rui’s blog]
In my own name, I oppose the death of a tyrant; I oppose employing such a barbaric method, hanging, to deny a life, regardless of how unworthy that that life may be.
Saddam has been executed. Amidst the myriad celebrations leading up to the New Year, following the harvest of autumn, as people across the world settled down to welcome the coming of a new year, as thousands upon thousands of people made their pilgrimage to Mecca, as thousands upon thousands enjoyed the leftovers of Christmas dinner, as all endeavored to pass the holidays in joy, Saddam was hanged.
I do not grieve for Saddam. But I feel the death penalty meted out to him was unjust, the time chosen to execute him repulsive, and the method used to end his life horrifying. So, altogether, I feel angry. Angered into shutting off my television, and using my own way to resist, resist this execution of Saddam — to express my wrath in my own way. I am angry because this cowardly act of hanging Saddam proceeded without the least hindrance. I am angry because I feel deeply despondent about human reason.
I remain thoroughly convinced it was wrong to sentence Saddam to death. Apart from the fact no one has the right to seize the life of another person — this is for me an extreme article of faith, my highest belief about people and humanity — I want to ask what sense there is in putting Saddam to death today? There is perhaps no sense in it at all. With the execution of Saddam, the situation in Iraq will grow only worse, not better, as thousands upon thousands thirst for revenge. The execution of Saddam, aside from exposing the basic cowardice and narrow-mindedness of humankind, will do nothing to make the world a safer place. Why must things be done in such a way?
I am angry, because I have always believed that in the 21st century we should be more enlightened, more rational and more capable of creating a world governed by reason than we were in the 20th century. But I understand now how naïve is this faith of mine, how unrealistic. I realize suddenly that perhaps the 21st century will offer nothing better than the terrors of the 20th century. I am deeply troubled, because in the 20th century the West had two major wars that brought the destruction of civilization. Facing the 21st century, I felt certain we had learned our lessons, that we could take comparatively rational and moderate positions in dealing with complicated affairs. I know now that this was probably a fantasy, and that we perhaps still face in the 21st century a barbaric world devoid of rationality. I don’t know whether the Iraq War begun in 2003 was merely a prelude, and whether more destruction lies ahead. But in the future we cannot see, the shadows [and signs] of greater destruction are already over our heads. This means we must look very carefully at ourselves.
I am angry, because the timing of Saddam’s execution was chosen in such a calculated manner, and with such cowardice. Can those people who planned this execution not see that the time, timing and times of this execution (时间、时机和时代) have created a hero for all times? Do they think they’ve accomplished a wonderful feat, to take a captured and captive despot up onto the gallows? During these times of holiday celebration, to make the people of the world face the death of an old man who perhaps no longer has any power to inflict harm — this is quite plainly to manufacture romantic heroism. Saddam’s silence gives no peace to those who carried out the sentence. The death of a person of such great guilt and extreme evil leaves people in the end only to feel that they’ve somehow been wrong. Now, thousands of people go to see Saddam’s grave. From January 1, 2007, how will history and those who come after remember and judge this man who was supposed to be the worst kind of despot? 100 years from now, how will people view what we’ve done today? Our silence and our tolerance [for this act]?
My anger is also about my extreme disappointment with the actions of America, this country in which I’ve chosen to live and work. Its democratic principles and ideals are being destroyed and challenged by the unscrupulousness of the current administration. We must take responsibility for the fact that we could not keep them from taking the stage [in elections], that we could not prevent an unnecessary war, that we could not prevent the senseless waste of the lives of our sons and daughters and our resources, that we allowed a small coterie of warmongers to mislead this country. These are the things for which we bear responsibility: we stirred up greater hate, manufactured more death, made the world less safe, and made the terrorists more aggressive. This is our responsibility, a responsibility no American can avoid: how do we face the founding fathers, and how do we face the reason and ideals that they upheld? How do we face the future?
My son gave me a phone call from an island in the Pacific and said, “Mom, I feel really angry about the execution of Saddam, and I feel seriously let down by America”. Hearing my son’s words, on the last day of 2006, I had no words, only tears. Anger set my hand to writing this small article to oppose, in my own name, the death of a tyrant, to oppose this barbaric use of hanging to take a human life, regardless of how unworthy that life may be, to oppose the American invasion of Iraq, and, as a mother, to weep for the tens of thousands of lives tragically lost in this war.

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“Must the Flowers of Democracy Be Nourished With Blood?”
Xiao Shu (笑蜀)
Southern Metropolis Daily
January 3, 2007, A02

