Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Journalist Exposes Police Pressure

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Journalists routinely face pressure and harassment in China in the course of their work. But every once in a while, an opportunity comes to push back — particularly if their work involves clear instances of negligence at the local level, where officials are not powerful enough to go head-to-head with national or regional media.
Such was the case this week as Caixin, one of China’s most respected news outlets, ran a story called “A Chronicle of Fear in a Quanzhou Hotel” (泉州酒店惊魂记), which detailed how the writer, journalist Zhou Chen (周辰), had been intimidated by local police in the city of Quanzhou, in coastal Fujian province, as she attempted to report on a chemical spill at a local oil port earlier this month.


In her account, Zhou said she had reached the scene of the spill soon after initial news of the accident emerged on November 4. But on November 11, as she continued to report the story, she alleges that she was tailed by a law enforcement officer. Later that night, she says, she was invited to the lobby of the hotel where she was staying to have a talk with the propaganda chief of Quanzhou’s port district — an invitation she declined.
Typically, such invitations in China can offer officials or others an opportunity to offer journalists payment to back off of a story, or to otherwise pressure them to drop their inquiries. Editors at media with a stronger sense of professionalism, such as Caixin, will generally instruct their reporters to avoid such traps.
Zhou Chen then wrote and filed her report on the spill, heading off to bed early. She was already in bed when she heard the sound of a keycard opening the hotel room door. Four men wearing police uniforms barged into the room, saying they were from the local police station and asking to see her identification. They claimed they were conducting searches for prostitutes and their clients.
A bald-headed officer, says Zhou, instructed two of his deputies to search the toilet and balcony to see if anyone else was present. During the search, she says, they never produced any identification. After the men left, Zhou received a phone call from the hotel service desk apologising and saying that the police had demanded that they provide a copy of the keycard for Zhou’s room, and confirming that they had not demanded keycards for any rooms other than Zhou’s.
On Monday, following publication of Zhou’s account, a communications official from the Public Security Bureau in Quanzhou said that the allegations made by Zhou Chen were under investigation. Yesterday, the Quanzhou Public Security Bureau issued a formal apology and said four officers were under investigation for overstepping their authority and causing “a negative social impact.” Three of these were “auxiliary officers,” the bureau said, meaning that they were charged with assisting police. The bureau also said that a deputy bureau chief was facing disciplinary measures.
 

Account Unmasks Its Powerful Backing

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

On November 20, the Wechat public account “Chang’an Jian” (长安剑), which translates as “Chang’an Sword,” openly confirmed through a simple act of rebranding what many have long suspected — that it is in fact an official account operated by the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (中央政法委), the body directly under the Chinese Communist Party taking charge of political and legal affairs. More specifically, the purpose of the commission, and its local and regional affiliates, is to implement Party policy in and among legal institutions — and its operations have been most visible in major initiatives such as crackdowns on organised crime. [Featured Image: Secretary general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Chen Yixin.]

The new logo of “Chang’an Sword” proudly announces its association with the powerful Party commission.
Reporting that the”Chang’an Sword” public account had changed its name to “Central Political-Legal Commission Chang’an Sword” (中央政法委长安剑), directly linking itself to the powerful office, the official China News Service said that “in three years of operation, this is the first time [the account] has made its identity openly known to the public, and the long-time guesses are now confirmed.”
Party and government organs in China have redoubled their efforts to establish a strong presence on social media platforms over the past few years, part of a broader shift of official information channels into the age of mobile media.
In a Christmas Day speech in 2015, during a visit to the People’s Liberation Army Daily (and several months ahead of a major media address in which he said media “must be surnamed Party” and serve the leadership), President Xi Jinping said the state must capitalise on changes in the media landscape. “Right now, media patterns, the public opinion ecology, target audiences and communication technologies are all undergoing profound change ,” he said, “and the internet in particular is driving a transformation in the media sector such as we have never seen before.”
“Wherever the readers are, wherever the viewers are, that is where propaganda reports must extend their tentacles, and that is where we find the focal point and end point of propaganda and ideology work.”
Xi’s remarks came as official public accounts on WeChat, Jinri Toutiao (今日头条) and other platforms were already proliferating. According to Xinhua News Agency, “Chang’an Sword” appeared on September 24, 2015. The account was positioned at the time as being “non-governmental” (民间身份), but reflecting an official position on political and legal affairs, with the stated goal of “promoting the spirit of rule of law” (弘扬法治精神).
Back in May this year, Chen Yixin (陈一新), secretary general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, created a stir online when he outlined what he called “the Six Grabs,” or liu ge zhua (六个抓), referring to six areas where his office and its affiliates needed to focus their efforts. Chen’s sixth grab, “grabbing Big Vs” (a reference to social media users with large fan bases), pointed to the need to develop trusted social media channels, on WeChat and other platforms, to share official information. When internet users read, however, that a top law-enforcement official was talking about “grabbing Big Vs,” they mistakenly assumed the intention was to arrest influential account holders.
More comments from Chinese users on the recent unmasking of “Chang’an Sword” are available at this Chinese-language post.

Tougher Days Loom for "Self-Media"

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Our roundup of top media stories this week is dominated by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which is having a busy time as it pushes a broad cleanup of social media publishing platforms, or “self-media” (自媒体). New regulations released by the agency on Thursday ordered internet information services of “a public opinion nature” (舆论属性) or “having the capacity for social mobilization” (社会动员能力) to implement a “voluntary” system of security evaluations designed to ensure that self-media — and even the unforeseen information products of the future — are under strict control.
These new regulations could, in fact, have a deep impact on the vibrance of the self-publishing environment, and provision of services, on platforms like WeChat. See the relevant comments below from media expert Wang Sixin.
Also this week, Hu Shuli, the founder and publisher of Caixin, offered a peek at how her media group has been performing since it introduced a paid subscription model back in October 2017.
___________________
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
November 11-16, 2018
➢ Letters of contrition from former cyber chief Lu Wei put on display at National Museum of China
➢ Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) brings self-media platforms (自媒体平台) in for discussions ahead of cleanup campaign
➢ Hu Shuli reveals the state of Caixin’s subscription model since introduction last year
➢ Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) introduces new regulation calling for security evaluations for internet information service providers
[1] Letters of contrition from former cyber chief Lu Wei put on display at National Museum of China

