Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
Speaking at the World Economic Forum’s 2014 Summer Davos in Tianjin three years ago, Lu Wei (鲁炜), the director of what was then China’s State Internet Information Office (SIIO) — and soon to become the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) — said proper controls must be built into the technical infrastructure of the internet in order to ensure global security. Lu, who was in fact talking about what China sees as necessary controls on information and public opinion, likened the process to considering basic passenger safety in the design of automobiles.
“The internet is like a car,” said Lu. “If it has no brakes, it doesn’t matter how fast the car is capable of traveling, once it gets on the highway you can imagine what the end result will be. And so, no matter how advanced, all cars must have brakes.”
In its latest regulation, released yesterday, the CAC, now the country’s most powerful information control body, directly under a central leading group chaired by President Xi Jinping, seems to be mandating brakes for any new internet information product or application — a requirement that could put the government in the room with product innovators.
Following on a series of regulations since the implementation of China’s Cybersecurity Law on June 1 this year that seek to enforce information controls along every aspect of internet service provision and consumption, the “Regulation on Security Assessment of New Technologies and New Applications for News and Information Services” now addresses the key phase of new technology adoption.
Although it is unclear exactly what the enforcement process will look like, the import of the regulation seems to be that any new technology-based information product — of a “public opinion character” (新闻舆论属性), say the regulations — or any key adjustment to such an existing product, must go through a process of “security assessment.”
“Security” clearly refers, in this context, to the state’s maintaining of regime stability through restrictive information policies, and does not address the issue of personal data or other forms of security. In its official announcement of the regulation, the CAC wrote that “direct broadcasting and other new technologies and new applications have been used by certain lawbreakers (不法分子) to disseminate illegal information, and carry out illegal activities online.” Information service providers, said the announcement, had had “a poor sense of responsibility over security,” and this had “impacted the creation of a healthy and orderly online news and information broadcast ecology.”
The new regulation suggests that any technology company introducing products broadly construed as “new technologies or new applications for internet news and information services” (互联网新闻信息服务新技术新应用), which would include new or changing product functions, will need to undergo a security assessment before the product is released. The CAC will have overarching responsibility for the assessment process, according to the regulations, and will ensure that “full and comprehensive information security management systems and safe and controllable technical protection measures are in place” so that content prohibited by the law is not disseminated.
As the Global Times reported, “The security assessment will examine the risk level of new technology and application for their ability to shape public opinion and social mobilization.”
It’s hard to say yet what this will look like in practice, but it certainly sounds like the CAC will be intimately involved in the process of internet innovation from the ground up, assessing the political implications of new products, and alterations of existing ones, before they are introduced.
A Q&A with a CAC official, released shortly after the regulations, said that firms would be responsible for conducting their own internal security assessments, which would then be reported to the authorities, meaning the CAC, for an official assessment phase.
QUESTION: What specific demands are made by the Regulation in terms of service providers upholding their responsibility for implementing security assessments on new technologies and new applications? ANSWER: The Regulation makes clear stipulations on service providers’ responsibility for security assessments. First, is the full and comprehensive building of a security assessment management system for new technologies and new applications, strengthening the building of personnel teams. Second, is the carrying out of security assessments on new technologies and new applications in accord with the law. When service providers employ new technologies, or make adjustments to already implemented technologies or applications that have a news and public opinion character (新闻舆论属性) or social mobilization function (社会动员能力), or major changes are made to such technologies, they must carry out security self-assessments (安全自评估). Within 10 days of the completion of security self-assessments, a report must be made to responsible units, which will conduct a security assessment. Third, they must cooperate as necessary with the security assessments of responsible units, and fully implement improvements in a timely manner.
The implication here is that the CAC will coordinate closely with technology companies to ensure that they have properly planned for any foreseeable impact on information and public opinion.
Also of note is a second regulation released by the CAC yesterday, which tightens discipline and training of information and content monitors at service providers, mandating that they properly “adhere to the political line and guidance of public opinion,” the latter being synonymous with the Party’s propaganda controls to maintain regime stability.
