Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

What to Say When You're a Party Official

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

On December 4, 2012, just weeks after he became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping sent a powerful message about the need to cut down on excess and extravagance. No more sumptuous banquets. No more grand motorcades that snarled traffic. Party officials had to get down to the serious business of governing. They had to focus on practical matters, and they had to speak about these matters in ways that were focused and concise.

But there was a problem, obvious to anyone who regularly feasts on the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi Jinping’s December 2012 declaration was yet another eight-course banquet, another formula Party officials across the country were obliged to indulge because the leadership in Beijing had set the table. It was called the “Eight Point Code of Conduct” (八项规定).

Point Three emphasized “shortening speech” (讲短话), “doing one’s utmost to avoid empty speech” (力戒空话) and also “conventional phrases” (套话). Point Four urged “active improvement of styles” (切实改进文风) — which, mind you, is unimproved language that when unpacked means essentially keeping things simple.

Point Six addressed the media aspects of the way the Party works, insisting that comrades in the Central Committee should decide on the basis of “work requirements” (工作需要), “news value” (新闻价值) and “social effect” (社会效果) whether or not something should be reported in the media. Leaders should, besides, “compress,” or limit, the number of reports (报道的数量), their length (字数) and their duration (时长).

But yesterday’s edition of the People’s Daily was a stark illustration of how the Chinese Communist Party ultimately finds it impossible to escape the bonds of its own discourse and the normative operation of power.

Just have a look at the front page. The headlines on the page are virtually identical, all mentioning that “Xi Jinping Received _____ President _____,” where readers may insert the proper African country in the first blank, and the name of that country’s leader in the second.

The only variation comes to the right of the paper’s masthead, where an image is shown of Xi Jinping greeting South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, and the headline tells us that Ramaphosa and Xi held “discussions,” or huitan (会谈), a notable difference from the simple reception, or huijian (会见), that the other African leaders had. The huitan suggests a bilateral exchange of views on “major political, economic, cultural or military matters” (重大的政治、经济、文化、军事问题). And such distinctions really matter within the Party’s refined system of discourse.


Relishing in the repetitive page design, and trolling through the monotonous coverage, one has to wonder: What happened to the 2012 injunction in Point Six to “compress the number of reports”? But it gets worse, of course, because the Party’s primary concern, here as always, is with the optics of power, and there are certain distinctions within the Party’s mapping of power that cannot be compressed.
And so, we give you page two of yesterday’s People’s Daily, noting that each photograph is carefully choreographed to ensure that the African leaders are standing in front of their respective national flags, with a balancing pair of Chinese national flags. If a picture is worth a thousand Party catchphrases, then 10 pictures of Xi Jinping shaking hands with African leaders amount to inestimable political capital.

The article with the bold headline immediately below the first two rows of photographs tells us that Xi Jinping will attend the 2018 China-Africa Summit and give an important speech that will be broadcast by China Central Television, China National Radio and China Radio International. Substance? What more do you need? Xi Jinping, as the “core” leader, is always the compression of news relevance.
And lest you still fail to understand that the primary and primal interest of the Party, over all issues of substance, is the reiteration of power and its proper arrangement, we have page three of yesterday’s People’s Daily. Here, the leaders of the Politburo Standing Committee are laid out in unerring order of status: Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang . . . .

Because there is nothing whatsoever incidental about these arrangements, we can generally assume they reflect the prevailing political circumstances. It is significant that we do not see Wang Huning here, despite the fact that he received a seeming vote of confidence from Xi Jinping at the work conference on propaganda and ideology last month. Wang was meeting with African leaders, but there might be an interest at play here in the People’s Daily to tone down his profile.

The Party’s impossible struggle against the vortex of its own political culture and language comes painfully into focus on the very next page. After the dull march of “news” about Xi Jinping and the China-Africa summit, we are treated to a commentary on the “spirit” of President Xi’s speech last month to the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference, the very event where he seemed to bolster Wang Huning and double-down on his policies over the past five years.

The commentary is bylined “commentator from this newspaper” (本报评论员), which means — again, if we know how to read the signs — that this piece is meant to represent the spirit of the Party’s Central Committee on matters of consequence. Such pieces are not written by individuals, but by a coterie of scribes within the paper whose job it is to refract the light emanating from the top leadership.

The first objective of the commentary is to pound home the point that the Party has complete and ultimate control over propaganda and ideology. Leaders at all levels must “firmly defend the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping,” and they must maintain “a high level of unity with the Central Party.” What all of this means in practical terms is not exactly spelled out. Rather, it is indicated with more slogans and waving flags. Officials must dedicate themselves to “political building” (政治建设). They must “firmly establish” the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识). They must ensure that the “main theme” (主旋律) resounds, and that “positive energy” (正能量) is strengthened. In spite of all of this jargon, they must “maintain clear heads” (保持清醒头脑) — a phrase that actually means that they must understand the Party’s core position and ideology, and must not be tempted by “erroneous ideas.”

One could forgive a Party official for thinking that it is all too much. With such restrictions, put so indefinitely, what can anyone possibly say? It’s a good time to remember Point Seven of the “Eight Point Code of Conduct,” which cautions officials that the release of statements must be strictly handled, that “unless arranged by the Central Committee, individuals must not publish books or individual speeches, must not send out greeting cards, congratulatory telegrams, make dedications or inscriptions.”

Well then, surely the best thing for any Party official to do is simply to parrot the Party’s official discourse as it emanates from the top. If one “cleaves” — now that’s an active verb the Party adores — to the declarations of Xi Jinping, how can anything go wrong? Right?

Wrong.

As the page four commentary in the People’s Daily reiterates, doing a proper job of propaganda and ideology work also means officials must “persevere in the implementation of the spirit of the ‘Eight Point Code of Conduct,’ firmly correcting the ‘four winds’ (四风), especially formalism (形式主义) and bureaucratism (官僚主义).” This includes the injunction to speak simply and focus on practical matters, and to emphasize “news value.”

Combatting formalism means that Party officials must definitely avoid the temptation to simply parrot the utterances of their superiors and go through the motions. “Right now, departments at all levels are busy transmitting the spirit of the Central Party,” says the commentary. “But we must recognize that still we see fierce transmission on the surface, and sloganish and mechanical transmission, and transmission of that which is swallowed in one gulp but never digested, and transmission through slavish copying of one’s superiors.”

The commentary urges officials not to “become gramophones” (当”留声机”). It warns them not to “irrigate by flooding” (大水漫灌). Emphasize the “real,” it says. Avoid “vacuity” (虚).

Say only what we say. But in saying what we say, make sure you are not just parroting what we say. Better yet, say what we mean, and when you say it make sure you mean it too. If you catch our meaning.
And . . .

Let the Flag of the Party Wave High Over the Front Lines of Propaganda and Ideology
——On the Study and Practice of the Spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Speech to the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference
People’s Daily
September 3, 2018
Page 4, “commentator from this newspaper” (本报评论员)

In the great game of [Chinese] chess that is national governance, the Central Party is the “general” positioned at the central command tent, and the chariots, horses and cannons are deployed with their clear roles.

“Strengthening the Party’s comprehensive leadership of propaganda and ideology work, supporting with a clear banner the Party’s control of propaganda and the Party’s control of ideology.” At the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference (全国宣传思想工作会议), General Secretary Xi Jinping again emphasized the political responsibilities and leadership responsibilities of Party committees at various levels, and he raised clear demands for increasing the Party leadership and Party building on the propaganda and ideology front, clearly defining our direction, strengths and advantages in propaganda and thought work.

Since the 18th National Congress of the CCP, the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core has placed propaganda and ideology work in an important position, and has taken a series of significant decisions, implemented a series of significant actions, and has pushed propaganda and ideology work to make historic achievements, and to make historic changes, fundamentally reversing what for a time was a passive posture in the ideological sector, raising the “9 Persistences” (九个坚持) to deepen systematic understanding of propaganda and ideology work. The experiences of the past 5 years fully show that only by letting the flag of the Party fly high on the propaganda and ideology front can we ensure that the main theme (主旋律) resounds, that positive energy (正能量) is stronger, spurring the whole Party and the whole society to advance with unity and force.

Propaganda and ideology work is political work, and [correct] politics is imperative in matters large and small. The strengthening of the Party’s comprehensive leadership of propaganda and thought work should be led by political building (政治建设), firmly establishing the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), firmly defending the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, firmly defending the authority of the Central Party and its central, unified leadership, maintaining a high level of unity with the Central Party in terms of political positions (政治立场), political orientation (政治方向), political principles (政治原则) and political path (政治道路). The decisions of the Central Party must be carried out to the letter (不折不扣贯彻落实), and propaganda and ideology departments at all levels must . . . regularly synchronize themselves with the demands of the Central Party. [The Party] must maintain clear heads (保持清醒头脑), raising political sensitivity (政治敏锐性) and [the power of] political discrimination (政治鉴别力), not allowing interference by static and noise (杂音噪音), not being tempted by erroneous ideas. [The Party] must strictly maintain the Party’s political discipline and political practices, taking the speaking of politics (讲政治) as a primary demand, and taking loyalty and reliability as the first standard, acting throughout as a person who understands politics (政治上的明白人) and is trustworthy [in their politics].

