Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
We were pleased to discover today that RUC News Workshop (RUC新闻坊), the official WeChat account of Renmin University of China’s School of Journalism and Communication, has posted a helpful timeline and summary of the development of the ongoing vaccine scandal in China. We share a translation of the timeline below.
This is obviously a story with potentially huge implications for China’s leadership. Under Xi Jinping, the Party has managed quite effectively to keep scandal out of the headlines, something evident before Xi’s hardline February 2016 speech on media policy. This story, with its clear indication of deeper institutional problems, will surely be aggressively curtailed by censors in coming days. But its development is in many ways eerily familiar — not unlike the bursts of coverage, and often decent reporting, that we grew accustomed to seeing in the heyday of the commercial press in China, up through the Hu Jintao era.
RUC News Workshop notes that the incident, which is being referred to in Chinese as the “Changsheng Bio-Tech Problem Vaccine Incident” (长生生物问题疫苗事件), first unfolded on July 15, but was slow to gain public attention — finally culminating yesterday with an official response from Premier Li Keqiang. RUC News Workshop divides the scandal so far into three phases.
July 15-July 20: The vaccine scandal goes on for 6 days, but failed to draw strong attention from media and from the public [on social media].
July 21: An article called “Vaccine King” (疫苗之王) posted to a WeChat public account is shared widely through WeChat groups, “lighting the fuse” of commentary and analysis of the story.
July 22: The vaccine scandal is fiercely discussed and steadily heats up. Finally, CCTV News, the People’s Daily, The Beijing News and other “mainstream,” meaning Party-run, media finally make their voices heard.
Our translation of the RUC News Workshop timeline follows, with some edits and cuts for clarity — and a few notes and links here and there.
TIMELINE July 15, 2018
A notice issued by the China Food and Drug Administration says that fabricated productions records had been discovered for rabies vaccines produced by Changchun Changsheng Life Sciences Limited (长春长生生物科技有限责任公司), known for short as Changchun Changsheng (长春长生). According to the notice, the company had been ordered to stop production, and its Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certification (生产质量管理规范证书) had been revoked. According to a news report by the Shanghai-based outlet Jiemian, the investigation had been prompted by an older staff member working inside a production facility who had come forward. July 16, 2018
Changchun Changsheng’s share price sinks and several large shareholders dump their holdings. July 17, 2018
Changchun Changsheng issues a public response to the situation, assuring customers there are no problems. Changchun Changsheng’s parent company, “Changsheng Bio-Technology Company” (长生生物科技股份有限公司), known for short as Changchun Bio-Tech (长生生物), issues a statement saying that all rabies vaccines that have entered the market comply with quality regulations and there is no cause for concern. July 19, 2018
The incident is further fueled as Changchun Bio-Tech issues a statement saying that its subsidiary, Changchun Changcheng, had previously received a penalty notice (处罚书) from health authorities in Jilin province notifying them that a batch of their DPT vaccines did not comply with safety regulations. The notice [which dated the start of the investigation to October 2017] said that the company’s DPT vaccines had been deemed “inferior medicines” not meeting standards. The company had been fined 3.44 million yuan, and some of its vaccine stocks were seized.
The first page of the notice issued by authorities in Jilin province to Changchun Changsheng. SOURCE: The Paper. July 20, 2018
The news, based on the previously mentioned notice, that problems with the vaccines had apparently been discovered, prompting an investigation, by October 27, 2017, drew anger from many Chinese. According to the timestamp accompanying the notice as it was made public on the official website of the Jilin Food and Drug Administration, it had not been posted until July 18. The gap between now and the start of the investigation by the Jilin Food and Drug Administration into the sale of these 250,000 doses of vaccine in Shandong was already close to 9 months. But Changchun Changsheng had made no mentioned whatsoever of the notice from health authorities in its 2017 annual report.
It is worth noting that in November 2017 another batch of DPT vaccines had shown problems, this time from Wuhan Institute of Biological Products Co. Ltd. (武汉生物制品研究所有限责任公司) — [whose website is now taken down]. And in 2016, another batch of DPT vaccines from Changchun Changsheng had failed to pass inspection. July 22, 2018
Responses come from official media. CCTV Finance runs a report saying the vaccine problem must be thoroughly investigated, and that “comprehensive oversight mechanisms” (完善的监管机制) and emergency response systems must be put in place. The official Xinhua News Agency points out that mishaps cannot happen when it comes to vaccines, and that “loss of confidence” [in vaccines] is even more terrible than “loss of efficacy.” The Food and Drug Administration issues a notice on the case, saying it has already ordered vaccine manufacturers across the country to inspect their processes, ensuring production is strictly compliant with GMP production standards. The Food and Drug Administration says it will also carry out unannounced inspections across the country, dealing strictly with lawbreakers.
At 11PM on July 22, an article appears on the website of China’s central government: “Li Keqiang Issues Official Comment on the Vaccine Incident: We Must Give the People of the Country a Clear Explanation” (李克强就疫苗事件作出批示：必须给全国人民一个明明白白的交代). The article says: “Premier Li Keqiang has issued official comments on the vaccine incident: This vaccine scandal has crossed a moral red line for the people, and we must give the people of the country a clear explanation.”In his official comments, Li Keqiang demands that the State Council immediately dispatch an inspection team, conducting a thorough investigation of the entire chain of vaccine manufacture and distribution. The full facts must be ascertained, he says, and those companies and people responsible be “resolutely punished and in no way appeased.”
Two stories this week underscore the Party’s determination to strengthen control over all activities and content on cyberspace by ensuring companies and staff are tied as closely as possible into the process of enforcing “guidance.” This is essentially the progressive application to cyberspace of the notion of “Party spirit” in the media, which Xi Jinping reiterated in his February 2016 speech on news and public opinion.
First, we have the founding of the Party committee of the China Federation of Online Social Organizations (中国网络社会组织联合会), a group created back in May this year, and about which very little has been reported. The federation essentially groups together, under the watchful eye of the Cyberspace Administration of China, organizations that are registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs but deal in some way or another with cyberspace. Second, we have a public apology by Baozou Comic, which had its social media accounts closed down back in May for content violations, combined with an interesting set of articles on the service’s website attempting to make amends for its political errors. The Baozou Comic case — following on the abject apology from Toutiao in April — is another clear example of how the Party is more readily using public shaming techniques to enforce loyalty and implement its censorship guidelines.
This Week in China’s Media July 14 — July 20
➢ Party Committee Formed for the China Federation of Online Social Organizations to Strengthen Party Control ➢ Four Agencies Coordinate to Launch “Sword Web 2018” Campaign Against Online IP Infringement and Piracy
➢ Baozou Comic Issues Apology, Says It Has Corrected Its Problems and Will Start Over
➢ Douyin Makes First Announcement of Global Monthly Users, Scale Outstrips Weibo
[1] Party Committee Formed for the China Federation of Online Social Organizations
On the afternoon of July 19, the Party committee of the China Federation of Online Social Organizations (中国网络社会组织联合会) was formally founded in Beijing. Attending the ceremony, Gao Xiang (高翔), deputy director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, said the Party needed to “properly grab and practically grab the effective coverage of online social organizations, the federation’s Party committee guiding, supervising and inspecting the 300 member units to raise the Party’s organizational strength, working to implement the Party’s full coverage of organizations.” This was Party code for the need for the Party to exercise full control over all social organizations operating in cyberspace. The China Federation of Online Social Organizations, founded in Beijing in May 2018 in a ceremony attended by the CAC’s top official, Xu Lian (徐麟), now represents 300 of online social organizations, which a June 2017 document from the CAC defines as “social organizations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs that carry out work on the cyberspace domain.”