As media across China today reported the close of the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the political event at which President Xi Jinping spoke of the glorious future of a “modern socialist nation,” the country’s Party-run newspapers seemed to careen into the past. With a visual prominence redolent of the pre-reform era, when Mao Zedong had unchallenged dominance on the front pages, today’s papers featured a large, airbrushed portrait of President Xi.
Here, for example, is the front page of the People’s Daily, the official propaganda organ of the CCP, where the visual representation of Xi’s power and centrality is absolutely unmistakable.
The bright red headline running vertically along the left-hand side reads: “Comrade Xi Jinping’s Leads Conference and Delivers Important Speech.” The slightly larger red headlines convey the more crucial fact that Xi Jinping serves as General Secretary of the CCP and as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The bit to the right of the masthead is a report about U.S. President Donald Trump’s congratulatory phone call to Xi Jinping, suggesting Trump congratulated Xi on “the successful closure of the 19th congress.”
At Party-run newspapers across China today, the front pages were not virtually, but actually, identical. Here are the front pages of Beijing Daily, the official Party propaganda organ of the municipal Party committee, and Liberation Daily, the official Party paper in the city of Shanghai.
Interestingly, there were just a few exceptions to today’s across-the-board identical layouts. Below is the front page of Nanfang Daily, the official Party organ of Guangdong province, which has traditionally been known for its slightly more adventurous media — the likes of Southern Weekly and Southern Metropolis Daily.
Media in the south have been quite effectively brought to heel under Xi Jinping since 2013 (and the staff walkout at Southern Weekly), but it’s interesting to see Nanfang Daily, which has long been one of the most commercialized of the provincial-level Party papers, going with a more human image of Xi Jinping on its front page.
This Xi Jinping seems friendlier and more contemporary, not at all like a leader plucked out of China’s Maoist past.
The headlines are slightly reconfigured as well. The largest headline here is about Xi Jinping’s appointment as general secretary, which is split off from the reference to his position as head of the Central Military Commission. That comes further down at the bottom, just above the image.
Below the image of Xi is a second set of headlines, these dealing with the content of Xi’s address at the press conference closing the 19th congress. The large headline reads: “A New Era Needs a New Atmosphere and Actions.” This being, as the smaller headline just above tells us, something that Xi “emphasized” when meeting with journalists.
Generally, commercial newspapers in provinces and major cities — those spin-offs of Party papers that rely on advertising and circulation to survive — went with the Nanfang Daily-style treatment of the news story (and the only news story) that is Xi. Here, side by side, are Hunan Daily, the official Party paper in Hunan province, and its commercial spin-off, Sanxiang City Express (三湘都市报).
What do these different treatments tell us? Most likely, that the most important audience for the retro-Maoist treatment of General Secretary Xi Jinping are the hordes of CCP members who are most likely to be picking up copies of the People’s Daily and the provincial Party dailies.
The rest of China — those who pick up copies of Sanxiang City Express or other tabloids at the newsstand to browse the lifestyle section — they can continue to see Xi in a warmer light.
When you are the leader of a political party that has unchallenged rule over a powerful authoritarian state, it’s your prerogative, for better or worse, to decide what is and isn’t history. On day three of the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, we can read just about everywhere in China’s official state media about how President Xi Jinping’s report and its boldly articulated ideas have brought us to a pivotal moment in history.
Just listen to this writer, Xiao Yu (晓夕), in a commentary run prominently at People’s Daily Online. Xiao seems on the verge of sublimating — and this is just the opening paragraph:
On October 18, 2017, a day that will be fixed and forever remembered in history, the entire Party and the entire nation held their breath in rapt attention, hanging on every word of the 19th report read by General Secretary Xi Jinping. The China Path and China Solution, as contributions to the journey of human civilization toward modernization — Xi Jinping’s Thought on New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics, for the first time came concretely and comprehensively into the world, appearing distinctly.