Effective styles give rise to fighting strength (好作风出战斗力). Strengthening the Party’s leadership of propaganda and ideology work also means we must strengthen the construction of working styles (作风建设), persevering in the implementation of the spirit of the “Eight Point Code of Conduct” (八项规定), firmly correcting the “four winds” (四风), especially formalism (形式主义) and bureaucratism (官僚主义). (NOTE: The other two “winds” are “hedonism” and “extravagance”). Right now, departments at all levels are busy transmitting the spirit of the Central Party. But we must recognize that still we see fierce transmission on the surface, and sloganish and mechanical transmission, and transmission of that which is swallowed in one gulp but never digested, and transmission through slavish copying of one’s superiors (上下一般粗). This must be given great attention, seriously researched, and conscientiously resolved. Putting the spirit of the Central Party into practice means we must apply them to our own circumstances [in the course of Party work], conscientiously studying and grasping [the spirit], and bringing it out in our own concrete work — not writing surface articles, not imitating and copying word for word, so that we become like gramophones (当”留声机”), not irrigating by flooding (大水漫灌); [we must] emphasize the “real,” do our utmost to avoid “vacuity” (虚), applying ourselves with precision and seeking practical results.

Highs and Lows for "WeMedia" in China

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

China’s so-called “WeMedia,” or “self media” (自媒体), publications and platforms launched on the WeChat service, lead our list of top media stories this week. The first “WeMedia” story concerns the shutdown of Iceberg Institute (冰川思享库), a platform launched by a group of professional journalists offering original content on politics and current affairs. Apparently prompted by critical coverage of Chinese “misreadings” of the United States in light of the ongoing “trade war,” this shutdown is the second the platform has faced in its history.
The second “WeMedia” story deals with what was at the start of August a local propaganda story in Shandong about the life-transforming potential of a village business raking in advertising income by harnessing a team of young rural women repurposing online content, such as popular dramas, to produce eye-catching entertainment. By month’s end, the “WeMedia village” in Shandong became the focus of national attention, and national criticism, for its “content laundering” behavior, and by September 1 the operation had reportedly closed its doors. [ABOVE: Screenshot of Li Chuanshuai, the young man who founded the business in “WeMedia village,” in an interview by Shangguan Video following national criticism of their work.]
Also this week, news of the pending closure of what was once a mass-circulation print newspaper, the Beijing Morning Post. Another nail in the coffin of print media in China.
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
August 25 to August 31, 2018
➢ Iceberg Institute WeChat Account Shut Down / Speculation that the Order Relates to Coverage of the US-China Trade War
➢ Shandong’s “WeMedia Village” Shuts Down After Becoming Focus of National Attention
➢ Coverage Turns Attention to Demeaning of Women in QQ Chat Groups for Didi Drivers
➢ CAC Launches National “Rumor-Busting Platform”
➢ Beijing Morning Post to Cease Print Publication
[1] Iceberg Institute WeChat Account Shut Down / Speculation that the Order Relates to Coverage of the US-China Trade War
On August 28, word spread through social media in China that the Iceberg Institute (冰川思享库), a publication focused on politics and current affairs, had once again had its account on WeChat closed down. The account page carried a notice that read: “After complaints from users and a review of the platform; [it is determined that the platform] violates the ‘Interim Provisions on the Administration of the Development of Public Information Services Provided through Instant Messaging Tools,’ an order has been issued for the blocking of all content, and use of the account has already ceased.”

Speculation online in China has pointed to the platform’s publication of an article about the US-China trade war, “What We Previously Understood Was Possibly a Fake America” (我们之前了解的可能是一个假美国). The article argued that the United States and China are already locked in a bitter trade dispute, and that the United States is coordinating with Japan and Europe to contain China with a long-term trade war strategy. But while many Chinese experts are lured into the fantasy that this is a short-term problem linked to the Trump presidency, said the article, this is in fact not the case, and China has fundamentally misread America and the nature of the relationship.
The Iceberg Institute was launched on WeChat in March 2016 by five veteran Chinese journalists, including Chen Jibing (陈季冰), Lian Qingchuan (连清川), Wei Yingjie (魏英杰) and Ren Dagang (任大刚). Almost all of the platform’s content was original, and much of it was commissioned form external writers. This is the second time the Iceberg Institute has had its account blocked. Founder Chen Jibing said in response to the shutdown: “As to how such thoughtful commentary can be done more appropriately in the future, I will have to think very carefully. But this much is certain, there is no way forward with the past model.”
KEY CHINESE SOURCES:
WeChat Public Account “Mei Tong She” (微信公众号”媒通社”): 知名公号“冰川思享库”被永久屏蔽
WeChat Public Account “Nan You Quan” (微信公众号”南友圈”): 头条|”冰川思享库”被永久封号，对话创办人陈季冰
WeChat Public Account “Shang Xue Yuan” (商学院): 可能我们之前了解的是一个假美国
[2] Shandong’s “WeMedia Village” Shuts Down After Becoming Focus of National Attention
Back in early August, official Party media in Shandong province turned attention, and praise, on a business in the “ordinary small village” of Limiao that was transforming the lives of local rural women by involving them in the production of content for social media platforms.
The business, “Boyan Cultural Communication Co. Ltd.” (济南薄言文化传播有限公司), started by a twenty-something returnee named Li Chuanshuai (李传帅), employed more than 20 young rural women, who scoured the internet for interesting entertainment content to post to the scores of WeChat public accounts operated by the company. Often, they posted short videos cut and edited from the latest popular TV dramas, to which they added their own comments. Sometimes they also posted small videos about village life. Their posts would carry online advertisements, allowing the company to earn income depending on the number of views the post received. Average July income for these women was 7,594 yuan, higher than the average income in Shanghai, and Li Chuanshuai reported personally making more than one million yuan over the past year.

On August 25, 2018, workers in Shandong’s “WeMedia village” receive their wages, and spread them out like fans. SOURCE: Hedgehog Collective.
This week, coverage by WeChat-based publications turned a more critical eye on the Li Chuanshuai’s content operation in Shandong, with devastating consequences for the “WeMedia village.”
In an August 27 report called, “An Onsite Exploration of Shandong’s WeMedia Village, Rural Women Make Incomes of Over 10,000 Doing WeMedia” (实地探访山东新媒体村，农妇做自媒体收入破万), “Hedgehog Collective” (刺猬公社) shifted the story to one about “Shandong’s WeMedia village” (山东自媒体村) to one about “a rural base for content laundering” (农村洗稿基地). Li Chuanshuai’s business model came under greater scrutiny, sparking a national conversation about the larger degradation of content quality and reading habits through the single-minded pursuit of attention and profit. By August 31, the official People’s Daily had weighed in on the matter through its own WeChat public account, writing that the flood of low-quality content had become a “deep-seated disease that must be dealt with in the development of WeMedia.”
Back in Limiao, the pressure of media attention was already affecting Li Chuanshuai’s operations. According to AI Finance and Economics on August 30: “Before the young women were all smiles, but in the past few days they have grown silent, and several young women around 18 and 19 have already left the operation out of shame.” News reports on September 1 quoted Li Chuanshaui as saying that the office in Limiao Village had already been shut down.
KEY CHINESE SOURCES:
WeChat Public Account “Hedgehog Collective” (微信公众号”刺猬公社”): 实地探访山东新媒体村，农妇做自媒体收入破万
WeChat Public Account “AI Finance and Economics” (微信公众号”AI财经社”): 亩产10万+
WeChat Public Account “People’s Daily Commentary” (微信公众号”人民日报评论”): 农妇做自媒体月入破万，内容创业该何去何从？ | 睡前聊一会儿
[3] Coverage Turns Attention to Demeaning of Women in QQ Chat Groups for Didi Drivers
After news emerged of the rape and murder on August 24 of a 20 year-old woman using the Hitch carpooling platform operated by ride-hailing service Didi Chuxing — the second such case since May this year — the company was ordered by regulators in China to overhaul its vetting procedures, and the company suspended its carpooling platform indefinitely and issued a public apology.
On August 30, People’s Daily Online and other media reported that “Didi Driver Chat Groups” (滴滴司机群) on QQ in many cities, including Wuhan, Shenzhen, Shijiazhuang, Yantai, Kunming and Fuzhou, contained posts that were demeaning to women and “relished in the fate of victims.” A police notice issued on August 27 said that those responsible for the posts had already been taken into custody.

KEY CHINESE SOURCES:
People’s Daily Online (人民网): 滴滴群侮辱乐清遇害者 多人被拘 警方：网络不是法外之地
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 十城约谈滴滴：深圳将断网列入惩罚措施，武汉开查司机聊天群
Chutian Metropolis Daily (楚天都市报): 疑似武汉滴滴司机群聊曝光，滴滴表示将配合相关机关依法处置
[4] CAC Launches National “Rumor-Busting Platform”

On August 29, the “Illegal and Harmful Information Informant Center” (违法和不良信息举报中心) of the Cyberspace Administration of China formally launched a new online “rumor-busting platform” (辟谣平台). The platform features a range of specific pillars, including “ministry releases,” a regularly updated list of rumors refuted by various government departments and ministries, “local responses” (地方回应), which debunks rumors emerging in cities and provinces, and “media verification,” which addresses allegedly erroneous reports in the media. Much of the content listed so far on the site’s various sections seems to overlap, and in nearly all cases the rumors are refuted by official government sources and police.
Rumors on the site dealing with politics seem to be primarily focused on cases of so-called “historical revisionism” (历史虚无主义) and language seen to be attacking Party martyrs and heroes, both issues that have been priorities under Xi Jinping.
KEY CHINESE SOURCES:
China Joint Internet Rumor-Busting Platform (中国互联网联合辟谣平台): SITE HERE
People’s Daily (人民日报): 中国互联网联合辟谣平台正式上线
[5] Beijing Morning Post to Cease Print Publication

A recent notice from the Beijing Post has revealed that the Beijing Morning Post (北京晨报), , a commercial newspaper published by the Beijing Daily Newspaper Group since TK, will cease its print edition at the end of the year, and subscriptions will no longer be available for 2019. News reports have said that plans have long been in the works to cease print publication, and arrangements have been made for employees to be redistributed to other newspapers and websites. On September 1, reports on the story by The Paper, Jiemian and other media were removed by the authorities.
On January 1, 2017, another major Beijing commercial newspaper, the Beijing Times, suspended publication. On August 21, 2018, a post to the WeChat public account of the Beijing Times revealed that the account would be transferred to “Capital News” (长安街知事), a WeChat public account operated by Beijing Daily, the official mouthpiece of the city’s top Party leadership.

