Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Xi Jinping, Constitutional Reformer

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

“Entering a New Era, Achieving New Acts.” This is the bright gold slogan emblazoned this week across the top of the official website of the People’s Daily — right over the top of an image of President Xi Jinping, identified as “the people’s leader,” or renmin lingxiu (人民领袖).
Xi Jinping’s new act, the amendment of China’s Constitution to remove term limits on the country’s presidency, paving the way for his own indefinite period of rule, has been the subject of fevered discussion outside China. Inside China, the topic is virtually impossible to broach, unless privately and in person.


The authorities have actively policed social media, including private chat groups, ensuring networked citizens do not have an opportunity to comment or speculate en masse. China’s cowed news media, meanwhile, have drowned the issue in a parade of noise, glorifying “the amendments” without offering any clear explanation of what these are or what they entail.
This approach was on full display in the article pinned to the top of the People’s Daily website yesterday. The piece, “Web users hotly discuss the constitutional amendment passed by the NPC,” is a compilation of comments reportedly made to the Strong Nation Forum (强国论坛) and the People’s Microblog (人民微博) about “the amendments” . They purr with praise about “protecting the fruits” of reform, “realizing the organic unity of the Party’s position,” or “enriching the constitutional spirit.” But the only hints as to the content of the recent amendments to the Constitution, which formally passed a vote by more than 3,000 NPC delegates on Sunday, come in a pair of posts alluding to the constitutional creation of a National Supervision System and the inclusion of “Xi Jinping Thought” in the Constitution’s preamble.
Unsurprisingly, the published comments make no mention whatsoever of the removal of presidential term limits.
But as I read through China’s non-coverage of these constitutional amendments, it struck me how far we have come in the dashing of liberal hopes for constitutional change since these hopes were voiced in late 2012 and early 2013, just at the dawn of the Xi era.
Marking the 30th anniversary of China’s 1982 Constitution on December 5, 2012, just weeks after he became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping said: “We must firmly establish, throughout society, the authority of the Constitution and the law and allow the overwhelming masses to fully believe in the law.” He also emphasized that “[no] organization or individual has the privilege to overstep the Constitution and the law, and any violation of the Constitution and the law must be investigated.”
In the wake of the anniversary, political reform advocates in China drew inspiration from Xi’s remarks. For them, “firmly establishing the Constitution” could be construed, and seized upon, as a means to push deeper social and political change through a process of actualization. The Constitution, they argued, already formed a consensus about China’s direction for the future. If the country could just put into practice the rights laid out in the Constitution — rights like “freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration” —  this would be immense progress.
On January 2, 2013, the China Media Project published an English-language translation of the New Year’s Greeting that opened the January edition of the liberal journal Yanhuang Chunqiu. Called “The Constitution is a Consensus for Political Reform” (宪法是政治体制改革的共识), the article argued that divisions over how to promote political reform, a “task of pressing urgency,” could be bridged by turning to the language of the Constitution. “As this new year begins, we have a new group of leaders, and certain changes in the way these leaders operate have been cause for encouragement,” said the article. “In this new year, what we hope among a multitude of other things is that there can be real action to make our Constitution real.”
This week, China’s Constitution did indeed get more real — in ways that liberal intellectuals find impossible to accept. The removal of presidential term limits came as a kind of culmination of the illiberal march of Chinese politics, through the very document liberal intellectuals had hoped just five years ago to make the blueprint of meaningful reform.
One has to imagine the insult cuts deep. Xi Jinping, it turns out, is a constitutional reformer after all. And now that he has detonated term limits on his own position as head of state, he can continue to be.

But the strange ambiguity in China’s constitutional pledges still runs just beneath the surface, even in the Party’s propaganda.
One of the comments in the piece on the People’s Daily website, reportedly offered by an internet user writing under the alias “Welcoming Justice” (欢迎正义) said: “Encouraging the people to study the Constitution, standardizing words and actions, will lend even more vitality to the new era. Revering the Constitution, respecting the Constitution, studying the Constitution and cherishing the Constitution. Those serving as officials and cadres must practice [the Constitution] through their actions, establish themselves as examples, and lay down the constitutional spirit. Those cadres who don’t understand the law, the people don’t need. Those officials who don’t understand the law, the ordinary people don’t welcome.”
And what if the people do study the Constitution? What if they expect the document, and the rights it stipulates, to be taken seriously by their officials?
Not to worry. These questions, and all others, are now firmly in the hands of one man, and there really is no need to “hotly discuss” them.

Web users hotly discuss the constitutional amendment passed by the NPC
March 12, 2018
On the afternoon of March 11, “Amendment to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” (中华人民共和国宪法修正案) passed by a substantial margin, drawing the focus of internet users. The vast majority of web users on Strong Nation Forum (强国论坛) and the People’s Microblog (人民微博) expressed the major significance and far-reaching impact of this amendment and urged its endorsement and active implementation.
. . . .
Web user “Daigo” (津哲代后) said: “The passing of the amendment shows the heart of the Party and the sentiment of the people.”
Web user “Little Cutie” (小可爱) said: “The amendment of the Constitution helps with sustainable development, helps with the continuity of the system, and lets the ordinary people see hope and an objective.”
Web user “Ren Yiping” (任毅平) said: “The advancement of the Constitution with the times preserves the people’s management of their own affairs, strongly defends national integrity, ethnic unity and social stability, and protects the fruits of 40 years of reform. It provides a powerful protection for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people from standing up to becoming prosperous to becoming strong.”
Web user “Erlong’s Truth” (二龙实话) said: “I wholeheartedly support the constitutional amendment. The times are changing, society is progressing and there is always room for the innovation of theories.”
Web user “Ding Guisheng” (丁贵生) wrote: “Governing the nation according to the law establishes the basis for justice and fairness. This is an important choice in ensuring the peace and stability of the country. Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想) benefits the long-term stability and development of the country . . . .
Web user Xu Xiaolin (絮筱霖) said: “Elevating the great achievements and precious experiences created by the people to the national constitution, realizing the organic unity of the Party’s position, the national will and the people’s wishes, is a successful instance of our Party’s governing of the nation.”
Web user “Aiminmao” said: “The writing of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era into the preamble to the Constitution provides a safeguard for the course of realizing the Chinese dream of the Chinese people! The constitutional amendment of the National People’s Congress will surely bring health and well-being to China in the new era.”
Web user “15191221122” said: “The Constitution has not only force but warmth, and is closer and closer to our ordinary lives.”
Web user “Crying Bird” (啼鸟) said: “If there are no laws to govern a country it will slip into chaos, and if the laws do not change they will decline. We must resolutely protect the authority of the constitution, supporting changes that accommodate the new situation of the new era.”
Web user “Big Meat-Eating Rabbit” (吃肉的大兔子) said: “The constitutional amendment will have an important influence on the struggle against corruption, patching up shortcomings in supervision, and it can more effectively support the development of the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
Web user “Mu Yanhong 102” (慕艳红102) wrote: “The life of the Constitution is in its implementation, and the authority of the Constitution is in its implementation. The process of constitutional amendment is also an opportunity to spread knowledge of the Constitution, and a process of enriching the constitutional spirit. We must fully utilize the rare opportunity afforded by the constitutional amendment, raising the constitutional consciousness of all the people, achieving among the people a consensus about the Constitution. This is especially the case for leading cadres, who must be models in the study of the Constitution, in honoring the Constitution and in promoting the Constitution.”
Web user “Welcoming Justice” (欢迎正义) said: “Encouraging the people to study the Constitution, standardizing words and actions, will lend even more vitality to the new era. Revering the Constitution, respecting the Constitution, studying the Constitution and cherishing the Constitution. Those serving as officials and cadres must practice [the Constitution] through their actions, establish themselves as examples, and lay down the constitutional spirit. Those cadres who don’t understand the law, the people don’t need. Those officials who don’t understand the law, the ordinary people don’t welcome.”
Web user “Bluetooth Dream Release” (蓝牙放飞梦想) said: “As a discipline inspection official, I resolutely support the constitutional amendment. The establishment of a National Supervision System will enable full-coverage monitoring of all public officials who exercise public power . . . . ”
Web user “Yun Liu Yi Jiangnan” (云柳亦江南) said: “As a grassroots Party member and official, I must take the earnest study and respect of the Constitution as the base of my life and work. I must do my part, protecting the Constitution and respecting the law, contributing my energies to this great Mother Country of ours!”
Web user “Not Forgetting the Original Intention, Always Moving Forward” (不忘初心一直向前) said: “As members of the Chinese Communist Party, we must support the amendment of the Constitution, serving as good and law-abiding citizens, and as qualified Party members.”

