When it comes to information and public opinion, the Chinese Communist Party has never had much need for that fanciful thing we call the truth. Truth is only ever a matter of the Party’s interest, something formed and unformed like a dirty ball of clay by however many hands can manage to shape it on the potter’s wheel of power. This basic fact about the political contingency of truth is the foundation of propaganda and media policy in the People’s Republic of China.
Which is why it is interesting to find articles emerging from Chinese officialdom, like this one published recently in China Press Publication Radio Film and Television Journal (中国新闻出版广电报), tossing in the term “post-truth,” or houzhenxiang (后真相), as though China shares in some general global truth malaise, driven by the rise of social media and mobile information. “In the era of ‘post-truth,'” says the article, “facts and data capable of reflecting the essence and changing nature of things are in extremely short supply, and mainstream [Party-state] media must place even greater emphasis on facts and data.”
Facts, of course, are generally in short supply in China not because authoritative sources are few and far between, or because people are driven by hopes and emotional impulses over rationality, but because — first and foremost — facts are regarded as politically hazardous insofar as they might coalesce into some form of truth not of the Party’s making. 

Post-truth has been understood in the West as a state in which the emphatic repetition of talking points is all that matters, in which facts are rhetorically weaponised. But the post-truth world is, domestically at least, the world the Party has always lived in, the garden it has carefully tended. The major difference, a significant one, being that the Party dominates the act of speech and the power of repetition. China is the promised land of post-truth, where the bullies have broken every pulpit but their own. Donald Trump, eat your heart out.  

What is clear from the piece in China Press Publication Radio Film and Television Journal is that Party pundits have seized on the notion of “post-truth” as yet another hook on which they can hang their accusations against voices emerging on the periphery, through social media and WeChat public accounts — the so-called “self-media,” or zimeiti (自媒体). The presumption is that media directly affiliated with the Party-state, which in China are referred to as “mainstream media,” or zhuliu meiti (主流媒体), are more reflective of the truth, more authoritative. This is easy enough to understand when we remember that we are talking here about the Party’s truth. When the Party’s will is standard, its media “mainstream,” all else is but pale shadow.
The piece is written by Zhao Shulan (赵淑兰), a journalist at the official Economic Daily. It is essentially the affirmation by a state press-worker of the role of the “mainstream media” in guiding or channeling public opinion in society in the “correct” direction, that most reflective of the Party’s truth-interest. Noting that self-media can be an “unstable factor” in the forming of public opinion, Zhao asserts (perfectly in line with the Party, of course) that “constant strengthening and elevating of the news and public opinion channeling capacity . . . . of the mainstream [state-run] media — ensuring the strengthening of correct public opinion channeling —  is an urgent and unavoidable topic of major significance.”
But how?
The key for Zhao is “subtlety,” or qiǎo jìnr (巧劲儿), which provides the headline of her piece: “Using ‘Subtlety’ To Raise the Channeling Power of Mainstream Media.” Subtlety in this case means the selective deployment of facts to make the case that best channels public opinion in a direction favourable to the Party. Zhao would probably not put it in exactly that way, but as she discusses recent cases such as the debate in China over “consumption downgrades,” her faith in the Party’s truth is overriding. A deep and abiding conviction that if you arrange the facts in just such a way, they will form the pre-truth of the Party’s infallibility and rightness.
“In the internet era,” Zhao concludes, “society is becoming a crystal lens, and the facts and the truth cannot be concealed.”
But certainly, oh certainly, they can be properly arranged.
 

Using “Subtlety” To Raise the Channeling Power of Mainstream Media
By Zhao Shulan (赵淑兰)
Lately, profound changes to structural patterns in the media and to the public opinion ecology have meant that the news and public opinion channeling of the mainstream [state-run] media face new terrain, new circumstances and new problems. In particular, the hyping done by certain self-media (自媒体) and online media out of commercial considerations often proves an unstable factor in the broadcasting of public opinion and its channeling [or control by the Party-state]. Therefore, the constant strengthening and elevating of the news and public opinion channeling capacity (新闻舆论引导力), broadcasting power (传播力), influence (影响力) and credibility (公信力) of the mainstream [state-run] media — ensuring the strengthening of correct public opinion channeling — is an urgent and unavoidable topic of major significance.