We might have a good chuckle at Xiao’s expense. But beyond the obvious sycophancy we should hear something else in this commentary bearing the gasping title, “Striding Forward Under the Guidance of Xi Jinping’s Thought on New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics.” (That, by the way, is one of a growing number of headlines these past two days using Xi Jinping’s new banner term, or qizhiyu (旗帜语), which I’ve bolded.)
A guiding “thought” attached to the name of a top Chinese leader is something we have not seen since the days of Mao Zedong. Note this propaganda poster from the 1960s, which bears the slogan: “Advance Courageously Under the Guidance of the Red Flag of Mao Zedong Thought” (在毛泽东思想红旗指引下, 奋勇前进). Source: Thomas Fischer, Flickr.com.
What we should hear, and what we should consider very seriously, is the fact that Xi Jinping’s banner term, the phrase meant to be the quintessence of his governing vision, is marching out into the world.
This is something quite noteworthy if we look back on the history of banner terms emerging from other Chinese leaders in the reform era. None of these — not “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” not Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents,” nor Hu Jintao’s “Scientific View of Development” — was ever presented so manifestly, or at all, as a vision for not just China but for the entire world.
The banner of “Xi Jinping Thought” (and that is almost surely what his phrase will become in short order, bespeaking Mao-like power) is marching out into the world. And all of us, we are told, huddled in our underdeveloped nations or our failing democracies, should flock to the Chinese standard, under which Xi Jinping offers a steady hand.
“Humanity is entering a new era,” writes the author of the People’s Daily Online commentary, “in which technologies constantly emerge, in which challenges constantly pile up, in which there is unequal development among nations, and in which regional confrontation grows ever more severe.”
At such a moment in history, the appearance of Xi Jinping’s solution, dubbed often as the “China Solution,” is an “event of milestone importance” (to continue with the writer’s unguent language). There is the sense that China has, at last, stood up, and even perhaps transcended its sense of victimhood. But the victories, of course, are not Xi’s alone. The writer persists:
This political party which has been called “the most innovative team in history” (史上最强创业团队), in this eastern nation that for more than a century was poor and weak, has brought changes for 1.3 billion people that make the heart leap, earth-shattering changes . . . As everyone everywhere listened to this report, they quietly became participants, observers, witnesses, and even more beneficiaries, of this major historical turning point.
Why, the writer asks, does Xi Jinping’s Thought on New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics merit the attention of the world? Because the “rich and great deeds of the past five years have demonstrated that this thought [of Xi Jinping’s] is ‘reliable,’ effective, and full of boundless potential.”
China’s annual GDP growth rate of 7.2 percent during the 2013-2016 period, argues Xiao, contributed roughly 30 percent of the global economy (对世界经济平均贡献率达到30%). Moreover, through its “courage and intelligence,” the Chinese Communist Party has resolved many old problems such as corruption, its “striking both tigers and flies” strategy offering “a new proverb and a new plan.” The CCP, in short, has figured it out — though one should take a long moment to ponder what exactly it might look like if countries with rule of law, or without, resort to the “tigers and flies” plan.
None of this is very new in one sense. Scholars like Daniel Bell have argued the merits of The China Model for years, and plenty of scholars, pundits and politicians have essentially defended Xiao’s fawning idea that the CCP is “the most innovative team in history.”
But these ideas are now codified at the very top in the banner term for the most powerful CCP leader in three generations. So I suggest we pause from our adulation, pull away from Tencent’s “Clap for Xi Jinping” app, and keep our wits about us. This is going to be a long ride.
As anyone might have guessed, the front page of today’s People’s Daily is dominated by the story of Xi Jinping’s political report yesterday to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The page is a riot of red headlines.
The front page of the October 19, 2017, edition of the People’s Daily.
The largest headline reads: “19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Opens in Beijing.” Immediately below: “Xi Jinping Represents the 18th Central Committee in Making a Report to the Congress.”