In the end there was no way for Saddam Hussein to escape death. When the news [of his execution] was released, welcoming cheers echoed across the Web.
I understand that jubilation. Saddam was a man of many crimes, with the fresh blood of his brothers on his hands. But understanding does not equal agreement. Even if Saddam’s actions merit a thousand deaths, I do not believe that to execute him now is the best possible decision. Had Saddam been executed amidst the crimes of his violent politics, had Saddam been murdered as he resisted capture, I would have been overjoyed. The problem is Saddam did not die in such a way. Saddam was an old man captured, having lost all power to resist, presenting no danger to anyone. That is to say, he had already become an ordinary person, defenseless, posing no danger whatsoever in the real world. The life of this ordinary Saddam should be respected. Of course he was guilty of serious crimes, and to not hold him accountable would be an affront to justice. But for Saddam, to have lost his power and be held captive was already the gravest of indignities, was already the best of all possible forms of retribution. What need was there to make him pay by robbing him of his life?
For an old man with one foot in the grave to be marched up on the gallows is a most inhumane act, however one looks at it — it’s not something that I can accept. Notwithstanding, many of my friends believe Saddam’s hanging will become the nightmare troubling despots everywhere, and therefore accelerate the process of democratization – or, in other words, the flower of democracy can be nourished only with the blood of despots. This sort of logic may seem airtight at first glance, but I’ve always found it specious.
Why do we need democracy? Or, why is democracy preferable to despotism? There are many reasons, but the most important reason of all is that despotism destroys humanity, that the rule of despotism turns human beings into beasts. Under despotism no one is secure, anyone may, at any time, be preyed upon, and people live in a state of fear. Not so with democracy. Democracy upholds humanity, because under democratic systems, life itself becomes the most precious value of society, and intruding on the life of another becomes the greatest evil and is prohibited. The life of each person receives the strictest protection of the law.
Democracy does not relish the blood of despots, but rather cherishes every drop of blood. This is what separates democracy from despotism. Of course there have been democracies in history [or democratic movements] that have not cherished blood [IE, in which blood was shed], as with the French Revolution, as with the Russian Revolution. Whether it is democracy that does not respect every drop of blood, or democracy that does not respect human life, or democracy marked by violence, all lie just to one side of despotism. It is simply a question of one man’s despotism versus a regime of collective political violence.
Democracy does not trade blood for blood, or seek to slake every thirst for revenge. An eye for an eye, this ancient concept of revenge, long ago became incompatible with modern civilization, and is not what we should seek. The idea that we must fight against evil with everything in our power cannot bring us true fairness and justice, but in fact will lead only to the plundering of morality and reason, multiplying violence by violence, bringing about civil strife. Democracy stresses humanity. Democracy also stresses clemency, stresses compromise. Yes, crimes must be accounted. But accounting for crimes does not mean asking for blood. Taking the example of Saddam, life imprisonment would have been in keeping with the principle of holding him to account, would not have prevented justice, and would also have meant sparing his life, showing the high moral values of moderation and compromise. Is this not the best of both worlds — virtuous and wise? To not employ such well-advised policies, to insist that Saddam pay with his blood to lay the foundations of democracy in Iraq. This extreme mode of action is, in my view, unbefitting to the work of creating a democracy in Iraq.
In an age of fairness — even if he was a despot, and so long as he has lost all power to harm others — we should give him the benefit of the doubt. If Saddam had been handled in such a way, this would have made a good demonstration to other despots, warning them stop the killing and change their evil ways. But sadly this opportunity has already been lost. Perhaps because of this other despots will resort to further extremes, and the price paid by the process of democratization will be even more serious. Therefore, in my view, the death of Saddam is not only an unhappy note for democracy in Iraq, but equally an unhappy note for the world.

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“Saddam’s Regret, Iraq’s Progress”
Xu Yiwei (余以为)
Southern Metropolis Daily
January 4, 2007, A2

The wild image of a Saddam captured, who had not committed suicide, made many of Saddam’s sympathizers lose hope. Now that he has quietly gone to his death, Saddam can be said to have regained some of the dignity he lost with his capture. Saddam knew the death penalty was unavoidable. His only regret was that they did not opt for a form of execution in which his blood would be spilt.
In contrast to Saddam’s own regrets, yesterday’s essay by Xiao Shu in this esteemed newspaper, “Must the Flowers of Democracy Be Nourished With Blood?”, seems far too poetic. Saddam was hanged, and his blood was not spilt. I emphasize this not only because Saddam demanded before the court to be executed by firing squad (shedding blood), but because before Saddam was captured he had an opportunity to take his own life but did not wish to inter himself in earth stained with his own blood.
There are many forms of execution, from Japan’s dissection of living people, to ancient China’s beheading, cutting of victims in half at the waist, splitting of people by horse carts, the inflicting of 4,200 death cuts. We should all be familiar with these from our school history textbooks. The replacement of execution by firing squad with lethal injection is still going on, and is a process not yet completed. To use a comparatively civilized method, taking all possible care to ensure the criminal’s dignity in executing Saddam, represents major progress for Iraq. Iraq’s national dignity was also restored through the process of this sentencing, as the decision of Iraq’s special court was respected.
For the Iraqi government to resume the capital punishment that Saddam abused during his rule, and to which the American, British and U.N. forces put an end, is criticized in those countries where the death penalty is already a thing of the past. While Iraq has returned to rule of law for only a short time now, the openness of the trial process, their serious treatment of capital punishment (requiring the president’s signature) and relatively moderate way of carrying it out, should be praised and studied.
Democracy doesn’t seek perfection. The cleanliness of democracy is only a mirage in the process of democratization. What democratization requires is rationality.

[Posted by David Bandurski, January 9, 2006, 1:25pm]

January 2 – January 9, 2007

January 2 — A new local regulation designed to combat official corruption and abuse of duty took effect in Henan’s capital city of Zhengzhou, making specific mention of watchdog journalism, or “supervision by public opinion” (舆论监督), as a key form of monitoring. The ordinance designates a range of areas — a “region of priority supervision” — for monitoring of government behavior by prosecutors and the press. These include, among others, official expenditures (treating of guests, etc), and the levying of educational fees.
January 5 — A number of media reports in China discussed the growing popularity of new “ID generation” software among Chinese Internet users, suggesting users might be finding ways around the proposed real-name registration system even before it has been implemented.
January 5 — Southern Metropolis Daily, a commercial spinoff of Guangdong’s official Nanfang Daily, called for Chinese leaders to strike a pact with domestic media similar to that it announced recently with foreign media, which have been promised greater access in the run up to the 2008 Olympic Games. In a page 2 editorial, the newspaper sought to dovetail the notion of a freer domestic press with Chinese President Hu Jintao’s social policy of the “harmonious society”, saying that if “this [concept of] ‘constructive and cooperative partnership’ were extended the government’s relationship with domestic media, this would … allow the media to take a more active and professional role in the building of a harmonious society”.
January 7 — Chinese media continued to reflect back on the jailing of journalist Gao Qinrong, who was released recently after eight years in prison. [Coverage from ESWN].