A Google search showing a report from The Paper on the closure of Beijing Morning Post, followed by a notice that the article is already offline.
KEY CHINESE SOURCES:
IT Home (IT之家):《北京晨报》即将停刊，曾是首都第一家都市早报
National Business Daily (每经网): 《北京晨报》年底停刊，将与其他报网合并
WeChat Public Account “Journalist’s Station” (微信公众号”记者站”: 今天，京华时报公众号完成迁移，账号被回收，往事成烟云！

Xu Lin Takes the Helm at Information Office

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In coverage — or lack of coverage — of the floods in Shandong province this week by traditional media outlets in China, we have further illustration of the changing nature of the media environment. No longer are magazines and newspapers pursuing in any way in-depth reports or analyses, as they might have done before the Xi Jinping era, and social platforms are taking the lead, to the extent that coverage is available at all.
Also this week, an important change at the Information Office of the State Council, with close Xi Jinping ally Xu Lin (徐麟), formerly CAC chief, taking over as director there, where he will be in charge of China’s foreign propaganda. Meanwhile, the CAC is pressing online video platforms very hard to ensure that they get rid of unwanted content and more loudly promote “positive energy,” this being a Xi Jinping era term for content that emphasizes positive and uplifting stories and views of Chinese society, and which builds up the Party’s position within that narrative of positivity.

THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
August 18 – August 24, 2018
➢ Questions of Human Cause Behind Flooding in Shouguang, Social Media Fill the Information Gap
➢ Party Media Criticize Rights Defense by Jasic Workers in Shenzhen, Saying it is Supported Financially By Outside Organizations / “Leftist Youth” Come to the Fore
➢ Xu Lin Promoted As Director of the State Council Information Office, Bi Jingquan Sacked as Deputy Chief of the State Market Regulatory Administration in Beijing in Wake of Vaccine Scandal
➢ Documentary “Looking Back on Yan’an” Airs, Emphasizing Role of Core Leadership
➢ Cyberspace Administration of China: Online Short Videos Must Be Full of Positive Energy
[1] Questions of Human Cause Behind Flooding in Shouguang, Social Media Fill the Information Gap
In the wake of Typhoon Rumbia, which battered the coastal province of Shandong, a debate emerged online in China about whether human error might have contributed to loss of life and property, particularly around the city of Shouguang. So far, 24 deaths have been reported in the area, 3 people are still missing, and economic losses estimated at 9.2 billion yuan (US$1.34 billion). On August 17 and 18, as heavy rain pounded the area, local authorities in Shouguang grew concerned about the integrity of upstream reservoirs and whether they could bear the strain. They decided to release floodwaters to the reservoirs. As the floodwaters surged downstream, river currents were said to actually flow backwards along certain stretches, inundating many villages in the process.
According to state media reports, villages in the Shouguang area received notice on August 19 that he reservoirs would begin releasing flood waters, but they were given no time to remove livestock and other possessions. Flood waters had inundated the area by that night, and by the 20th Shouguang had already become a disaster zone. The strategic release of floodwaters from the reservoirs continued through August 21.

Shouguang Daily, the local Party newspaper, focusses in disaster coverage on what officials are doing.
According to an article released through “Xia Ke Dao” (侠客岛), a WeChat public account operated by the overseas edition of the People’s Daily, the Weifang Flood Control and Drought Relief Command Office had conducted proper monitoring of the rise of floodwaters, but the question remained of whether or not they had properly released waters to lower reservoir levels as the typhoon approached, and whether they had properly implemented early warning systems.
It seems clear looking at the sharing of information on the Shouguang floods that in this case social media-based accounts and media look the lead. In one article, the WeChat public account “Mei Tong She” (媒通社) said that traditional media had been completely powerless throughout the story, and even 5 days into the crisis had not released a single influential in-depth report. Among local media, most coverage had been devoted to the holding of meetings about the crisis, and there was little actual reporting on the situation itself. The stale nature of the “reporting frames” (报道框架), said the article, were a cause for concern.
The “Hot Search” league table on Weibo (微博热搜) could be seen as a further illustration of the problem. Generally, “Hot Search” can have a huge impact on attention to an issue. In this case, search threads for “Shouguang floods” were taken taken at least three or four times, and the “Hot Search” league table was dominated by celebrity news.
Key Chinese Sources:
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 马上评｜“下游人民就该受灾吗”，水库泄洪之问不容回避
WeChat Public Account “Xiake Dao” (微信公众号”侠客岛”): 寿光洪水，答案藏在细节里
WeChat Public Account “Xiu Tan Ji”(微信公众号”闲谈集”): 放水淹寿光：与所有的灾难相比，愚蠢是最大的灾难
Jiemian News (界面新闻): 山东潍坊通报为何泄洪：台风降水远超预报 不泄将影响近百万人生命安全
WeChat Public Account “Mei Tong She” (微信公众号”媒通社”): 寿光水灾舆情复盘：众声喧哗，这里急需权威主流媒体报道！
People’s Daily Online (人民网): 暴雨致潍坊逾147万人受灾 启动应急预案最高级别响应
[2] Party Media Criticize Rights Defense by Jasic Workers in Shenzhen, Saying it is Supported Financially By Outside Organizations / “Maoist Youth” Come to the Fore
On August 24, China’s official Xinhua News Agency ran a news story called, “Behind the ‘Rights Defense’ Incident By Workers at Shenzhen’s Jasic Company” (深圳佳士公司工人“维权”事件的背后), clearly part of a strategy by state media to discredit the labor actions at Shenzhen’s Jasic Technology Co., Ltd., which began back in May this year as workers who tried to organize an independent labor union were attacked by thugs and fired from their jobs. “The reporter discovered,” the story said, “that as investigations by the Public Security Bureau have deepened, the truth concealed behind the workers’ rights demands has slowly come to the surface.” The report, based on clear collaboration with police, employing direct quotes from interrogations, alleged a conspiracy to incite unrest by local worker advocacy organizations supported by overseas non-profits.
On August 24, authorities in Guangdong detained around 50 Maoist activists who had come together in Shenzhen to support Jasic workers in their bid for an independent union. Video footage of the police action shared online showed police in full riot gear shoving their way into an apartment where the activists were staying.
Key Chinese Sources:
BBC Chinese (BBC中文网): 深圳佳士工人维权发酵：多名声援团成员失联
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 深圳佳士公司工人“维权”事件的背后
Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报): 深圳佳士“维权”事件调查
Guangming Daily (光明日报): 维权不能脱离法治轨道
[3] Xu Lin Promoted As Director of the State Council Information Office, Bi Jingquan Sacked as Deputy Chief of the State Market Regulatory Administration in Wake of Vaccine Scandal
On August 21, Xinhua News Agency reported that Zhuang Rongwen (庄荣文), previously head of the State General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (National Copyright Administration), had been appointed as director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, and as a deputy director of the Information Office of the State Council. The same Xinhua notice reported that Xu Lin (徐麟), previously director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, was now appointed as director of Information Office of the State Council.
The notice also said that Bi Jingquan (毕井泉) would be removed as deputy director of the State Market Regulatory Administration. Bi’s removal, a direct result of the recent scandal surrounding the sale of substandard vaccines in China, was regarded as unfortunate by some industry experts, who saw Bi as a reformer in the process of revitalizing the domestic pharmaceutical industry.
Key Chinese Sources:
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 国务院任免国家工作人员
Lianhe Zaobao Online (联合早报网): 变革者毕井泉引咎辞职 药监改革何去何从
[4] Documentary “Looking Back on Yan’an” Airs, Emphasizing Role of Core Leadership
From August 17-19, the Party Building Conference of the Central Military Commission, the command and control center of the Chinese military, was held in Beijing. Delegates at the meeting attended a screening of a not-yet-released propaganda documentary called “Looking Back on Yan’an” (回望延安) — produced by the People’s Liberation Army News Broadcast Center (解放军新闻传播中心). On August 21, two days after the conference, the film was released during prime time on three separate channels in the China Central Television network.
On August 23, explanations of the film were published in various media under the control of the People’s Liberation Army. According to the People’s Liberation Army Daily, the military’s principal propaganda organ, one of the key themes of the propaganda film is the “emergence of a single leadership core,” referring to the strong leadership of the Chinese Communist Party — but also of course referring to President Xi Jinping.
Key Chinese Sources:
CCTV.com (央视网): 央视隆重推出大型文献片《回望延安》
PLA Daily Online (中国军网):《回望延安》: 回望党和军队的精神家园
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 从延安精神中汲取力量——文献片《回望延安》在军内外引起强烈反响
[5] Cyberspace Administration of China: Online Short Videos Must Be Full of Positive Energy
In recent days, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) has held numerous forums and conferences to promote the “building of positive energy content” in the field of online short video, pressing the need to offer greater intensity of “authoritative” and “positive” content — and to use the visual strengths of short video to explain to the masses the importance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and the spirit of the 19th National Congress of the CCP.
At one forum attended by 36 online short video platforms, an official from the CAC emphasized that as the platforms upheld Socialist Core Values (社会主义核心价值观), they must resolutely remove “illegal information in violation of regulations” — a term used to apply broadly (and often inconsistently) to content the authorities regard as politically sensitive. The participants, who included such platforms as Pear Video (梨视频), Tik Tok (抖音) and Kuaishou (快手), affirmed their commitment to upholding their “corporate responsibilities” and “increasing the supply of positive energy content.”
Key Chinese Sources:
CAC Website (中国网信网): 要让网络短视频充满正能量