The smaller, non-bolded headline above the main headline is one of the key messages of Xi Jinping’s report: “Obtaining Victory in the Building of a Moderately Well-Off Society; Seizing Great Victories in New Era Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利). The bolded phrase above is a portion of Xi Jinping’s new “banner term,” or qizhiyu (旗帜语), missing only the word “thought” (思想). We have identified Xi’s full “banner term” as The Thought of New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics (新时代中国特色社会主义思想).We can expect to see this phrase — or perhaps eventually a shortened crowning form, “Xi Jinping Thought” — quite regularly in the People’s Daily in the future.
Xi Jinping’s new banner term, “The Thought of New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics,” appears on an image at the top of an article by Xinhua News Agency yesterday.
If you have any lingering doubts about the integrity of this phrase, or its importance, you need only follow the explications of it in the state media. This article on the Xinhua News Agency website yesterday bears the headline: “These 8 Things Are Clear in The Thought of New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics.” So this report, like quite a number of others, uses Xi Jinping’s banner term in the headline, then proceeds to explicate it.
But notice the visuals in the Xinhua article too. At the top is a deep red image, the Great Hall of the People in the background, with the golden characters: “The Thought of New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics.”
Continuing with today’s People’s Daily, the smaller subheads below the main headline read: “Xi Jinping points out that through a long period of struggle, socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era. This is a new historical direction our country’s development.” Again, this sets up Xi Jinping’s banner term. The idea is that we have witnessed the end of one era, spanning Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and we are now on to the next era.
In many places online now, including at the top of People’s Daily Online, you can also see the three characters meaning “New Era” (新时代), which will almost surely become shorthand in many cases for Xi’s banner term. The next section of the subheads contains this bit, again about historical continuity of ideas, with an emphasis on the new: “The thought of new era socialism with Chinese characteristics clearly adheres to and develops socialism with Chinese characteristics, and its principal task is to realize socialist modernization and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.”
In that last quote, I left off a bit on the end about the building of a “powerful nation of modernized socialism” (社会主义现代化强国). But of course that’s important as well, and there is strong suggestion in Xi’s political report that China’s particular brand of governance, which is sometimes now called the “China Solution” (中国方案), or “China Plan,” is a model for countries around the world.
The top of today’s People’s Daily Online, the official website of the official CCP newspaper, with bright golden characters at the top reading “New Era,” and a quick-scan QR code link to the text of Xi’s political report.
Of course, we can’t forget the bit of text next to the masthead in the People’s Daily. That, as it clearly states, is the theme of the congress: “Not neglecting our original intent (不忘初心), steadfastly bearing in mind our mission (牢记使命), raising the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, decisively achieving a comprehensively well-off society, seizing the great victory of new era socialism with Chinese characteristics (夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利), struggling tirelessly to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.”
A single page in the People’s Daily more or less says it all. Though as we have said, we will be unpacking this document for many, many weeks.
Building on yesterday’s reading of Xi Jinping’s political report to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, we can add the following observations. We will continue to update our readers as we note points of significance in the hefty document:
4. The tifa, [the Party must] “act within the scope of the law” (在宪法法律范围内活动) has vanished from the political report.
This phrase was first introduced at the 12th congress in 1982, right at the outset of the reform period. It was again in use at the 13th congress. At the 15th congress in 1997, it was, “The Party led the people in creating the constitution and the law, and acts within the scope of the constitution and the law.” At the 17th congress in 2007, at the midway point in Hu Jintao’s tenure, the relevant phrase was, “Party organizations and all Party members must act of their own accord within the scope of the constitution and the law” (各级党组织和全体党员要自觉在宪法和法律范围内活动). Finally, at the 18th congress in 2012, as Hu Jintao passed the reins to Xi Jinping, the phrase became: “The Party led the people in creating the constitution and the law, and the Party must act within the scope of the constitution and the law” ( 党领导人民制定宪法和法律，党必须在宪法和法律范围内活动).
All forms of this tifa have disappeared from the political report to the 19th Party Congress. In place of the phrase we find another: “No organization or individual is permitted special privileges to exceed the constitution or the law” (任何组织和个人都不得有超越宪法法律的特权).