Southern Metropolis Daily calls for a domestic “partnership” between government and media

Carrying its recent tradition of outspoken editorial writing into 2007, Southern Metropolis Daily today offered backhanded praise for the State Council’s “constructive” relationship with foreign media and said the same relationship should apply to domestic media. [pdf_editorial-on-domestic-partnership_smd.pdf: Today’s A2 editorial page in Southern Metropolis Daily].
The editorial, again a case of jieti fahui (or using the opportunity afforded by an official pronouncement to make one’s own point), followed a statement by Cai Wu, a minister of the State Council Information Office, on December 28 in which he said foreign reporters were welcome in China and that the government viewed them as “constructive and cooperative partners”.
The editorial also sought strategically to dovetail the notion of a freer domestic press with Chinese President Hu Jintao’s social policy of the “harmonious society”, saying that if “this [concept of] ‘constructive and cooperative partnership’ were extended the government’s relationship with domestic media, this would … allow the media to take a more active and professional role in the building of a harmonious society”.
The editorial follows in full:
“Government and Media Should Be Partners in Cooperation”
Southern Metropolis Daily
January 5, 2007, A2
2006 has passed, and the echoes of promise give us cause to anticipate more bright things to come. For the media, the new relationship State Council Information Office minister Cai Wu has forged between the Chinese government and international media is a self-confident, professional and worldly action. If this brilliance shines in all directions, touching domestic media too, this will earn worldwide respect for the position of Chinese media.
According to the Chinese News Service, Information Office head Cai Wu announced that China would relax its restrictions on foreign media reporting activities in China, that it would explain Chinese policies and release information “as quickly and accurately as possible” through a more comprehensive and normalized press announcement system. Moreover, [Mr. Cai said] contacts for press spokespeople would be publicized for media and society, allowing spokespeople to “go out” and directly meet with reporters and answer questions. He said China would better accommodate the trends of globalization, internationalization and information exchange, taking the initiative in providing the public and media with authoritative and accurate information.
This active initiation of a new strategy for media meets international practice and displays self-confidence. It is also beneficial in molding the image of a China opening up. Of course, the thing to most take notice of is this new conceptualization of the relationship between the government and the media. Cai Wu described the relationship of the Information Office with foreign media as one of “constructive and cooperative partnership”.
“Constructive” means Chinese officials recognize foreign media play a positive role in constructing an image of China and advertising its policies, and that they no longer view them [foreign media] entirely as vehicles for disparaging [China] with negative news. “Cooperative” means Chinese government officials will “not be afraid of having contact with media”, that they will help media to carry out reporting in a public, transparent and timely way, avoiding the release of inaccurate, incomplete or false information by foreign media. “Partnership” means the government and the media are on equal terms, that there are no hierarchies of status but rather mutual respect and responsibility.
Viewing the international media in such a broad-minded and rational way is sure to draw the respect of the world. It goes without saying that this policy will have a major affect on China once it goes into effect … and [the policy] has already been reported widely and with enthusiasm by international media.
If this [concept of] “constructive and cooperative partnership” were extended the government’s relationship with domestic media, this would not only gain more respect for China internationally, but would also allow the media to take a more active and professional role in the building of a harmonious society. Speaking in terms of their abilities as media, there is fundamentally no difference between domestic and international media — both are fast, accurate ways to transmit various kinds of information, particularly concerning government affairs, letting the people know the true state of things and the true meaning of policies. If the government uses domestic media as a professional and duty-bound equal partner, then many of the careless remarks of Western media about China will disappear automatically.
Actually, domestic media are more constructive than international media. In the first place, domestic media do not have an ideological and cultural gap with the government, and share with the government a lofty sense of responsibility to protect the country and the interests of the people. For this reason there’s no need to set up defenses, and even less need to worry about impure motives. Moreover, the media can be more comprehensive and in-depth than the government in gathering of facts about society. What they see and feel (their news reports and editorials) not only help the people better understand the situation at the national, provincial and city levels, but also can inform the government in a timely way about what is going on in society, serving as a reference for officials in making government policy. If the government relaxes its hand and allows the media to independently realize a professional spirit, then many of the crooked paths of contemporary history will be avoided, not to mention numerous accidents in everyday life.
In the same way, domestic media have greater capacity than international media to “cooperate” with the government. After going through decades of opening and reform experience and political training and experience, domestic media are no longer colored with a Lu Xun-style critical complex, nor do they blindly admire the West. Rather they deal more with the concrete matters of their work, meeting all manner of social problems and breaking news with seriousness, pursuing the truth. They are most contented when employing their own professional vision and a spirit of reason to help the government solve all sorts of social problems, when they raise public confidence by getting an accurate grasp of policy and the facts. In terms of their value orientation and the fundamental interests of the people, the government and the media are in fact united — and this is especially the case in China.
Right now what we need to work harder to redefine [“recreate”] is the question of the [relative] standing of government and the media. In China, the political system determines that government and the media are intimate “partners”. But for reasons of historical legacy, the media’s subordinate status has meant it cannot carry out news reporting and commentary in a professional and timely way. As a result it happens that media are in the doubly embarrassing position of [A] not being able to transmit the government’s will quickly and in an easily understandable fashion and [B] not being able to provide an accurate picture of government policies. When public confidence in the media is weak this actually damages public confidence in the government. If the government relaxes its hand and allows the media to use their own principles to carry out reporting and the transmission of information, this will go a long way toward promoting government effectiveness in dealing with change [emergencies, etc] and the accuracy of government policies. At the same time it will help the government more quickly and comprehensively understand the political situation and the will of the people, making [relevant] policies and promoting the project of building a harmonious society. (The writer is a journalist).