Examples of participants in the China Federation of Online Social Organizations include the China Electronics Chamber of Commerce (CECC) the Cybersecurity Association of China (中国网络空间安全协会), and the China Youth New Media Association (中国青少年新媒体协会) associated with the Chinese Communist Youth League. But members apparently also include executives from major tech firms and online media, such as Alibaba (CEO Jack Ma is listed as a vice-president) and People’s Daily Online (CEO Ye Zhenzhen is listed as a vice-president).
At the founding back in May, state media identified the group as “our country’s first national, federated and hub-type social organization that voluntarily connects online social organizations, formed by 10 national online social organizations with the Cyberspace Administration of China as a sponsoring institution.” The stated mission of the federation is to “promote the development of online social organizations . . . under the leadership of the Party and the government.” Key Chinese Reports: Online Communication Magazine WeChat public account (网络传播杂志): 重磅！中国网络社会组织联合会党委成立大会在京举行
Cyberspace Administration of China Website (中国网信网): 中国网络社会组织联合会在京成立 [2]Four Agencies Coordinate to Launch “Sword Web 2018” Campaign Against Online IP Infringement and Piracy
Four government agencies announced on July 16 that they would coordinate in a campaign to strike hard against intellectual property right violations and piracy on the internet. The special action, they said, had begun in early July and would extend for four months. The agencies include the Cyberspace Administration of China, the National Copyright Administration, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Ministry of Public Security.
According to the notice, the campaign will focus on three particular areas of violation according to China’s Copyright Law: 1. reposting of copyrighted content, focusing on so-called “WeMedia,” or zimeiti (自媒体) on WeChat public accounts and other platforms that illegally copy and share material; 2. sharing of short videos in violation of copyright, focusing on such platforms as Douyin, Kuaishou, Watermelon Video and Bilibili; 3.violations in priority areas such as animation, video streaming and audiobooks. Key Chinese Reports: China Intellectual Property News (知识产权报): “剑网2018”专项行动将重点整治短视频等领域侵权行为
Beijing News Online (新京报网): “剑网2018”专项行动将重点整治短视频等领域侵权行为 [3] Baozou Comic Issues Apology, Says It Has Corrected Its Problems and Will Start Over
Baozou Comic, the popular comic sharing site that had its accounts on Weibo and WeChat shut down indefinitely by authorities back in May, has now posted an apology dated July 11 on its website, saying its “fundamental error was that our education in socialist core values was insufficient.” In an effort to rectify its problems, underscore its missteps and begin operating afresh, Baozou has posted several sections on its website as part of a “‘New Start’ Special Series.” These include a section called “Journey With The Homeland’s Martyrs, Making Deep Apologies” (英烈故土行，深刻致歉), which describes visits by the Baozou CEO and staff to official memorials to martyrs and heroes across the country.
Key Chinese Reports: IT Home (IT之家): 暴走漫画活了，发致歉信称改正错误重新出发 Online Communication Magazine WeChat public account (网络传播杂志): “暴走漫画”发致歉信！自媒体应有怎样的“网络伦理操守”？ [4] Douyin Makes First Announcement of Global Monthly Users, Scale Outstrips Weibo
On July 16, the short video app Douyin announced that its global active monthly users have reached 500 million. This is the first time the app announced global figures. The app announced last month that its domestic active monthly users had reached 300 million. Douyin said 40% of its users were now in the 24-30 age group, surpassing previously dominant 18-24 age group. Key Chinese Reports:
36KR.com (36氪): 最前线 | 抖音全球月活用户突破5亿，这个消息比预想的早了半年
Media Observer (传媒大观察): 3分钟速览每日传媒大事记（7月18日）
Messaging from US President Donald Trump on trade and China continues to be a sensitive area on Chinese social media, prompting deletion of posts on Weibo. In an interview with CNBC this week, Trump told “Squawk Box” host Joe Kernen that he was prepared if necessary to impose tariffs on all of China’s imports to the United States — citing the figure of 505.5 billion US dollars for 2017.
Sharing a link to this story in Chinese today, Feng Wei (冯玮), a professor of history at Shanghai’s Fudan University, who has more than 167,000 fans on Weibo, offered three observations:
2018-07-21 12:14:45 | 【Trump Prepared to Impose Tariffs on 505 Billion in Chinese Imports】Assessment: 1. This shows that Trump anticipates that China will not make concessions that satisfy him, and so the big door to negotiations is closed; 2. 505 billion concerns China’s entire manufacturing industry, its effect underestimated; 3. I fully oppose the harm done by the careless puffing of those so-called “experts” who are an abuse of public funds. It’s already clear, and the lessons are profound! http://t.cn/RgQJN43 2018-07-21 12:14:45 | 【特朗普准备对5050亿美元中国进口商品开征关税】评：1、此举显示，特朗普判断中国不会作出令他满意的让步，因此关闭谈判大门。2、5050亿将涉及中国涉美所有加工制造业，影响低估。3、我始终反对的那些滥用国帑胡乱吹的“专家”的危害，已经显现，教训深刻！http://t.cn/RgQJN43
Feng was presumably referring in his third comment to experts in China who have downplayed the impact of trade tensions with the United States, and played up Chinese strengths. In any case, his post, made at around 12:15PM Beijing time, had been removed by approximately 3:39PM.
Similar posts by Phoenix TV commentatorSong Zhongping (宋忠平), with over 9 million fans, and from the official Weibo account of Hong Kong Economic Daily (香港商報), were also removed today.
Trump’s July 15 remarks to CBS Evening News anchor Jeff Glor, in which he answered a question about the United States’ biggest “foes” — apparently not understanding the difference between foe and competitor — were also among the deleted posts on Weibo. In that interview, Trump said “China is a foe economically, certainly they are a foe.”
Screenshot of Trump interview with CBS Evening News, shared by Miaopai on Weibo.
At 2:46PM Beijing time today, Weibo user Dan Bin (但斌), a corporate executive with close to 12 million followers, shared a video link to the Trump interview, which he had posted to Weibo’s video channel. “Trump directly explains his views on trade,” Dan Bin’s post said. It was deleted in less than an hour, by 3:35PM, but the video remained on Weibo, with comments apparently disabled.
Last month we looked at the seemingly unstoppable political inflation of Xi Jinping, as a Party publication called for systematic study of international praise for China’s president, and as the Academy of Social Sciences in one province put out a call for “research” on his formative years in the village of Liangjiahe. The “genie of hype and triumphalism,” we said, would not be so easy to stuff back into the magic lamp of propaganda. [ABOVE: Screenshot of a recent video claiming China has technological superiority over the United States.]
But China seems in any case to be trying — wary perhaps of the unease self-aggrandizing discourse can generate internationally, and of the dangerous somnolence it can induce at home.
A cartoon appearing on Chinese social media today reads, “No to arrogant and boastful discourse.”
Yesterday, the Party’s official People’s Daily began running a series of commentaries on the pitfalls of “boastful and arrogant” discourse, warning that “certain media” had become careless. These “certain media,” we should note, were not fringe voices, but rather mainstream Party ones. The first piece criticized is sourced to China Central Television, and was shared on a number of official news sites back in March. The second is a video produced by Weichen Finance, posted to Tencent Video, that quotes Tsinghua University economics professor Hu Angang — who has in recent years loudly advocated the view that China’s current political system is superior to systems in the West — to support the view that China already has a technological edge on the United States.