It shouldn’t take an expert to realize that the removal of “the Party” entirely from this phrase is a significant change, lessening the sense that the Party is restrained by legal frameworks.
5. We see the appearance of a Mao-era phrase, “Party, government, army, society and education — east and west, south and north, the Party leads all” (党政军民学，东西南北中，党是领导一切的).
At the 10th congress in 1973, in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, the political report included this phrase: “[We] must further strengthen the Party’s unified leadership. Party, government, army, society and education — east and west, south and north, the Party leads all” (要进一步加强党的一元化领导。工、农、商、学、兵、政、党这七个方面，党是领导一切的). During the Cultural Revolution, this phrase appeared constantly in the media, which of course were dominated by Mao Zedong.
In the 19th congress report, we see the reemergence of this phrase, and alongside it we see the frequent occurrence of the phrase “the Party’s leadership” (党的领导), which appears 16 times.
Occurrence of the term “the Party’s leadership” in political reports through history.
6. We see the phrases “Mao Zedong Thought” (毛泽东思想) and the “Four Basic Principles” (四项基本原则) dropping to new low points.
In Xi Jinping’s political report, “Mao Zedong Thought” appears just twice, and the “Four Basic Principles” appears once. This is the lowest point ever for both terms, as you can see in the graphs below.
“Mao Zedong Thought” in political reports through history. The “Four Basic Principles” in political reports through history.
Xi Jinping’s political report today to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was a long and drawn-out affair. There is a great deal of discourse to grapple with. But this is our initial take on some of the key points. 1.Xi Jinping’s “banner term,” the phrase that is meant to seal his legacy, is: “The Thought of New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” (新时代中国特色社会主义思想). The history of what has been called “Deng San Ke” (邓三科), or the nod in key CCP political documents to “Deng Xiaoping,” the “Three Represents” (Jiang Zemin) and the “Scientific View of Development” (Hu Jintao), is also now apparently finished.
Since the 14th National Congress of the CCP in 1992, the opening of every political report — when it is declared at the outset what the main theme of the congress will be — makes mention of key banner terms and guiding thought (指导思想). At the 14th National Congress it was “Deng Xiaoping’s Thought of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (邓小平建设中国特色社会主义思想). At the 15th National Congress in 1997, it was “Deng Xiaoping Theory” (邓小平理论). At the 16th National Congress in 2002, it was “Deng Xiaoping Theory” and “The Important Thought of the Three Represents” (三个代表重要思想). At the 17th and 18th congresses, the “Scientific View of Development” was mentioned after mention of “Deng” and “San” — that is, after “Deng Xiaoping Theory and the “Three Represents.”
But with the 19th Congress today we see that the above chain of official terminologies, or tifa (提法), has been broken. Xi Jinping said today: “The theme of the congress is: not neglecting our original intent (不忘初心), steadfastly bearing in mind our mission (牢记使命), raising the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, decisively achieving a comprehensively well-off society, seizing the great victory of new era socialism with Chinese characteristics (夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利), struggling tirelessly to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.”
Xi Jinping did not say that the conference would be guided by the “Deng San Ke” — by the ideas of his predecessors. In his report, he twice mentioned Marxism-Leninism and “Deng San Ke.” However, in the first case, this was to say that the Party, led by Marxism-Leninism and the “Deng San Ke,” had now “carried out arduous theoretical exploration, obtaining major new theoretical results for the emergence of The Thought of New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics.” In the second case, Xi said that, “The Thought of New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Important Thought of the Three Represents and the Scientific View of Development, a new achievement in the sinicization of Marxism, a crystallization of the collective knowledge and experiences of the Party and the people, an integral part of the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, a compass for the whole Party and whole people in achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, and it must receive long-term support and constant development.”
That is a mouthful. But the important thing to recognize here is that the “Deng San Ke” is resolutely in the past. By contrast, “The Thought of New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” is the here and now.