Signals From Xi's Speech on Ideology

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

During a high-level conference on propaganda and ideology held this week, President Xi Jinping held his ground, and seemed to reaffirm his confidence in Wang Huning, the top Party leader in charge of ideology. To help us understand the significance of Xi’s keynote speech at the event, I’ll focus first on two points of background and one point of timing.
The first point of background is the criticism Xi Jinping has received since July this year. Not long after the “ink-splashing incident” (泼墨事件), in which a young woman, later confirmed to be Dong Yaoqiong (董瑶琼), posted a video to the internet in which she throws ink on an image of the president, a wave of criticism of Xi appeared both domestically and internationally. This criticism has included more open denunciation of excessively positive and exuberant propaganda, of which the documentary film “Amazing China” has been one of the most representative examples.
The second point of background is the upcoming 40th anniversary of the start of economic reforms in China. How this anniversary will and won’t be commemorated in the state media has been an important, lingering question this year.
Finally, regarding timing. It was five years ago, on August 19, 2013, that Xi Jinping held another important conference on propaganda and ideology during which he introduced the notion of “public opinion struggle,” or yulun douzheng (舆论斗争), coming several months after the release of the so-called “Seven Don’t Speaks,” a communique circulated by the Party’s General Office that banned discussion of a range of issues. The fifth anniversary of the “8.19 speech” was commemorated by Party media over a period of several days, so this also presented the perfect opportunity for Xi to hold another important conference.
A High-Level Affirmation of Propaganda Work
Xi’s latest speech is essentially an affirmation of his speech on propaganda and ideology from five years ago. In this recent speech, he says, “The policy decisions and deployments of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on propaganda and ideological work are completely correct, and the broad masses of officials on the front lines of propaganda and ideological work entirely deserve our confidence.”
The conference was chaired by Wang Huning (王沪宁), the standing committee member in charge of ideology whom many suspect has been a key mastermind of Xi’s projection of authoritarian resolve and national strength. This is the second of two high-profile appearances Wang Huning has made this month — the first being his solo reception of a visiting delegation from Vietnam. We can interpret these as a process of endorsement (背书) by which Xi is signaling that Wang has his confidence.
As for the speech itself, we can see no obvious differences from the speech five years ago. As far as we can glean from official reports of the speech (as yet, no full-text version has been made available), Xi Jinping does not appear to have mentioned the hardline phrase “public opinion struggle.” However, there was another hardline phrase: “We must adhere to the truth with a clear banner, firmly refuting falsehoods” (要旗帜鲜明坚持真理，立场坚定批驳谬误).
Those inclined to a normative Western reading of “truth” and “falsehood” should understand that this is not an affirmation of truth as you might understand it — but rather an affirmation that it is the Party’s prerogative to define that truth, and its obligation to do so according to the clear direction of the top leadership. Which is why Xi follows immediately with: “We must exert pressure to ensure Party organizations at all levels act without negligence, exercising unflagging control of the [Party’s] position, unequivocal in holding those responsible [for lapses] to account.”
One clear difference in the recent speech versus that 2013 speech is Xi’s emphasis on his own stature and position. Five years ago, he had not yet introduced his banner term, “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), or the notion of the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), first on the list being “consciousness of the core” (meaning the primary leadership role of Xi himself). This time, he calls on the entire Party to study and implement his own “thought,” though he does not in this instance combine “thought” with “Xi Jinping.” He urges them to “firmly establish the Four Consciousnesses, resolutely protecting the authority and centralized leadership of the Central Committee, firmly grasping the correct political orientation.”
Party discourse notwithstanding, this is a far more direct injunction: Listen to me, follow me.
Reform Anniversary: Where are Mao, Deng and Jiang?
2018 marks the 40th anniversary of China’s Opening and Reform policy. In his speech, Xi does not mention this fact as a point of background. And there is one phrase in particular that deserves attention: “To raise the banner, we must hold the banners of Marxism and of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics up high, persevering in using Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era to arm the entire Party, to teach the people, and to promote our work.”
According to past practice within the mainstream Party discourse, when speeches come to the part about the development of ideologies, Marxism must come along with a string of others — “Leninism,” “Mao Zedong Thought,” “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” the “Three Represents” (Jiang Zemin) and the “Scientific View of Development” (Hu Jintao). In his recent speech, Xi Jinping omits five of these six. This is particularly significant because one of these, “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” is of course intimately linked with China’s reform path over the past four decades.
For Xi to neglect mention of Deng altogether gives us an inkling of the fuller picture. No mention of Deng + no mention of opposing the extreme left + an emphasis on the Party’s and his own authority + an affirmation of the ideological direction set five years ago. All of this added together equals resolute opposition to the right.
 

Migrant School Closure a Weibo Taboo

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

It has been more than a week since education authorities in the Beijing district of Shijingshan notifed parents through their official WeChat public account that one of the areas oldest and largest migrant schools, Huangzhuang, was to be closed, effectively immediately. The notice, “A Letter to Parents” (致家长的一封信), said the students would be redistributed, but the details of this redistribution are as yet unclear, according to reports from overseas Chinese media. Meanwhile, more than 300 migrant children who were enrolled in a summer program at the school have been shut out, their parents without clear short-term options.
The school’s principal, Chen Enxian (陈恩显), told overseas Chinese media that local authorities had closed the school without prior notification, padlocking the gates and preventing anyone from entering. [Caixin’s August 16 slideshow of photos taken of the empty school grounds.]

A “letter” issued through WeChat to parents at Huangzhuang, a migrant school on the outskirts of Beijing.
Why has the school been closed? According to a report from the Global Times, the company that holds the land said the lease was being terminated due to “illegal” use of the land. Another source told the paper, however, that the land was to be designated as green space. In fact, the school’s closure can be seen as the latest in a series of moves by authorities in Beijing — and in other Chinese cities — to force out migrant workers and their families.
For Huangzhuang, the writing has been on the wall for many months already.
Southern People Weekly, a magazine based in Guangzhou, ran a feature report in January on migrant schools in Beijing that noted that Huangzhuang School had received “verbal notice” back in October 2017 that it had been refused the necessary permits and would have to be demolished. Back in December last year, the New York Times also reported in its coverage of the extended crackdown on the migrant population in Beijing– which included coverage of forced closures of migrant schools — that Huangzhuang School had already been slated for demolition.
The Global Times report mentioned that “the company that holds the land” had pointed to illegalities. But trace the lines of ownership and you quickly realize that “the company” is simply the local government’s hand at work.
Back in January, theSouthern People Weekly report noted that Huangzhuang’s lease was with the Huamu Branch Company of Beijing Jindu Gardening and Forestry Corporation (北京金都园林绿化有限责任公司花木分公司). Beijing Jindu Gardening and Forestry (北京市园林绿化集团有限公司) is operated in turn by Beijing Landscape and Forestry Group (北京城建集团有限责任公司) — a link noted clearly on the group’s “About” page. And who runs Beijing Landscape and Forestry Group? Its single shareholder is the People’s Government of Beijing.
The group’s legal representative is its CEO and Party branch chief, Chen Daihua (陈代华), who in this 2016 interview appearing on Beijing’s city government website made clear that in the early 1980s the group was originally the Beijing Command of the Infrastructure Engineering Corps of the People’s Liberation Army (中国人民解放军基建工程兵北京指挥部), and was restructured in 1983.
Understand these connections behind the story of the fate of Huangzhuang School, and by extension the fate of migrant workers in the capital, and you understand why this story is regarded as sufficiently sensitive by the authorities to warrant censorship of discussion on social media.
The following are two examples of related posts on Weibo that were removed yesterday:

2018-08-20 14:54:08 | Beijing’s largest school for migrant children has been closed, but the question left in its wake: what will these 1,800 children of migrant workers do? How will the city authorities manage the aftermath? This is the question that will test the level of city management. I just saw a comment from a web user that said: ‘How can a city as big as Beijing not accommodate 1,800 migrant children? . . . . They seem so desperate.’ I was talking with a local person yesterday, and he said: ‘Beijing people are the most desperate; if migrant workers can’t make it, they can return home, but where do Beijingers go? . . . Full Text: http://m.weibo.cn/1306014463/4275105527914554 ​
2018-08-20 14:54:08 | 北京最大打工子弟学校关停，而遗留问题是，这1800名外来打工子弟孩子怎么办？ 城市管理者如何善后解决，这是考验一个城市管理的水平。 刚看到网友评论：偌大个北京城，竟然容不下这1800名外地孩子……听上去很惨。 昨天我跟本地人聊天，他说：北京人最惨，外地人大不了回家，北京人回哪? 外来务工人员…全文： http://m.weibo.cn/1306014463/4275105527914554 ​
2018-08-20 13:55:56 | 【Beijing’s Largest Migrant School Closed / Has 20-Year History】The Hengzhuang School located in Beijing’s Shijingshan District has a 20-year history as a school, and the vast majority of the school’s students don’t have Beijing residency permits. Now, over a dispute over land-use, the inability to renew its education permit and other problems, the school has no way to continue operating. And now, 1,800 migrant students face the tough alternatives of either returning to their hometowns or falling through the cracks. The teachers will either lose their jobs or be redistributed. Full text: http://m.weibo.cn/1887344341/4275094890800576 ​
2018-08-20 13:55:56 | 【北京最大打工子弟学校关停 拥有20年办学史】位于北京市石景山区的黄庄学校有着20年的办学史，学校绝大部分学生都没有北京市户口。日前，由于用地纠纷、办学许可证无法换新等问题，校址不再具备继续办学条件，1800名打工子弟面临着回老家或接受分流的两难境地，教职工也在失业或接受分配中抉择。7月，…全文： http://m.weibo.cn/1887344341/4275094890800576 ​

What Do "Low-Quality People" Watch on TV?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

China’s nightly official newscast, Xinwen Lianbo, is not generally the kind of programming that gets the blood flowing. Its regurgitation of the political news of the day is a political ritual, more about the Chinese Communist Party’s construction of power than about relevance to television viewers. But when Xiang Ligang (项立刚), chief executive of the telecom industry news site cctime.com, remarked on social media over the weekend that “those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality people,” things got very heated indeed.
Made just before midnight on August 18 to Weibo, here is what Xiang’s post said:

“Those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality people. They don’t need to know the major things happening in the country, and they aren’t capable of doing great things. People in China who do great things must watch Xinwen Lianbo.”

Many internet users, infuriated by the apparent political-class implications of Xiang’s remarks and his supercilious toadying to the Party, leapt to the attack. Where did Xiang get off deciding who was “low-quality” and who was “high-quality”?

“Low-quality people?” wrote journalist Yan Lieshan (鄢烈山) on Weibo. “They’ve never watched China Central Television, but watch the Cantonese programming on Hong Kong television instead. I stopped watching Xinwen Lianbo a long time ago, and only occasionally come across it in the hotel when traveling. Or maybe I spot it on the TV in some buffet restaurant. If Xiang Ligang is a high-quality person, then I’ll happily be a low-quality person.”
“That’s just what I am, a low-quality person who can’t do great things,” wrote Weibo user Jiang Guangda (@江广达_41207). “So from this day forward I am boycotting cctime.com, up until the point it goes bankrupt!”

 
In his rebuttals to critics online, Xiang Ligang suggested that “low-quality people” were those who had “glass hearts” (玻璃心), or were overly sensitive, and who refused to take responsibility, to which user Qiuyue Changsa (@秋月长飒) responded: “I’d like to ask you: When you turned off the comments on your Weibo post, would that be considered having a glass heart, and refusing to take responsibility?”
The tiny spark of Xiang Ligang’s phrase “low-quality people,” or xiadengren (下等人), caused such an online conflagration that even China’s commercial media pitched in on the story. The following is a short interview Xiang did with Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily.

SMD: why did you send out the Weibo post with the phrase, “Those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality.”?
Xiang Ligang: It started when I noticed that in the Taiwanese news, aside from some political discussion programs and some entertainment programs, there wasn’t much in the way of content, compared to a science and technology program I’d seen on CCTV-2 that had a lot more value. So I posted an said that.
Later someone commented on that post that in China there was only Xinwen Lianbo, and that made me angry, so I wrote a Weibo post about Xinwen Lianbo, and in that I said the thing about low-quality people not watching Xinwen Lianbo. 。
SMD: How do you view the way things have developed and been communicated?
Xiang Ligang: I never thought this thing would escalate to the point it has. It’s definitely been played up by just a few people. And I don’t really want to waste my time on this matter.
This was just my own personal attitude, something I shared within a small group. And most of my fans are those who pretty much share my outlook on things. But later certain Big V’s started started pushing this and seized on that phrase, “Those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality,” so things really spread like wildfire. These people, you could say, have values really opposed to mine, and they seized on this phrase to launch an attack against me.
SMD: What did you mean when you said “low-quality people” in your post?
Xiang Ligang: I have a very clear definition about low-quality people. In my eyes, high-quality people are first and foremost those who do real things. People who have ideals and who take things on. People who face life with courage and strive for self-improvement. And finally, people who love themselves, love their family, love their hometown, and love their country. It’s not at all how it was made out online, just referring to people who have money and are living well. Who are low-quality people? People that are lazy and greedy, who are ungrateful, who don’t take responsibility — they harbor dissatisfaction and hatred toward society.
SMD: How do you view the critical responses online?
Xiang Ligang: I’m essentially a conservative. I believe that right now social stability and economic development are good. This is my basic outlook on life.
So why are many people attacking me? Some ordinary internet users are just seeing that one line and feeling it’s totally unacceptable, and I can understand why they are upset. I think its normal for them to attack me. Then there’s another group of people who know what my values are and who just despise me. Later a bunch of people told me that they despise me because I support the idea of patriotism. These people, in my view, are low-quality people. This kind of person really rubs me the wrong way. This is just my attitude in life.
These people don’t have an effect on me. I just go about my own business. I don’t rely in this life on Weibo, or on seeking conflict.

Trial By Invective

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Chen Jieren (陈杰人), the blogger and popular “Big V” taken into custody by authorities in Hunan province back in June, appeared in court yesterday. But this was not a court of prosecutors and defenders, of cross-examinations, legal arguments or objections. It was the court of the People’s Daily. The court of Xinhua News Agency. The court of the Global Times.
In a raft of reports, central state media attacked Chen as an “internet pest” who had “polluted the online space,” who had deceived millions of online fans into believing he is a man who cares deeply about truth and justice. In fact, the reports said, he is a deranged profiteer, raking in millions through intimidation and extortion, all in the name of watchdog journalism.
As Chen’s lawyer, Tong Zongjin (仝宗锦), rightly pointed out in a Weibo post that was promptly censored, these attacks in the state media — and their reported “confessions” — are a flagrant violation of the principle of presumption of innocence, and amount to trial by the media. “Neither Xinhua News Agency nor the law enforcement officers who told Xinhua reporters about the case have the right to ‘hand down a judgment’ in a case that is still under investigation,” Tong wrote.
It might be possible to debate the facts in Chens’ case, if they were available and transparent, and ask whether there is any basis at all to the allegations made against him. But the crushing, schoolyard-bully language of the state media attacks offers another kind of transparency. The reports are an illuminating gaze into the dark insides of a system that will enforce, through violence when necessary, its supreme right to the truth, that will dismiss as “fake news” all facts that are politically inconvenient or challenge vested interests — a tactic that goes back many decades within the Party discourse, no reference needed or intended to Donald Trump.
The real target of the state media barrage is the claim to independence — of journalism, of thought, of conscience — and the tools that potentially empower those claims. “The development of the self-media must be legal and orderly,” says the People’s Daily piece, referring to the universe of public accounts that have emerged on platforms like WeChat in recent years. “They cannot be allowed to develop barbarously, or even to become online criminal forces.” The kicker is a lingering threat: “The police will not rest in bringing to justice those ‘harmful pests’ of the internet, who pollute the online space with malicious hype seeking illegal profit, regardless of how popular they may be, or how much they manage to package themselves as bright defenders of justice.”
The facts in the Chen Jieren case, laid out like damning exhibits in the state media attacks, are nothing more than a distraction, a bonfire of shame and invective to send a signal to the whole of Chinese society: Do not dare claim the truth for yourself; it is the Party’s through and through.

Maliciously Hyping and Provoking Trouble, Frenzied Profiteering Through Extortion
— Getting to the Bottom of Online Big V Chen Jieren
(People’s Daily, August 17, 2018, page 9)
“Actually, I cheated you all. On the surface, I appeared bright and blameless, a Big V flying the flag of equality and justice — when in fact I was angling for personal gain, and I committed many shady acts and was essentially an online parasite.” This was the confession of online Big V Chen Jieren as he faced interrogation. “I apologize to you all for betraying your goodwill and trust. The internet is a place where information can be very confusing, and the last thing you need is for your eyes to be betrayed by a hypocrite like me.”
Over the past few years, Chen Jieren has made a name for himself through his self-media account (自媒体账号) as someone who “criticizes the government,” “dares to speak” and “dares to expose information,” to the extent the his fans reached into the hundreds of thousands. But on the afternoon of July 7, a notice from police in Hunan caught people off guard: suspect Chen Jieren had already been taken in by the police and subjected to compulsory criminal measures.
As the police have progressed more deeply into the case, the true face of Chen Jieren has gradually been uncovered. The Chen Jieren case is a “clan-style” gang offense of online criminal forces (网上黑恶势力性质的), and this gang has donned the cap of the law and of supervision by public opinion [OR: “watchdog journalism”], taking the internet as a criminal platform, and unrestrainedly conducted extortion and blackmail, wantonly seeking profit, so they are suspected of the crimes of extortion and blackmail, and of carrying on illegal business activities. Over a period of several years, the Chen Jieren gang established 21 accounts, including the “Jieren Observation Viewpoint” (杰人观察视角), “Jieren Observation Heights” (杰人观察高度), on Weibo, WeChat, Toutiao and other self-media services, issuing more than 3,000 posts of various negative forms, hyping, attacking and exposing, and altogether they manufactured around 200 negative public opinion situations (负面舆情) in 11 provinces, raking in funds in the 10s of millions, seriously misleading members of the public watching and listening, seriously disturbing online order, and doing serious damage to grassroots governance and to social stability. . . . 