Will China's President Be Informed?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

“To err is human,” Deng Yuwen, the former editor of Study Times, wrote in the South China Morning Post today. “And a leader who tolerates no checks on his power is even more likely to err, because power can make one arrogant and impervious to other views.” As the National People’s Congress opens tomorrow, one crucial focus will be a proposed change to China’s Constitution removing term limits for the presidency. As many commentators have warned this week, such a change would pave the way for Xi Jinping to rule for an indefinite period, and would undo a key political reform measure introduced by Deng Xiaoping. Potentially vesting great power in the person of Xi Jinping, as opposed to collective leadership, it would also raise serious questions about whether Xi’s leadership can be sufficiently adaptive, or whether it will, as Deng Yuwen said, be “even more likely to err.” There has long been reason to wonder, in fact, whether Xi Jinping isn’t sealing things up so tight that the system is gasping for air. In late 2015, one year before his elevation as “the core,” Xi Jinping put his foot down on “improper discussion of [the policies] of the central Party,” or wangyi zhongyang (妄议中央), a phrase that was added to the Party’s updated Disciplinary Regulations. Don’t chatter about the Party’s business, he seemed to say: Just follow my lead. Visiting key Party media a few months later, Xi gave a speech in which he stressed that the media “must be surnamed Party” — meaning that they must do the Party’s bidding. In the same speech he mingled oil and water by stating that “positive propaganda,” which has traditionally signalled suppression of critical news coverage, is at one with “supervision by public opinion,” the phrase that has long been synonymous with more probing, and even investigative, coverage. “Supervision by public opinion and positive propaganda are unified,” Xi said. Yikes. So where, then, does China’s Mr. Personality get his information? Some technologists argue that new technologies have already presented authoritarian states like China with a solution, making possible “a big-data dictatorship.” Those in power can count on endless streams of information, from social media sentiments to credit information, all harnessed through artificial intelligence. “Given that many dictatorships collapse as a result of poor information,” Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, wrote on Project Syndicate this week, “digital technologies could become an even more powerful prophylactic against bad decision-making than term limits.” In fact, the Chinese Communist Party has long dealt with the delicate balance between information controls it sees as imperative, and the need to ensure restricted flow of valued intelligence. We can see this tension in one of the Party’s oldest systems of official intelligence, the insider news briefs and journals known as “internal references,” or neibu cankao (内部参考). Cheng Li, a senior fellow at Brookings, noted in his book The Power of Ideas that these internal references are produced by a range of actors, from think tanks and government departments. They can sometimes circulate only at the most senior levels — for example, among Politburo members — and at other times may be available to provincial or county-level leaders. During the heyday of the commercial press in China, from the mid-1990s through around the Beijing Olympics, internal references were often tip sheets used by enterprising reporters, clueing them in to potential stories. A journalist for a major Party-affiliated newspaper in Beijing once told me that his paper produced internal reference documents only on an irregular basis, whenever there were critical stories that editors or their Party superiors determined could not be made public. When they did produce an internal brief on a story, this could circulate at quite senior levels in the capital, sometimes even getting an endorsement from a member of the Standing Committee. Other media may produce internal references on a more regular basis. Systematic study of the internal reference system would present obvious challenges. But it would be fascinating to discover how the system might have changed, or is now changing, in light of the explosion of big data. My guess is that internal references remain as much or more relevant today. Despite the faith of technologists, there are plenty of facts and observations that must still derive from good old-fashioned reporting.
In any case, the news media in China remain very much involved in the manufacture of internal references — a reminder of how the Party regards media as arms of intelligence gathering as well as propaganda. Earlier this month, a commentary in The Beijing News voiced concern over the abuse of two local news journalists in Hebei province who had been investigating a pollution case. According to media reports, journalists from the Internal Reference team of Hebei Television, the province’s official television network, had gone to Quzhou County (曲周) in southern Hebei to follow up on reports of pollution by a local enterprise. The journalists were mobbed and seriously beaten by assailants who also stole their filming equipment, wallets and mobile phones. At some point, one of the journalists was bound by the assailants, who threatened to throw them down a well. A subsequent investigation showed that the enterprise in question had identified itself as a goat breeding cooperative, but in fact was manufacturing industrial plastic sprays, and flouting environmental laws. The commentary in The Beijing News portrayed the case as a worrisome disruption by local thugs (with the possible involvement or negligence of county officials) of a necessary process of supervision by the media — not as an agent of the public interest per se, but as an indispensable arm of the provincial leadership. “The undercover journalists had a special mission,” the paper wrote, “to represent the Hebei Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in conducting an undercover investigation, performing a supervision role.” The paper continued in its affirmation of the role of Internal Reference-related investigations:
Undeniably, if it had not been for the investigation by these journalists, this illegal workshop would have continued to illegally pollute. . . . Protect the journalist’s right to report, and allow them to carry out their work with ease, with the courage to expose problems in society, and they will uphold the social and public interest. If the opposite occurs, and the environment for reporting grows serious, and certain people can use violence to prevent reporting, beating and threatening journalists with impunity so that they feel a general chill, then this will necessarily mean the loss of the front line in news supervision (新闻监督), and the greatest loss will be the social and public interest.
It is fascinating to note what this passage reveals about mainstream official views of the role of the “journalist.” There is clearly a righteous tone about the value of their work — and yet, there was never any real expectation of exposure in this case, not public exposure anyway. The point was internal exposure to provincial leaders, who apparently tasked the reporters with the investigation. In this case, the “social and public interest” is to be served only in secret. In fact, the “general chill” of which the writer speaks has already happened to the media in the broader sense. Nothing makes this point more clearly than Xi Jinping’s conflation of “supervision” and “positive propaganda.” In the face of severe restrictions on news reporting, one might imagine the internal reference system offering some relief in the form of premium restricted access content. But one substantial weakness of the system is that it maps right on top of the Party-state bureaucracy, meaning that provincial officials, for example, who have direct control over outfits like Hebei Television, have an incentive themselves to remove or tone down reporting of potentially damaging stories. By contrast, one reason that the investigative reporting carried out (largely) by commercial newspapers from the end of the 1990s was so effective was that it utilized “cross-regional reporting,” or yidi jiandu (异地监督), meaning that papers from one administrative region would report on malfeasance in another. A paper in Guangzhou could report on corruption at the city level in a neighboring province without immediate fear of reprisal from its Party bosses in Guangdong. Xi Jinping does not seem to have much interest in this sort of intersectional supervision. He has brought to heel China’s once unruly (by today’s standards) press. His leadership has been marked across the board by greater centralization and a top-down approach. We might suppose that information is not getting bottlenecked, that it is filtering up to Xi, and to others who make the key policy decisions — that they are not “arrogant and impervious.” But the reality is that we have no way of knowing. No one does. And that has to tell us something.  

Li Datong's Open Letter

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The following open letter was posted to WeChat on February 26, 2018, by Li Datong (李大同), the former top editor of Freezing Point, a respected supplement of the China Youth Daily newspaper.  The letter has been one of the most prominent voices of criticism in the wake of the announcement that China would eliminate term limits for the president and vice-president, paving the way for Xi Jinping to serve beyond the end of his current term in 2023. 

To: Xu Tao (徐韬), Ren Ming (任鸣), Yang Yuanqing (杨元庆), Chen Jining (陈吉宁) and the rest of the 55 Beijing delegates to the National People's Congress.

Greetings All!

I am a Chinese citizen, and a voter in Beijing. You are delegates chosen by us, and you represent us in political deliberations and in political action — and you represent us in exercising the right to vote (表决权).

After speaking with many other voters who are of the same opinion as me and reaching common agreement, I decided to make an urgent call to you, urging you to enter dissenting votes during the 13th session of the National People's Congress that is about to take place, overruling the decision taken by the Party's Central Committee concerning the amendment of Article 14 of the Constitution to abolish term limits for the president.