Missing from the criticism in the People’s Daily, of course, is any acknowledgement that the Party’s own information controls, which have emphasized positive news, trumpeted “positive energy,” and militated against criticism, could possibly bear any responsibility for China’s inflated view of itself.
A partial translation of the first commentary follows.
EDITOR’S NOTE: The ideas expressed in written discourse (文风) are no small matter. Recently, we’ve seen repeated boastfulness and arrogance . . . which have impacted the credibility of the media, polluted the public opinion ecology and twisted the national psyche, being disadvantageous to public morals, to the coalescing of public feeling, and to the building of a clear online space. In order to amend the boastfulness and arrogance of certain media, and their flashy but empty discourse, and in order to implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s demand that written discourse be “brief, true and fresh” (短/实/新) . . . from today on the Opinion Channel of People’s Daily Online will issue a series of commentaries called “Three Critiques of Boastfulness and Arrogance” (三评浮夸自大文风).
_________
The good and bad of an article rests on whether it radiates the truth, and whether it reflects society. When written discourse is boastful and arrogant, when the headlines seek to jar [the reader] and offer specious facts, this is not only irreverent to the reader but forfeits the value of communication and pollutes the public opinion environment.
A March 2018 article sourced to China Central Television bears the headline: “In These Sectors China Has Chalked Up Many ‘World Firsts’!”
Online recently, articles talking about how “America is afraid” (美国害怕了), or “Japan is terrified” (日本吓傻了), or “Europe is filled with regret” (欧洲后悔了) have earned a great deal of hits. But read through these instant-hit articles and you see that they have little fresh to offer, and in fact are cause for concern. For example, some of them exaggerate and generalize and shout out that “In These Sectors China Has Chalked Up Many ‘World Firsts’!” (在这些领域，中国创下多个“世界第一”！无人表示不服).
Some engage in arbitrary overrating, subjecting themselves to ridicule, shouting things like, “Never Fear: China’s Technological Strength Has Surpassed America, Reaching World #1” (别怕，中国科技实力超越美国，居世界第一).
Others resort to wishful thinking, accepting at face value isolated phrases from overseas and exaggerating them into “China Occupies the Center of the World Stage” (中国在世界舞台上占据中心位置) and “China is Now the World’s Largest Economy” (中国现在是全球第一经济体). The blustering articles have, first of all, not real facts to support them; second, no content to serve as blood and muscle; and third, no intellectual value whatsoever. They are just empty shells that cannot withstand the least bit of breeze. We have to understand that an article will not grow more colorful just because it makes a boast, and the country will not grow stronger because it is arrogant. If we excite such extreme emotions, and if we spread such prejudices, this could easily become a case of “Yelang thinking highly of itself” (夜郎自大), in which we arrogantly blow our own trumpet, and lead our society into a cognitive trap of splintered information and automated thought.
In communication studies there is a viewpoint that says that “the best editor is definitely an expert salesman.” For some media, boasting and arrogance has become like a huge balloon constantly inflating, in danger of bursting at the slightest touch. . . But the news is not about feeling pleasure (爽文). If you only think about sales and never about nutrition (讲营销不讲营养), if you only think about eyeballs and not about responsibility, you mislead the masses — even if it earns you a moment’s burst of traffic.
Most of the stories on our list this week received little or no attention outside of Chinese-language media. But there are, nevertheless, some important developments worthy of continued observation. At the top of this list should be the rollout by People’s Daily Online, the digital platform operated by the People’s Daily, of a so-called “third-party content review platform” (第三方内容审核平台). This week, 14 major digital platforms signed up with People’s Daily Online to formalize involvement in this platform. It’s unclear yet what exactly this platform will mean, and how it will operate — but the obvious goal is to further draw private technology companies into the orbit of Party-state media, ensuring that their content is not disruptive.
Also this week, Liu Yadong (刘亚东), editor-in-chief of Science and Technology Daily (科技日报), issued a warning on over-exuberance in China’s media about the country’s advantages in the science and technology fields, and other media discussed his remarks as a necessary corrective coming from “inside the system” as trade tensions with the United States and other countries come to the fore.
This Week in China’s Media June 23 — June 29
➢ Science and Technology Daily Editor-in-Chief: “Four Great Inventions” Hoodwink Leaders and the Public ➢ Minister of Radio and Television Outlines Party Dominance During Visit With Tech CEO Jack Ma
➢ Central Propaganda Department and Other Agencies Tackle “Yin-Yang Contracts” (阴阳合同) And Other Loopholes in the Entertainment Industry
➢ People’s Daily Online Launches “Third-Person Content Review Platform” [1] Science and Technology Daily Editor-in-Chief: “Four Great Inventions” Hoodwink Leaders and the Public
On June 21, at a salon on technology communication held at the China Hall of Science and Technology (中国科技会堂), and called “Where Are Our Bottlenecks?”, the editor-in-chief of Science and Technology Daily (科技日报), Liu Yadong (刘亚东), gave a keynote speech in which he criticized the widespread pushing — essentially propaganda — of the so-called “New Four Great Inventions” (新四大发明). These are: 1) the high-speed rail, 2) Alipay (支付宝), bike-sharing (共享单车) and online shopping (网购). Promotion of the idea of these “Four Great Inventions,” said Liu, misled both leaders and the general public, and Liu’s remarks were regarded by many in the media as “a shock coming from inside the system” (“体制内震撼发声”).
In Liu Yadong’s view, China still lags far behind the United States and other developed countries in terms of science and technology, and this has long been a consensus view in China as well. But Liu said that constant drum-beating within China about the “Four Great Inventions,” and remarks about “fully surpassing [the US]” (全面赶超) and “China now being first in the world in economic strength, science and technology strength and comprehensive national strength” (中国现在的经济实力、科技实力、综合国力都分别超越美国，成为世界第一) had now become a constant feature of media reporting.
Responding to Liu’s speech, the Global Times newspaper said it was a representative voice in what should be a period of self-reflection on China’s real capabilities. The reflection, it said, was demanded by the ongoing “trade war” (贸易战) with the United States and penalties facing China’s ZTE Corp. Key Chinese Reports: Science and Technology Daily WeChat public account (科技日报): 纯干货｜核心技术受制于人怎么破？杜祥琬倪光南都来支招了
Global Times (环球时报): 社评：科技日报总编强调中美巨大差距刍议
TMT Media WeChat public account (钛媒体): 体制内震撼发声：“新四大发明”忽悠了领导忽悠了公众忽悠了自己
A lead editorial in the Global Times responds to Liu Yadong’s criticism of over-exuberance on China’s science and technology strengths. [2]Minister of Radio and Television Outlines Party Dominance During Visit With Tech CEO Jack Ma
Nie Chenxi’s official portrait on the “News of the Communist Party of China” website.
On June 22, Nie Chenxi (聂辰席), the head of the China’s State Administration of Radio and Television (国家广播电视总局), met with Alibaba CEO Jack Ma (马云). During his visit with Ma, a tech billionaire who in many ways symbolizes China’s push for innovation, Nie emphasized the need to “deeply study Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era and the spirit of the Party’s 19th National Congress,” the former phrase being the president’s “banner term” (旗帜语), the phrase meant to sum up his policies and legacy. Nie also spoke of the need to emphasize the so-called “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识) — essentially, the need to have political awareness of the big picture as it impacts the Party’s position — and “Four Confidences” (四个自信), or confidence the country’s chosen political path (meaning CCP leadership), its guiding theories (meaning those of the CCP leadership), its political system (meaning one-party dominance), and in China’s unique culture.