[Posted by David Bandurski, January 5, 2007, 6:20pm]

Chinese media: “personal ID generation tool” could undermine real-name registration on the Web

There’s been hardly a peep about the proposed real-name registration system for the Web in China since the chairman of the Internet Society of China, charged with creating the system, stepped out on November 28 to calm fears such a system would violate personal privacy. Officials have said the system is necessary to enforce “responsible” Web use in China and combat such behavior as online character attacks and fraud.
But a ripple of recent reports about new “ID generation” software in China suggests Web users might be finding ways around the real-name system even before it’s been rolled out.
The so-called “personal ID generation tool” (身份证生成器) software, available online for more than a year now, has become one of the hottest downloads on the Chinese Internet in recent months, according to Chinese media reports. The tool enables Web users to generate personal IDs that allow them to bypass real-name registration fields.
The tool is currently being used by online game players who either do not wish to offer up their personal information or are under the legal age required for certain games. But experts have said, according to Guangzhou’s Yangcheng Evening News, that the software could pose a major challenge to a broader real-name registration system for the Chinese Internet, the kind of system the ISC is in the process of creating.
Mr. Huang, an expert at a Hebei-based technology firm, told the Yangcheng Evening News ID generation tools were being downloaded at record rates because users were concerned about personal privacy as the practice of requiring one’s personal ID number became more and more widespread in China.
In a news story posted on China Central Television’s international Website, a reporter watched an online forum as a user with the alias “Minnow” posted the request: “I want to register an account to play online games. Who can loan me an ID number?” Within five minutes a user with the alias “Master-Hand” had posted a link to a site where “Minnow” could download a personal ID generation tool. Speaking with the reporter via the forum, “Minnow” said he was 14 years old and wanted to play online games against the wishes of his parents, whose ID’s (and supervision) would ordinarily be required for online games.
According to Chinese authorities, the use of personal ID generation tools constitutes forgery and is punishable by law, with fines of between 200 and 1,000 yuan and up to 10 days detention, Yangcheng Evening News reported.
MORE LINKS:
‘Personal ID Generation Tool’ Becomes Hot Download, Challenges ‘Real-Name System‘”, ChinaNews.com.cn
Appearance of Personal ID Generation Tool Means Real-Name System Serves Practically No Function“, CCTV.com
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 5, 2007, 12:25pm]

Propaganda discipline 宣传纪律

According to the CCP’s Party constitution: “The Party’s publications must, without condition, publicize the Party line, course, policy, and political views. On highly political matters of policy and theory on which the Party has already passed down decisions, Party members may express their own opinions according to accepted organizational procedures. However, under no circumstances may they make statements against the policy decisions of the Party, whether through publications, broadcasts or other public means. Nor may they disseminate among the public any opinions contrary to the Party line, course, policy or political views. This is the Party discipline”. The Propaganda Bureau may at various times send down varying editions of “propaganda discipline.” Moreover, various media organizations may also set down their own “propaganda discipline.” Generally speaking, “violations of discipline” include “opposing the Four Basic Principles” (of Deng Xiaoping ), “opposing the basic theory, course and creed of the Chinese Communist Party,” “opposing major policies of the Party and the nation,” “endangering national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” “fomenting hostilities against the government, upsetting social order and destroying social stability,” “Broadcasting political rumors, insults or defamation, or smearing the reputation of the Party, the nation or its leaders,” “propagating cult practices,” “revealing [State] secrets,” “reporting news of floods, epidemics, earthquakes or nuclear incidents in violation of regulations,” etc. Those found to “violate discipline” are referred to the Central Disciplinary Committee and various administrative units the according to the specific nature of their crimes (See notice: “Regulations on Punishment of Violators of Propaganda Discipline at Television and Broadcast Organizations,” issued by the State Administration of Radio Film & Television, 2002) [国家广电总局印发《广播电视播出机构工作人员违反宣传纪律处分处理暂行规定》的通知 广发纪字[2002]423号].

Beijing Youth Daily editorial appeals for balance of public and commercial interests in Chinese media

For China’s increasingly commercialized media, the New Year means freshening things up, changing the mix, dropping the bad ratings apples. While China’s political apparatus continues to apply pressure on media from above, commercial imperatives raise the threshold below. Journalism is squeezed in the middle. [PDF: pdf_beijing-youth-daily-editorial.pdf, January 1, 2007]. [IMAGE: Logo for the now defunct Today’s Topic program at Beijing TV].