Handwritten letters at the National Museum of China attributed to former CAC head Lu Wei. Image: Global Times Online.
As a new exhibit called “Major Transformation: Celebrating 40 Years of Reform and Opening,” opened its doors at the National Museum of China, visitors found that the exhibit contained “letters of remorse,” or chanhuishu (忏悔书), from Lu Wei (鲁炜) the former deputy minister of the Central Propaganda Department who for several years serviced as head of the Cyberspace Administration of China and was the country’s most visible face of internet control. Lu Wei was detained in an internal corruption probe back in November 2017, and plead guilty to charges of bribery in his trial last month. A formal verdict and sentencing are expected soon.
In one of the handwritten letters on display at the museum, Lu Wei wrote: “I was in severe violation of six major points of discipline . . . . and my errors were many, deep and disgusting, doing major harm to the work of the Party and blackening the Party’s reputation.”
A portion of Lu Wei’s letter mentioning his wife and his personal life drew particular attention online in China, some readers remarking that it had all the hallmarks of the marching of criminals through the streets (游街示众). Lu Wei wrote: “My conduct resulted in great harm to her, and we often argued about this. She entirely lost faith in me, and once said to me with grief and indignation: ‘I can’t control you, but before long the Chinese Communist Party will control you.’ How true her words have become!”
Key Sources:
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报): 超3万人昨参观“伟大的变革——庆祝改革开放40周年大型展览” 反腐成果引观众点赞 鲁炜等多名落马高官忏悔书曝光
Central Discipline Inspection Commission (中央纪委国家监委网站): 【镜头——庆祝改革开放40周年大型展览】全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 习近平参观庆祝改革开放40周年大型展览
AND: 庆祝改革开放40周年大型展览开幕 王沪宁出席开幕式并讲话
[2] Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) brings self-media platforms (自媒体平台) in for discussions ahead of cleanup campaign
Since October 20, the Cyberspace Administration of China has carried out a wide-ranging campaign to assert greater control over so-called “self-media,” or zimeiti (自媒体), a term that refers to accounts on social media that are used for publishing activities. Since the start of the campaign, the CAC has reportedly taken punitive measures against around 9,800 accounts.
According to the CAC, most of these accounts are hosted on the WeChat (微信) and Weibo (微博) platforms, and also include accounts on Jinri Toutiao (今日头条), Baidu (百度), Sohu (搜狐), Phoenix Online (凤凰) and other platforms. Some, said the agency, have distributed “harmful political information” (政治有害信息), have “maliciously falsified Party or national history” (恶意篡改党史国史), have “defamed heroic figures” (诋毁英雄人物), or have “tarred the national image” (抹黑国家形象). Others have spread rumours, trafficked in sensational headlines, included indecent content or committed other “challenges against the moral bottom line.”
As is typical for such actions, the CAC portrayed the campaign as a response to “a fierce response from society” (社会反映强烈).
The CAC announced on November 12 that it would be calling meetings with major platforms, including those mentioned above, and holding them responsible for content violations. The agency said it would push platforms to work in concert to improve a “blacklisting” system (黑名单制度), so that accounts shut down on one platform could not simply reemerge on another platform, or under another account.
Key Sources:
Cyberspace Administration of China (中国网信网): 国家网信办“亮剑”自媒体乱象 依法严管将成为常态
AND: 国家网信办约谈客户端自媒体平台 主体责任不容缺失
CCTV Online (中央电视台): 《焦点访谈》 20181110 自媒体 要自律不要自戕
[3] Hu Shuli reveals the state of Caixin’s subscription model since introduction last year
Hu Shuli (胡舒立), the founder and publisher of Caixin, one of China’s leading financial and current affairs magazines, accepted an interview on November 16 in which she revealed the current state of her group’s subscription model.
Caixin founder Hu Shui. Image from Caixin.
According to the figures Hu provided, the Caixin Pay (财新通) service currently has 200,000 individual subscribers, and Caixin Online logs approximately 100 million page views (PV) per month and 50 million unique visitors (UV). Hu said that readership had risen steadily and was generally higher than that for competitors in the industry.
For Caixin, Hu Shuli said, the switch to a paid subscription model just over a year ago, in October 2017, had been with the hope of finding a sustainable model for survival as a news media “whose core value was on-the-scene reporting.” Hu said she hoped Caixin’s success with the model so far might encourage other media to follow suit, and might also help to change China’s culture of rampant copyright violation.
In an interview with the Associated Press in January this year, Hu Shuli declined to discuss subscription or revenue numbers.
Key Sources:
SCTN (证券时报网): 胡舒立：”财新通”个人付费用户超20万 将推多种方式降低阅读门槛
Tencent (腾讯网): 财新传媒从办会到付费阅读：为什么，想什么，做什么
[4] Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) introduces new regulation calling for security evaluations for internet information service providers
In new regulations released on November 15, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) required that all providers of internet services of “a public opinion nature” (舆论属性) or “having the capacity for social mobilization” (社会动员能力) “must voluntarily conduct security evaluations” (安全评估). The regulations are designed to create formal mechanisms by which the government can ensure that any and all internet services with the potential to impact the news cycle, set the public agenda or support collective action have systems in place — subject to regular government oversight and participation, and properly supported in terms of personnel and technology — to prevent “security risks.”
For an initial reading and partial translation of the regulations, see our earlier post.
On November 16, the day after the regulations were announced, WeChat announced that it would lower restrictions on personal registration of public accounts from 2 accounts to 1, meaning only a single account would be allowed per verified individual. For companies, the restriction would be lowered from 5 public accounts to 2.
Wang Sixin (王四新), a professor at Communication University of China and director of the Internet Intellectual Property Research Center (网络法与知识产权研究中心), said that the change in restrictions on public account registration at WeChat had to do directly with the release of the new regulations by the CAC. “WeChat has both public opinion nature and social mobilization capacity, and the release of . . . . the new regulation means that WeChat and other internet information service providers that have both public opinion nature and social mobilization capacity will face much greater operational risk,” said Wang. By limiting the number of public accounts that can be registered by users, both individual and corporate, said Wang, WeChat can reduce the pressure stemming for the security evaluation requirements.
Wang Sixin said the new regulations would have an impact not just on platforms like WeChat and Weibo, and on forums and video sites, but would also have an impact on ride-hailing apps like Didi (滴滴约车) and many other services, from education to healthcare.
Key Sources:
Cyberspace Administration of China (中国网信网): 具有舆论属性或社会动员能力的互联网信息服务安全评估规定
WeChat public account “Media Tea Time” (传媒茶话会): 个人只能注册1个公号，这与国家网信办新规有啥关系？

Preventing Cyber Shock

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In new regulations released on Thursday, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) required that all providers of internet services of “a public opinion nature” (舆论属性) or “having the capacity for social mobilization” (社会动员能力) “must voluntarily conduct security evaluations” (安全评估). The regulations are designed to create formal mechanisms by which the government can ensure that any and all internet services with the potential to impact the news cycle, set the public agenda or support collective action have systems in place — subject to regular government oversight and participation, and properly supported in terms of personnel and technology — to prevent “security risks.”
The regulations make clear that “security risks” are understood as arising from the online population itself, and we should understand this not as an attempt to make the internet a more secure space for users (through data protection, etc.), but rather a more secure space politically for the government and for the Chinese Communist Party. The regulation is premised on the fundamental fear that communication technologies might overwhelm the government, making it impossible to achieve what has long been a central objective — the control of public opinion in order to ensure social and political stability.
Of particular interest to understanding the impetus behind these regulations are several stipulations contained in Article 3, about the need for active review and reporting on “new technologies or new applications that result in a dramatic shift in terms of the functional attributes of information services . . . . resulting in major changes to the public opinion nature [of communications] or to the capacity for social mobilization.” Right after this comes mention of circumstances “where there is a clear increase in user scale, resulting in major changes to the public opinion nature or capacity for social mobilization of the information service.”
Over the past decade, China’s leadership has repeatedly found itself in a reactive position regarding the impact of new communication technologies such as Weibo or WeChat. But cyber policy under Xi Jinping has become far more proactive. The above language takes into account the potential for shocks that might come as a result of new technologies, or even modification of existing ones. The government does not want to be caught on its back feet. It wants to prepare for and neutralize such shocks, and so incorporating this in the system of “voluntary” security evaluations makes a great deal of sense from the standpoint of this underlying fear.
Our partial translation of the new regulations through the end of Article 6, covering most of the basics, follows:

Regulation on Security Evaluation for Internet Information Services of a Public Opinion Nature or Having Capacity for Social Mobilization

具有舆论属性或社会动员能力的互联网信息服务安全评估规定

Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)
November 15, 2018
Article 1: In order to strengthen the safety management of internet services of a public opinion nature (舆论属性) or having the capacity for social mobilization (社会动员能力), and of relevant new technologies and uses, in order to regulate internet information service activities, protect national security, social order and the public interest, this regulation is formulated in accordance with the Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China,
the Regulation on Internet Information Service of the People’s Republic of China and Measures for Security Protection Administration of the International Networking of Computer Information Networks.
Article 2: For the purposes of this regulation, internet services of a public opinion nature or having the capacity for social mobilization include the following circumstances:
(1) The opening of [discussion] forums, blogs, microblogs, chatrooms, communication groups (通讯群组), public accounts, short video, live broadcasting, information sharing, mini programming and other information services or corresponding associated functions.
(2) The opening of other internet information services that provide public channels for voicing of public opinion (公众舆论表达渠道) or the capacity to engage social participation in particular activities (发动社会公众从事特定活动).
Article 3: Providers of internet information services in any of the following circumstances must voluntarily conduct security evaluations (安全评估) and take responsibility for the results of these evaluations:
(1) Having online information services of a public opinion nature or having the capacity for social mobilization, or other information [existing] information services that add such facilities;
(2) Using new technologies or new applications that result in a dramatic shift in terms of the functional attributes of information services, the implementation methods of technologies, or the allocation of foundational resources (基础资源配置), resulting in major changes to the public opinion nature [of communications] or to the capacity for social mobilization;
(3) Where there is a clear increase in user scale, resulting in major changes to the public opinion nature or capacity for social mobilization of the information service;
(4) Where illegal and harmful information is disseminated, demonstrating that the existing security measures cannot effectively prevent online security risks;
(5) Other circumstances when notices made by affiliated offices of the Cyberspace Administration of China at the prefectural level or above (地市级以上) require that security evaluations be carried out.
Article 4: Providers of internet information services may voluntarily conduct security evaluations, or may entrust the process to a third-party security evaluation body.
Article 5: In carrying out security evaluations, providers of internet information services must conduct comprehensive evaluations to determine the the effectiveness of their security measures in terms of the legality of their information services and new technologies or applications, their implementation of laws, administrative regulations, departmental rules (部门规章) and standards, and their effectiveness in preventing security risks, with priority placed on evaluation of the following content:
(1) The situation with regard to determination of the security management personnel, information audit personnel (信息审核人员) and/or the situation with regard to the construction of the security management structure;
(2) Measures to check the true identities of users and maintain their registration information;
(3) Measures to maintain logfiles of the account numbers, times of activity, nature of activity, source IP address and destination address, network source port, client hardware, etcetera, as well as logs of the information sent by the user;
(4) Measures to maintain records for users and distribution groups (通讯群组) of names (名称), nicknames (昵称), bios (简介), notes (备注), logos or signs (标识), information posted (信息发布), [information] shared (转发), comments (评论), as well as records of the prevention or handling of illegal or harmful information through distribution groups and other services;
(5) Technical measures taken to protect personal information and prevent the spread of illegal or harmful information, and the risk that control is lost of social mobilisation functions;
(6) The situation with regard to timely handling of information regarding complaints, [the operation of] informant systems (举报制度), the making public of procedures for complaints and informing [of illegal or harmful information by users];
(7) The situation with regard to the establishment of technical, data and assistance mechanisms to assist cyberspace authorities in carrying out their legal supervision and management of internet information services;
(8) The situation with regard to the establishment of technical, data and assistance mechanisms to assist national security agencies in carrying out their legal investigation of crimes;
Article 6: When internet information service providers discover security risk in the course of security evaluations, they must rectify these in a timely manner and ensure that they these security risks are eliminated.
When security evaluations are carried out, in accord with laws, administrative regulations, departmental rule and standards, these must be compiled as a security evaluation report (安全评估报告). The security evaluation report must include the following content:
(1) Basic information and licensing concerning the functions and service scope of internet information services, the hardware and software facilities involved;
(2) Results in terms of the operation of the security management system and technical measures to prevent risk;
(3) Conclusion of security evaluation;
(4) Other relevant circumstances that require elaboration.
 

Tiger in the River

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party, a “tiger” refers to a high-level corrupt official. The tiger I’m writing about here is Qian Yin’an (钱引安), a top official in Shaanxi province who was placed under investigation earlier this month. And the river? The river here is not in fact a river, but a reference to Liangjiahe (梁家河), the village with the character for “river” in its name where President Xi Jinping is said to have spent his formative early years as an official more than four decades ago. Allow me to explain.


On November 1, news that Qian Yin’an was under investigation made the rounds on the internet. At the same time, another point of related interest and speculation gained some traction on social media, based on an article published back in the summertime from the very same Qian Yin’an — praising Xi Jinping in language so obsequious it turns the stomach.
Qian’s essay, which ran in the Study Times journal on August 3, was called: “Searching for Liangjiahe in My Heart.” Study Times is published on a weekly basis by the Central Party School.

Emphasizing his loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party, Qian Yin’an wrote, with a not-so-veiled reference to Xi Jinping Thought ( 习近平思想):

As a cadre in Shaanxi, I have visited Yan’an many times, and I went into Liangjiahe many times. For me, each time was an exercise in refining my sense of Party nature (党性), a baptism of the spirit (灵魂的洗礼). And every time I came away with new thoughts and understanding.
. . . . . There are major teachings in those remote valleys, and those teachings contain great spirit.
. . . . . Systems of thought never come without foundations, and great systems of thought must necessarily take root in great soil (伟大的土地).

In May 2017, Qian Yin’an was promoted to a ministerial level position (省部级) in the leadership, serving as a member of the provincial standing committee in Shaanxi. At that time, an article appeared online that spoke with praise of Qian’s steady rise through the ranks. At the age of 34, it said, Qian Yin’an had served as the deputy chief of a district in the city of Xi’an, later rising to a positions as a district Party secretary in the city, as a deputy major, as mayor of Baoji city, and finally as Party secretary of Baoji city.
“This most recent rise by Qian Yin’an is an affirmation by the Shaanxi Party Committee of Baoji’s development in recent years,” the National Business Daily reported, “and also an acknowledgement of [Qian’s] abilities.”


In Chinese officialdom, leaders of prefectural-level cities (地市级) and above generally leave traces in official news coverage. Qian Yin’an appeared for the first time online in 2009. The article below, which was posted to Netease but sourced from Xi’an Evening Post, shows Qian accepting his appointment as deputy mayor of Xi’an.

The August 2011 article below, sourced to the China Business View but appearing here at People’s Daily Online, talks about how then deputy mayor Qian Yin’an invited other Xi’an city officials along with him on an undercover inspection tour.

And here is the announcement on Christmas Day in 2013 of Qian’s appointment as major of Baoji.