As I understand it, the stipulation in the 1982 Constitution that the national leaders of China may not serve for more than two terms in office was political reform measure taken by the Chinese Communist Party and the people of China after the immense suffering wrought by the Cultural Revolution. This was the highest and most effective legal restriction preventing personal dictatorship and personal domination of the Party and the government, and it was a major point of progress in raising the level of political civilization in China, in line with historical trends. It was also one of the most important political legacies of Deng Xiaoping. China can only move forward on this foundation, and there is emphatically no reason to move in the reverse direction. Removing term limitations on national leaders will subject us to the ridicule of the civilized nations of the world. It means moving backward into history, and planting the seed once again of chaos in China, causing untold damage.

I ask you please to take the greatest interests of the Chinese people into consideration first and foremost, earnestly considering our request and submitting your dissenting vote — for the long-term peace and stability of China, and for the preservation of political civilization in China.

Respectfully,
The Citizens (公民敬礼)

Signed,
Li Datong (李大同)

Goodbye Republic

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

As Xi Jinping's "New Era" ushers China back into the authoritarian past, paving the way for the Putinesque removal of term limits for the president and vice-president, there is so much to say. But the thing about such atavistic acts is that we have reflected on them before. We have been there. We have done that.

And so, without further ado, I share a translation of a piece written back in 1980, almost two years before presidential term limits were put in place in China's 1982 Constitution. The piece, written by Yan Jiaqi (严家其), the former political advisor to Premier Zhao Ziyang who fled China in the wake of June Fourth, was published in the Party's official People's Daily after first appearing in a journal called New Period (新时期) — or "New Era," as it might alternatively be translated.

Yan's piece reserves criticism for "capitalist dictatorship" — there were still ideological lines to uphold — but is absolutely clear in its assessment that the abolishment of "lifelong tenure," or zhongshengzhi (终身制), is a mark of progress for political systems, and that the return of "lifelong tenure" for top leaders spells the death of a republic.

Lifelong Tenure is an Ancient Form of System

By Yan Jiaqi


"Lifelong tenure" (终身制) is an extremely ancient system. Since humankind entered the class society and established states, two systems have had long histories: one is "private ownership" of the social and economic system, and the other the statist political system of "lifelong tenure."

Way back in the time of dictatorship by slave owners, the lifelong tenure of heads of state came to form one type of system. The leaders of ancient Egypt, Babylon, Persia, India, China and other lands all had lifelong tenure. Of course, there were also exceptions. In the Roman Republic of the 6th century B.C., the position of Roman head of state was held by dual consuls. A consul's term was set at one year, and every year an election was held.

Looking back on history, the system of "lifelong tenure" of heads of state under private ownership is closely connected to the system of monarchy. We can say that perhaps all lands with monarchies in history are inseparable from "lifelong tenure." But under republics, establishment of "lifelong tenure" usually presages the restoration of monarchy. If no term limits are applied to the head of state, republics undergo metamorphosis and become monarchies. Toward the end of the Roman Republic, those military chiefs who emerged during the period of civil war did their utmost to abolish strict term limitations, first announcing time after time that they would extend their terms, then ultimately declaring that they would hold lifelong terms. At the end of the 1st century B.C., with the establishment of "lifelong tenure" for heads of state, the Roman Republic became the Roman Empire.

Aside from ancient Rome, in more contemporary history, we have Napoleon Bonaparte in France, and Yuan Shikai (袁世凯) in our country after the Xinhai Revolution — all extending their terms and then declaring lifelong tenure before ultimately destroying their republics and ascending to imperial thrones. Like the system of monarchy, "lifelong tenure" is an ancient system gradually being phased out of history.

The abolishment of "lifelong tenure" is an important transformation in the history of human development where political systems are concerned. This transformation has been achieved by many countries through periods of bourgeois revolution (资产阶级革命时期) or revolution. The terms of office in various countries are all different. In Switzerland, the highest administrative organization is the Federal Council, which serves for terms of just one year. The American president serves for four-year terms, and the French president for 7 years. The United Kingdom is a monarchy in name, but the highest powers are not held in the hands of the monarch but are exercised through parliaments, cabinets and prime ministers with definite terms of tenure (5 years) — and "lifelong tenure" is purely a figment.

The bourgeoisie abolished the "lifelong tenure" of those at the height of power, effectively preventing the restoration of despotism. However, in these countries, the system of private ownership that has a long history equal to that of "lifelong tenure" continues to exist in the private ownership of capitalism. Owing to the existence of capitalist private ownership, the fact of bourgeoisie dictatorship cannot be changed regardless of how the bourgeoisie determines the terms of presidents or prime ministers, or what political system is employed.

(Excerpted from "On the Abolishment of Lifelong Tenure," published in the March 1980 edition of New Era (新时期).)

China's Race Against History

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

There has been a burst of commentary over the past few days about the overtly racist Africa skit that aired during the official Spring Festival Gala last week on China Central Television. I won’t recap the arguments here, except to note that we don’t need to read intent to appreciate the very real racist impact of a Chinese actress wearing blackface and butt padding to portray an African mother figure. Despite this well-intentioned argument, the link between racism and intentionality is a commonplace misunderstanding of the complex dynamics of racism.
If we do look at the intent behind the Africa skit, however, it’s not hard to make out that the purpose of Chinese leaders in airing the segment was to promote China’s strategic relationship with Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative. At the end of the skit, Lou Naiming, the Chinese actress playing “Mama” in blackface, praises a China that “has done so much for Africa,” and declares with feeling: “I love Chinese people! I love China!”
The Belt and Road theme figured strongly in this year’s Spring Festival Gala, and it directs us to a second controversy, one that has gotten far less air time outside China.
During a special segment under the title “A National Treasure Returns Home” (国宝回归), actor Zhang Guoli introduced a mysterious “special guest” who “left the mother country in the 1930s and drifted overseas for more than 80 years.” The guest, a “green-black scroll” measuring over 30 meters in length, was now “returning home.”
Shan Jiaxiang (单霁翔), director of the Palace Museum, explained to the audience that this scroll had been lost to Japan in the 1930s, but in 2002 was purchased by a Beijing auction house and returned to China, where it was subsequently donated to the Palace Museum after being purchased by Hong Kong tycoon Hui Wing-mau, who joined Zhang and Shan on stage.
“It’s name is ‘Landscape Map of the Silk Road’,” said a slightly uneasy looking Shan Jiaxiang.
“Would you like to see this ‘Landscape Map of the Silk Road!” Zhang boomed out to the audience.
“Yes!”

 
Shan explained that this was “a map of the Silk Road that was drawn during the reign of the Jiajing Period of the Ming dynasty.” It drew out 211 geographical coordinates between the city of Jiayuguan (in present-day Gansu province) in the east and Bakkah (present-day Mecca in Saudi Arabia) in the West, and also described customs and local conditions in ancient cities along the route.
The discovery of the painting, the segment explained, had “epoch-marking significance” (划时代意义) for the archeology of the Silk Road. “Yes, it is extremely valuable,” said Shan, following Zhang Guoli’s lead. “It proves that we Chinese already had a clear understanding of the path of the Silk Road as early as the middle of the 16th century.”
Here, in the form of a designated “national treasure” returned to its rightful home, was irrefutable proof of the Chinese agency behind the whole idea of the Silk Road, vesting Xi Jinping’s visionary Belt and Road Initiative with a sense of historical destiny.
This is a good time to remember that old rule of thumb: if something seems too good to be true, it probably is.
In any case, the gala’s “Landscape Map of the Silk Road” (丝路山水地图) quickly sparked a controversy online in China. Internet users pointed out that many things about the map had been tampered with or misrepresented, including its name and its age. These alterations had been made, they suspected, in order to make a stronger political case for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, the German geographer who coined the term “Silk Road” in 1877. Source: Wikipedia Commons.
Beginning with the question of the map’s name, it is common knowledge among historians that the term “Silk Road” did not appear until 1877, in a map collection by German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen. In this work, called China, Richthofen refers to the term twice, first as he traces the history of trade routes between Europe and China through Central Asia, and second in reference to a map by Greek geographer Marinus of Tyre, which Richthofen calls “die Seidenstraße des Marinus,” or “the Silk Road of Marinus.”
At this point, a bit of basic math is required. In the gala segment, “A National Treasure Returns Home,” Shan Jiaxiang dates the map in question back to the “middle of the 16th century.” That means that this map called “Landscape Map of the Silk Road” is supposed to have been created more than 300 years before the term “Silk Road” was actually coined — again, by a German geographer.
It’s completely impossible, of course, that a map drawn during the reign of the Jiajing Emperor (1522-1566 A.D.) in the Ming dynasty would be given a name including a term that would not appear until more than three centuries later. But Shan Jiaxiang is not a career archaeologist or geographer, but a career official, and so long as he can ensure that this map has “epoch-marking significance” for the political archaeology of the new Silk Road, he presumably cares little about the archaeology of the “Silk Road” concept itself.
Another key problem is that much of the trade through Central Asia was in fact cut off by the middle of the Ming dynasty, and these routes were diminishing in importance. As enthusiasts and amateur historians on China’s internet pointed out, it seems highly improbable that Chinese at this point during the Ming dynasty would painstakingly produce a map of the route.
The age of the map in question has in fact long been contested. As Shanghai’s The Paper noted in a backgrounder on the scroll, it was previously in the collection of Japan’s Museum of Fujii Yurinkan, where experts had dated it to the Qing dynasty. After the scroll was purchased and returned to China in 2002, it was referred to, as in this news story on its appearance at an auction by Poly Auction, as the “Mongolian Landscape Map,” using the name apparently added to the back of the map by “Shang You Tang” (尚友堂), a Beijing bookshop, sometime at the end of the Qing dynasty or the beginning of the Republican period.
Professor Lin Meicun of Peking University began researching the “Mongolian Landscape Map” in 2004, and subsequently argued that it dated instead to the middle of the 16th century. In 2013, Lin gave a talk at Cambridge, the Facebook announcement offering this description:

This lecture introduces a 16th century Ming dynasty map which covers the Silk Road regions in the Mongolia Empire. Recently discovered in Japan, the Mongolian Landscape Map (蒙古山水地璺) is a hand scroll in ink and color on silk, 0.59 meters wide and 31.2 meters long.

Professor Lin has insisted the scroll was used by the Jiajing Emperor during the Ming dynasty, but the exact nature and origins of the work remain disputed.
In an article posted yesterday to the Caijing website, columnist Yang Lang (杨浪) said it was reasonable “from an academic standpoint” to question the naming of the scroll and its age and provenance. The reference to the “Silk Road” in the name given during the CCTV gala, which has been used by state media for a number of years, is clearly problematic, said Yang, given the origins of the term in the 19th century. Nor is there any indication that the name on the scroll itself, “Mongolian Landscape Map,” offered more than a century ago by the Beijing bookshop, is any more authentic. Yang also noted intriguing comments from another expert writing online, who said that the “map” seemed to resemble in every detail — including its length — a scroll listed in a record of imperial palace treasures from the Qing dynasty.

A google search entry for an article at The Paper quoted an expert as saying the so-called “Landscape Map of the Silk Road” is not, in his view, from the middle of the Ming dynasty.
Earlier today, The Paper ran an interview in which Nie Chongzheng (聂崇正), an expert in ancient drawings at the Palace Museum, directly voiced his doubts about the scroll. Nie, who claimed to have studied the scroll personally, said he believed that the work was not, as characterized during the CCTV gala, a scroll painting from the middle of the Ming dynasty. “My feeling,” he said, “is that this is a painting work from the early Qing.”
The interview with Nie — which bore the headline, “Ming Painting or Not? Behind the Renaming of the ‘Mongolian Landscape Map’ as the ‘Landscape Map of the Silk Road'” — is now, quite tellingly, missing from the website of The Paper. It can still be viewed at Sina.com, however.
Dating the so-called “Landscape Map of the Silk Road” to the early Qing dynasty puts it back anywhere from 100 to 200 years later than claimed in the CCTV gala segment.
Why should that matter at all?
We understand why if we look at the state propaganda surrounding the scroll. Here, for example, is a piece run by China Daily, published by the State Council Information Office, nearly five years ago, just months before the unveiling of the Belt and Road Initiative:

Researchers have discovered that a document long thought to be a landscape painting from the Qing Dynasty, is in fact one of China’s earliest world maps from the Ming Dynasty. . . . Matteo Ricci, the Italian missionary who arguably published the first Chinese-language world map during his long stay in China, was believed to be the source of Chinese people’s knowledge of world geography. But now a newly appraised Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) world map proves that the Chinese’s exploration of world geography had started long before his arrival in 1583.

In dating this hand scroll back to the reign of the Ming dynasty Jiajing Emperor (1522-1566 A.D.), in other words, official China is in a race against history. It must get its mapmakers far enough back into the 16th century to pre-date the arrival of Matteo Ricci. The date to beat: 1583.
1566 certainly does the trick. But then, isn’t that almost too good to be true?
 
 
 
 
 
 

Mobilizing for the "China Solution"

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

China’s comeback story is playing on repeat these days. According to this feel-good narrative, the country has returned to the center of the world stage after weathering two centuries of misfortune. And now, As Xi Jinping told fellow leaders last month, China faces an historic opportunity to contribute to the world (为世界作贡献). The model that empowered China’s restoration, newly encompassed by the grandiose notion of “Xi Jinping Thought,” “has the potential to correct and transform the existing world order.”
The underlying idea here is that China’s unique system of leadership under the Chinese Communist Party has been tested, validated and even vindicated by the country’s rapid development and newfound prosperity, and that this “model” — this “China Solution” (中国方案) — constitutes “an important consensus of global development.” The not-at-all-subtle implication is that it offers an alternative to the Western democratic governance model.
But is it possible that China is vastly overplaying its hand? Is it possible that its confidence (particularly in the face of American retreat) is overheating into degenerative hubris?
In fact, the vehemence with which China is now declaring its glorious return is itself a sobering reminder of the basic character of its “model.” China’s Leninist political system has a tendency in its DNA to melt the finer points of policy down in a white heat of enthusiasm. For evidence, we could turn to the most obvious examples of the pre-reform era, including the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. But even after four decades of reform, the politics of the Chinese Communist Party remain fundamentally unchanged — and the growing cult surrounding Xi Jinping, recently christened “leader of the people,” is an illustration of its atavistic tendencies.

Sun Liping’s post on movement-style governance now calls up a message that reads: “This content cannot be viewed due to violations.”
Over the weekend, Sun Liping (孙立平), a professor at Tsinghua University, posted an article on his public WeChat account, “Social Observations” (孙立平社会观察), in which he discussed one of the most fundamental aspects of China’s form of governance — the “movement method.” This is essentially about the power to mobilize and direct all sectors of society toward a concrete policy objective, even if it means (and it always does) casting procedure aside.
In China, the “movement method,” which, as Sun notes, marks a form of governance distinct from that of systems based on rule of law, can be seen in everything from the eviction of migrants in Beijing back in November, to the recent declaration of a “sweep the black” campaign against organized crime, to the official response to an isolated knife attack in a Beijing shopping mall last week. It can be seen in the elevation of Xi Jinping, and in the trumpeting of his flagship slogan — “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” It can be seen in the rollout of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). And it can be seen in China’s declaration of a “new era” for the rest of the world.
If we seek to understand the true distinguishing characteristics of China’s “model,” this movement-style governance is an excellent candidate for the list. The information control so crucial to this style of governance — the narrative, after all, must be directed — is another important candidate. And right on cue, we find today that Sun Liping’s article has been removed from WeChat. No doubt it hit too close to home.