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On January 1, Beijing Youth Daily rued the passing of one of the latest victims of China’s ratings game, Today’s Topic (今日话题), an investigative news program produced by Beijing TV. Today’s Topic was one of 11 longstanding programs at Beijing TV to get the axe on December 18 last year.
The Beijing Youth Daily editorial argues that while private media in the West are commercially driven, there are mechanisms in place to monitor journalism as a public trust and solicit feedback from viewers through means other than simple audience ratings driven by the needs of advertisers. China, the author suggests, lacks such mechanisms, so that public-interest oriented programming faces inevitable extinction. The editorial follows in full:
“Shedding a Few Tears for Those Vanishing TV Programs”
Ma Shaohua (马少华) [Professor of journalism at Renmin University]
Beijing Youth Daily
January 1, 2007
The end of one year and the beginning of another is the time for news media to make programming adjustments. These are carried out entirely on the basis of audience polls and market research. And while this is a normal principle for the operation, survival and development of media, if it means serious, public-interest programs vanish in the process people will come to understand sooner or later that the loss is ours.
Beijing TV’s Today’s Topic is one such program. If we look at the shared fate of programs of this kind, the cancellation [of Today’s Topic] can be said to have landmark significance.
Since the launch of CCTV’s Focus [investigative news program] in 1993 [http://www.cctv.com/program/jdft/01/], a large number of similar critical television programs have appeared across the country. They investigated social problems, taking on the task of media supervision [Chinese watchdog journalism]. In the last few years before the new century they held a strong position and had broad social influence. Their ratings held steady at the top of the charts. But since the new century the ratings of these programs have suffered, and a number have been cancelled. One issue is that viewers are trending towards entertainment programming, another that the [scope of] topics available for watchdog journalism is narrowing [IE: it’s getting tougher politically for journalists to push harder-hitting topics]. The pattern of [such investigative] programs is monotone, the cost of making them high and the production time drawn out. When competing with the latest generation of live-broadcast commentary, live studio expert interviews and other low-cost, energetic and enjoyable commentary format programs, these [investigative programs] are at a distinct disadvantage. A more direct reason is that they [these investigative programs] are broadcast at peak viewing times that can draw in tens of millions of yuan in advertising revenues, but their low audience ratings are not enticing to advertising agents.
Ratings are one form of evaluative indicator. They employ statistical methods to obtain results from a sample of viewers. Indirectly, they reflect the influence and quality of programming. But the only thing they reflect directly is the collective viewing habits of an audience [IE, quantity over quality, or how invested a viewer is in a program], so they are of most value to advertising agents and have a direct bearing on the station’s advertising revenues. According to a paper by China Central Television’s Guo Yabing (虢亚冰) and Shandong TV’s Gao Limin (高立民) … evaluation systems employing primarily audience ratings are used internationally mostly for commercial TV stations. When Cui Yongyuan (崔永元) said “audience ratings are the source of innumerable evils”, he was employing an extreme expression but speaking to the important influence audience ratings have over the appraisal and survival of programs.
If these serious TV programs disappear due to low ratings, this means first of all that those households whose TV’s have been installed with audience monitoring devices are not watching them. By working their remote controls viewers are expressing their interests. The problem is that while interest is easy to express, true demand is not necessarily so easy to work out. Just as watching a program does not necessarily imply satisfaction with it, a person’s interest [in a program] does not necessarily mean he benefits from it. Speaking from the standpoint of human nature, we are all inclined to entertainment and relaxation, and we avoid those topics that are rather serious and require using greater energy. Viewed from the surface some topics seem relevant to just a small number of people, while entertainment programming can make everyone happy. People pick up their remotes and cast votes for entertainment, failing to realize the dire straits of those comparatively serious programs actually more relevant to their interests [IE, as citizens].
The idea of providing viewers with what they need and not just what they enjoy has already been endorsed by more aware media people in the West as the social responsibility of the media. OK, then what do viewers need? They need to widen their field of vision, gaining a deeper understanding of information and viewpoints that can help them understand their situation and the problems they might face [in the future].
There are also a number of interests that might not be represented in audience ratings indicators. For example, Zhang Haijun (张海军), one of our former master’s students [in Renmin University’s journalism program] and an editor at Today’s Topic, wrote in his thesis that because audience ratings calculations do not cover viewers in rural areas outside [the city], those programs addressing rural issues cannot get ratings support and therefore will necessarily suffer – notwithstanding the very enthusiastic feedback these programs get from rural viewers.
This example shows clearly that topics discussed in the news media are an important public resource and there should if possible be a more open and public process for determining [the kinds of programs available], eliminating the bias that comes with one-side indicators. Similarly, the cancellation of TV programs has long been seen as an internal business and operational question for media.
Perhaps I’m being too much of an idealist in saying this, because these questions [which involve public discussion, etc] are remote from the everyday operations [of media]. But we should also realize that even in the private [non-state] environment of Western media there are such mechanisms as press councils through which society may become involved, and there are public broadcasting systems not influenced by advertising interests. But in our own system for evaluating news media, aside from an audience ratings system under direct pressure from advertising, we still lack a mechanism for the expression of more open and diverse social interests.

Other Links:
In Defense of Journalism as a Public Trust“, Poynter.org
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 4, 2006, 3:41pm]

December 26, 2006 – January 1, 2007

December 28 — Chinese journalist and blogger Fu Jianfeng (傅剑锋) posted an insider’s account [translated at ESWN here] of contacts between himself and his “deepthroat”, a whistleblower offering information on a medical fraud case. The posting offers a sketchy but rare view into the workings of watchdog journalism, or “supervision by public opinion”, in China.
December 29 — China’s top broadcast regulator, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), announced it would take action against online TV stations, referring to those sites advertising themselves as “stations” and offering their own content in addition to video-shared content [more from Danwei.org here].
December 30 — Huang Liangtian (黄良天), editor of Popular Masses (百姓), a magazine published by China’s Ministry of Agriculture, was dismissed from his position and moved to a lesser publication. Media observers speculated the move was due to hard-hitting investigative coverage of worker’s rights and illegal land seizures by officials. [More from Reporters Without Borders here].
January 1 — As Peking University held face-to-face admissions interviews, prospective students were reportedly asked a series of tough social questions, including whether they supported a real-name registration system for the Chinese Internet. Other questions included their views on a number of Chinese cities limiting migrant workers, whether scientists should be involved in politics and business, and what their views were on Hunan TV’s immensely popular Super Girls singing contest.