From 2009 to his fall from grace this month, Qian appeared five times in the People’s Daily. Since 2014, his name has appeared in 198 articles in newspapers across the country, some of these announcing his name among the appointment of delegates to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. His name appears in the headline of 52 articles.
Qian’s byline has also appeared a number of times. On December 15, 2015, Qian wrote an article for China Discipline Inspection Daily in which he said all the requisite things about the need to uphold “political responsibility”:

In 2016, he wrote another article, this time for China Business View, about “always defining loyalty to the Party as the first mark of character”:
 

In March 2018, he wrote about “commanding with political construction” (以政治建设为统领), borrowing again from political discourse as it was trending in the uppermost ranks:

Doing a simple analysis of these reports, we can gather that Qian Yin’an has a knack for following along. His speeches and articles are peppered with whatever political buzzwords are trending at that moment, phrases like “mass line” (群众路线), “strict governance of the Party” (从严治党), the “four consciousnesses” (四个意识), and so on.
At a meeting on June 29, 2018, Qian Yin’an stressed that: “[We] need to raise our political position, fully placing politics in the first position, resolutely preserving the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and resolutely preserving the authority of the Central Committee of the CCP and centralized, unified leadership.”
In fact, “resolute preservation” is just a favored slogan of Qian’s. Back when he was serving as a district chief in Xi’an, luxury property developments went up in an area of the Qingling Mountains under his jurisdiction that was supposed to have been ecologically protected. In recent years, Xi Jinping repeatedly asked in written comments that these developments be investigated, but these instructions were impeded. It is generally believed that the umbrella of protection over the luxury development case has been Qian Yin’an.
In late July this year, under pressure from the Central Committee, Shaanxi finally began dealing with the issue of the illegal developments in the Qingling Mountains. And it’s significant to note that the Qian Yin’an article about the lessons of Liangjiahe was published in the Study Times just three days after a special conference was held to address the question of the illegal developments.
Could this have been a coincidence? Possibly. But it is also possible that Qian’s article was intended as a form of disaster management. In China, red and black — meaning loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party and corruption — are often two sides of the same coin, and when things turn difficult politically, the tigers know that the surest form of protection is to wrap themselves in a mantle of red.
The timing of Qian’s August paean to Xi Jinping is most definitely food for thought. I hope that the Study Times comes clean with the process of how and when the article was submitted, which might tell us a great deal about how messy politics can become within the official Party media.
Three months after Qian’s article in the Study Times, this was the news as announced on the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI): Qian Yin’an, a member of the Party Committee of Shaanxi province, was now under investigation for corruption.

As one internet user aptly responded on social media, making underhanded reference to Liangjiahe, that place advertised as having been so formative for President Xi: “Qian Yin’an has fallen into the river.”
 

A Very Chinese World Internet Conference

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The fifth World Internet Conference (WIC) concludes today in the scenic water town of Wuzhen in China’s coastal Zhejiang province. As Quartz noted yesterday, this year’s WIC seems even less worldly than previous events, with just one representative from Silicon Valley among the list of speakers.
This is corroborated if one searches through the photo library of the event provided by Xinhua News Agency and other official state media. The events seem conspicuously short on non-Chinese participation. Take, for example, the photo below from the side panel on “International Cooperation Along the Digital Silk Road.”


Predictably, the English-language China Daily has still found a way to report that foreign attendees have responded with enthusiasm to the Chinese official line, which was conveyed at the start of the conference with a welcome letter from Xi Jinping. One China Daily report quoted Kevin Collins, a managing director at the global management consulting firm Accenture, as saying that it was “very nice to see one official after another get up and say effectively the same thing that brings everyone together.”

Assuming these comments — delivered without quotation marks — are Collins’ at all, does this note about the “same thing” reflect a heartening consensus, or blind uniformity? Collin’s remarks could easily be read as ironic.
Whatever the case, it is crucial to the Chinese Communist Party, even in this era of greater apparent confidence on the international stage, to demonstrate foreign approbation of its positions.
For those of you who are not familiar (having never had your teeth pulled one by one by Global Times reporters trying to get you to say what they mean), this is the hey-foreigner-what-do-you-think genre of Chinese state media coverage. Basically, put a foreigner on the spot for a soundbite at a China-hosted event that offers general praise because an opportunity is never afforded, as in a real interview, to get down to substance.
We can almost visualise the set-up job in the photograph of Collins, in which he is pictured holding at arm’s length a copy of China Daily that was no doubt handed to him by the reporter as she inserted herself before a panel kicked off.
We can also note that Collins is a clear minority in this photograph. The attendance is overwhelmingly Chinese. This is no doubt one important reason why instructions from propaganda authorities have reportedly included a prohibition against live broadcasting of this year’s WIC. China has gone out of its way at WIC to emphasise themes such as the need to reach common trust globally over internet policy and development, and to build a “community of common destiny in the online space (网络空间命运共同体) — a mapping onto cyberspace of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy notion of a “community of common destiny [or future] for humankind.”
The theme of global destinies would hardly play well online in live broadcasts showing conference rooms full of almost exclusively Chinese. So much better to control the optics by sending young China Daily reporters off to round up foreigners and their friendly views.
So what were these foreigners supposedly so enthusiastic about? What were the lines drawn by China’s number one cyber visionary, Xi Jinping himself? The following is a translation of the summary of Xi’s welcome letter as given by the People’s Daily news app, and promoted during WIC near the top of the news at People’s Daily Online.
The core idea here is building what China sees as a fairer global community of internet governance for an expanding global digital economy, meaning that China itself has a greater say in the shape of of global cyberspace and is able to legitimise its own views on governance.
__________________
Xi Jinping Gives His Newest Assessment of Internet Development Trends and the Digital Economy
November 8, 2018
People’s Daily App
The water town of Wuzhen has again caught the attention of the world. On November 7, the Fifth World Internet Conference opened in Wuzhen. President Xi Jinping sent a letter of congratulation. While the congratulation letter was not long, it contained a wealth of information. What are the trends in world internet development? How important is the digital economy? How can countries work together to build a community of common destiny in the online space (网络空间命运共同体)？In his letter, Xi Jinping gave the newest answers.
One major trend: the world is right now undergoing another revolution in science and technology and industrial change that is larger in scale and deeper [than ever before]
Xi Jinping pointed out that the world today is right now going through another revolution in science and technology and industrial change that is larger in scale and deeper [than ever before]. In his view, the internet, big data, artificial intelligence and other modern-day information technologies are constantly making breakthroughs, the digital economy is flourishing in its development, and the interests of various countries are becoming more closely interrelated.
One assessment: In order that a new tool for world economic development can be added, the accelerated development of the digital economy is urgently needed
In his analysis of trends in the development of the internet, Xi Jinping picked out on key phrase: the digital economy (数字经济).
Xi Jinping has given the digital economy strong priority all along. At his previous letter [in 2017] to the World Internet Conference, Xi Jinping pointed out that “the development of China’s digital economy will take to the express lane,” and that [China will] “promote other countries of the world joining together in stepping aboard the internet and digital economy development express.”
At this year’s National Cyberspace Work Conference (全国网络安全和信息化工作会议), Xi Jinping emphasised: “[We] must develop the digital economy, accelerating the promotion of digital industrialisation.”
Why is the digital economy so important? Xi Jinping offered his newest assessment. He said the in order that a new tool can be added for world development, we urgently need accelerated development of the digital economy, and [we must] promote the movement of the global internet governance system in a fairer direction.
One proposal: advancing together and profiting together, taking a road of mutual trust and common governance
As a major internet nation (互联网大国), China prioritises not only its own development, but also works to build a community of destiny for the online space.
How concretely can that be done? In his letter, Xi Jinping first analysed the “three differences” and the “three similarities” between various countries in the world. While nations all have different national circumstances, their stages of internet development differ, and the actual challenges they face differ, they share a desire to promote digital economic development, and an interest in dealing with cybersecurity challenges and strengthening the governance of the online space.
On this basis, Xi Jinping raised a proposal for various countries deepening practical cooperation: with common advancement as the impetus and common benefit as the goal, traveling a path of mutual trust and common governance, making the community of common destiny in the online space more full of vitality.
One hope: allowing the people of various countries in the world benefit from the fruits of internet development
The theme of this year’s World Internet Conference is “Creating a Digital World of Mutual Trust and Common Governance: Joining Hands to Build a Community of Common Destiny in the Online Space Together” (创造互信共治的数字世界——携手共建网络空间命运共同体). In the conclusion to his letter, Xi Jinping raised one hope: the hope that everyone could pool their wisdom to enhance common understanding, together promoting global digital development, building a sustainable digital world, and allowing the fruits of internet development to enrich all the people of the world.
 