Consolidating Mainstream Public Opinion in Actively Responding to Public Opinion Flash Points
Recently, a post originating from self-media advancing the view that China’s private sector should step back [in favor of greater public sector involvement] made the rounds on the internet and created a storm of attention. The post said: “China’s private sector economy has already fulfilled its task of supporting the development of the state economy, and it should exit the field.” Concerning this [argument], the Economic Daily quickly responded with a post to its WeChat public account that same day, calling on all to be alert to and reject the stirring up of public anxieties over the idea that “the private sector must exit the field.” The post received more than 30 million hits within a short period of time, effectively guiding public opinion in the correct direction (有效引领了舆论的正确走向) and earning widespread praise. The next day, the Economic Daily again ran a commentary that clearly and unambiguously emphasised that the “Two Unshakeables” (两个毫不动摇) [policy of Xi Jinping, stating that both state and private sectors must be encouraged] could not be abandoned. The People’s Daily and many other mainstream media followed in making their voices heard, joining strength to propagate the attitude and policies of the Party and the government concerning the development of private businesses.
In the current public opinion ecology (舆论生态), public opinion flash points and their repercussions generally arise as suddenly as typhoons, with rapidity and violence. When these public opinion storms emerge, people are generally unable to make proper sense of things, incapable of distinguishing up from down and left from right — and often, thought they hear only thunder, they assume there must be rain. If the mainstream media step forward with courage, and at the right moment, helping people make sense of the confusion, formulating a plan, then everyone can get on the right path, finding their way through the blizzard, and this means that public opinion leadership can be better exercised and the influence of the mainstream public opinion [of the Party-state] can be effectively consolidated.
Public opinion leadership is about timeliness, and “time” is all about [seizing the] opportunity. Only be seizing timelinesses can a beneficial result be expected, and only with such beneficial results can we talk about strong and effective public opinion leadership. The assertive entry of the Economic Daily through its new media presence in the early stages of the “private sector exit” commotion, enabling clear positioning and clarification of errors, separating true and false, was a display of speed and timeliness, and it allowed seizure of the high ground and authority in public opinion face-off over economic questions.
Adequately Deploying Facts and Data to Raise the Credibility of Public Opinion Leadership
Using facts and data to speak is an effective way of strengthening the results of news and communication. In receiving news reports, what audiences want most are facts. And data are an integral part of the facts. On the domestic internet and in self-media at present, there is often certain information that stands between fact and rumour, or is outright rumour, and the goal of the disseminator certainly often to grab attention and draw the interest of the audience. In other cases they may wish irresponsibly to unburden their emotions, to make a name for themselves, or even to pursue hidden agendas (别有用心). In the era of “post-truth” (后真相), facts and data capable of reflecting the essence and changing nature of things are in extremely short supply, and mainstream [Party-state] media must place even greater emphasis on facts and data.
In August this year, a reporter for the Economic Daily went to Zhongguancun with the assignment of reporting on the results of innovation [in the Chinese economy]. In the midst of their reporting, they learned that a scientist formerly with the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had completely relocated the business he had started in the U.S. to Zhongguancun. Why would he make such a decision? He told the reporter: “I’ve worked in Silicon Valley before, and the pace of work there is pretty fast, but that pace is maybe half of what you find here in Zhongguancun.”
“As an entrepreneur, I vote with my feet when it comes to selecting the right environment for business,” [the source continued]. “I choose the place where things are best.” Top science and technology talent is increasingly choosing to gather in Zhongguancun, and in China. This fact illustrates that China’s science and technology development and industrial upgrading are something no country can contain. These real choices, ideals, efforts and goals define the prospects of China’s science and technology innovation and economic restructuring and upgrading.
To enhance their news and public opinion channeling capacity, mainstream media must pay special attention to styles and methods (方式方法). One extremely important aspect of this is to draw a concentric circle (同心圆) around public opinion in society rather than run counter to it. Drawing a concentric circle demands that we unite with the direction and policies of the Party and government, and that we identify these with the thoughts and hopes of the population. Only by remaining rooted in the concerns of the ordinary people can the media ensure their voices are accepted; and only by achieving acceptance can [the media] achieve resonance with the public and obtain favourable communication results.