Movement, Movement, Movement
By Sun Liping (孙立平)
Movements are an operational form of governance of life and society used routinely within certain systems.
If we wish to understand how the movement method operates, we can first look at its opposite side. Generally speaking, in doing a certain thing, there are two basic methods of approach. The first is to act according to rules and procedure, proceeding step by step. The other is to employ the movement method, proceeding with great fanfare. In the former case, procedures, systems and rule of law are very important. In the latter case, power, mobilization and force are the most important factors.
There are also grades within the movement method. In his early dissertation, the American political scientist Thomas Bernstein (伯恩斯坦) divided movements into two types. The topic of his research was the process of forming cooperatives in China and the USSR. He argued that the social mobilization used in the process of the Soviet Union’s collectivization drive could be called “command mobilization.” In the Soviet case, the enactment of rural collectivization relied on urban work team implementing forced measures in the countryside. Any rural peasants who resisted efforts the formation of communes were forcibly suppressed by the dictatorship. And so, the revolution in the Soviet Union was achieved through a process of urban uprising, and had more to do with a mass bass that was not deeply rooted in the countryside.
The process of collectivization in China was different. The movement method employed in the process of Chinese rural collectivization can be labelled “participatory mobilization” (参与式动员). In the process of Chinese rural collectivization, while work teams were also dispatched widely, their primary role was not to force measures upon the peasants but to carry out propaganda and persuasion so that they came to recognize that the present situation with regard to land holdings and operation was unreasonable and not in their long-term interests — that individual farmers would see brighter prospects for the future only by taking the road of socialist collectivization. Through this whole process happened along with “visits to the poor” (访贫问苦) and “appeals to present prosperity” (忆苦思甜). The goal was to vest the peasantry with ideas of class consciousness, to elevate their political understanding. The result was to have peasants voluntarily opt in to the rural collectivization movement.
This could also be seen at the time through the method of class struggle. In the USSR, major purges, including of counter-revolutionaries, were carried out by organs of dictatorship). But in China at the time, class struggle emphasized the participation of the masses, and it was carried out through a method of mass struggle (群众斗争). According to Mao’s ideas, the goal of this was to educate the masses and to elevate their consciousness. Of course, it also owed to the relative weakness of administrative organs.
Regardless of which method a movement takes, all share a number of common characteristics. First, they have revolutionary inertia (革命的惯性), because movements are all in fact forms of revolution; second, their goal is to achieve a broad reordering of society, and this goal cannot without great difficulty be achieved through conventional means; fourth, [movements happen because] conventional means are not adequate, have insufficient capacity, prove generally ineffective, or are so riddled with problems that they cannot be reversed.
Not all societies have the capacity for social mobilization or for the creation of movements. For the movement method to be possible, the first requirement is a certain kind of system. In this system, there must be a center (中枢) [or central administration] that is capable of mobilizing the populace, or that can efficiently direct the system of administration, or that can achieve both simultaneously. At the same time, the entire society must have a high degree of integration, or [a high degree of] linkage (联动性), so that in the process of social mobilization the whole of society can be spurred into action — and the condition necessary for action is entails all different sorts of organization, or administrative methods of organization, or some other form of organization.
The combination of the above-mentioned institutional factors amounts to a nationwide system (举国体制), [or “whole-nation system”], so that whatever task is concerned the mobilization happens on a national scale, and the entire population is mobilized. Thereupon, a single word reverberates (一声令下), and the entire society acts together. But in this process, expert division of labor is smashed, and every department and unit has its own targets and quotas.
For example, a number of years ago when many locales [throughout China] were promoting investment, offices including [chapters of] the Chinese Communist Youth League, the All-China Women’s Federation and the Department of Family Planning all had investment promotion targets, and if those targets were not met then the leaders responsible for those offices would be removed. Land reclamation and demolition is also achieved through this process of mobilization of [responsible] units (单位动员) — and even primary and middle schools employ mobilization, making primary and middle school students return home to engage their parent in ideological work. Some places even have rules about penalization by association (连坐的惩罚办法) [for example with offending parents or relatives, in order to force compliance with overall objectives]. When social tensions arise as a result of demolition and land requisition, the task of stability preservation (维稳) falls to a number of different departments. I have a friend who labors free of charge and without real authority for the China Association for Science and Technology, and even he has been issued quotas for house visitations to offer sympathy and comfort [in complaint cases]. During these visits, he must offer a bit of money as a means of placation, or if there is no money must draw upon his meager research funds.
The result of this is the chaos of social functions throughout the society. In the midst of a movement, various offices and departments have no choice but to set aside the [normal] functions of their office and to engage in matters outside their own familiarity and expertise. In order to complete these tasks, and in order that the boss isn’t punished, these offices and departments must do whatever they can, by means fair or foul.
Then we can observe the various stages in the exercise of a movement. If the movement is to be successful, these various stages are essential. Creating an atmosphere for success relies on creating the atmosphere first through a kind of environmental pressure, whether that means pressure over political correctness or pressure on moral grounds. The concentration and the surge, the mobilization of every possible resource to be mobilized, is half the battle. You institute harsh punishments and strict evaluation. Under these circumstances, magnifications and distortions are perhaps utterly unavoidable. An at-all-costs and through-all-methods ethos is something common to such movements.
The result is that the negative effects quickly rise to the surface. One chop of the cleaver and a huge grunt, repeated wave after wave, and when the task is done you’re left with a single chicken feather. Sometimes, movement-style governance devolves into a competition between officials. You’re fierce, so I must be fiercer than you. You’re extreme, so I must be even more extreme. You did it in three days, so I must do it in one. Where did the Great Leap Forward come from? Aside from the fantastical nature of the goals themselves, one very important reason was the wave-upon-wave logic (加码的逻辑).
Periodic movements and routine inertia (常规性的惰性) often go hand in hand. The necessity of movement-style governance methods is directly related to general negligence, and directly related to the breakdown of regular procedures and rules that occurs in the midst of movements. Movements very often become a race to destroy the rules, and the result is that rule of law is destroyed. What of those original agreements? What of those contracts? What of those approvals that relevant departments previously signed off on? They mean nothing now. “Sell coal and we’ll arrest you, emit smoke and we’ll demolish your home” (卖煤就抓人，冒烟就拆房). In a banner such as this one [posted to deter air pollution], can you see even the shadow of rule of law? And when movements become a commonly used form of governance, they can very easily encourage an opportunistic mentality among officials to the point of making a complete mess of things. The good cadre becomes the one who stands out in the midst of the movement, and they are showered with favor and possibly promotion.
Just as I was writing this essay, I saw two bits of news. This first said that after [leaders at] the top deployed their “sweeping black” campaign, certain provinces ordered that prosecutor’s offices at every level throughout the province must handle at least one case this year against organized crime (涉黑案件). The second said that there had been a knife attack at the Joy City Mall in Beijing, and that the City of Beijing had deployed 200,000 personnel to carry out patrols through the night. Moreover, official news sources said that beginning with the next day, starting the very next day, there would be deployed in Beijing a 700,000-strong security patrol force consisting largely of volunteers. Consider that number for a moment. Beijing’s total population is estimated at 20 million, and according to a perhaps somewhat exaggerated figure about 10 million people will be leaving Beijing during the Chinese New Year. How many people do you think will be left in Beijing?
This calls to mind a metaphor that emerged during the stock market crisis of 2015. Imagine that someone who fears you and is by nature a bit hesitant is serving as your driver. You tell them how they should drive. You tell them to go just a bit faster, or that they should slow down. OK, so you want to go a bit faster? Well, let’s just push the accelerator to the floor. But all at once this is too fast for you, so you ask to slow down — we don’t want an accident after all. OK, so you’re scared, right? You want to slow down? Their foot goes off the accelerator and slams hard on the brakes.
This, it must be said, is how it normally works with the movement-style approach. And herein we can glimpse some of the most basic secrets about how the movement-style model of governance (运动式治理) works.
 

The "Misguided Academics" of Europe

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Over the weekend, the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) and the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), both based in Berlin, jointly released a report calling on European leaders to take more concerted action to deal with China’s efforts to exert political influence in Europe. “If Europe intends to stop the momentum of Chinese influencing efforts,” the report said, “it needs to act swiftly and decisively.”
The report takes a fairly comprehensive look at Chinese influence tactics in Europe, outlining challenges in three “arenas”: 1. political and economic elites; 2. media and public opinion; and 3. civil society and academia. The report also draws parallels with “high-profile precursors in other Western liberal democracies, specifically Australia and New Zealand.”
Whatever its merits, the GPPi/MERICS report was sure to draw sharp criticism from China. The first volley came late yesterday in the Global Times, the tabloid published by the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily. The op-ed, “Misguided Academics Promote China-EU Confrontation,” argued that the GPPi/MERICS report was an unfair reflection of China’s ambitions in Europe, and that it “advocates confrontation between Chinese and EU political models.”
Over the past year, MERICS, Europe’s largest think-tank on contemporary China, has been singled out for ad hominem attacks from the Global Times, and the idea that the think-tank nurtures “misguided academics” is a principal line of attack. Just last week, in fact, an article in the Global Times credited the newspaper itself with driving a precipitous drop in “negative” coverage by MERICS by running a report back in March 2017 “on the problem of politicization of ‘China research’ at MERICS.” The piece, which suggested MERICS president Sebastian Heilmann was leaving his post in September because of “reservations on the part of the funder,” Mercator Stiftung, quoted an anonymous academic from Hamburg, Germany, to disparage MERICS research as “China research for the entertainment section.”
Anticipating further growls from the Global Times and other state media about Europe’s newly cautious attitude toward China, we offer a translation of the most recent Global Times attack on MERICS. Enjoy.
 