Other phrases that played prominently in Nie’s mostly boilerplate speech were the “transmission of positive energy” (传播正能量), meaning more focus on positives in news and entertainment, and “preserving the country’s ideological and cultural security” (维护国家意识形态和文化安全).
Earlier in June, Minister Nie met with China Mobile CEO Shang Bing (尚冰), also emphasizing a long string of Party imperatives such as the need to “promote the main theme” (弘扬主旋律), “transmit positive energy” and “deeply study” the thought of Xi Jinping. Key Chinese Reports: Inside Telecoms WeChat public account (广电业内): 聂辰席会见马云，总局总台领导接连会见BAT巨头，透露了什么讯号？
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 聂辰席会见腾讯公司董事会主席兼首席执行官马化腾 [3]Central Propaganda Department and Other Agencies Tackle “Yin-Yang Contracts” (阴阳合同) And Other Loopholes in the Entertainment Industry
On June 27, the Central Propaganda Department, the Culture and Tourism Bureau, the State Administration of Taxation, the State Administration of Radio and Television, the State Film Bureau and others jointly issued a “Notice” (通知) demanding limits on exorbitant pay (天价片酬) in the film and television industries, and action to tackle such problems as “yin-yang contracts” (阴阳合同), a practice by which a relatively low-paying contract for actors is reported to the tax authorities while a second more lucrative contract is handled on the side.
The “Notice” emphasized that compensation standards would be set for the television and film industries, making clear the maximum compensation levels for actors and for program guests. Key Chinese Reports: People’s Daily (人民日报): 中宣部等部门印发通知 治理影视行业天价片酬“阴阳合同”偷逃税等问题 [4] People’s Daily Online Launches “Third-Person Content Review Platform”
On June 25, People’s Daily Online, the digital portal operated by the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper, hosted a forum on “management of internet content risks” (互联网内容风险管理). At the forum, 14 major digital content platforms signed agreements with People’s Daily Online for participation in a “third-party content review platform” (第三方内容审核平台). The media included Jinri Toutiao (今日头条), Pear Video (梨视频), Migu (咪咕文化) and Kuaishou (快手). According to media reports, discussion at the forum centered around “how to strengthen internet content management.”
In one report, Quantum Cloud (量子云), another of the initial 14 companies to sign on to the People’s Daily Online platform, responded to the news of the new agreement: “Taking on the responsibility expected of us by family users, Quantum Cloud follows People’s Daily Online and other mainstream [Party] media as the benchmark, upholding the banner of content with mainstream [Party] values, steadily expanding the strength of our content review (内容审核力度), actively transmitting positive energy and socialist core values.”
It is not yet clear exactly how the “third-party content review platform” will operate. Key Chinese Reports:
Caijing Online (财经网): 量子云签约入驻人民网“第三方内容审核平台”
China.com: 量子云首批入驻人民网“第三方内容审核平台”
At a seminar in Beijing last week, Liu Yadong (刘亚东), the editor-in-chief of a newspaper published by the Ministry of Science and Technology, warned in a public speech that China risked a crisis of over-confidence by constantly hyping its achievements and capabilities. Liu’s remarks, and the positive response from many quarters, including the Global Times newspaper, typically outspoken in its go-China nationalism, are a reaction in part to alarm and pushback from the West over China’s boldly stated ambition to lead the world in key technology sectors by 2025.
But the genie of hype and triumphalism will not be so easy to coax back into the lamp. Hype, after all, is at the heart of Xi Jinping’s leadership in the so-called “New Era” — and of the manufacture of legitimacy by the Chinese Communist Party of which he is “core.”
In recent days, even as the chatter over Liu Yadong’s remarks was fresh, we had further illustration of just how deeply the atmosphere of worship surrounding Xi Jinping is affecting scholarship in China. This came in a notice posted by the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences to its official website, calling for submissions for new research projects dealing with the “Great Teaching of Liangjiahe (梁家河大学问).
The first page of the application form for scholars wishing to apply for research funding for projects concerning the “Great Teaching of Liangjiahe.”
For those unfamiliar with the significance of Liangjiahe, the village where Xi Jinping spent seven supposedly formative years as a sent-down youth during the Cultural Revolution, I recommend Chris Buckley’s wonderful story last fall in the New York Times. The story of Xi’s time in Liangjiahe has become the most basic foundation of the myth of Xi, of a politics of adoration built atop a narrative of sacrifice and hardship, in a place where Xi is imagined to have set down deep roots among the common people.
On this issue, I want to hand the microphone over to Guo Yuhua (郭于华), a highly respected professor of sociology at Tsinghua University, who made a smoldering post yesterday to her WeChat public account addressing the research call from the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences. But first, here is just a bit of the text from that call:
In order to further deepen the research of the great teaching of Liangjiahe, and in order to understand the foundation and source of General Secretary Xi Jinping becoming the core of the Party, commander of the army and leader of the people, and the originating context and logical fountainhead of Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, steadily enhancing the “Four Consciousnesses,” and making firm the “Four Confidences,” the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences has decided to undertake topical research on the “Great Teaching of Liangjiahe” (梁家河大学问).
The call offers a list of possible topics for new projects, and makes clear that budgets will be determined once project proposals are accepted through an “impartial, equitable and competitive” process. Applications are to be sent to Office 210 of the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences on Xiaozhai Road East in Xi’an, just a short walk down the street from the Shaanxi History Museum.
Our translation of Guo Yuhua’s WeChat post follows.
Topics of Splendor (伟光神创的课题)
By Guo Yuhua (郭于华)
From the WeChat public account Yuhua’s View on Society (于华看社会)
When I first saw that the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences had issued a call for research projects on “The Great Teachings of Liangjiahe (梁家河大学问), I thought for sure this was some sort of spoof. I was entirely prepared to laugh. But once I read through all of the materials explaining the process, with entries such as “topic direction” (选题方向), “application requirements” (申请条件), “research fees” (研究经费), and even “application acceptance” (申请受理) and “method of contact” (联系方式) — and once I came across other such notices from universities across Shaanxi province — I came to realize this was no joke.
After reading carefully and working things out, I realized the problem was my own shallowness. With a better understanding now of the key topical points, the following themes emerge: A Great Period of Time (伟大的时间)：
“Seven years” (七年) has now become a catchphrase. Among the topics listed under “topic selection,” we can note that topics 1 through 7 all begin with the phrase “[During the] seven-year period as a sent-down youth in Liangjiahe” (梁家河七年知青岁月), and this seven-year period is closely tied up logically with “[Xi Jinping] Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (新时代中国特色社会主义思想), with “the development thought of [placing] the people at the center” ( 以人民为中心的发展思想), with “the idea of ecological civilization” (生态文明思想), “the thought of three industry integration for the new era” ( 新时代三产融合思想), “the thought of a decisive war on poverty in the new era” (与新时代脱贫攻坚思想), ”the strategic thought of rejuvenating the countryside in the new era” (新时代乡村振兴战略思想), and “the thought of grassroots Party building in the new era” (新时代基层党建思想). All of this demonstrates that seven years is now regarded [by the CCP] as a great period of time (伟大的时间段), a period critical to Chinese history if not even world history. It is the time period, we can say, in which “time began”! A Brilliant Place (光辉的地方)：
“Liangjiahe” (梁家河) is of course also a keyword,” and none of the topics provided can depart from this place. It is related to what they are calling “jia-style and jia-teaching” (家风家教), and “scientific content and the values of the era” (科学内涵和时代价值), and connected also to “spiritual nutrition and the building of spirit” ( 精神养分和精神塑造). It is a “great teaching” formed from the hybrid of “China’s excellent traditional culture” ( 中华优秀传统文化) and “red cultural genes” (红色文化基因).