Recently, self-media and online media have been talking a lot about “consumption downgrades” (消费降级), and at base this coverage is about spreading a pessimistic attitude. This is an issue on which the mainstream [Party-state] media cannot so easily achieve channeling through refutation; they cannot simply shout in response, saying these statements [about consumption] are false. But if they are able to calmly discuss the issue with self-media on a basis of equality, analysing the mechanics of how consumption increases or decreases, then the public opinion results can still be decent.
In fact, some mainstream [Party-state] media are not different from self-media and online media in terms of understanding why consumption rises or falls, and they simply “meet the enemy head on” before they even work out the sense of the matter at hand. Actually, the rise and fall of consumption corresponds to structural changes in consumption, and recent drops in consumption are really about consumption prices. This is a different problem, a different concept, with a different meaning, and can’t be confused with [a drop in consumption as consumer behaviour]. Objectively speaking, the self-media and online media embellishments over consumption declines are essentially an outpouring of displeasure over the pressures caused by exorbitant housing prices and rising commodity prices. If we take a more rational and expert approach, it’s not hard to see that drops in consumer prices have come not with cold consumer sentiment but with an explosion in consumption. This tells us that the drop in consumer prices is not caused by a drop in household incomes. If we then look further, we can see that the red-hot sales of low-price goods has to due with the return of more rational consumption attitudes, and with the wave in innovation of modes of consumption [in China]. At the same time, using data to show that consumption is unchanged can also burst the bubble of this idea of consumption downgrading.
. . . . If we offer a lesson to mainstream media in terms of public opinion leadership, I’m afraid it should be that . . . . with a correct sense of political orientation, public opinion guidance and value orientation, we should conduct public opinion leadership with attention to the expert professional art of redirection, rather than shouting at high volume and lecturing those we seek to guide from a position of superiority, compelling their submission.
In the internet era, society is becoming a crystal lens (水晶体), and the facts and the truth cannot be concealed. The mainstream [Party-state] media need to be attentive to social concerns, and official [Party-state] departments also need to support the mainstream media in responding to these social concerns, revealing the facts through the mainstream media in a timely manner.

December is just around the corner. That means the Chinese Communist Party is gearing up for the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of “reform and opening up,” which formally dates back to the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP,  held in Beijing from December 18 to December 22, 1978.
Yesterday, the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper published a list of 100 names of people it deems to have made “outstanding achievements” (杰出贡献) in the course of reform and opening. The list, introduced with an invitation to readers to make their own nominations, includes many well-known business people, the likes of Alibaba founder and CEO Jack Ma (马云), and Tencent founder Pony Ma Huateng (马化腾).

The listing for Jack Ma drew some raised eyebrows on social media and in both domestic and overseas media because it confirmed Ma’s membership in the Chinese Communist Party, which has not previously been acknowledged. Many have long assumed Ma was probably unaffiliated — or perhaps even a member of one of China’s consultative parties. Given Ma’s visibility internationally as one of the most important faces of Chinese tech innovation and business success, his outing as a Chinese Communist Party member certainly makes for eye-catching news.
But another detail regarding the People’s Daily list of “outstanding achievers” that drew the attention of Chinese was the fact that the list did not include Ren Zhengfei (任正非), the founder of Huawei, generally regarded as one of China’s biggest global business success stories of the reform period. Huawei is today the world’s largest manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, and just this year it overtook Apple to become the word’s number-two manufacturer of smartphones.
How can the Party’s flagship newspaper overlook the “outstanding achievements” made by Huawei and its chairman, Ren Zhengfei, currently ranked 83rd on Forbes’ “China Rich List 2018”?
Some have speculated that this was an intentional act of concealment connected to recent difficulties in the US-China relationship. As a post on the Wechat public account “Zhi Gu Qu Shi” (智谷趋势) argued yesterday:

This makes one think of the previous ZTE crisis, and also strict controls recently announced by the US government on [Chinese] tech exports, and wonder whether the relevant departments [in China] didn’t decide intentionally to hide [Huawei from this list] against the backdrop of US-China tensions? After all, Huawei’s expansion in the US could at any time be seen as “state conduct” and then the US Committee on Foreign Investment might make things difficult.