"Anxiety Pills" in the Party Media

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

In recent days, a colorful and unusual phrase, “anxiety pill,” or ding xin wan (定心丸), has gotten a great deal of play both online and in official state media. The reason for the state media’s interest is no mystery – the phrase appeared in President Xi Jinping’s most recent remarks on private and state-run enterprises, amidst concerns that the government will strengthen the state sector and diminish the role of the private sector.


Referencing rumors of dark days ahead for the private sector, Xi Jinping recently told business leaders gathered at a symposium that “any remarks that deny, cast doubt on or shake the basic economic system of our country go against the policies of the Party and the government and must not be heeded or believed.”
“Every private business and every private businessperson,” Xi added, “can eat an anxiety pill and go about their own development with peace of mind!”
The phrase “anxiety pill” even made a page-three headline in the Party’s official People’s Daily.
A vertical headline on page three of the People’s Daily on November 2, 2018, reads: “Eat an Anxiety Pill, Seek Your Own Development With Peace of Mind.”
But that did not necessarily mean that the authorities welcomed just any discussion around this colorful phrase. One related report on WeChat was available for only a very short time before being removed by the censors. The post, called “Private Property Concerns and the ‘Anxiety Pill’: A Brief History of the ‘Anxiety Pill’ in the People’s Daily” (私产焦虑与”定心丸”——人民日报”定心丸”史小考), was a brief but revealing dig into the use of this phrase in the Party’s flagship newspaper.
Screenshot of the headline on WeChat of a deleted post looking at the history of “anxiety pill” in the People’s Daily.
The author of the post, Wang Mingyuan (王明远), calculated that the phrase “anxiety pill” has been used in 1,840 articles in the People’s Daily over the paper’s roughly 70-year history. He discovered first of all that the figurative act of eating “anxiety pills” has generally been attributed in the past to private businesses, as well as to farmers (农民) and foreign-invested enterprises (外资企业). Secondly, he found that “anxiety pill” was appearing now with greater and greater frequency. Third, the term was generally used with the idea that central Party media or even senior leaders were providing the public with information in order to ease their concerns.
A more careful look at the Wang Mingyuan post suggests the author wrote the piece quickly, conducting a quick search and writing feverishly after spotting the headlines on November 1. But Wang’s focus on this term was truly illuminating, and so we were encouraged to do my own investigation.
In fact, Wang’s conclusion that “reports in which ‘anxiety pill’ appears are all about the concerns ordinary people have about losing their private property” is not entirely accurate. Over its 70-year history, “anxiety pill” has had varied and changing meanings within the Party press, and some of these meanings have little or nothing to do with the theme most of interest to the author of the recently-deleted post – namely, recent concerns about possible pressures facing the private sector in China.
These meanings need to be discriminated. But according to our reading of “anxiety pill” in the People’s Daily, most of the articles indeed have to do with the interests of ordinary people, and this is especially true of articles containing the term since 1978, during the period of economic reform and opening.
We invite you to have a look at the following chart:
“Anxiety Pill” in the People’s Daily. The chart shows the percentage of total articles using the term in specific historical time frames.
Our look at the numbers suggests the author is correct when he concludes that the number of articles using the term “anxiety pill” have increased since 1979, and have risen substantially in more recent years, since 2010.
From 1946 to 1959, a total of 20 articles used the term “anxiety pill” in the People’s Daily, accounting for one percent of the total.
In the early part of this period, articles generally had to do with private property, but after the socialist transformation (社会主义改造) process up to around the middle of the 1950s, the meaning of the term was different. Look, for example, at these articles appearing during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962):

The first of these is a piece that jubilates over economic troubles in the United States in 1958, when the country was hit by a recession. The piece reports that the New York Times has “admitted that economic recession is an incurable disease suffered by the capitalist system” – and that President Eisenhower’s “anxiety pill” has failed to bring relief. The second is about a communiqué emerging from Sino-Soviet talks on the arts, quoting the Chinese writer Bing Xin (冰心) as saying that the communiqué is “an ‘anxiety pill’ for peaceful people, and an intercontinental ballistic missile for imperialism.”
From 1960 to 1969, a total of 13 articles used the term “anxiety pill” in the People’s Daily, also accounting for around one percent of the total. Many of these have to do with adjustments to national policy in the wake of China’s Great Famine. The two articles listed below in the People’s Daily database, for example, have to do with the introduction of an incentive system for production teams that manage to record higher outputs. The second of these says that the implementation of this system has “made everyone eat ‘anxiety pills,’ and the zeal for production should increase greatly.” More zeal, in other words, means a bigger harvest—and so everyone can rest assured that their bellies will be full.

The handful of pieces published during the Cultural Revolution were essentially in service of internal political struggles and had nothing whatsoever to do with the interests or concerns of ordinary people. Between 1970 and 1979, there were 14 articles that used the term “anxiety pill,” but 10 of these appeared in 1979, the first year of opening and reform.
From 1980 to 1989, there was quite a dramatic increase in the number of articles using the term, with a total of 180 accounting for 10 percent of the total. These are all closely tied to economic reforms. Look, for example, at the sample of articles below from 1988. The first of these articles mentions prescribing “long-lasting anxiety pills” for businesses, by which it means effective reforms to the contract responsibility system, moving China further toward a market economy.

We even found one piece from 1988 that talks about the 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in October-November 1987, as offering “anxiety pills” to individual business owners (个体经营者). Interestingly, the reporter who wrote that article was Zhu Weiqun (朱维群), who would later take charge of the United Front Work Department.
After this point, “anxiety pill” enters a period of rapid increase.
In 1990-1999，299 articles, 16 percent of the total
In 2000-2009，414 articles, 23 percent of the total.
In 2010-2018 (up to November 3), 881 articles, 48 percent of the total.
This means that close to half of all articles including “anxiety pill” in the more than 70-year history of the People’s Daily have been published in just the past 9 years, and we have also seen the sharpest increase since 2016. According to the temperature standard we apply to Party media discourse at the China Media Project, we can say that “anxiety pill” has become a “warm” term, the third of our six designations for keywords (cold/tepid/warm/hot/red hot/blazing). As of November 3, the term had been used in 119 articles for the year, and we can expect it to continue strong for the rest of the year, particularly given Xi Jinping’s recent remarks.
When we use the Aheading Information (前方) database of national newspapers in China, we can see a similar pattern emerging.