To put it more directly, Liangjiahe is a place deserving of resplendence! A Sacred Leader (神圣的领袖)：
The period of time and this place all center on the core, on the commander (统帅), on the leader (袖的). Needless to say, their resplendence cannot outshine the sacred light of the leader. This goes without saying. The Topic of Innovation (创新的课题):
This set up of topics can be referred to the tradition of the unprecedented (空前绝后), the idea that here no ancients tread (前无古人), and none that follow can possibly exceed. Oh, what greatness! Oh, what mightiness! What boundless and unlimited creativity! How fully it displays the spirit of the social sciences under Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era. For this, we can only offer our enthusiastic “likes”!
June 26, 2018
Over the weekend, Reference News (参考消息), the newspaper published by the official Xinhua News Agency that clips news coverage from around the world, ran an interview with Yan Xuetong (阎学通), director of the Institute for International Relations at Tsinghua University and one of China’s leading foreign policy experts. In the interview, Yan discusses the rise of China and substantial changes — but not yet fundamental, he says — to the global political and economic system.
At the website of Reference News, the interview carried the headline, “Push for Independence in Taiwan Would Be the Biggest Crisis in the Future for China-US Relations.” At the website Aisixiang (爱思想) the headline was instead: “‘Chaos and Disorder’ Are Becoming the Normal State of the World.”
The following is a partial translation of the interview with Yan, for whom the return of bipolarity in world affairs is clearly a fait accompli.
Editor’s Note:
As a well-known scholar of international relations, and director of the Institute for International Relations at Tsinghua University, Yan Xuetong (阎学通) has long observed the shift of global power and researched China’s foreign policy strategies. In his books Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten Years and The Transfer of Global Power, he explicates his theory of “moral realism” (道义现实主义) and his views on “political determinacy” (政治决定论), that “the success of a rising power comes when its political leadership is stronger than that of dominant countries.”
This year, as the West bursts out with the concept of “sharp power” (锐实力), whipping up a fresh round of “China Threat Theory” (中国威胁论), and is reduced to a “New Cold War” (新冷战) mentality, the familiar old predicament of China’s rise (崛起困境) has emerged once again. How can [China] accurately grasp the development of world affairs and determine a strategy for China’s rise? How can China face the risks and challenges that attend its rise? How can China’s international leadership be constituted? With these questions, our reporters sought out Director Yan Xuetong. The Nature of the Global Order Has Not Fundamentally Changed Cankao Xiaoxi: In the world today, it seems that “chaos and disorder” have become the ordinary state of things. How do you see the state of affairs today? Yan Xuetong: We see different changes in the state of the world along different dimensions. When we compare today to the 20 years following the break up of the Soviet Union (1992-2011), we see that the world is moving now from a unipolar situation in which the United States is supreme, to a bipolar world in which the supreme powers are China and the United States. We are moving away from a state in which international norms are led by Western liberalism (西方自由主义) to a state where international norms are no longer respected; the international system is moving from a West-centered model to one in which power is redistributed; and [at the same time], the nature of the international system (国际体系) remains the hegemonic system of the post world war period, with no fundamental change in its nature.
The making of the new world order will take some time. The process of redistribution of power is the process of power devolution (权力分散) and the reconstitution of influence (势力重组), and so the normal state of things is chaos and disorder. In the midst of this process, as there is a lack of a dominant set of values, the bond of old norms is weakened, and new norms have not yet been built. The use of strategies of competition that do not respect norms or uphold commitments will become the normal state, and the worship of resourcefulness and lack of strategic credibility (战略信誉) will become a path that many countries are inclined to.
As nuclear weapons will prove a deterrent to war by any major power, these countries will tend to use economic sanctions as a means of competition, and protectionism will carry the day. Major powers will not wish to bear the costs of global governance and the preservation of order. Global governance and regional cooperation will stop in their tracks, and it’s possible that regionalization will see a reverse trend, including in the European Union. We could quite possibly be in a situation in which there is no global leader. The situation in the world right now has only undergone a change in degree (程度变化), and not a fundamental change in nature, a change in terms of the order but not a change in terms of systems — and this can’t be compared with the changes brought on by the two world wars. If we compare the situation of the past 50 years to what we face now, we can say that we are in an intermediate phase of change, because the changes now have not yet reached the immensity of what we saw with the end of the Cold War. A “Bipolar System” Will Take Shape Within Five Years Cankao Xiaoxi: Back in 2013 you predicted that by 2023 a bipolar system between China and the United States would establish itself. Is this still your view, and why? Yan Xuetong: After the Cold War, the United States became the absolute leading power in the world, but its leadership position of late is not like that of the 1990s. In 2013, I predicted complete bipolarization by 2023. Looking at things now, we can ascertain even more clearly that multipolarity is impossible, and a bipopular system (两极格局) within five years is extremely possible.
We can judge the international system by comparing the strength (实力) of the major powers and their strategic relationships. Lately, the world’s third-ranked power cannot in terms of national strength be compared on the same level as China or the United States. By 2023, this gap will widen even further. Strategic relationships have also become quite clearly a matter of other major nations choosing between the United States and China. The international system after 2018 will be decided by the relative development speeds of the major powers. I believe that there is no science to determining what the international situation will be like after 10 years. The most I’ll project ahead is 10 years. Within 10 years, there is no way that China will be on par with the United States. The growth of our country’s comprehensive national strength (综合国力) has already slowed down, and there is a risk that this rate of growth in strength could continue to decrease.
Once the bipolar system is established, there will be a real question of whether the concept of “the West” as it is now used in international relations will be applicable. “The West” was originally a geographic concept, later it became a cultural concept, and in the wake of the Cold War it became a political concept. The present [process of] bipolarization has meant that Western countries and developing countries alike are experiencing internal splits, and the remaking of political strength will very possibly not happen any longer along Western and non-Western lines, but along ideological lines. . . . When Western countries no longer influence international politics in a unified manner, the political concept of “the West” will no longer objectively suit the study of international relations. The Risks of Trump Uncertainty Cankao Xiaoxi: You have said before that with the rise of China, we will face greater troubles and threats. Trade tensions between China and the United States have impacted the bilateral relationship. In the future, what risks and challenges do we need to prepare for? Yan Xuetong: From the standpoint of international relations, within the next two years, one of the biggest problems we will face is how to deal with Trump’s unpredictability. Because he essentially makes decisions according to his own, there is little continuity between these decisions, and it is very difficult to predict, and so we must ensure that bilateral tensions do not spread to the ideological sphere. The core of the Cold War was about ideology, and only by preventing ideological tensions can we prevent a Cold War. Over the next five years, ideas of independence in Taiwan could develop further, bringing the risk of a full-fledged standoff between China and the United States, which we must be one guard against. Over the next 10 years, the biggest danger on the outside will probably be the question of Taiwan independence. For this we need to build effective prevention mechanisms to avoid [a crisis].