Flood of salacious “law and order” content hits the Chinese newsstand

What does a bribery case involving a hospital director in the Chinese city of Changde have to do with Hollywood actress Demi Moore? Absolutely nothing. But a perplexing mixture of pilfered Web photos and sensational law and order content smash the two together on a recent issue of Legal News Compendium (法制文荟), one of many “law and order” tabloids now available at newsstands in China. The tabloids, most of which appear to be fronts for soft pornography, provide an interesting glimpse into the dirty bargain basement of Chinese media commercialization. [BELOW: Legal tabloids sold at a newsstand in Shanghai, See PDF for larger image].

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The growing popularity of “law and order” tabloids follows a general trend in Chinese media. “COPS”-style television shows are all the rage on local and national television in China, stealing the ratings thunder from once popular news programs like China Central Television’s “News Probe”. The shows generally receive the support of local police, who see them as a good opportunity to advertise their efforts to combat China’s growing public safety problem. For the first time this year “public security” rose to the top of the list of concerns voiced by officials in a survey conducted by the Central Party School [link to Chinese news here].
The explosion in law and order related programming has already brought tension between the policy goal of educating the general population about the law and the government’s efforts to keep a lid on sensational or indecent content.
In late November national media announced the release by the propaganda department of a “Decision” calling for strengthening of legal education among the general population. Officials said at a forum on law and order programming in late November that to “promote the legal system and realize its use in protecting social harmony [China] must strengthen publicity work and education for the legal system and propagate legal knowledge”.
But China’s top broadcast regulator, the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT), made it clear on November 20 this year that law and order programs would have to tone down their content. SARFT said it would reign in programs showing violent or explicit content, or that leaked facts about critical cases.
Browsing a newsstand in Shanghai last week, CMP found 10 “law and order” tabloids that seem to be riding the wave of interest in good-guys-bad-guys stories — and giving their circulations an extra boost with salacious content. All of the tabloids sell for just one yuan. All have blue banners and are called “Legal” (法制) something or other: Legal Viewpoint (法制视点), Legal Weekly (法制周刊), Legal Spectacle (法制大观), Legal Life (法制生活). Only three have the required publishing license numbers on display on their front pages, but some have licenses for unrelated publications listed inside. The papers cover a range of legal cases and information apparently from police blotters.
The top story in the Changde (Demi Moore) issue of Legal News Compendium is about the busting up in 2005 of a crime ring selling Chinese women across provinces [Internet photo of Moore used by the paper here]. There are no datelines or bylines for any of the stories, suggesting they might be robbed from other media. However, CMP could not locate coverage of any of the front page stories in Legal News Compendium in a database of Chinese newspapers going back to the late 1990s. Other stories in the issue include:
*A man jailed 10 days for writing a poem on the Great Wall
*A purse snatcher nabbed after hiding out in a public toilet
*A man “tricking” his girlfriend into becoming a prostitute
*A man severely beaten “over a cigarette” . . .
The Legal News Compendium is far and away the tamest of the bunch. Slightly farther along the sleeze scale is Legal Times (法制时报), which sprinkles prurient images of women among its crime reports. The front page story is identical to that of Legal News Compendium, about a crime ring selling women. This time, though, there is an image at center of a young woman lying on a sofa in her nightgown. The source of the photo has been photoshopped away and the words “photo and text not related” added. This newspaper is the only one to bother pointing out the obvious to readers [BELOW: Image of Legal Times].
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Flip through the pages of Legal Times and you get the usual crime stories with the occasional leering woman and advertisements for sex hotlines crowding together at the bottom of each page.
At Legal World (法制时报) the marriage of sex and the crime story makes it more boldly to the front page. Photos of women beneath the banner refer readers to unrelated law and order stories on the inside. On the inside pages, once again, sultry personals and ads for sex hotlines. [BELOW: Image of Legal World].
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The rest of the tabloid “law and order” newspapers follow the same model of crime content allied with sex. The only other characteristic worthy of note is how these newspapers make use of their publishing licenses.
Returning to the Legal News Compendium, there is no license number listed on the front page. But the title “Northern Family Newspaper” (北方家庭报) appears in small vertical characters beside the larger title. Turn to the center spread and a larger banner for “Northern Family Newspaper” appears, this time with the date (December 10) and the publishing license number (CN15-0051). It’s as though the paper is reversible, so that it can be turned inside out from the center to display its legitimate publisher. Needless to say, the paper is hardly offering family-oriented content.
The same is true of the Legal Spectacle (法制大观), whose center spread has an additional banner for Science and Technology News (科技信息报), apparently the tabloid’s sponsoring institution (主管单位), and the license number (CN15-0047). [BELOW: Image of center of Legal News Compendium with banner at top for “Northern Family Newspaper”]
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[Posted by David Bandurski, December 20, 2006, 5:03pm]

More than just the Gao Qinrong case: Is south China’s old tiger growling again?