President of Europe’s Largest “China Research Center” to Vacate His Post: And the Back Story Seems to be Even Richer!
January 30, 2018
[Global Times Germany correspondent, Qing Mu (青木), Global Times reporter Zhang Beixin (张倍鑫)] — The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), which has been called Europe’s largest “China research center” recently issued a notice on its official website announcing a change of management, saying that effective September this year Sebastian Heilmann would no longer serve as president of the center. In March last year, the Global Times ran a full-page report on the problem of politicization of “China research” at MERICS (see image). After that, MERICS’ entirely one-sided voice criticizing China was somewhat moderated, and use by German media of the research results from scholars at the think tank also went down. A scholar who cooperates with MERICS told the Global Times reporter that doubts raised by China also put pressure on Mercator Stiftung, the foundation that created the think tank. A person familiar with the situation told the Global Times reporter that Heilmann’s departure likely owed to reservations on the part of the funder.
MERICS was created in November 2013 with funding from Germany’s largest private foundation, the Mercator Stiftung. This center recently issued a notice saying that Heilmann would return to Germany’s Trier University starting September 1 owing to family reasons. Within just a few years, [the notice said], Heilmann had fashioned MERICS as one of the world’s leading think tanks for China research, and the Mercator Stiftung expressed its thanks for his outstanding work. The foundation was preparing for the second round of MERICS funding (2019-2023). In the future, Heilmann would actively support the smooth leadership transition at MERICS, and would continue to maintain a close connection with MERICS.
The change in leadership at MERICS did not attract much attention in Germany’s media, but in China research circles in Germany it caused something of a stir. Berlin China specialist 莱希贝格 told the Global Times reporter that Heilmann was stepping down early, before the end of MERICS’ first five-year round [of funding], and clearly his cooperation with the Mercator Stiftung had not gone so smoothly. 莱希贝格 reckoned that MERICS’ greatest failure had been to spark questions from China, for example that it had been too political, and had lacked objectivity.
At the time of its founding in 2013, MERICS said that it hoped to “reveal different aspects of China”, and to “deepen knowledge and understanding of China in Germany and in Europe.” But the result was that it released various research articles on China that were essentially critical of China and were clearly subjective in nature.
Thanks to its reputation as Europe’s largest “China research center,” MERICS quickly gained visibility. In particular, after the center’s scholars published articles in America’s New York Times, in Germany’s Der Spiegel and other “major Western media,” MERICS became perhaps synonymous with “China research” in Europe. Germany’s Der Tagesspiegel newspaper reported previously that some traditional think tanks in Germany worried that MERICS was monopolizing “expert knowledge on China,” and that they believed it lacked historical perspective on China.
Through investigation, Global Times reporters found that MERICS does not resemble a think tank in the true sense, and it has not long-term research plan. Each week the center issues its online magazine called “China Monitor,” which 5 to 10 articles. These “academic articles” all follow hot topics about China, looking more like personal reflections, the language often provocative, tending to draw attention. This has led the organization to have a poor reputation among academics. One Chinese expert in Hamburg told this reporter angrily that these article could not be called scholarly research, that they lacked serious arguments, and that they also lacked a historical view — that some resembled “China research for the entertainment section.”
The Global Times reporter has applied for onsite interviews with this think tank on many occasions in the past, but has always been refused, the organization saying that “we refuse interviews from state media.” In March last year, the Global Times ran a full-page article called “Getting to the Bottom of Europe’s Biggest ‘China Research Center'” in which it exposed the problem of politicization in MERICS articles. People with knowledge of the situation have revealed that after the report came out, Heilmann was furious and said he wanted to seek out the Global Times reporter to argue it out, and that he even flew into a rage asking the Chinese Embassy in Germany how the article had come about.
According to an investigation by Global Times reporters, from 2013 to March 2017, around 80 percent of the articles published by MERICS were negative. After the publication of the full-page report by the Global Times, articles from the center about China that were negative with a strong sense of subjectivity were around 50 percent. The tone of its experts in media interviews was also somewhat moderated. For example, in an interview with Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR) radio on April 6, MERICS scholar Sabine Mokry (莫诗彬) affirmed China’s activities in Africa, saying that China’s economic and political involvement in Africa had earned praise from locals.
According to its plan, the Mercator Stiftung should already have invested 18.4 million Euros in MERICS. Insiders reveal that the foundation is clearly unhappy with the current situation at MERICS. One person in charge at the foundation previously told the Global Times reporter that MERICS’ objective had been to advance understanding of China, not to oppose [China]. [Berlin China specialist] 莱希贝格 believes that given the current situation at MERICS, the management change is perhaps an opportunity that can make MERICS move in a more objective direction.

 

Sudden Change at the Top of CCTV

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Chinese state media reported today that Shen Haixiong (慎海雄), chief of Guangdong’s provincial propaganda department, has been appointed as the new director of China Central Television, the state-run television network. Shen replaces Nie Chenxi (聂辰席), a former deputy director of China’s broadcast regulator, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, and vice minister in the Central Propaganda Department.
According to The Paper, a publication based in Shanghai, the decision to appoint Shen as head of CCTV was announced today at a network leadership meeting (领导干部会议) attended by officials from the Organization Department of the CCP and by senior propaganda department leaders.

Coverage of the appointment of Shen Haixiong as head of CCTV is missing at The Paper, a Shanghai-based online publication.
While the report from The Paper was quickly pulled, yielding a message that said it had “already gone offline,” a report citing The Paper was still carried on the website of The Beijing News as of 7PM Beijing time. That report highlighted Shen’s 26 years in various posts at Xinhua News Agency, including “senior reporter” and editor-in-chief, after which time he was sent to Guangdong to become a member of the provincial Party committee and minister of propaganda — finally serving in October last year as a delegate to the 19th National Congress of the CCP.
So far little information is available about the reasons for the change at the top of CCTV, and news of the move is apparently being suppressed by some outlets while remaining on others. Coverage at The Paper remains offline, and a post made earlier today at Sina.com now yields a “Page Not Found” notice. One of the earlier sources for the story as reported by Hong Kong media was a post to the official WeChat account of News Frontline, a media-related publication associated with the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper. But posts on Weibo seem to be automatically resulting in deletions, as in the case of the following two posts:

1. 
Guangdong Party Committee member and propaganda minister Shen Haixiong is appointed director of China Central Television
2018-02-02 15:32:32 | 广东省委常委、宣传部长慎海雄，担任中央电视台台长。 ​
2.
[Major personnel changes at CCTV: Shen Haixiong to Serve as Director] Today (February 2) in the afternoon, CCTV held a leadership meeting, with Organization Department and Central Propaganda Department leaders participating. At the meeting it was announced that Shen Haixiong was to serve as director of China Central Television, becoming the 12th director since the network was founded, replacing Nie Chenxi. Shen Haixiong was previously a member of the Guangdong Party Committee and [provincial] minister of propaganda.
2018-02-02 15:19:09 | 【央视重大人事变动：慎海雄接任台长】 今天（2月2日）下午，中央电视台召开领导干部会议，中组部、中宣部领导参加。会上宣布，慎海雄就任中央电视台台长，成为央视建台以来的第12任台长，聂辰席卸任。慎海雄此前为广东省委常委、宣传部部长

A report from Caixin, based partly on the original post on the News Frontline WeChat account, noted that Shen Haixiong had taken the place in Guangdong left by the departure in August 2015 of Tuo Zhen (庹震), the official best known outside of China for the role he played in the Southern Weekly incident in January 2013 — including allegedly penning a New Year’s greeting that closely echoed Party ideology and drew the ire of staff at the respected newspaper. Tuo Zhen left Guangdong in 2015 to take up a new post as a deputy minister of the Central Propaganda Department.
“By coincidence,” Caixin wrote, “both of the provincial propaganda ministers serving consecutively, Tuo Zhen and Shen Haixiong, have been sent there from positions as deputy directors (副社长) of Xinhua News Agency, then been returned to Beijing to serve in the propaganda apparatus.”