Chen Jieren was born in Qingshuping Township (青树坪镇), Shuangfeng County of Hunan province, to an ordinary peasant family. His parents were disabled, and the household was struggled with poverty. He worked in the local government and for well-known media, but he was fired by news media because of fake news (假新闻).
In recent years, information technologies have developed. These days, “Everyone has a microphone,” and Chen Jieren clearly recognized the commercial opportunity. He neglected the general knowledge that “on the internet there is not land outside the law,” and he discarded the principle that “self-media must also have professional journalism integrity.” Through unrestrained packaging and hyping, he steadily expanded his influence, seeking fame and fortune.
Open Chen Jieren’s self-media accounts and you find that they are filled with shiny but spurious titles like “veteran media professional,” “scholar of legal culture,” “expert on brand development” and “crisis management,” that he was selected to the list of “top 100 influential Chinese thought leaders” . . . . Read the posts in his accounts and their eye-catching headlines, the enumerations of “evidence,” and add to this the inflammatory nature of his writings, and all of this might easily give you the impression that Chen Jieren is someone who “calls for the truth and upholds justice.”
From 2003 to now, Chen Jieren has been involved in the media industry for many years, and he is clear about how to write articles so that they attract eyeballs. When he realized that writing articles could mean huge economic gain, he started to see this as a road to making money, and he saw the law and journalism as tools for earning money,” Chen Jieren’s lover Liu X said during interrogation. On May 31, 2018, Zhao X Geng (赵某庚), the driver for a certain transport company in Shaodong County, Hunan province, felt unwell on the job, and three days later passed away. Zhao X Geng’s family sought out Chen Jieren for help in seeking compensation. Chen Jieren instructed his brother, Chen Weiren (陈伟人), to negotiate, and the first time he met with the niece of the victim, Peng X, he accepted 26,000 yuan as a consultation fee and reached an agreement: for a settlement [with the company] of under 400,000 yuan, they would take a 10 percent service fee; for anything exceeding 400,000 yuan they would take a 30 percent service fee.
After this, Chen Jieren directed his younger brother Chen Weiren to post “Li X Yan, Black-Hearted People’s Congress Delegate From Hunan’s Shaodong County, Causes Death.” Chen Jieren also arranged for the child [of the victim] to appear outside the transport company with a banner . . .  putting pressure on the local government and the transport company.
Right after, Chen Jieren and the others demanded that Li X Yan compensate the Zhao family. “At the time, I took charge getting the compensation down to 700,000 yuan. A few minutes later, older brother called to cuss me out, saying I had to keep with to the 880,000 previously agreed,” says Chen Weiren. Ultimately, Chen Jieren and the others received a profit of 263,000 illegally from the deal.
“Considering myself a lawyer, when I would write things online to manufacture a disturbance, I would normally employ legal analysis, creating the impression that I was speaking from the law, but behind the scenes it was connected to a lot of personal gain, and this is something that the masses of internet users had no idea about.” In Chen Jieren’s eyes, writing essays, manufacturing public opinion, making social media posts, all of it could be turned into business.
. . . . [Long list of alleged crimes removed here] . . . .
The dignity of the law cannot be trampled, and the goodness of the people cannot be abused. Chen Jieren has ultimately been brought to justice. “I wrongly believed that without belonging to any particular media, I could act in my own way. For the sake of profit, I habitually spoke selectively and with bias, polluting the online space, and violating the overall spirit and direction of the national legal and regulatory system for the internet. I should pay the price for my own illegal actions,” Chen Jieren says with remorse.
The development of the self-media must be legal and orderly. They cannot be allowed to develop barbarously, or even to become online criminal forces. We must cut away those law-breakers who seek to gain underhanded profit by the internet.
“The masses in society must be alert to all instances of those with impure motives masquerading as justice, raising their ability to distinguish. If they are blackmailed by someone, they must not give in, but must use the weapon of the law to protect themselves; relevant departments and units should also ensure robust systems of entry, content review, responsibility etcetera are in place for self-media, creating a proper and healthy online environment,” the police said. The police will not rest in bringing to justice those “harmful pests” (害虫) of the internet, who pollute the online space with malicious hype seeking illegal profit, regardless of how popular they may be, or how much they manage to package themselves as bright defenders of justice.
 

Welcome Back Google? Not So Fast

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Highlights from our round-up of top-five Chinese media stories from the past week include messaging from the central Party media on the need for the country to steady itself and be ready for “wind and rain” given domestic and international pressures on the Chinese economy, and a surprising hat-tip to former President Jiang Zemin in a provincial-level Party paper.
Also of interest, a brief invitation from the overseas edition of the People’s Daily for Google to return to China is pulled from Facebook and Twitter.

This Week in China’s Media
August 4, 2018, to August 10, 2018
➢ Central Media Issue “Declaration” on the Domestic Economy 
➢  People’s Daily (overseas edition) Welcomes Google Back to China on Facebook and Twitter, Then Deletes Post
➢ Shaanxi Daily Looks Back on Jiang Zemin Inspection Visits in 40th Anniversary of Reform Coverage
➢ New Tax Procedures Introduced to Combat “Unreasonable” Pay Levels in Entertainment
➢ Puyang Broadcast TV in Henan Demand Wages
[1] Central Media Issue “Declaration” on the Domestic Economy 
On August 7, the official Xinhua News Agency ran an article called “Creating a Good Life Come Rain or Shine” (风雨无阻创造美好生活) that amounted to a “declaration” (宣言) of purpose on China’s future and development in times of adversity. “It is normal for there to be wind and rain,” the article said, using a two-character phrase frequently used in Chinese to denote hardship and adversity. “But regardless of what kind of wind and rain, there is no way it can impede the march of the Chinese people toward good lives.”
The article, which was carried the next day on the front page of the People’s Daily and many other newspapers, was the fourth time in recent months that such “declarations” were released by state media. While references to the United States” or “Sino-US [relations]” did not appear in the article, it can be read as a response to ongoing trade tensions. At one point, the article said, directing its ire clearly at the Trump administration: “There are certain people who don’t wish to see the lion stir or the dragon rise into the air, who don’t want to see 1.3 billion people living good lives, and so they seek unilateralism, protectionism, trade bullying (贸易霸凌主义). This is something that cannot be avoided, and must be challenged and met.”

At the recent session of the Party’s Politburo on July 31, the phrase “change in the midst of steadiness” (稳中有变) was raised. China News Service, the country’s second official newswire, reported that “change” related to a number of news problems and challenges internally in China, and to clear changes in the “external environment” (外部环境). In its own assessment of the macroeconomic situation in the past three years, the Guangming Daily, a paper published by the Central Propaganda Department, said that China had made progress in “preventing and resolving major risks” (防范化解重大风险), but that the trade war with the United States and other external environmental challenges had “clearly expanded uncertainty.”
Key Chinese Sources:
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 宣言：风雨无阻创造美好生活
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 宣言：改革开放天地宽
People’s Daily (人民日报): 宣言文章为何刷屏？穿越“风雨”说信心
China News Service (中国新闻网): 政治局定调中国经济：“稳中有变”如何应对？
Guangming Daily (光明日报): 经济运行稳中有变 改革开放勇往直前
[2] People’s Daily (overseas edition) Welcomes Google Back to China on Facebook and Twitter, Then Deletes Post
On August 6, the overseas edition of the CCP’s official People’s Daily turned to Facebook and Twitter, both services blocked in China, to say amidst speculation that Google planned a return to China that the company was welcome, but that the precondition was that it abide by China’s laws and regulations. The posts have already been deleted. On August 8, Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po newspaper posted images of the posts to its official Weibo account (@香港文汇网). These too have now been deleted.

According to a report from Hong Kong’s Ming Pao on August 9, some university students inside China reported that they could access Google Scholar from campus, but the service was unavailable if they were not on the campus internet network.
Key Chinese and Other Sources:
Sohu.com: 人民日报发文欢迎谷歌回归 但前提是“遵守中国法律”
Free Weibo (自由微博): 香港文匯網：【人民日报发推欢迎Google回归后又删除】
Newsweek: Google Welcome in China but Must Comply With Censorship: State Media
Business Insider: Chinese state media tentatively welcomed Google back to China, then deleted all trace of its invite
Ming Pao News (明报新闻网): Google學術搜尋重返內地校園
[3] Shaanxi Daily Looks Back on Jiang Zemin Inspection Visits in 40th Anniversary of Reform Coverage
On August 10, Shaanxi Daily, the official newspaper of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee, published a four-page series called, “Comrade Jiang Zemin Inspects Shaanxi” (江泽民同志视察陕西) as part of an ongoing series dealing with the 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening. By August 12, the text of the online electronic version of the print page was already unavailable, although the image of the page itself could still be viewed. In 2018, news mentioning “Jiang Zemin” has been extremely rare in China, in part a reflection of the dominance of Xi Jinping — and this is the first time Jiang has appeared this year in a provincial-level Party publication.