This new tifa, or official discourse phrase, was actually conveyed in slightly different language when other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Zhang Dejiang (张德江) and Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声), visited the various regional delegations. The phrase as it was used then was: “Xi Jinping’s Thought of New Era Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想). Readers who in the past read our speculations about whether Xi Jinping would be “crowned” with his new banner term will remark the significance of this. Xi Jinping has, it seems, been crowned — but not yet as openly as he might be. In fact, it is very possible that in the future (how near we cannot say) this lengthy banner term will be shortened to “Xi Jinping Thought” (习近平思想), putting this general secretary on a level with Mao Zedong. 2. The phrase “political system reforms” (政治体制改革) has disappeared entirely from the section titles within the text of the political report.
From the 13th to the 16th reports, “political system reforms” did make the section titles, signifying a higher level of importance to the idea that the political reform should be an issue of priority. In the report to the 17th congress, the phrase disappeared from the section titles, but at the 18th congress it re-emerged. So here, once again, we discover that the phrase is gone.
Graph of number of occurrences of the term “political system reforms” in the past political reports, beginning with the 12th Party Congress.
The title of the sixth section of the political report to the 19th congress is “Fully Building a System of the People Serving as Their Own Masters, Developing Socialist Democratic Politics” (健全人民当家作主制度体系，发展社会主义民主政治). The phrase “political system reform” appears just once in the entire political report today, the lowest level ever if we count from the 13th congress in 1987. 3. In this report, we see no sign whatsoever of “ruling the country in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政).
These two phrases were raised by Xi Jinping in the first months of his leadership, and were regarded by some as signs that he harbored more liberal plans for political reform. In his speech commemorating the anniversary of China’s constitution on December 4, 2012, Xi Jinping used both phrases together: “Ruling the country in accord with the law first means ruling the country in accord with the constitution; the crux of governing in accord with the constitution is governing in accord with the constitution (依法治国首先是依宪治国，依宪执政关键是依宪执政). In 2014, publishing a collection of Xi Jinping’s important speeches in 2014, the Central Propaganda Department excised the constitution speech, a possible sign of ideological hardening. In September that year, Xi Jinping again used the phrases when commemorating the 60th anniversary of the formation of the National People’s Congress, but the phrases have rarely been used over the past two years. They now seem to be fading far into the past.
Xi Jinping’s first political report, delivered today at the opening of the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, is a monster that must be carefully dissected through many painful hours of reading — turning it constantly against the mirror of political reports past. So we do not presume to offer a reading here.
But we can point to a few aspects and look at how the congress is being reported through Chinese media, which on this story are naturally dominated by official state media.
The October 18, 2017, edition of the CCP’s official People’s Daily, with an image from the “preparation conference” of the 19th Party Congress the previous day, and a list of delegates.
A number of the initial media reports, like this one from Caixin (which is basically Xinhua, as we can expect of most “reporting”), focus on Xi Jinping’s statements about the “Two Centenary Goals” as a key point of significance. Basically, this is the idea that China is heading into a phase in which it can anticipate, and “struggle” toward, the full creation of a “moderately well-off society” (the first goal), and at the same time push actively and confidently (Xi has spoken of “Four Confidences”) toward the creation of a fully modernized socialist nation (the second goal).
Xi’s report essentially suggests at the 16th, 17th and 18th national congresses of the CCP have focussed on the first of these goals, while the 19th congress and the 20th will focus primarily on the latter (while consolidating the former). Xi Jinping calls this the “new journey toward the building of a comprehensively modernized socialist nation” (全面建设社会主义现代化国家新征程).
So the 15-year period from 2010 to 2035 will be devoted, we are told, to the project of building this “modernized socialist nation.” What is that, you ask? Well, the answer to that question is of course extremely complicated — seeing as it is fundamentally about reading Chinese politics, the business many of us are always imperfectly on about. But part of the answer will be about reading Xi’s political report and the media coverage around it over the next weeks and months. And we do of course know that the “modernized socialist nation” is about the power and prestige of the Party and its governance system, and about China’s place in the world (security, cybersecurity, etc.).
That is very unsatisfying, I know. But let’s be honest enough not to pretend there are easy answers here.