Few would take issue with the assertion that Huawei has emerged as one of the most successful and innovative of Chinese private enterprises in the reform period. As for its alleged links to the government, there are so far little more than guesses, though such conjecture is sure to haunt Huawei as it might any Chinese company.
In fact, all of China’s major enterprises are linked in countless ways to the government. When it comes to the accusation that this or that move on their part is “state conduct,” Alibaba and Tencent are equally as vulnerable.
But we can say with some certainty that the People’s Daily‘s publication yesterday of the 100-name list is a political wound in Huawei’s side.
For Ren Zhengfei, absence from the list leads to one of two very uncomfortable conclusions. Either he is in the unfortunate position of accepting his lot as one whose efforts do not constitute “outstanding achievement” within the Party’s reform and opening pantheon (a political indignity); or he must eat the bitter fruit of concealment, tacitly accepting his compromisingly close links with the government.
For reasons unclear, the list also excludes Hong Kong business magnate Li Ka-shing (李嘉诚) and economist Wu Jinglian (吴敬琏), both so conspicuous in their absences that storms of conjecture are inevitable.
This list, in short, is a lightning rod.
As China looks back, officially, across the expanse of reform and opening, what to conceal and how is of course an important question for the Chinese Communist Party. One of the most important figures sure to remain unacknowledged is of course Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), the 1980s premier whose name cannot be spoken.
China is now encountering a crisis of confidence, with public sentiment quietly in turmoil. Every misstep made by those in power pricks the nerves of society. Against this backdrop, the Party knows that it must tread carefully when it comes to the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of reform and opening, that it must tiptoe through the minefield and minimise all risks to itself. But there are, at the same time, plenty of foolish officials who glimpse an opportunity and act impulsively, becoming bulls in the china shop.
I haven’t the slightest idea who conceived of this very public act of adulation in the People’s Daily. Judging from the immediate results, however, it seems to have tossed a stone into the calm pool of public opinion, dividing society. One is reminded of the old saying: “The world might be free of trouble, if only fools would not go in search of it.”
 

This week we have quite a mix of stories topping the list from Chinese media, including an offensive chopstick video that will probably sink the fortunes of fashion house Dolce & Gabbana in China, a second-place marathon finish that put (excessive?) Chinese nationalism in the spotlight, and an order to one of the country’s most successful broadcasters, Hunan TV, to tone down its entertainment content.
Another significant story this week is about a video conference in which the Central Propaganda Department apparently urged government and Party organs, and Party members, to make sure they are reading official Party newspaper and periodicals. That should be read as another signal of the Chinese Communist Party’s determination to maintain and renew dominance over public opinion in the face of a mobile-driven revolution in communications.
___________________
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
November 17-23, 2018
➢ Dolce & Gabbana sinks in China after insulting online video and insensitive response
➢ Official WeChat public account of Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission comments on marathon flag incident
➢ Central Propaganda Department holds video conference on circulation of official Party newspapers and periodicals, Gansu Daily emphasizes need for Party officials to read Party publications
➢ Hunan TV ruled “too focused on entertainment” in official inspection tour, set for more news content during prime time
➢  Local police in Quanzhou apologize after Caixin magazine runs account of intimidation of journalist covering local chemical spill
 
[1] Dolce & Gabbana sinks in China after insulting online video and insensitive response
Italian luxury fashion house Dolce & Gabbana inspired fury in China on November 18 with a short advertising video called “Eating With Chopsticks,” in which a Chinese model was shown attempting to eat Italian foods such as pizza with chopsticks, accompanied by remarks from a Chinese narrator that many viewers found insulting to traditional Chinese culture and to women. At one point, as the model attempts to eat a ridiculously sized cannoli, the narrator asks: “Is it too big for you?”

Worsening matters, the immediate response to the rising controversy by Stefano Gabbana, the fashion designer who co-founded the fashion house with Domenico Dolce, was to unambiguously insult China and Chinese in private messages that were leaked to the media.