We have a number of important stories on China’s media this week. Two of these speak to the rapid and steady decline of traditional print newspapers in the country — first, the closure of a major commercial newspaper in Gansu province, following a string of similar closures on the east coast (as print revenues decline in the face of internet growth), and second, the ongoing leadership saga at The Beijing News, long regarded as one of the China’s top professional newspapers. Also this week, the release of the 2018 Blue Book on China’s Media, a media industry survey produced by Tsinghua University, helps to explain where the development is actually happening in China — think mobile internet, which now accounts for almost 70 percent of the total internet advertising market and has surpassed the entire advertising market for traditional media.
In legal news, a district court in Shanghai rejected a defamation case brought by a major medicinal wine brand against a WeChat public account, on the grounds that the article in question fell “within the scope of protected freedom of expression.” That case deserves further attention, as such decisions, on free speech grounds, are exceptionally rare in China. [ABOVE: Screenshot from a Pear Video report on operating family newsstands.]
This Week in China’s Media June 16 — June 22
➢ 2018 Blue Book of China’s Media released
➢ Approval of 5G SA standard paves the way for vommercialization
➢ Beijing Business Today (北京商报) editor-in-chief Li Hai becomes deputy chief editor of The Beijing News (新京报)
➢ Western Economic Daily (西部商报) closes its door on June 22, continuing trend of newspaper closures in China’s coastal and central regions
➢ Hong Mao, a medicinal wine brand, files suit against a WeChat public account for defamation, case rejected by court [1]2018 Blue Book of China’s Media Released
On June 21, the School of Journalism and Communication at Tsinghua University released 2018 Blue Book of China’s Media (传媒蓝皮书-中国传媒产业发展报告), the ninth in the annual series, which looks at media development in China across various segments of the industry.
The Blue Book shows that according to statistics from the Financial Affairs Department of the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) — an office that was recently slated for reform — revenues for television advertising in China for 2017 fell for the first time, dropping 1.84 percent from the previous year. Advertising revenues for print continued to drop in the double digits, down 14.8 percent from 2016, but the numbers for newspaper advertising were even worse — down 30 percent for a total of 15 billion yuan. Looking at traditional media, only publishing and film recorded growth for the year, but both were marginal in comparison to the internet. Online advertising, online games and online video were the three major engines of growth in the media industry, according to the Blue Book. The market size of the mobile internet has already surpassed that to the traditional internet, and mobile internet advertising now accounts for 69.2 percent of the total internet advertising market, and has itself surpassed the entire advertising market for traditional media.
According to the Blue Book report, the newspaper industry in China “reformed” and developed for around 40 years, enjoying a roughly 20-year golden period (辉煌时期). But faced with the challenge of new technologies, and new business models, newspapers were in an increasingly passive position. Some newspapers, said the report, had remained at the forefront of media convergence — for example the People’s Daily “Central Kitchen” (中央厨房), or “Media Hub,” designed to be a full digital convergence content supplier for a range of media clients. Other directions of development, the report noted, include “robot-generated news” (机器人新闻写作), virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) offerings and “data storytelling” (以数据讲故事), but these are not yet profitable businesses.
On the foundation of the capital invested in the big three Chinese internet companies — Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent, known collectively as “BAT” — links will continue to be made with other industries. Most of the leading news and entertainment media in China today are in some way or another tied to or dependent upon the big three, with examples including Jinri Toutiao (今日头条), Bona Film (博纳影业), Enlight Media (光线传媒), 21st Century Media (21世纪传媒), Youku (优酷), Tudou (土豆), Huxiu (虎嗅), Zhihu (知乎) and others. Key Chinese Reports:
Sohu Account “Newspaper Transition” (报业转型): 2018年中国传媒产业发展报告（完整版）
People’s Daily Online (人民网): 《2018年中国传媒产业发展报告》在清华发布 预计2020年中国传媒市场规模突破3万亿元 [2]Approval of 5G SA Standard Paves the Way for Commercialization
3GPP, the international standards body that governs cellular standardization, approved the 5G SA (standalone) standard, meaning that the commercialization of 5G is drawing closer, due for a possible rollout in 2020. With the support of the China Academy of Telecommunication Research of MIIT (CAICT), China Mobile and Datang Telecom Group have formed three national engineering laboratories, and these, according to the People’s Daily, will be the primary vehicles for 5G innovation in China.
Reporting on the approval of the 5G SA standard, China Business said that the core question now was what sorts of breakthroughs 5G SA might support, following on ground-breaking changes with previous standards — messaging with 2G, smartphone applications with 3G, and new video capabilities with 4G. CAICT has said that 5G advances could mean new services in such areas at 3D high-res video, cloud offices and gaming, mobile-based medical services, self-driving vehicles, smart cities and smart homes. Key Chinese Reports: People’s Daily (人民日报): 我国5G产业将全面启动 为2020年规模商用提供支撑
China Business (中国经营网): 拓展5G移动生态 万亿级应用市场待启 [3] Beijing Business Today (北京商报) Editor-in-Chief Li Hai Becomes Deputy Chief Editor of The Beijing News (新京报)
According to Shanghai’s The Paper (澎湃新闻网), former Beijing Business Today editor-in-chief Li Hai (李海) has been transferred to The Beijing News, where he is now deputy chief editor. The move could be an effort to address the hemorrhaging of top management from The Beijing News, which was once one of the country’s most respected professional newspapers — although the position of editor-in-chief position at The Beijing News remains vacant. Li Hai was a long-serving editor at Beijing Business Today, and was the deputy editor-in-chief before being promoted to the editor-in-chief position.
Beijing Business Today editor-in-chief Li Hai has been brought on to the editorial team at The Beijing News. SOURCE: The Paper.
In 2011, after The Beijing News was placed under the management of the Beijing Municipal Propaganda Department (北京市委宣传部), essentially downgrading its position as a national-level paper, two top leadership positions were designated, both to be appointed by the propaganda department: 1) director/Party secretary (社长/党委书记); 2) deputy secretary/discipline inspection secretary (副书记/纪委书记). The top editorial positions were to be held by one chief and four deputies (一正四副), with Wang Yuechun (王跃春) serving as editor-in-chief, and Wang Yue (王悦), Liu Binglu (刘炳路), Wang Aijun (王爱军) and He Longsheng (何龙盛) serving deputies. In 2015, both Liu Binglu and He Longsheng left the newspaper, Liu going to Ant Financial (蚂蚁金服) and He joining Kunlun Fight (昆仑决), a kickboxing entertainment company. Both of their positions were left vacant.
Since the end of 2017, The Beijing News has continued to lose top management. The paper’s former director exited to become the CEO of the Beijing Cultural Center Fund (北京市文化投资发展集团), and the position was taken up by Song Ganshu (宋甘澍), the chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference for the local district of Dongcheng. Finally, in December 2017, editor-in-chief Wang Yuechun announced her departure. Key Chinese Reports:
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 北京商报总编辑李海调任新京报常务副总编辑
WeChat Public Account “Journalists Station” (记者站): 北京商报总编辑李海，调任新京报常务副总编辑 [Link Censored] [4] Western Economic Daily Closes its Doors, Continuing Trend of Newspaper Closures
At an internal meeting on June 20, the Gansu Daily Newspaper Group (甘肃日报报业集团) announced that it would close its commercial spin-off, the Western Economic Daily (西部商报). The newspaper, which was launched on January 1, 2000, has continually suffered deep losses in recent months and years — cited as the chief reason for its closure. The paper has reportedly also had serious problems competing for revenue with Lanzhou Morning Post, another commercial city newspaper launched in 1997.