 
In 2017 alone, the term “anxiety pill” appeared in the headline of 1,109 articles. By November 3 this year, there were already 917 headlines using the term — so we can probably expect a new high, understanding of course that this is not a perfect science and there can be some variance in how the database is compiled.
What do we learn from all of these trending numbers? For many who have commented on the term in light of recent anxieties over the private sector, the trend to note is the way discursive “anxiety pills” are increasingly being prescribed by the leadership as real actions politically and ideologically take China in a direction that for many induces anxiety.
Sharing Wang Mingyuan’s ill-fated post before its deletion, Mao Guochuan (马国川), an editor for Caijing magazine, put his finger directly on this sense of disquiet and suggested several measures he would prescribe:

The true anxiety pill would be: 1) openly and clearly opposing the [political] left-wing; 2) revising the Constitution, fixing term limits; 3) reversing the verdicts in certain unfair cases against private businesses; 4) openly and clearly repudiating the Cultural Revolution. Without these steps, there is always the possibility that the ‘anxiety pill’ is actually a ‘strongman pill.’

 
 
 

Don't Believe The Hype

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The following Weibo post was deleted from the platform sometime before 7PM on October 23. The post contains no obvious terms of sensitivity that might trigger keyword blocks, but rather speaks directly to young people with a caution about believing the hype about China’s greatness at the expense of a clearer understanding of the world.

2018-10-23 18:57:20 | Young friends, there are certain blind people (妄人) at the moment who want to stir you to arrogance, demanding every day your belief that China’s old culture is superior to that of any other country, and that China’s old morals are superior to those of any country.  There are even those fools who, having never set foot outside, shout at you saying, “Head East! Head East! The West, this bag of tricks, is going nowhere!” So let me tell you all: Don’t buy it! Don’t mistake your own ears for your eyes! Open your eyes and look at yourself, then look at the world . . .  http://m.weibo.cn/1397724893/4298359554018677 ​

2018-10-23 18:57:20 | 少年的朋友们，现在有一些妄人要煽动你们的夸大狂，天天要你们相信中国的旧文化比任何国高，中国的旧道德比任何国好。还有一些不曾出国门的愚人鼓起喉咙对你们喊道，“往东走！往东走！西方的这一套把戏是行不通的了！” 我要对你们说：不要上他们的当！不要拿耳朵当眼睛！睁开眼睛看看自己，再看看世…全文： http://m.weibo.cn/1397724893/4298359554018677 ​

A contemporary reader might assume these are the words of a contemporary — perhaps a “Big V” user on Weibo offering a rebuttal of the “Amazing China” hype still so evident in the tone of official media coverage and its repudiation of liberal values broadly panned as “Western.”
But in fact the words conveyed in this microblog post are those of Hu Shi (胡适), the Cornell and Columbia-educated essayist and diplomat (serving as Chinese ambassador to the United States from 1938 to 1942) regarded still as one of the seminal figures of Chinese liberalism. Hu was a central figure during the 1919 May Fourth Movement and the “New Culture Movement” of the 1920s. 
The passage in the deleted Weibo post can be found in Hu Shi’s Collected Works.
In May 1954, just as Mao Zedong was introducing a new Party policy emphasizing the “Party nature” (党性) of newspapers and their need to be led by Party committees, Hu Shih published a piece in the Columbia Law Review called “Communist Propaganda and the Fall of China.” Now, in the “New Era” of Xi Jinping’s renewed called for the “Party nature” of media, it seems that the propaganda machine can still work to obliterate Hu Shi’s ideas.

Former Cyber Czar Lu Wei Appears in Court

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week in China’s media, former cyber czar Lu Wei, the man who for much of Xi Jinping’s first term as general secretary epitomized China’s new confidence in its policy of concerted control of cyberspace, finally appeared in court to face charges of corruption; a self-made online video streaming superstar was sentenced to detention for disrespecting China’s national anthem; and state media tried to downplay fears that the country’s private sector is in retreat.
 
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
October 13-19, 2018
➢ Case against former cyber czar Lu Wei appears in court, accused of accepting 32 million in bribes
➢ Vice Premier Liu He voices support for role of private sector, Party media discuss non-public economy
➢ Official media debate safety of GMO foods, as Science and Technology Daily accuses Heilongjiang Daily of incorrect reporting
➢ Live-streaming star given five-day administrative detention for disrespecting national anthem
➢ Sexual assault case against actor and television host Zhu Jun to be heard October 25
[1] Case against former cyber czar Lu Wei appears in court, accused of accepting 32 million in bribes
On October 19, the Intermediate People’s Court of Ningbo City in Zhejiang province began court proceedings in the case against Lu Wei (鲁炜), a former deputy minister of the Central Propaganda Department and China’s first cyber czar as head of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) from 2014 to 2016. During his tenure as director of the CAC, Lu fashioned an image as an unapologetic and even charismatic proponent of China’s aggressive internet control regime, saying in one speech to an international audience that a safe internet requires brakes just as safe cars require brakes.
According to the court, from 2002 through to the second half of 2017, Lu Wei abused his positions as a member of the Party committee at Xinhua News Agency, as propaganda minister of Beijing, and as head of the CAC and a deputy director of the State Council Information Office, to seek personal benefit, accepting bribes amounting to around 32 million yuan. According to reports from Xinhua News Agency, Lu Wei plead guilty to the allegations, and now awaits sentencing.
Lu Wei was deprived of his Party membership and official posts, a process known in Chinese as “shuangkai” (双开), in February 2018, and the language used against his by official state media was extraordinarily severe, suggesting that he was guilty of a long list of crimes, including “deceiving the Central Committee” (欺骗中央), “speaking idly of central Party policies” (妄议中央), “anonymously framing others” (匿名诬告他人), “interfering in inspections from the central Party” (干扰中央巡视), “vile moral conduct” (品行恶劣) and “engaging in factionalism” (拉帮结派).
Key Chinese Sources: 
WeChat public account “Zhejiang Tianping” (微信公众号”浙江天平”): 中共中央宣传部原副部长鲁炜受贿案一审开庭
WeChat public account “Political Awareness Circle” (微信公众号”政知圈”): “不论如何判都认罪”的他, 落马后中央曾下发文件
[2] Vice Premier Liu He voices support for role of private sector, Party media discuss non-public economy (非公经济)
In a joint interview with the official People’s Daily newspaper, Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television appearing on October 19, Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He (刘鹤) responded to recent turbulence in Chinese share markets and and other fears about general economic weakness, including concern that the private sector was struggling in the midst of deeper economic weakness while the state sector was advancing, a phenomenon referred to in Chinese as guojin mintui (国进民退).