In an apparently heated exchange with Instagram user @michaelatranova, Gabbana refused to take responsibility for the controversy or disavow the video. “It was deleted from Chinese social media because my office is stupid as the superiority of the Chinese,” he wrote. “And from now on in all the interviews that I will do international I will say that the country of [poop emojis] is China.”
“China Ignorant Dirty Smelling Mafia,” he added with unmistakable venom.
On November 21, a Dolce & Gabbana fashion event called “The Great Show,” planned for that evening, was cancelled. The show had previously been billed as the biggest fashion show in the house’s 33-year history. The China market has recently accounted for roughly one-third of Dolce & Gabbana’s global sales.
The next day, major Chinese online retailers such as Xiaohongshu (小红书) and Ymatou (洋码头) dropped Dolce & Gabbana.
On November 23, Domenico Dolce and Stefano Gabbana finally sought to address what was now a full-blown crisis with an apology video in which they said “sorry” in Chinese. But by this point it was already too late to stem the damage, and the outright rejection of the D&G brand and even more extreme expressions of Chinese nationalism became a form of political correctness. Those trying to inject nuance into the discussion had to tread very carefully.
Hu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of the Global Times newspaper, which is generally among the first to fan nationalist responses to international affairs, wrote on Weibo: “We see one Italian fly into a rage against China in a chat and this quickly becomes something that ignites nationalist sentiment throughout public opinion — with celebrities also openly expressing their feelings about it, some even directly appealing to nationalism. This scene strikes one as somehow not right. On one side is an Italian individual and company, and over here on our side we quickly make it an issue for our entire society. How is it we make this out to be something like the Mukden Incident or the Marco Polo Bridge Incident?
Tsinghua University professor Guo Yuhua (郭于华) wrote on November 24 on his WeChat public account that the readiness to denounce so fully and harshly anyone who insults China is a mark of fragile confidence. Guo’s post was quickly removed by censors.
Key Sources:
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报): D&G设计师被曝辱华 上海大秀宣布取消 品牌方道歉并称“设计师Instagram账号被盗” 原定出席其时装秀明星纷纷取消计划
AND: 京东官方声明称下架相关商品 小红书和洋码头也官方回应下架相关商品 D&G中国在线销售渠道全断了
Guangming Daily (光明日报): D&G自取其辱 道歉须有诚意
WeChat public account “People’s Daily” (人民日报): 刚刚，D&G宣布取消上海大秀！此前中国众星抵制该涉嫌辱华品牌
Sina Weibo account of Hu Xijin (@胡锡进): TEXT TEXT TEXT
WeChat public account “Laobin Dong Lei” (老兵东雷): 那位把D&G带入深坑的网友，谢谢你！
[2] Official WeChat public account of Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission comments on marathon flag incident
During the Lake Taihu Marathon, held in the city of Suzhou on November 18, female long-distance runner He Yinli (何引丽) twice had her form thrown off by race volunteers who rushed onto the course and placed the Chinese national flag in her hands. In the end, He Yinli finished just 5 seconds behind Ethiopian runner Ayantu Abera Demisse, accepting the second-place prize. The actions, broadcast live on Chinese state television, drew criticism from commentators and were the subject of lively commentary online.
On November 20, a spokesperson for Wisdom Sports, which hosts the Run China marathon series along with China Central Television and the China Athletic Association, said that the handing off of the national flag had not been intentional, emphasising that these were spontaneous acts. But media quoted some sources as saying that the handing out of national flags to Chinese competitors was standard practice for the Run China series. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2173995/chinese-marathon-runner-loses-race-after-marshal-tries-hand-her
The WeChat public account “Central Political-Legal Committee Chang’an Sword” (中央政法委长安剑) pointed out that the International Association of Athletics Federations, the global sports governing body, has ruled that even judges may not step out onto marathon courses. It is not a courtesy to destroy fairness, said the account, nor is it patriotism to neglect the rules. The account called the acts at the marathon “crass red worship” (低级红) that “profaned the love of country.”