There has been a great deal of speculation over the last several days about possible fallout for bolder southern Chinese newspapers following up on the case of Gao Qinrong (高勤荣), the reporter who was released from prison on December 7 after eight years in jail [read about the case at ESWN]. There has been, according to Jonathan Ansfield, news from major Chinese Web portals suggesting at least a limited ban on Gao Qinrong coverage (the purpose of which might be to limit a flood of online opinion), but CMP has so far been unable to confirm the existence of a blanket ban from the Central Propaganda Department. In fact, coverage in southern Chinese media continues, with the Information Times, a commercial spinoff of Guangzhou Daily, today re-running the Southern Metropolis Daily editorial from December 15, and coverage appearing yesterday in Strait News, a commercial newspaper in Fujian province.
The absence of the Gao Qinrong story in Beijing media such as Beijing Youth Daily and The Beijing News suggests local bans might be in force there. It should be remembered that “bans” in China are issued informally, usually via telephone, by a complicated bureaucracy, and are often difficult to pin down.
But setting aside the issue of what ramifications the Gao Qinrong interviews might have for Southern Weekend and/or Southern Metropolis Daily, CMP noted with interest that the entire last issue of Southern Weekend had a bit of the newspaper’s long-lost boldness about it. The piece on Gao Qinrong was not necessarily the boldest of all, in fact.
Throughout the 1990s, Southern Weekend was the primary target of the Central Propaganda Department’s News Commentary Group (阅评组), facing frequent censure and restructuring for pushing the bounds of news coverage. In the years following the ouster of editors Zhang Ping and Qian Gang 2001, many readers and media commentators said Southern Weekend had been effectively tamed by authorities and had lost its spirit of outspokenness.
The recent issue of Southern Weekend arguably recovers some of that old spirit. Starting from the top of Southern Weekend‘s front page on December 14, we have the list of the newspaper’s 12 candidates for “person of the year”, to be featured in the December 28 issue. Roland Soong has translated the list of candidates here, but the placement of former People’s Daily deputy editor-in-chief Zhou Ruijin (周瑞金) in the first spot can be read as a mildly audacious move.

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[Front page of December 14 edition of Southern Weekend]
Zhou Ruijin has been as the center of calls this year for greater political reform. In a May essay, “How Should We See The Third Reform Debate?”, Zhou said China’s third round of debates on its reform path had focused since 2004 on internal contradictions in China, issues such as healthcare, education, affordable housing and the widening gap between rich and poor. Zhou wrote: “I believe that a whole range of problems now appearing in China’s economic reforms today are largely because we’ve not had political system reforms and legal reforms going along in step [with economic reforms]. Along with this, it’s not that these problems are the result of economic reforms so much as that economic reforms have been insufficiently deep, comprehensive and integrated”.
Zhou’s words came on the heels of political reforms in Vietnam, whose Communist Party for the first time held multi-candidate elections for its party chief this year. Zhou Ruijin made the controversial suggestion that China should hold multi-candidate elections for the position of General Secretary in 2007 [More analysis from Willy Lam at The Jamestown Foundation]. By all accounts, Zhou Ruijin’s writings this year met strong opposition from top propaganda officials, so a great deal could potentially be read into Southern Weekend’s decision to place the postage stamp-sized photo of the former editor ahead of the others on its list.
Moving down the front page, we have a large grey headline announcing the Gao Qinrong story on the inside: “One reporter’s eight years in jail”. The tagline reads: “What did eight years in prison mean for a former news reporter? Gao Qinrong, who is now already 46 years old, has no way to answer this. He says only that when he walked out of the prison gates he felt the value of freedom, “Getting out of prison is good — I can go to sleep whenever I please”.
The story dominating the front page of Southern Weekend’s December 14 issue is the sort of “defense of rights” (维权) story CMP said recently seems to be on the rise in China. The story is an investigative piece about citizens in Fujian’s Sanming City pushing the issue of child safety at a local park. The story isn’t the boldest in this edition and is unlikely to raise any red flags with censors, but it does recall Southern Weekend’s tradition of investigative reporting.
Below the investigative report is an editorial by Guo Guangdong (郭光东) about the legal controversy surrounding the “Temple Slayer” case. The editorial again raises the question of rights protection and rule of law. It issues a clear challenge to courts in Shaanxi Province to listen to appeals from prominent legal experts and evaluate the psychological fitness of the defendant in the case, Qiu Xinghua, who was sentenced to death in the first instance trial. The issue at hand is not merely this case, the editorial says, but China’s “legal history” at a crossroads. “Are we not hotly debating ‘The Rise of Great Nations‘? Vast territory, a huge population, or even wealth and a strong military are not enough to make us a great nation. Only as rule of law and human rights are upheld through one after another Qiu Xinghua case will our mother country truly be regarded as a great nation and receive the praise of the world”. CMP noted recently the sensitivity of the term “human rights” in China, a term this editorial did not shrink from using, even in reference to China’s domestic situtation. [SCMP on CCTV’s “Rise of Great Nations” series]. [David Bandurski on series at WSJ].
An article on page B11 of the recent Southern Weekend probably surpasses the Gao Qinrong interview in sensitivity. This is a half-page profile of lawyer Zhang Sizhi, who has represented a legendary line-up of defendants including the “Gang of Four“, China’s most famous dissident, Wei Jingsheng, and Shanghai lawyer Zheng Enchong. Most recently, Zhang Sizhi was an outspoken critic of new government rules placing curbs on rights lawyers in China. [“Zhang Sizhi: Notes from the Wei Jingsheng Case”].
The Zhang Sizhi article, centered around his birthday celebration in Beijing on November 26, takes a close look at China’s most outspoken legal figure, who has tried many of China’s most sensitive and high-profile cases, at a time when the topic of freewheeling lawyers is not particularly welcome in China. Does the article mention the case against Wei Jingsheng in 1995? Yes. Does it mention the case against Zheng Enchong? Yes. The article lists many of Zhang Sizhi’s top cases under his photograph.
The article concludes by describing the scene at Zhang Sizhi’s party, in which he sits together with Mao Zedong’s former secretary Li Rui (李锐), leading legal scholar Jiang Ping (江平) SARS hero Jiang Yanyong (蒋彦永) and reformist economist Mao Yushi (茅于轼). All of these figures are regarded as key proponents of reform in China. Li Rui and Zhang Sizhi were in fact two of the 12 reform-minded former leaders and intellectuals who signed an open letter protesting the shutdown in January 2006 of the weekly Freezing Point. Back in 2003 it had been an interview with Li Rui in which he advocated political reforms that had resulted in the shutdown of 21st World Herald [More from CPJ here]. The Southern Weekend profile concludes by writing of the men as they sit together on November 26: “When well-wishers Li Rui, Jiang Ping, Jiang Yanyong, and Mao Yushi sit together with Zhang Sizhi, these five old men who bow only to the truth constitute a classic and abiding image”.
Strangely, though, this sentence is not finished in the print version of Southern Weekend, where it reads: “When well-wishers Li Rui, Jiang Ping, Jiang Yanyong, and Mao Yushi sit together with Zhang Si …” The complete version is available on the Internet, but one can only speculate as to the reasons for this error.
Other Sources:
[“Gao Qinrong Silenced Again“, China Digital Times]
[“Sketch of a media blackout“, Danwei.org]
[Posted by David Bandurski, December 19, 2006, 4:57pm]

Xinhua News Agency: How did fake reporters become so savage?