It was also reported that on October 17 Liu He had chaired a so-called “leading group conference” on the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, where the key role of SMEs in China’s overall economic development was again affirmed.
These moves in the state media seem to be a concerted effort to stem fears that tougher times are ahead for private business in China, a debate that has simmered online over the past few months. On September 11, a post by Wu Xiaoping (吴小平), a finance expert and web entrepreneur, suggested that “China’s private sector has already done its job in aiding the development of the state economy, and it should now leave the stage” (中国私营经济已完成协助公有经济发展的任务, 应逐渐离场). 
Key Chinese Sources:
Xinhua Online (新华网): 中共中央政治局委员、国务院副总理刘鹤就当前经济金融热点问题接受采访
People’s Daily (人民日报): 中共中央政治局委员、国务院副总理刘鹤接受采访——谈当前经济金融热点问题
Gov.cn (中国政府网): 刘鹤主持召开国务院促进中小企业发展工作领导小组第二次会议
Economic Daily (经济日报): 国企“接盘”民企并非“国进民退”
Beijing Daily (北京日报): 不能把国企规则简单照搬到非公企业上——兼谈当前应如何正确认识非公经济
[3] Official media debate safety of GMO foods, as Science and Technology Daily accuses Heilongjiang Daily of incorrect reporting
On October 19, the Science and Technology Daily (科技日报), a paper published by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology, ran a report alleging that a page-seven story running the previous day in Heilongjiang Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Party committee in Heilongjiang province, had made “serious errors” in reporting on the safety of genetically modified foods. The October 18 report had suggested that some GMO foods already approved for release onto the market were unsafe.
Heilongjiang Daily runs report suggesting GMO foods are unsafe.
The Science and Technology Daily rebuttal of the Heilongjiang Daily report quoted a number of prominent experts by name (in a media environment often rife with anonymous sourcing), including Yang Xiaoguang (杨晓光) and Jiang Tao (姜韬), both researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and emphasized that approved GMO foods were safe and that “the consensus in the scientific community is that no evidence can be found to substantiate the claim that GMO foods are harmful to the human body.” Among the criticisms in the Science and Technology Daily piece, Lin Min (林敏), the director of the Biotechnology Institute of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, accused one of the key sources in the Heilongjiang Daily story, Wang Xiaoyu (王小语), the deputy secretary of the Heilongjiang Soybean Association, of seeking to openly discredit GMO foods in order to protect the traditional soybean industry in the province. Wang Xiaoyu’s remarks, said Lin Min, went against the policies of the central government in supporting GMO food development.
Key Chinese Sources:
Science and Technology Daily (科技日报): 《黑龙江日报》非转基因大豆报道严重失实
Heilongjiang Daily (黑龙江日报): 非转基因大豆的坚守者——访原黑龙江省大豆协会副秘书长王小语
[4] Live-streaming star given five-day administrative detention for disrespecting national anthem

According to a post made to the official Weibo account of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau on October 13, a video streaming host on the video streaming platform Huya identified with as “Yang Mouli” (杨某莉) — using an anonymous Jane-Doe character to replace the middle character of the name — was given a five-day administrative detention by police in Shanghai’s Jing’an District, accused of using her own version of China’s national anthem as the music in the opening sequence of her online broadcast and treating the tune without the appropriate level of seriousness and respect. The police cited in their notice the new National Anthem Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国国歌法). It was quickly revealed that the streaming host was Yang Kaili, a 21 year-old self-made star with more than 44 million followers on the Huya platform.
Key Chinese Sources: 
The Paper (澎湃新闻网):【雷热点】上海警方依法行政拘留侮辱国歌的网红女主播
[5] Sexual assault case against actor and television host Zhu Jun to be heard October 25
On October 15, Chinese singer Zhang Xianzi (弦子) posted on her Weibo account that her sexual assault case against celebrity actor and television host Zhu Jun (朱军) would be heard in court in 10 days time, on October 25, and that her lawyer had already submitted a request that Zhu Jun appear personally in the courtroom to face questioning. She also revealed that her legal team had submitted a request to the Haiding Precinct of the Beijing Public Security Bureau that all records concerning the allegations against Zhu dating back to June 2014 be made available as evidence.
In August 2018, an account appeared online offering a detailed account of the sexual assault Zhang Xianzi, known generally to the public by her given name “Xianzi,” allegedly suffered while serving as an intern for Zhu Jun in June 2014. The account sparked fierce interest online, the latest in a wave of cases in China’s developing MeToo movement.
Key Chinese Sources: 
Weibo account “@ComradeMaiXiao (微博用户@麦烧同学): #弦子和麦烧的开庭日记#
Sina Online (新浪网): 朱军案10月25日开庭 当事人已申请朱军本人出庭
AND: 朱军性侵案25号开庭，朱军或被要求出庭，女方发文疑扭转局面！

Mapping Xi Jinping News Thought

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

By this point most everyone has probably seen or read about the superbly abstruse “mind map” (image above) created by state media in China to isolate the strands of President Xi Jinping’s core ideological concept: “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想). If this is truly a map of Xi Jinping’s mind, one has to wonder: Is he clinical?
But I’m sorry to point out that despite the intensity of the map, there simply is not enough detail when it comes to media policy.
The node on the mind map dealing most directly with media is “19,” about building socialist ideology. This branch looks at issues like addressing “fundamental change in the nature of the public opinion ecology” and other such things, all related to the control of information in the “New Era.” Many of these aspects, however, fall under what has more recently been termed “Xi Jinping News Thought,” or Xi Jinping xinwen sixiang (习近平新闻思想) — a designation that makes Xi the first leader in the reform era to have a “name crowning,” or guanming (冠名), in relation to media policy.
Back in June this year, in fact, the Central Propaganda Department published a book called Teaching Materials in Xi Jinping News Thought (习近平新闻思想讲义).


Fortunately, Xi Jinping News Thought has also been summarized and explicated by state media in China. The following is our translation of a recent piece at China Youth Online (though versions ran earlier in the summer) that outlines the 7 “news” about Xi Jinping News Thought. We added our comments below the translation of each “new.”
Enjoy.
_______________
7 “News” About Xi Jinping News Thought (习近平新闻思想的七个”新”)
October 11, 2018
China Youth Online
Xi Jinping News Thought (习近平新闻思想) is an important integral part of Xi Jinping Though on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Since the 18th National Congress of the CCP, General Secretary Xi Jinping has given top priority to the Party’s news and public opinion work (新闻舆论工作), has provided new holistic thinking and strategic deployments regarding the new situation and new tasks facing the Party’s news and public opinion work, and has raised many new ideas and new viewpoints.