The “Comrade Jiang Zemin Inspects Shaanxi” article looked back on five visits Jiang made to Shaanxi province between 1989 and 2002, and emphasized how Comrade Jiang Zemin cared for the development of Shaanxi and had defined the direction for the province in terms of reform and “socialist modernization” (社会主义现代化).
Key Chinese Sources:
Shaanxi Daily (陕西日报): 江泽民同志视察陕西
[4] New Tax Procedures Introduced to Combat “Unreasonable” Pay Levels in Entertainment
News reports this week in China said that since August 1 this year a new taxation system had been applied to the film industry, with taxes on incomes rising suddenly from 6.7 percent previously to 42 percent, and that authorities were demanding that tax payments be made in a lump sum every six months. On August 11, iQiyi, Youku, and Tencent Video joined with major production companies Daylight Entertainment (正午阳光), Huace Film and TV (华策影视), Ciwen Media (慈文传媒), Youhug (耀客传媒) and New Classics Media (新丽传媒) to issue a document called “Joint Declaration on Inhibiting Unreasonable Compensation and Preventing Negative Trends in the Industry” (关于抑制不合理片酬，抵制行业不正风气的联合声明). They pledged in the document to jointly resist “sky-high” payments for entertainers and tax evasion, and to be open about contracts. The statement specified clear standards for paying of star entertainers, with the maximum not to exceed one million RMB for individual episodes, and 50 million RMB for films.
According to Xinhua News Agency, the Central Propaganda Department and the State Administration of Taxation jointly issued a “Notice” in June demanding that the problem of excessive pay be dealt with and a system of “sunshine contracts” (阴阳合同) be put in effect in order to ensure the healthy development of the industry.
Key Chinese Sources:
36KR.com (36氪): 抵制天价片酬！9家公司联合声明：单个演员片酬不超5000万
National Business Daily (每日经济新闻): 天价片酬，再见！每经影视对话联合声明方：明星片酬税费由演员承担
Central News Agency Taiwan (中央通讯社): 傳中國官方出手 明星稅率從6%飆至42%
WeChat Public Account “Black Bamboo Zhang” (微信公众号”紫竹张先生”): 税务总局出手了，明星税率从6%改为42%
China News Service (中国新闻网): 明星天价片酬再见！5000万，不能再多了
Xinhua News Service (新华社): 中宣部等部门联合印发《通知》 治理影视行业天价片酬“阴阳合同”偷逃税等问题
[5] Puyang Broadcast TV in Henan Demand Wages
This week, images made the rounds in WeChat private message groups and on social media in China of employees from Puyang Broadcast TV in Henan province gathering at the local Petition Office (信访局) to demand unpaid wages.

In June this year, internet users posted images on Weibo and WeChat reporting that journalists at Qiqihar Broadcast TV in Heilongjiang province were demanding payment of back wages, and that the station was already three months behind in payment.
Key Chinese Sources:
Baidu Tieba “Puyang Bar” (百度贴吧”濮阳吧”): 最近网上濮阳电视台讨薪的事是真的么？有人知道吗？？？
WeChat Public Account “Fanren Fanyu” (微信公众号”凡人钒语”): 不要以为戴顶“党媒”的帽子，就可以搞特权！
WeChat Public Account “Riji Bu Fanhuang” (微信公众号”日记不泛黄”): 又见广电职工拉横幅讨薪，媒体界还有铁饭碗吗？

Dazzling Surveillance

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

Over the past year, international media and human rights groups have reported actively on the deteriorating human rights situation in Xinjiang in China’s northwest, where unrelenting and virtually ubiquitous state surveillance using a range of technologies has become a fact of life for millions of ethnic Uyghurs. In one of the strongest reports, the Wall Street Journal wrote of China’s “total surveillance state” in Xinjiang as a “vast experiment.”

Mobile news from state media. The headline reads: “Director of Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission: Ensuring Full Coverage of Public Surveillance By 2020”
But the experiment is already expanding across the breadth of China. At a conference back in June — a video conference, no less — Chen Yixin (陈一新), the director of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, urged the rapid and full implementation of what the Chinese Communist Party calls “Project Dazzling Snow” (雪亮工程). Chen spoke in glowing terms of the project, a comprehensive video surveillance network intended to cover communities in rural China down to the village level, as a “thousand-mile eye” (千里眼) protecting the security of the people.
It was the duty of all officials involved, Chen said, to “make even bigger contributions to promoting the modernization of social management and the building of a peaceful China.”
When it was first approved by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party back in 2016, “Project Dazzling Snow” was envisioned as having “full geographic coverage, full network sharing, full time coverage, and full operational control,” meaning that the system would be nationwide, capture every nook and cranny with the exception perhaps of private homes, and would be readily accessible to law enforcement with 24/7 data — at the push of a button, to use an old-fashioned term.
In a political culture in which digitalization is often treated as a noble political end in itself, the project would “raise the digitalization of law and order and prevention in society,” and would “efficiently protect the life and property of the masses.”
But how did such a delightful image, that of glistening and crystalline snow, come to describe a project that to a great many people outside of China’s control obsessed political culture must seem a devilish ambition?
In Chinese, the phrase “dazzling snow” refers to brightness and clarity. In the 1940s, the phrase was most usually associated in discourse of the Chinese Communist Party with words like “sword” (刀剑) and “eyes” (眼睛). For example, there were phrases like, “sword as dazzling as snow” (雪亮的战刀), and “the eyes of the people are as dazzling as snow” — the latter phrase meaning that China’s masses are discerning, or penetrating.
In fact, the phrase “The eyes of the people are as dazzling as snow” has long been a standard within the official Party media in China. It has been used to declare China’s resistance against imperialism, against the Kuomintang, and in support of class struggle. The image below is of a 1955 report in the People’s Daily on the suppression of the so-called “Hu Feng Counter-Revolutionary Clique,” referring to the campaign launched against the writer Hu Feng, who argued among other things that writers should have autonomy and not be directed by politicians.

The name “Project Dazzling Snow” derives directly from “the eyes of the people are as dazzling as snow.” The project first emerged under this name in Sichuan province.
By September 2015, when the National Development and Reform Commission, the Central Public Security Comprehensive Management Commission and other departments jointly issued an “Opinion” on increasing nationwide video surveillance for public security reasons, the phrase had come into use across the country. Finally, in January this year, the phrase “Project Dazzling Show” entered a Number 1 Central Document (中央一号文件) for the first time, being mentioned in a document called “Opinion from the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council Concerning Implementation of the Village Revitalization Strategy” (中共中央国务院关于实施乡村振兴战略的意见).
The notion of “village revitalization,” or xiangcun zhenxing (乡村振兴), which also appeared in Xi Jinping’s political report to the 19th National Congress of the CCP last fall, seems to have become closely associated with blanket public security surveillance of the countryside — a less catchy cousin of “Project Dazzling Snow.”
The coming of age in the state media of “Project Dazzling Snow” happened more than a year ago, on June 14, 2017, as the phrase appeared for the first time in the Party’s official People’s Daily .

The People’s Daily report dealt with implementation of video surveillance in the Jin’e Subdistrict of Longchang County in Sichuan province, where 10 villages were brought into the new system of “Project Dazzling Snow.” The article described the set up of “command centers” at the county and subdistrict levels, a “platform” at the level of each local police station, and a “[computer] workstation” (工作站) in each village. All of the major streets and roads, said the report, were covered by 24-hour, 360-degree video surveillance.
“Project Dazzling Snow” is now in the midst of a concerted nationwide implementation push, with Chen Yixin emphasizing in his June meeting that full national coverage was to be achieved by 2020, just two years from now. The chilling implications of mass video surveillance in Xinjiang are already being felt, and now the rest of the country can expect to be equally “secure.”

Discourse Climate Report: July 2018

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

The CMP discourse climate report for the month of July 2018 is now available. The biggest trends this month? Well, we see, not surprisingly that two terms continue to dominate: “Belt and Road” and “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.”
And what about the terms related to Xi Jinping’s predecessors? There has been some talk in recent months about “disappearing Deng Xiaoping”. So what do we see in the discourse? This month we actually see a slight downturn in reference to all three banner terms of Xi Jinping’s predecessors: “Deng Xiaoping Theory” (Deng); the “Three Represents” (Jiang Zemin), and the “Scientific View of Development” (Hu Jintao). Judging from the context in which the terms were used in May and June, this decline has to do with the completion of events to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx.
Also this month, we take a look at the various terms related to “MeToo” in China, as a number of high-profile allegations of sexual harassment, in particular by prominent members of the Chinese media, became an issue of focus across social media.
 