Turning to today’s People’s Daily, the front page news is about yesterday’s “preparation conference” for today’s big meeting. Think of it as coverage of the dress rehearsal. We can expect the political report to be highlighted in tomorrow’s edition. But there is one piece that is perhaps worth our attention today, which sets the tone and offers some hints about language and emphasis — and that is the lead commentary, or shelun (社论), which is highlighted on page one and run on page two, alongside a graphic treatment of all of the superb achievements the Party says it has made in the past 5 years.
This commentary, “Opening New Horizons in Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” (note the clear reference to the second “centenary goal”), also gets the prime spot today at the top of People’s Daily Online.
The commentary stinks of confidence. Does it stink more than usual? That is hard to say. But I found it particularly interesting that it argues that China’s achievements over the past 5 years have offered an example to be emulated by developing nations. At one point it says that “socialism with Chinese characteristics has expanded the path for developing nations in progressing toward modernization, gifting Chinese knowledge to humankind and offering China’s plan.”
The idea of “China’s Plan” (中国方案), which Xi Jinping introduced in July 2014 in a meeting with leaders from Central and South America, might be worth keeping an eye on. As newly prosperous China seeks, under these two overlapping “centenary goals,” to become globally influential China, maintaining and propagating what it sees as its native innovation of socialism — and “Chinese Marxism,” another interesting term in this commentary — will no doubt be central to the project. We might bear in mind the Xinhua commentary yesterday about the “doddering democracy” of the West, and Xi’s remarks today about the success of “socialist democracy.”
The People’s Daily commentary closes with the image of the “ship of great dreams,” which the Party guides bravely through the waves, on to brighter shores. This seems to be a widespread metaphor surrounding the congress, and there is even a short official video making the rounds called “Navigating the Ship” (领航), which might also be translated simply “Navigator,” referring to Xi Jinping himself. Xinhua wrote about the Party and Xi as navigators just a couple of days back, and this idea emerged too in July around Xi’s role as “navigator” of China’s military.
There may be more to this image than stilted Party poetry. Ships, after all, travel away from the shore and out into the wider world.
Our full translation of today’s lead commentary in the People’s Daily follows:
Opening New Horizons in Socialism With Chinese Characteristics (开辟中国特色社会主义新境界)
— Warmly Welcoming the Opening of the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party People’s Daily, October 18, 2017
The tapestry of history is always opened through grinding forward progress; the chapter of the age is always written in new struggles.
Today, the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party opens ceremoniously in Beijing. This congress is an extremely important congress opening at a critical phase in the comprehensive building of a moderately well-off society (小康社会) and in a key period in the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义). Our Party will raise a program of action that is overarching, strategic and forward-looking concerning what [ideological] banner we uphold, what path we take, what spiritual attitude we maintain, what historic mission we bear, and what goals we struggle toward. The success of this conference concerns the past and future business of the Party and the government, concerns the fate of socialism with Chinese characteristics, concerns the fundamental interests of the broad masses of the people — and it has major political, theoretical and practical import for the victory of the comprehensive building of a moderately well-off society, winning great victories for socialism with Chinese characteristics and realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.
“The yearning for a good life, that is the goal toward which we struggle.” Looking back on a five years past that were anything but ordinary, the Central Committee of the CCP with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core (习近平同志为核心的党中央), and with great political courage and a fierce sense of responsibility, carried out great struggles with many new historical characteristics, facing challenges head on as they climbed, breaking new ground in pushing forward the agenda, discarding old ways and introducing new. [The Party] advanced the overall plan of the “Five In One” (五位一体) [NOTE: this term from the 19th Congress refers to: 1. economic development; 2. political development; 3. cultural development; 4. social development; and environmental development], coordinating with the advancement of the strategic arrangement of the “Four Comprehensives” (四个全面), achieving along with the people a clear raising of national economic strength, technological strength, national defense strength, comprehensive national power (综合国力) and international influence. On the foundation of the advancements made since the founding of the new China, and particularly since the commencement of economic reform and opening, [the Party has] advanced socialism with Chinese characteristics to a new phase of development. The achievements of the past 5 years are omni-directional [comprehensive] and innovative (开创性的). The changes of the past 5 years are deep and fundamental in nature. These historic achievements and historic changes mark the fact that our country now stands at a new historical juncture, and they have deep and major significance for the business of our Party and the state.