Key Sources:
Tencent Sports (腾讯体育): 国内马拉松赛场终点前递国旗成固定环节 网友呼吁取消
WeChat public account “Central Political-Legal Committee Chang’an Sword” (中央政法委长安剑) : 递国旗是礼遇？这是典型的低级红高级黑
[3] Central Propaganda Department holds video conference on circulation of official Party newspapers and periodicals, Gansu Daily emphasizes need for Party officials to read Party publications
On November 16, China’s Central Propaganda Department hosted a video conference dealing with the circulation of Party publications. The video conference was reportedly intended to convey the demand to Party and government organs at all levels that they must strengthen their “subscription work” (订阅工作) and “increase expenditure guarantees” (加强经费保障) — meaning essentially that they must spend money on subscriptions to official publications to ensure that “the circulations of Party newspapers and periodicals remain stable” (党报党刊发行数量稳定). The conference also urged the need for Party publications to use electronic reading boards (电子阅报栏) and new media channels to expand their reach among media audiences, including Party members and officials.
The conference almost certainly reflects broader concern within the Party leadership that the digital transformation of the media is making it more difficult for traditional Party media to make themselves heard.
On November 19, Gansu Daily, the official newspaper of the provincial Party committee of Gansu province, began a three-day series of front-page commentaries saying that “Party members and cadres must read Party newspapers and periodicals.” The first commentary said that the question of whether or not Party members and official subscribe to Party publications is not a matter of personal preference, but a reflection of “whether or not they invest their hearts in the voice of the Party.”
Key Sources:
WeChat public account “Media Observer” (传媒大观察): 《甘肃日报》连发三天系列评：不看党报是对党的声音不上心
Gansu Daily (甘肃日报): 让党报党刊成“精神大餐”——“党员干部要看党报党刊”系列谈之一
AND: 加强学习从读党报开始——“党员干部要看党报党刊”系列谈之二
AND: 落实意识形态的一项重要工作——“党员干部要看党报党刊”系列谈之三
[4] Hunan TV ruled “too focused on entertainment” in official inspection tour, set for more news content during prime time
Official state media reported this week that a central Party inspection group (中央第八巡视组) had conducted inspections of Hunan TV from February to July of this year, and had relayed results to the Party’s provincial committee in Hunan complaining that the network’s programming was “too focused on entertainment” (过度娱乐化). China National Radio reported on November 19 that the provincial leadership has instructed Hunan TV to deal with “three excesses” (过度) — namely, “over-concentration of performing arts and entertainment (过度集中综艺娱乐), over-reliance on entertainment celebrities (过度依赖明星艺人), and over-prioritisation of commercial values and market results (过度追求商业价值和市场效果).”
Reports said Hunan TV planned to address these concerns first by increasing the amount of news programming during prime time, and also by increasing “public welfare programming” (公益类节目) and public service announcements.
Key Sources:
CNR Online (央广网): 解决卫视过度娱乐化、严惩违规吃喝 湖南做好巡视“后半篇文章”
Hunan Daily (湖南日报): 立行立改 猛药去疴——湖南卫视整治“过度娱乐化”见成效
[5] Local police in Quanzhou apologize after Caixin magazine runs account of intimidation of journalist covering local chemical spill 
On November 17, Caixin, one of China’s most respected news outlets, ran a story called “A Chronicle of Fear in a Quanzhou Hotel” (泉州酒店惊魂记), which detailed how the writer, journalist Zhou Chen (周辰), had been intimidated by local police in the city of Quanzhou, in coastal Fujian province, as she attempted to report on a chemical spill at a local oil port earlier this month.
In her account, Zhou said she had reached the scene of the spill soon after initial news of the accident emerged on November 4. But on November 11, as she continued to report the story, she alleges that she was tailed by a law enforcement officer. Later that night, she says, she was invited to the lobby of the hotel where she was staying to have a talk with the propaganda chief of Quanzhou’s port district — an invitation she declined.
Typically, such invitations in China can offer officials or others an opportunity to offer journalists payment to back off of a story, or to otherwise pressure them to drop their inquiries. Editors at media with a stronger sense of professionalism, such as Caixin, will generally instruct their reporters to avoid such traps.
Zhou Chen then wrote and filed her report on the spill, heading off to bed early. She was already in bed when she heard the sound of a keycard opening the hotel room door. Four men wearing police uniforms barged into the room, saying they were from the local police station and asking to see her identification. They claimed they were conducting searches for prostitutes and their clients.