Journalism Denied: How China Views the News

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In a report released this week, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC) released the results of its annual survey on conditions facing foreign journalists working in the country. The report, “Access Denied,” showed that 40 percent of the 117 respondents — from among a membership pool of 218 foreign correspondents — reported a deterioration of conditions during the previous year. Correspondents reported continuing, and in some cases worsening, harassment and intimidation by local authorities and state security, and 15 percent of respondents said they had faced difficulties in renewing their journalism visas.
In a statement accompanying the report, the FCCC said that the survey provided “strong evidence to suggest that, from an already very low baseline, reporting conditions are getting worse.”
Asked about the FCCC survey during a regular press conference on January 30, Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying was dismissive, saying that although she has “yet to see this so-called report,” she found the “accusations in this report very unreasonable.”
Hua then staged a survey of her own:

I would like to ask all of you some questions. How do you like your working environment in China? Has the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry, as the competent department in charge of foreign media organizations and journalists stationed in China, provided you with all necessary convenience and assistance for your coverage? If any of you believes that the FCCC has spoken your mind, or you find yourself approving the contents of this report, you may raise your hand and let me know. (No hand raised)
No one.
Then, you can tell the FCCC that foreign journalists present here today do not agree with its report’s conclusion, so it has in no way reflected the genuine opinion of almost 600 foreign journalists stationed in China. We will continue with our efforts to assist and facilitate foreign journalists’ report and coverage in China, as we always do. If you encounter any problem and difficulty in your work, feel free to contact us anytime.

Some asked on social media outside China why no foreign correspondents present had raised their hands. I think it’s important to point out that this was a formal press conference, where correspondents should be expected to raise their hands for questions, not for the purposes of pop opinion polls conducted by government representatives. In that sense, Hua’s ploy was irregular and improper.

In such a situation, it would be perfectly reasonable for foreign correspondents present to interpret Hua’s words not as an invitation for dialogue and mediation, but as a dismissal of the seriousness of the issues addressed in the FCCC report, and even as an act of further intimidation.
It goes without saying that the Chinese Communist Party has long had a tense and often combative relationship with the foreign press, and particularly with media from Western countries, which it habitually accuses of institutionalized bias. Chinese scholars and government officials have written reams about the predominance of “negative” news coverage about China in newspapers like the New York Times — and such research, usually leading to foregone confirmations of bias, are de rigueur in communication studies circles in China.
In the eyes of many Chinese, the Western media have been thoroughly discredited by their “negative” reporting on China. Perceptions are hardly helped by the fact that most Chinese cannot regularly access foreign media coverage, even if language is not an issue, and by the fact that China’s government regularly attacks foreign media coverage as false or overblown. Nuance is virtually impossible to come by. In a piece last month, an editor at China-US Focus, a research website linked to the China-United States Exchange Foundation launched by former Hong Kong chief executive Tung Chee Hwa, closed a discussion of supposed Western media bias by arguing that while negative coverage is inevitable if media are to fulfill their watchdog role, Chinese people “deserve to be portrayed not as imperial subjects, but as people with autonomy and initiative.”
In light of the FCCC report, and in the midst of ongoing frictions over fairness in reporting, it is crucial to remember that the Chinese Communist Party in fact rejects, in its official position on the media, the entire basis on which we might talk about things like fact, fairness, transparency or objectivity. For the Party, there is in fact no debate about what purpose the media service, or how. As Xi Jinping said back in 2016, the media must all be “surnamed Party,” which is to say that they must love, protect and serve the interests of the Party.
In the articulation of policy, there is the Party’s journalism and nothing else. Nothing, in any case, that can be admitted or accepted.
To understand once again — to remind ourselves — where the Party stands on this issue, we can turn to a very recent piece in the Party’s official Qiushi journal. In speaking the Party’s views, I believe the article will speak for itself.
 

Clearly Seeing the Base of the Western Concept of Journalism (看清西方新闻观的本质)
Qiushi 
January 27, 2018
By Wen Hua (闻华)
Concepts of journalism are the soul of news and public opinion work. To do a proper job of the Party’s news and public opinion work, we must take the Marxist View of Journalism (马克思主义新闻观) as our “fixed point” (定盘星), clearly recognizing and consciously resisting Western concepts of journalism, leading the masses of news and public opinion workers in becoming transmitters promoting the Party’s policies, recorders of the conditions of the times, promoters of social progress, and defenders of fairness and justice.
News and Public Opinion Are Manifestly Ideological in Nature
News and public opinion are important [forms of] ideology, and the business of journalism belongs to the superstructure [of governance]. News activities in any society are necessarily guided and limited by the political ideas that dominate in that society and by the political system, and there is no such thing as absolute freedom.
Any news report is subject to guidance, and what is reported, what is not reported, how something is reported, all of these expose positions, viewpoints and attitudes. Through reports on domestic and international events, journalism directly, fully and comprehensively reflects the complexities of changing social life. Objective facts do not have value traits, but journalism, in reporting the facts, must entail an assessment of those facts, and reflect differences in values. News reports all reveal the values and views of the reporter, whether through the gathering of information and its selection, or through commentary, headlines, photographs, layouts and even choice of fonts and font sizes, accompanying content and other means — so that as the audience receives the facts, they receive at the same time the ideas and viewpoints of the reporter.
Therefore, journalism is not just a reflection of an objective society, but rather is a conscious reflection of social life through a process of selection, extraction and processing of objective facts under the guidance of a definite ideological and value framework. Like other social sciences, such as politics, law, religion, the arts and philosophy, is an important form of social ideology (社会意识形态). Journalism, through its unique character of “using the facts to speak” (用事实说话), is always a kind of “invisible opinion” (无形的意见), having an imperceptible influence on its audience that cannot be supplanted by other forms of ideology. Before the annihilation of class (在阶级消灭之前), the ideologies articulated on a social and economic basis are all vested with class nature, and journalism is no different.
The Marxist View of Journalism openly admits the ideological nature of news and public opinion, and it emphasizes especially the Party nature of journalism, seeing publications as weapons of struggle (战斗武器) for the worker classes, and seeing the occupation of journalism (新闻事业) as part of the work of the Party, emphasizing the use of the news and public opinion to win over public sentiment, boost morale and create cohesiveness. Prioritizing the Party’s news and public opinion work is a fine tradition of our Party, and it is a magic weapon leading us constantly to victory. Just as General Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized, in the beacon-fire days of the revolution, through the years of the building of the nation, and through the surging times of reform, the Party’s news and public opinion work has been a powerful force in “rousing the multitudes of workers and peasants.”
In clear contrast to this, the Western capitalist concept of journalism denies the ideological nature of news and public opinion. But is this really true? Quite to the contrary, Western countries are actually very clear about the ideological nature of news and public opinion, and they are old hands at carrying out ideological infiltration. It’s not difficult to understand, then, why the most important hand for anti-China forces in westernizing and dividing China is ideological infiltration, confusing people’s ideas and undermining the common foundation on which the Party and the people unite in their struggle. This is the fiercest hand, and the most deceptive. From the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union to the instigated and schemed “color revolutions,” the manufacture of democratic calamities, thence to the constant smearing, defaming and demonizing of China, sparing no pains in attacking the leadership system of the Chinese Communist Party and our country’s socialist system, the Western media have always been the daring vanguard of ideological infiltration. Can this not cause us alarm? The undermining of a country, of a political regime, always begins in the ideological realm. Political unrest and regime change may happen overnight, but the transformation of ideas is a long process. If ideological defenses are broken, other defenses are difficult to hold.
Are the Western Media Truly Free and Neutral?
Western capitalism does its utmost to conceal the class nature, Party nature and orientation of journalism. It does its utmost to praise “objective reporting,” “political neutrality” and other such journalism values. It does its utmost to propagate the idea that the media are a “fourth estate,” the “uncrowned kings.” Well then, are the Western media truly as free and neutral as they proclaim themselves to be?
The Western media are controlled by capital, and their freedom is false. The Western news system is a so-called independent media system. Independent media refer to media owned by individuals, and here we can see the most vital aspect of the Western capitalist news system. Operating media requires spending money, and only with money can you operate media. Moreover, operating large media is something only big capitalists and big financial groups can do. America’s Wall Street Journal and Fox Broadcasting Group, Britain’s Times newspaper and other media belong to Murdoch’s News Corporation; America’s Sulzberger family controls the New York Times Company’s New York Times newspaper and the International Herald Tribune, while the Graham family has long held the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times was long held by the Chandler family; Britain’s Thompson family holds Reuters, one of the world’s four largest news agencies, while Britain’s Financial Times, the Economist magazine and Pearson Television Group, holder of Europe’s largest television distribution network, are all under the flag of the Pearson family. Britain’s Guardian newspaper has always been held by the Scott family; American’s NBC network was purchased by General Electric, the latter being controlled by Morgan Stanley, etc. Not only does it require money to operate media, but so-called “free reporting” is also inseparable from the support of money. Without money, news media can’t possible send journalists all over the world, and they cannot gather news and information welcomed by the market, so they can only purchase the news products provided by these big players, becoming their megaphones and amplifiers.
Clearly, the true holders of the independent media are not the ordinary people who comprise the 99% of Western society, but the major families, big enterprises and huge financial groups, the most powerful [forces] in Western society, which have been called the 1%. Capitalists, by investing in order to operate media, directly control media ownership, through the operation of news agencies they control media content, and through advertising they control the economic lifeline of the media. Media are ultimately the mouthpieces of capitalists and large financial groups, the spokespersons of capital. Lenin said it well: “In societies where the power of money is the foundation,” “it is impossible to have actual or true ‘freedom.'” Independent media can be free of the government, but cannot possibly be independent of capital; they can “freely” question politicians, criticize political parties, criticize the government, but they will not fundamentally question, criticize or oppose the capitalist bosses or the capitalist system. Who a media belongs to may change, but ten thousand changes don’t alter the fundamental fact that capital is absolutely in control.
Therefore, Western media are only tools by which various interest groups contest for power and interest, and what they reflect are the inclinations and positions of the interest groups they belong to — they cannot possibly be neutral. Independent media may “mildly criticize in order to help out” (小骂大帮忙), but as soon as it involves a topic touching on the basis of the capitalist system, reports and commentaries will tread lightly and turn the conversation to other issues. This is why in recent years the global financial crisis created by the avarice and excess of the big shots of Wall Street was never exposed or warned of in America, where we are told that “oversight is everywhere,” and spread its contagion across the world. This is why when the “Occupy Wall Street” movement directed blame on the deep-seated corruption of the capitalist system, the American mainstream media still held that this “had no news value” and turned a blind eye and a deaf ear, scarcely dealing with it at all. The “Occupy Wall Street” movement was a movement of the 99% against the 1%. The 1% the Occupy movement opposed are the very same monopoly capitalist enterprises that control the so-called independent media, and the media are their mouthpieces and tools — so how could they possibly do deep and sustained reporting [on Occupy]?
Quite the opposite situation happens if street protests or even violent terrorist actions happen in other places, especially those places with ideologies that differ from that of the West. Then the Western media will describe these as movements of “opposition” for “democracy,” “freedom” and “human rights” — sparing no space and wantonly adding color. In their reporting on the March 14 riots in Lhasa [in 2008], some Western media threw objectivity and truth to the back of their minds and entirely stood with the “government of Tibet in exile,” their reports full of lies and prejudice. In the same way, for the July 5 Xinjiang incident, which was clearly an orchestrated smash and burn operation marked by violence, some Western media confused black and white, twisting the truth and calling it a “peaceful demonstration” and “peaceful resistance,” even when they hadn’t reported on the ground or didn’t have sufficient evidence in hand. This is their so-called objectivity and neutrality.
The facts show that that the “neutrality” praised by the Western concept of journalism, and its trumpeting of an abstract and absolute “freedom of speech,” is only a way for capital to deceive the masses in order to achieve their commercial and political goals. It is a sham.
Adhering Throughout to the Marxist View of Journalism
The Party’s news and public opinion work is work of core importance. General Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized many times: “Properly doing news and public opinion work concerns our banner and our road, concerns the implementation of the Party’s theories, line and policies, concerns the smooth advancement of the various projects of the Party and the government, concerns the cohesion and united spirit of the people through the Party and the country, concerns the fate of the Party and the country.” It is from this height that we must come to recognize the Party’s news and public opinion work, fully adhering to the Marxist View of Journalism, and conscientiously resisting Western concepts of journalism.
We must firmly adhere to the principle of Party nature. The principle of Party nature is the fundamental principle of the Party’s news and public opinion work. Ideas are imperceptible, but the media that transmit and carry on ideas and positions are concrete. The media operated by the Party and the government are propaganda positions of the Party and government. They must be surnamed Party, must be grasped within the hands of the Party, and must become the mouthpieces of the Party and the people. [Media] must enhance their consciousness of falling in line (看齐意识), conscientiously following the Party’s central leadership, and conscientiously following the theories, lines and policies of the Party.
 