In China the problem of “news extortion”, in which reporters (or supposed reporters) arm-twist officials or companies into paying up to keep stories under wraps, has complicated causes. One key problem is the awkward marriage of official control and commercial wantonness in China’s current media climate. While media are still regarded as important tools of the party — which can make journalists formidable (depending on who’s being “investigated”) — they are under ever greater pressure to generate ad revenues. In a country where media are just beginning to learn about meeting the needs of the reader (to the extent that’s possible under state control), the threat of an expose can be a powerful inducement to advertise. [SEE “China’s Yellow Journalism”, Far Eastern Economic Review, June 2006].
Most of the institutional reasons for corruption in journalism get short shrift in China. In rare cases where “news extortion” does come up, the language generally turns to the “responsibility” of the individual “news worker”. Journalists are showered with ideological terminologies, like the Marxist View of Journalism or the Socialist View of Honor and Shame.
Lately, attention seems to be turning to a convenient scapegoat: the “fake reporter”. These are people without the required press credentials (记者证) and working for unauthorized or apocryphal newspapers and magazines.
But a December 12 editorial from China’s official Xinhua News Agency — whose own journalists were found guilty of corruption in late 2003 — seems to suggest, as it reflects on the media climate in China, that a vast area of grey exists between the “real” reporter and the “fake” reporter. In many cases these so-called “fake reporters” might in fact be unofficial hires for “real” media. The implication: this problem calls for institutional reform, not just law enforcement action.
The news peg for the editorial, “Who let fake reporters get this savage?”, is the recent arrest of 44 “fake” reporters in the city of Lvliang (吕梁), in China’s northern Shanxi province, in what national media called a “collective campaign against fakes” lasting over three months.
The Xinhua editorial follows:
“Who let fake reporters get this savage?”
Xinhua News Agency
December 12, 2006
. . . Lvliang’s fake reporters were merciless. These fake reporters would wave the banner of working for the good of the people, conducting watchdog journalism. The would display journalism credentials on their cars and carry counterfeit press badges. They would present fake materials they had gathered [on companies, etc], and would solemnly carry out activities in the name of news organizations . . . or but into village elections, or provoke conflict with village-run mines [NOTE: Chinese mines are notorious for their poor safety record and violation of regulations] . . . or extort money from corporate bosses, or swindle money. They were in the habit of doing all manner of things with the goal of benefitting financially from their illegal activities.
People can’t help but ask: Why are these fake reporters so savage? Who is it that gives them ground to stand on?
The lax management of news bureaus by a number of smaller newspapers and journals is one reason for fake reporters running amok. Some media seek only economic benefit, set up branch organizations in a careless way and are reckless in the hiring of personnel. On top of this oversight measures are nonexistent, so that some reporters act wildly against the law and public opinion. What’s more, some fake reporters use contacts and connections among real reporters at small newspapers or journals, so that it’s difficult for local officials to tell one from the other. Owing to the easiness of the extortion process and the motivation to profit, personnel [at media] without fixed duties follow the example [of fake reporters] . . .
It is also true that the repeated successes of extortion by fake reporters owes to problems endemic to some [media] work units. One deputy county head in Lvliang says: “We can’t bear being baited by these fake reporters, but neither can we bring them in. There’s nothing we can do. They’ve got a hold on us”. The boss of one unregulated mine says that he receives about 20 or so fake reporters each year and pays out roughly 100,000 yuan (US$12,300). Illegal coalmines and law enforcement offices are also frequent targets of fake reporters’ activities. From this one can see that the flies don’t pester the eggs that aren’t cracked. Wherever there are problems that are not dealt with quickly, then naturally weaknesses will emerge [把柄/or evidence reporters can hold over the heads of companies or officials] and end up in the hands of fake reporters. Those units that are blackmailed fear their problems will be revealed and that the fever will spread to the whole body, so that they’ll lose a great deal over a small matter. Often, not ever daring to uncover the fake reporter’s real identity they’ll bankrupt themselves to avoid utter disaster, diffusing the situation. This provides opportunity after opportunity to fake reporters. The severity of the fake reporter problem also reveals loopholes in government management and the problem of corruption.
Journalism is a sacred profession, and its inundation with fake reporters is disastrous, not only disturbing the normal social order but also doing severe harm to public confidence in the news media …
Dealing with the problem of fake reporters is critical, but stopping at [one-off] strikes against them is insufficient . . . Alleviating symptoms does not deal with root causes and cannot guarantee another group of fake reporters won’t crop up again. Only by dealing clearly with the causes, ensuring departments responsible for media (主管单位) take realistic steps to strengthen their management of media branch organizations, that there is a working system in place that removes obstructions to watchdog journalism by real reporters — and at the same time intensifying the anti-corruption campaign — can we make sure fake reporters lose the habitat [in which they now thrive].

[Posted by David Bandurski, December 15, 2006, 1:25pm]