New positioning (新定位) —— a new positioning of the nature and status of the Party’s news and public opinion work.
“The Party’s news and public opinion work is an important task in the work of the Party, and a major matter in the management of state affairs and in the peace and stability of the country.”
“Properly doing the Party’s news and public opinion work is the banner and path, concerns the implementation of the Party’s theories, lines, principles and policies, concerns the smooth advancement of the work of the Party and the state, concerns the cohesion and force of the entire Party and the people of the whole nation, and concerns the prospects and destiny of the Party and the state.”
——February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping speech to the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
[NOTE: This positioning is not exactly “new.” In previous administrations there was an emphasis on the importance of “guidance of public opinion,” or control of the media to control the public agenda, as a key component of the Party’s exercise of power. The difference under Xi Jinping is more a matter of intensity, bringing the Party back to the center of media policy and practice. But there is also a greater push under Xi Jinping to redefine the Party’s role relative to society, to put the Party back at the center of not just news but also entertainment, manufacturing (or so is the hope) a new closeness between the Party and the people, addressing a gap noted also in Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th Party Congress in 2012.]
New formulation (新表述) ——making a new formulation of the responsibility and mission of the Party’s news and public opinion work
“Under the conditions of the new era, the responsibility and mission of the news and public opinion work of the Party is: raising high the banner [of the Party] (高举旗帜), leading the way toward [proper] guidance (引领导向), cleaving to the center (围绕中心), serving the overall situation (服务大局), uniting the people (团结人民), raising morale (鼓舞士气), defining social morals (成风化人), creating cohesion (凝心聚力), clearing away [political] errors (澄清谬误), separating true from false (明辨是非), connecting domestic and foreign (联接中外), linking with the world (沟通世界).
——February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping speech to the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
[NOTE: Again, not a lot of newness here. These are all very familiar terms within the Party’s media control lexicon, and the emphasis on proper guidance etc. is typical. The difference is intensity, and bringing the focus of media intensely and unambiguously around the Party and its leadership. See next entry.]
New judgement (新论断) ——making a new judgement of the guidelines and principles of the Party’s news and public opinion work
“If we are to take on this responsibility and mission, we must place political orientation (政治方向) in the first position, firmly adhering to the principle of Party spirit (党性原则), firmly adhering to the Marxist View of Journalism (马克思主义新闻观), firmly adhering to correct guidance of public opinion (正确舆论导向), firmly adhering to an emphasis on positive propaganda (正面宣传为主).”
“Most fundamental in ensuring that the Party’s news and public opinion work adheres to the principle of Party spirit is to adhere to the Party’s leadership of news and public opinion work. The media operated by the Party and the government are propaganda positions of the Party and the government, and they must be surnamed Party.”
——February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping speech to the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
[NOTE: This new judgement is actually a concerted return to a very old judgement of the role and function of the news media. In the past under the Chinese Communist Party, we have seen a strong emphasis on the “Party spirit” of the media after political disruptions. The concept rose noticeably in the 1950s around the Anti-Rightist Movement, and it crested again immediately following June 4, 1989, crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations, becoming then a focus of discussion of the role of the media through to Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour.” Generally speaking, the rise of “Party spirit” signals a loss, de-emphasis or outright denial of the agency of the press in monitoring power. The more “Party spirit” prevails, the fewer voices one can expect to hear.]
New arrangements (新擘画) —— making new arrangements for the innovation and development of the Party’s news and public opinion work
“Along with changes in the development of the [social/political/international] situation, the Party’s news and public opinion work must innovate its concepts (理念), content (内容), style (体裁), forms (形式), methods (方法), strategies (手段), [industry] formats (业态), systems (体制) and mechanisms (机制), enhancing the focus and effectiveness [of propaganda and public opinion control]. [We must] accommodate the trends in communication toward de-massification (分众化) and differentiation (差异化), accelerating the construction of a new pattern of public opinion channeling (舆论引导新格局).”
—— February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping speech to the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
“Adhering to correct guidance of public opinion (正确舆论导向), placing a high priority on the building and innovation of broadcast strategies, raising the communication power, influence and credibility of [the Party’s] news and public opinion.
——October 18, 2017, Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th National Congress of the CCP
[NOTE: This is all about advancing the way the Party does media, and on this front under Xi Jinping, the Party is attempting a great deal more “innovation,” aided by the overall shift in the nature of the media environment. Arguably, more tools are now available to the Party in enforcing its dominance in the communication realm than ever before. And the Party recognizes that it can’t have a simple one-size-fits-all approach. In a sense, this is about building in enough responsiveness that the attractiveness of core messages is enhanced — closely related to the next “new.”]
New deployments (新部署) —— making new deployments for online news and public opinion work.
“Right now, patterns of media (媒体格局), the public opinion ecology (舆论生态), audience targets (受众对象) and communication technologies (传播技术) are all undergoing deep change, particularly internet media which are prompting change such has never before been seen in the media sector. Where the readers are, where the audience is, the antennae of propaganda reports must extend, and the pressure points and footholds of news and propaganda work must be placed there.”
—— December 25, 2015, speech on inspection tour of the People’s Liberation Army Daily
“[We] must strengthen positive propaganda online, adhering to the correct political orientation with a clear banner, [adhering to correct] guidance of public opinion, [adhering to correct] value orientations, using Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era and the spirit of the Party’s 19th National Congress to unite and condense tens of millions of internet users, deeply carrying out education in the ideals and beliefs [of the Party], deepening propaganda and education in Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era and the Chinese Dream, actively fostering and putting into practice socialist core values (会主义核心价值观), promoting online propaganda concepts, content, forms, methods and strategies and other innovations, having a grasp of timing efficiency (把握好时度效), building a circle of trust online and offline (构建网上网下同心圆), better coalescing social consensus, firming up a mutual ideological foundation for the united of all people in the country.”
—— April 20-21, 2018, emphasized by Xi Jinping during the National Cybersecurity Work Conference
[NOTE: This signals the massive shift away from traditional media as a priority to mobile platforms and products as the focus of “public opinion work,” or media control. This is essentially about ensuring that the very old policy of “positive propaganda,” emphasized at points through the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, is intensified and effectively applied in a transformed media environment, dominated by WeChat and other platforms. Built into this idea is a notion of semi-responsiveness to audiences — call it audience-sensitive propaganda, if you will. The Party must know where the audiences (the differentiated masses) congregate, how they interact, and then must meet them in these environments through innovated products to deliver what are essentially old messages (about Party dominance of social and political life).]
New treatments (新阐述) —— providing a new treatment of the building of international communication capacity (国际传播能力建设).
“In conducting news and propaganda work under conditions of comprehensive opening to the outside, one important task is to lead people to have a more comprehensive and objective understanding of contemporary China, and view of the outside world.
—— August 19, 2013, emphasized by Xi Jinping at the National Propaganda Work Conference
“[We] must accelerate the building of international communication capacity, enhancing our international discourse power (国际话语权), concentratedly and properly telling the China story, at the same time improving strategic arrangements, applying strength to create flagship media for external propaganda that have strong international influence.”
—— February 19, 2016, emphasized by Xi Jinping at the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
[NOTE: This is all about the “going out” of Chinese media, and building channels through which the Party can influence audiences overseas, gaining and keeping control of the coverage and framing of issues important to the leadership. The recent restructuring of state media can be seen as an important part of this strategy. Again, not entirely new, in the sense that the building of influential media groups was emphasized even in the 1990s, and Hu Jintao talked about “soft power” and “going out.” But the emphasis under Xi Jinping is intensified, and there is a great deal more confidence, combined with structural change.]
New demands (新要求) —— raising new demands for the strengthening of news and public opinion work team construction
“In strengthening the work of propaganda and ideology departments, we must first of all strengthen our leading cadres and teams. Leaders and comrades at propaganda offices at various levels must strengthen their study and strengthen their experience, truly becoming experts in which others can place their trust.”
—— August 19, 2013, emphasized by Xi Jinping at the National Propaganda Work Conference
“[We] must deeply conduct education in the Marxist View of Journalism, leading the masses of news and public opinion workers to become disseminators advocating the Party’s policies, recorders of the conditions of the times, promoters of social progress, and guardians of fairness and justice.
The crux of media competition is the competition for talent, and the core of advantage in the media is the talent advantage. [We] must accelerate the training and creation of news and public opinion teams that are staunch in their politics (政治坚定), that excel in their business (业务精湛), that conduct themselves well (作风优良), that can be trusted by the Party and the people.”
—— February 19, 2016, emphasized by Xi Jinping at the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
 

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