Employees at Western Economic Daily told media that they had not been paid in some cases for as long as four months. “They haven’t come up with any severance plan, and they haven’t paid us what we’re owed,” said one staff member. “They just suddenly announced the paper is closed, and sent us home to wait for further news.”
For many years, perhaps up through 2010, China’s newspaper industry seemed immune from the storms pummeling traditional media in other parts of the world. But since that time, the rise of new internet platforms, and a corresponding decline in newspaper readership, has hit the industry hard. Newspaper groups in Shanghai, Zhejiang and other areas along the south and east coastal regions of China have progressively shut down many newspapers. The closure of Western Economic Daily could be understood as an indicator that the wave of closures is moving inland. Key Chinese Reports:
WeChat Public Account “Media Observer” (传媒大观察): 《西部商报》将于6月22日停刊 [5]Medicinal Wine Brand Hong Mao Files Defamation Suit Against WeChat Public Account, Is Rejected
According to a report by Jiemian News (界面新闻), the WeChat public account “Chengyuan Lawyers” (律师程远) was sued back in March by the medicinal wine brand Hong Mao, based in Inner Mongolia, after it published an article analyzing alleged illegal advertising by the company. Hong Mao accused the account of “infringing on its reputation” (侵犯其名誉权), and demanded that the offending article be deleted and a public apology made in addition to symbolic compensation of 1 yuan.
On June 13, Shanghai’s Minhang District Court rejected the lawsuit, saying that upon review of the article in question, which made use of Hong Mao advertisements, and reviewing government regulations concerning the management of advertisements, the opinions and advice provided by the public account were a matter of food and medicine safety and a public interest concern (食药品安全之公共利益的关注), and they should fall within the scope of protected freedom of expression (应属受保护的言论自由之范畴). Key Chinese Reports:
Jiemian News (界面新闻): 鸿茅药酒状告一律师公号文章侵犯其名誉权 法院驳回诉讼请求 Legal Daily (法制日报): 状告某新媒体名誉侵权被法院驳回 “鸿茅药酒”的正名之门被暂时关闭
Western media prejudice is a persistent theme for China’s state-run media, and Western sources — both real and apocryphal — are often used to purvey the view that anti-China prejudice is somehow coded in the DNA of the foreign journalist. Only this week, the official People’s Daily profiled the translation team behind the English-language edition of Xi Jinping’s The Governance of China. The paper quoted Scottish translator David Ferguson, identified as “the foreign expert,” as saying: “I think that many reports about China in the Western media are biased, and many of the writers have never even come to China, and so these reports mislead the people in these countries.”
Mr. Ferguson may or may not have actually said this. But we can say for sure that statements of this kind, most readily sourced to foreigners, have been leveled at “the West” and “Western media” for decades.
The cover of a book on the English language written by David Ferguson, a member of the team that translated Xi Jinping’s book, The Governance of China.
Way back in March 1949, six months before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the People’s Daily ran an article called “Talking About America’s News Industry” (谈谈美国的新闻业). Written by Huang Caoliang (黄操良), the head of the paper’s international news desk at the time, the article argued that journalism and press freedom in the United States were undercut by capitalist ownership. To support his case, Huang recycled a single American author critical of contemporary media barons.
In January last year, the People’s Daily ran an “Expert View” column that bore the headline, “Under Money Politics There Is No Freedom of Speech” (金钱政治下，哪有新闻自由). The column essentially rehashed Huang Caoliang’s 1949 argument, that truth in Western journalism is fatally undermined by its capitalist foundations. Interestingly, the byline for the column was shared by a People’s Daily reporter and an assistant professor from the journalism department of an American university. This apparent fabrication — I understand it was unwelcome news to the assistant professor in question — was subsequently removed from the digital version of the paper, though without the public correction professional journalism standards generally demand in “the West.”
But while the theme of Western bias is sure to persist out of ideological force of habit, it seems that some minds within the Party couldn’t be happier with the treatment China and its powerful leader have received in the West (and in the rest) since the 18th National Congress of the CCP was held in November 2012, and since a cascade of shocks, from Brexit to the Trump presidency, have upset expectations of global leadership.
Last month, China Leadership Science (中国领导科学), a journal published by the Central Party School in Beijing, ran a series of articles billed as a deep study of “the international praise for Xi Jinping’s super-strong leadership in the New Era.” In a remarkable lead article accompanying its research — “Extraordinary Leader: A Study of the International Praise for the Super-Strong Leadership of Xi Jinping in the New Era” [PDF here] — the journal’s editorial department made the case for systematic research of the hurrahs and tributes enjoyed by Xi Jinping. Such study, they said, would serve the goal of “determinedly preserving General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core status throughout the Party, so that in our ideas, politics and actions we may willingly maintain a high level of uniformity with the Central Party of which Comrade Xi Jinping is the core.”
The most recent edition of the Central Party School’s journal China Leadership Science pushes for systematic study of praise for Xi Jinping overseas.
This knot of Party discourse, or New China Newspeak, essentially boils down to the idea that loyal Xi followers within the Party can help consolidate his power and standing by systematically channeling the praise he receives internationally. What the Party needs, in other words, is a dedicated School of Sycophantology. And the latest edition of China Leadership Science, you might say, is its manifesto — as much a profession of love as a declaration of mission. “China’s international standing,” the journal delights at the outset of its lead article, “is now at a high not seen in modern times.”
The term “super-strong leadership,” or chaoqiang lingdaoli (超强领导力), is a term that first emerged back in January this year at a “theoretical research conference” held by the China Leadership Science Academy (中国领导科学研究会), the organization within the Central Party School that publishes China Leadership Science. We will have to watch and see how and whether the term continues to be used in the official discourse.
The China Leadership Science piece is an interesting look at the Chinese Communist Party’s conflicted view on censure and praise from the international community, and from the West in particular. When coverage is critical, state media tend to militate against the prejudice of “Western media” generally, resorting to ad hominem attacks. When the coverage is positive, however, the same state media are quick to re-establish the authority of these flattering voices, pointing out that sources are “well-known international media” or “recognized websites.”
The editors of China Leadership Science seem more interested in cherry picking than systematic research when it comes to international coverage of Xi Jinping. But there can be little doubt that these are interesting times in terms of the reshaping of global narratives of leadership.
The journal concludes its piece with unmistakable optimism. Everyone in the world, from developed and developing countries alike, is “looking to the China Path and the China miracle.” Everyone craves “Chinese experience, Chinese wisdom and the China Solution.” And this must be why Xi Jinping’s books “continue to top the global sales charts.”
Are we sure? Have we checked those sales charts? But the editors are undeterred: “Under these circumstances,” they write, “China naturally receives the attention of the world, and the leadership ideas and grace of General Secretary Xi Jinping of course continue to dazzle international society.”