7月语象速递|米兔，迷途
By 喵酱
2018年进度条已经过半。一眼望去，词云还是熟悉的模样：图中16字长语和一带一路已连续霸屏6个月。
”
根据香港大学新闻及传媒研究中心中国传媒研究计划（CMP）划分的六级语温梯度（沸、烫、热、暖、温、冷），7月关键词语温分布如下：

数据来源：人民日报图文数据库 *以上语温等级，均使用占比方法测定。参见《钱钢语象报告：党媒关键词温度测试》
7月，这组词语的语温变化几乎都是一级升降，唯一的例外是“系列重要讲话”，跳动两级，由冷入暖。
结合前几个月看，六月给一些热词短暂降了温。七月，它们又纷纷恢复到烫词。这些词一部分和十九大相关，如：以习近平同志为核心、人类命运共同体。
由热回烫的还有：放管服、全面深化改革。放管服为简政放权、放管结合、优化服务的简称。这个说法由李克强在2016年《政府工作报告》中首次提出。与此相应，简政放权、权利清单/责任清单、人民日益增长的美好生活需要和不平衡不充分的发展之间的矛盾由暖升热。
此外，国家安全、从严治党、党的领导、全面深化改革也是本月“新烫”，上月为热词。
维稳、司法公正、三严三实、红船精神、中国特色社会主义法治体系向上窜了一窜，从冷变温。

13个关键词

本月邓小平理论、三个代表、科学发展观三词从暖降为温。5月、6月纪念马克思诞辰200周年的活动结束，三词热度随之下降。
凉了好几个月的“经济体制改革”由冷变暖，“市场经济”由热变烫。同时，“民主政治”也变多了，由冷变暖。
当然，不变的是16字长语，久居沸点。

中央政要

毫无悬念，领先的还是他（703次）。7月有31天，算下来，他平均每天出现22次还多。小时候萦绕耳畔的一句广告不禁在我脑海响起：大宝，天天见。
但，有时候居然不是一下就能看到他。7月9日，他不在头版。回头细看，这原来不是第一次，也不是仅有的一回。7月，有那么四天，头版标题里没有他。
李克强持平为烫词，共出现76次，较上月（55次）有所上升。本月，他出访欧洲，见了德国总理默克尔。李总理6月28日发表转变政府职能电视电话会议的讲话，刊登在7月13日出版的人民日报上。会议主题为深化“放管服”改革，促进政府治理体系和治理能力的现代化。
除了这两位，其他人出现频率如上图。随习出访非洲，参加金砖国家论坛的中央外事工作委员会办公室主任杨洁篪（42次），中央书记处书记、中央办公厅主任丁薛祥（33次）都属热级。
栗战书（28次）、王晨（22次）、汪洋（18次）跟在后面，也是热级。韩正出现13次，有所下降，成为暖。王沪宁由暖转温（5次）。
李希、张又侠虽然仍为冷词，但是出现了。前者在一篇开创司法体制改革的文章被提到，后者会见了越南、塞尔维亚国防官员。
7月，人民日报上没有见到中央军委副主席许其亮、天津市委书记李鸿忠的身影。

地方政要

从地方官媒曝光量来看，和六月份一样，西藏党委书记吴英杰（109次）是第一，广东省委书记李希（79次）第二。广西省委书记鹿心社（69次）这个月跃居第三，几个月以来，曝光率稳步提升。随后是河北省委书记王东峰（67次）和吉林省委书记巴鲁朝音（66次）。
本月曝光量变动比较大的有黑龙江省委书记张庆伟，和河南省委书记王国生。前者从上月的70次，下降到本月36次。后者从上月的34次，上升至本月的62次。

外国元首

本月外国政要曝光排名有了大变化。一向位居第一、偶尔第二的特朗普本月大幅下降，排名第五，只出现13次。
先来看看他前面都有谁。7月的金砖会议带动了与会国的曝光率，东道主南非总统拉马福萨一马当先，出现36次。
随后就是习“最知心的好朋友”普京（21次）了。7月，趁着金砖会议，两人在约翰内斯堡又见了面，并且“巩固了6月北京会晤成果”。
巴西总统特梅尔（18次）位居第三。金砖另一位政要印度总理莫迪出现12次。
再往下是默克尔（15次），7月李克强出访德国进行第五轮中德政府磋商，两人一起出席了经济合作论坛，会见记者。
然后，这才终于看到特朗普（13次）。7月，中美贸易争端不断升级。美国东部时间7月6日凌晨0:01分，美国正式开始对340亿美元的中国产品加征25%的关税。此前，7月5日，中国商务部在记者会表示，如果美方征税，中方将被迫进行反制。
加税消息发出当天，不少网友的目光被一条在黄海上狂奔的美国货船吸引。船装满大豆，目标大连港，数次提速，加足马力向前冲。然而来不及了！它最终没能赶上中美互征关税的deadline。据《卫报》消息，这意味着它要多支付25%关税，成本将增加约600万美元。而今，这艘大豆船还在公海漂流，没有找到它的归宿。
受关税消息影响，沪深股市全线低开。7月，人民币对美元汇率连续贬值，6月中旬至7月底累计贬值幅度超过6%。
此前几个月，特朗普在《人民日报》出镜率在外国元首中，基本第一，只有6月输给普京，成了第二。本月，特朗普退至第五。提到他，《人民日报》表示“关税措施加重美国经济内伤”、“扰乱全球经济，危害美国自身”。

本月聚焦

#Metoo，米兔，迷途

7月底，米兔成为舆论焦点。米兔不是小米官方的那只吉祥物，而是反对性侵Metoo运动的音译。
置身风暴之前，我们先来看看米兔是怎么变成米兔的。
2017 年，十多位女性联名向《纽约时报》和《纽约客》指认好莱坞圈内大佬哈维·韦恩斯坦性骚扰。其中一位女星，莎莉·米兰诺在社交媒体上号召被性侵或者性骚扰过 的女性，都站出来，用Metoo作为他们的标签。指认就是反抗，借助互联网，Metoo跨越国家、语言和圈层，成为世界范围内反对性骚扰的一个标语。
2017年底，香港曾先于内地一步，讨论性侵。香港跨栏运动员吕丽瑶在Facebook上传一张她举着METOO牌子的照片，公开自己8年前曾被教练性侵。特首林郑月娥责成警务处长积极跟进。
到了内地，Metoo开始有了不同叫法，一种随音译，曰米兔。7月，性侵舆论风口浪尖时，微博上Metoo和米兔的帖子遭遇审查。这之后，微博热搜突然出现一个新词，“俺也一样”。微博上的同类标签还有：
#我也是#
#米兔运动#
#我都係#
#私も同じ#
#yo también#
#吾亦如是#
#anche a me#
#俺也是#
#我都系#
#ミーツー# #私も#
#저도요#
7月25日，一篇名为《章文，请停止你的侵害》的文章称作者被媒体人章文性侵。随后文章在微信、微博等平台热传。其实，就在前几天，7月23日，公益圈知名 人士雷闯被举报性侵，已经引起一波米兔的讨论。这场讨论有多火，我们通过“微信指数”看一看。微信指数没有收录“性侵”一词，我们以近义词“性骚扰”替代。

话题的高低起伏非常明显，这场讨论始于个案，开始得突然，声势一下子涨上去。米兔作为一个音译说法，它的表现远不及性侵事件主人公。
再来看看米兔单独的曲线。

峰值出现在7月28日。前一天晚上，学者刘瑜在自己微信上发了一篇《关于metoo》，认为Metoo高歌猛进之时，有可能造成误伤。第二天，公知圈反应剧烈，女权主义者批评文章中受害者应该自我保护的观点；有人认为米兔才刚开始，担心矫枉过正为时尚早；也有人指出文章中将网络举报比喻成文革时期大字报不妥。
在这一天，米兔的讨论走向峰值。
在中文语境下，性侵这两年几次成为热点话题。2017年4月，台湾作家林奕含自杀。她的作品《房思琪的初恋乐园》就是以自身经历为蓝本，写了一个女生被老师诱奸的故事。在生前最后一个采访中，她说，“人类历史上最大规模的屠杀是房思琪式的强暴。”
2018年4月份，北大毕业生实名举报前北大教授沈阳，曾性侵95级学生高岩，后者在98年自杀离世。沈阳任教的南大文学院，建议他辞去教职。
性侵几次进入公共视野之后，终于越过个体事件，引起了多层次的讨论。这次讨论触发了很多议题，比如性和权力的关系，女性的社会角色，性侵在法律上的判定。也 将媒体圈、公知圈、公益圈许多人曝光出来，光环不再。那么现在，网络举报了，然后呢？米兔下一步会如何？米兔带来了讨论，但还未有确定答案。米兔仿佛在一片迷途中，寻找出口。
另外，性侵话题刚热起来时，曾有人担心这是一出调虎离山之计，为此前引起巨大舆论的疫苗事件分担流量。但是，从微信指数上来看，即使在性骚扰/米兔讨论得最热烈的几天，两个话题的热度也不可相提并论。

四十年关键词之“党内民主”

改革开放四十周年，当年雨后春笋般涌现的一批词，现在如何？7月，我们来看“党内民主”。

党内民主不是改革开放后的新词。1948年4月25日，习仲勋在土改期间就曾说过，“整党要采取党内民主与党外民主结合办法”。
1978 年创造了“党内民主”四十年曲线的第一个高峰，它成了暖词。邓小平曾于改革开放之初，大力倡导党内民主，“党内要畅所欲言”，“党内斗争要有原则”。 1978年1月，《人民日报》发文《不许压制批评》，提到，“充分发扬党内民主，认真开展批评和自我批评…是我们党区别于其他政党的一个显著标 志。”1978年底十一届三中全会前的中央工作会议，党内创所欲言，叶剑英称赞为“党内民主的典范”。
但这个蜜月期是短暂的，如同华国锋的执政期，也是短暂的。1981年，“党内民主”的频率直线下降，成为冷词。直到80年代末，它曾有小幅回转，享有一点温度。随后，整个90年代，它都是冷的。
再就到了21世纪，“党内民主”不断攀升。十六大做出了“党内民主是党的生命”的论断，同时，“人民民主是人民共和国的生命”。从2005年到2011年，有那么段时间，“党内民主”基本上是暖词，偶尔成为温词，并且在2009年和2012年再造两个高峰。
但到了2013年，它重重摔了下来，从热词连跳两级，成为冷词。比1981年那次直线下降，斜率更大。在这之后，“党内民主”没再热过。到了十九大，2016年和2017年“党内民主”成为温词，如同列席会议一样地出现了。
2018年的七个月，“党内民主”共出现了5次。上半年出现的频率，约等于90年代初期。

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