Rooting out gangs, and talk of gangs

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

On January 25, 2018, China’s Procurator-General, Cao Jianming, the country’s top prosecutor, announced a nationwide campaign against organized crime, and against those within the Party and government who cooperate with crime syndicates.
The campaign was spelled out in an official notice from the Central Office of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council called “Concerning the Carrying Out of a Special Action to Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil” (关于开展扫黑除恶专项行动的通知). The term “black and evil forces” (黑恶势力) refers in Chinese to organizations, such as crime syndicates and gangs, engaged in criminal activity. In the wake of Cao’s announcement, commentators quickly noted that the phrasing of this latest campaign seemed calculated to avoid association with the “strike black” campaign undertaken in Chongqing in 2010 by Bo Xilai, a princeling who had been seen as a potential rival to Xi Jinping before his dramatic downfall in 2012. This latest campaign by Xi, which seems in some sense modeled on Bo’s 2010 campaign, has come with official language that speaks not of “striking” but instead of “sweeping away black and eliminating evil,” saohei chu’e (扫黑除恶).
In his announcement, Cao said the campaign would be a “crushing tide” against organized and gang crime — but he seemed also to indicate that the campaign could broaden to “fight against acts of secession, infiltration, evil cults, and espionage to resolutely protect the state and political security.”
One key focus of the nationwide campaign seems to be corrupt grassroots-level officials — county, township and village — who cooperate with crime syndicates. In a piece over the weekend, the official Xinhua News Agency said the campaign targeted “organized crime and officials who hide criminal organizations.” Organized crime, said the Xinhua article, is “deeply interwoven with corruption,” and the campaign would deal with the “protective ‘umbrellas'” — meaning the Party and government officials — who sheltered gang activity.

A cartoon accompanying the deleted Weibo post by “Liu Yun PhD” shows a shovel rotting out a cluster of criminals, including a “village tyrant” and an “evil clan force,” huddling under an “umbrella of protection.”
Any serious campaign to deal with organized crime in China, and those who shelter it, would have to deal aggressively with widespread abuses at the village and township level. Criminal gangs and hired muscle are regularly involved, for example, in cases of demolition and land requisition. [See this recent Chinese report on a case in Guangdong province].
But try talking publicly on social media about village corruption and links to criminal gangs and you’ll probably find that you’ve stepped over an invisible red line.
On January 27, “Liu Yun PhD” (刘耘博士), a Weibo user from Hunan with more than 373,000 fans, made a post in relation to the new “sweep black” campaign that alleged corruption in the village of Luozhuang in Jiangsu province’s Donghai County.

[Why must the Central Party sweep black and remove evil? Look at these “village tyrants” and you’ll understand] (2018-01-26 Study Group) “Village tyrants” run amok in the Chinese countryside, evil forces that bully ordinary people and corrode political power at the grassroots level. And Gao Maoyi (高茂义), the Party branch secretary of Luozhuang Village (罗庄村), Wenquan Township (温泉镇), Donghai County (东海县), Jiangsu province, is a classic “village tyrant.” Luozhuang Village is a provincially-designated impoverished village, with no collective enterprises and no other mining or other resources, but in this village . . . .
【中央为什么要扫黑除恶？看了这些“村霸”你就懂了】（2018-01-26 学习小组） “村霸”，是横行中国乡里、欺压百姓，侵蚀中国基层政权的恶势力，而江苏省东海县温泉镇罗庄村党支部书记高茂义就是一名典型的“村霸”。 罗庄村是一个省级贫困村，村子里既无集体企业也无其他矿产资源，但就是这样的村还…全文： http://m.weibo.cn/3197077575/4200897321931903 ​

A link to a full post, perhaps a news article, about Luozhuang Village is now deleted, calling up an error page claiming the page was blocked out of privacy concerns.

The Weibo post by “Liu Yun PhD” was deleted from the platform just over an hour after first being posted.

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