EXCERPT: “Extraordinary Leader: A Study of the International Praise for the Super-Strong Leadership of Xi Jinping in the New Era”
Since the Party’s 18th National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping has made comprehensively pathbreaking and historic achievements in leading the Party and the country, there has been a deep and fundamental historical transformation (变革), the people feel they have gained a great deal, and China’s international standing is now at a high not seen in modern times. The superlative (高超) leadership wisdom (智慧) and leadership style (领袖风范) [of Xi Jinping] has consistently drawn attention from international society, earning a high level of praise. Deeply studying the international praise for Xi Jinping’s super-strong leadership (超强领导) in the New Era will no doubt benefit us in further strengthening the “Four Consciousnessess”(四个意识), in persisting with the “Four Confidences” (四个自信), and in determinedly preserving General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core status (核心地位) throughout the Party, so that in our ideas, politics and actions we may willingly maintain a high level of uniformity with the Central Party of which Comrade Xi Jinping is the core（高度一致). 1. Overview of International Praise for the Super-Strong Leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping in the New Era
Since the 18th National Congress of the CCP, the voices from international society praising General Secretary Xi Jinping’s super-strong leadership strength ( 超强领导力) in the New Era have continued to rise, their frequency, breadth and intensity unprecedented, and this can be seen in the following 6 aspects: First, the variety of media. International society’s praise for General Secretary Xi Jinping’s super-strong leadership perhaps includes all forms of media — for example specialized books, research articles, newspapers, magazines, radio, television, online commentary, etcetera. Relatively representative books include Xi Jinping’s Leadership (习近平的领导力), [Yuri Tavrovsky’s] Xi Jinping: The Chinese Dream (习近平 :正圆中国梦), The Age of Xi Jinping (习近平时代), Great Power Leader Xi Jinping (习近平复兴中国), Great Nation Leader Xi Jinping (大国领袖习近平). Aside from these, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Times, Asahi Shinbun, Radio France Internationale, Deutsche Welle television, Voice of Russia (俄罗斯之声), the Economist, The Diplomat and other well-known international media, recognized websites or academic publications, whether through commentaries, essays or excerpts and interviews — all have offered their praise, giving rave reviews.
Second, the strength of personality (个人色彩). Since the Party’s 18th National Congress, China’s president has visited more than 50 countries on five continents, has received hundreds of visits from foreign heads of state and other government officials, and has hosted or appeared at a series of important international conferences and events. General Secretary Xi Jinping hs been active on the global stage, serving as a model of the mature political leader. He faces problems head on, taking them on personally, showing wisdom amid the confusion, inspiring affinity and attraction, continually drawing the attention of others wherever he goes, becoming the focus of discussion. His representative work, Xi Jinping’s Governance of China, has already spread across the world, so that in the case for example of the United States, libraries having the book exist in every state, covering essentially all public libraries and community libraries. The praise of international society for Xi Jinping’s leadership is not limited only to the realm of politics but has already become a matter of personal will for many people. Third, there is the sustained time period [of praise for Xi Jinping]. Beginning with the opening of the 18th National Congress in 2012, the praise for Xi Jinping’s leadership by international society has never ceased. He has remained a focus of international discussion, a topic to be followed, a priority for research.
Up to now, along with a number of major historical moments that have enriched China and impacted the world — the Party’s 18th and 19th congresses and various plenary sessions, focussing on the governance practices of the Party, the APEC Summit, the G20 Summit, the Davos Forum and other major events, and the overseas visits of General Secretary Xi Jinping — the praise for Xi Jinping’s leadership by international society has been grown day by day, repeated constantly. This sort of sustained praise for a national leader is something rarely seen. Fourth, there is the broad [geographical] scope [of praise for Xi Jinping]. Conscientious search and gathering, and systematic sorting, reveals that from the standpoint of geographic coverage (地域覆盖面), praise for the super-strong leadership of Xi Jinping from international society covers the entire globe. It comes from the United States, from Great Britain, Japan, Germany and other developed countries, and also from the vast majority of developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Since the 19th National Congress of the CCP, the Chinese Academy of Governance (国家行政学院) [within the Central Party School] has held many study events for overseas officials. More than 240 mid and high-level officials from 40 countries spanning Asia, Europe, Africa, Latin America and Oceania have expressed enormous admiration (极大赞赏) for the marvelous (极不平凡) and historic achievements made since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party [in 2012], and generally believe that General Secretary Xi Jinping has shown superlative leadership wisdom (高超领导智慧) and been a model leader in promoting socialism with Chinese characteristics and world peace and development. Fifth, there is a wide variety of people [praising Xi]. Looking at the praise overall, those in international society praising the leadership of Xi Jinping . . . include not just overseas politicians, well-known scholars and journalists, but also include well-known leaders from businesses and social groups, and also overseas Chinese. At the same time, they include international publics and internet users. Commentaries and praise of Xi Jinping’s leadership mostly appear on social media and in online comment threads. Among these there are people who are familiar with China and who research China, and also people who have come to be interested in China, and to research and understand China, through their interest in Xi Jinping. There are people in their 80s and 90s, and those who are just 16 or 17 years old. Sixth, there is the level of praise (赞誉程度高). Many international figures have offered extremely high level of praise of Xi Jinping. When General Secretary Xi was on a visit to the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, prime minister of the Netherlands, gave a heartfelt sigh: “China chose an excellent leader! Only an excellent leader like Xi Jinping could properly govern a country of China’s size, successfully resolving its various internal problems.” Former United States ambassador to China John Huntsman characterized Xi Jinping’s leadership as “unprecedented,” saying that he was the Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping most vested with transitional character (最具转型色彩), and that he had earned widespread attention from world leaders. Former Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj used a single Chinese character, “strong,” to express his view of Xi Jinping. He explained that “strong” could mean many things, including a strong capacity for work, a strong capacity for leadership, a strong ability to create cohesion, etcetera. . . .
Former German Ambassador to China and BMW Foundation chairman Dr. Michael Schaefer has said that one can see through the series of speeches Xi Jinping has made since becoming General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, that “Xi Jinping is an extremely great leader,” and he can surely create an even brighter future for China and the world. Yuri Tavrovsky, a China scholar and political commentator who is a professor at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University), believes that “an extraordinary leader has emerged in China.” America’s Time magazine listed Xi Jinping among the top 100 most influential people [for 2017].
For May 2018, we have just two Chinese Communist Party phrases topping the official discourse in the People’s Daily with “blazing” (沸) ratings. These are, perhaps not so surprisingly, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), President Xi Jinping’s “banner term” (旗帜语), and “Belt and Road” (一带一路), China’s ambitious infrastructure-driven foreign policy program. Several other key terms saw relative cool downs in May. They include: “19th National Congress” (十九大); “China Solution” (中国方案); and “Two Centenary [Goals]” (两个一百年).
Which Party leaders got top billing in the People’s Daily? Xi Jinping was naturally in a league of his own, with 749 appearances (articles mentioning him) for the month. Premier Li Keqiang was a distant second, with 79 appearances. The next three members of the Politburo Standing Committee come in very close to one another, almost as though following an informal rule. They are: Wang Yang (汪洋), with 20 article mentions; Li Zhanshu (栗战书), with 19 article mentions; and Han Zheng (韩正), with 19 article mentions.
As for foreign leaders in the People’s Daily, Donald Trump still held the top position in May, with a total of 29 articles mentioning him. Relatively speaking, however, it was a cool month for the U.S. president, who had 49 mentions back in April.
We also take a look in this report at the phrase “Amazing China” (厉害了，我的国), inspired by the 90-minute propaganda film, billed as the highest-grossing documentary film in China’s history, that was released back in March. “Amazing China” peaked as a discourse phrase in the People’s Daily in March, but has since declined to zero. This follows rumors that the Central Propaganda Department ordered the documentary film’s removal from the internet back in April. That may have been the case, but we found that the film is still available online in a number of places, including at Tencent Video (腾讯视频) and Youku (优酷).
The full Chinese-language report, produced this month by Fei Yun, follows. Enjoy.