The leadership of the Party is the most fundamental character of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and it is the greatest advantage of the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In the past 5 years, opening and reform and the construction of socialist modernization (社会主义现代化) have made historic achievements, and socialism with Chinese characteristics has achieved new brilliance and vitality most fundamentally because of the firm leadership of the Chinese Communist Party with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core. In the grinding advance of the past 5 years, the ingenuity, cohesion, fighting strength, leadership strength and rallying power of the Party has risen constantly, and its core leadership role in maintaining overall control and coordinating various aspects [of governance] has been fully at play — and this is the fundamental reason we have made deeply significant achievements, progress and development. Of particular importance has been the spirit of the series of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speeches (习近平总书记系列重要讲话精神) and his new concepts, thoughts and strategies on the governance of the nation (治国理政新理念新思想新战略). [These] have raised to a new level our Party’s principles for holding power (执政规律), principles for building socialism (社会主义建设规律), and principles for developing human society (人类社会发展规律), and they constitute a full and scientific theoretical system (科学完整的思想理论体系) — amounting to the newest fruits of the sinicization of Marxism (马克思主义中国化), and opening up new horizons for the development of contemporary Chinese Marxism (当代中国马克思主义).
The question of [development] path is an arch question that concerns the success or failure of the Party’s work; path determines destiny, and path is the life of the Party. It is by cleaving to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics that the Chinese people have, through long struggle, achieved the historic leap of standing up, then becoming prosperous and finally becoming powerful. In the grinding advance of the past 5 years, socialism with Chinese characteristics has achieved new brilliance and vitality and opened constant new horizons in its development, and socialism with Chinese characteristics has expanded the path for developing nations in progressing toward modernization, gifting Chinese knowledge to humankind and offering China’s plan (中国方案) [NOTE: This is a concept Xi Jinping apparently first raised in a meeting with leaders from South and Central America in July 2014].
At this new historical juncture,in an era of rapid transformation, if our Party wishes to win the [advantage] of initiative and to make new victories in the great struggle, [we] must be ever firm in the “Four Confidences” (四个自信) [NOTE: This is: confidence in [the Party’s] path; confidence in [the Party’s] theory; confidence in the system; and confidence in [Chinese] culture], firmly grasping the characteristics of our country’s development phase, firmly grasping the yearning of the people for beautiful lives. We look forward to this congress, with a broad and far-seeing vision, considering and grasping a series of major challenges facing the future development of our country, [and look forward to it] opening new theoretical horizons, taking new practical steps, leading the whole of the Party and the various peoples of the nation to a new attitude of striving, carrying out the great struggle, building great projects, advancing great deeds, achieving great dreams, steadily advancing socialism with Chinese characteristics.
All great achievements are the result of continued struggle, and all great tasks require moving forward as we build a bridge between the past and the future. Today, we are closer to achieving our goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people than at any stage in our history, and we are more confident than at any period in history that this goal can be achieved.
[We must] realize the first centenary goal of winning a comprehensively well-off society, and for the second centenary goal, starting off on the journey toward the building of a modernized socialism nation, our great Party will move ahead, not veering from our original intentions (不忘初心再出发), bravely bearing this heavy responsibility, guiding the ship of the Chinese peoples great dream through the waves, toward even brighter shores.
We wish the congress full success!
From the outset of his first term as general secretary in late 2012, state media in China made much of Xi Jinping’s down-to-earth style. The new leader, we were told, had demanded less jargon of his fellow officials, and had poo-pooed public speeches burdened with boilerplate.
The China Daily, published by the Information Office of the State Council, ran a related piece under a headline that was almost brusque by official standards: “Plain Talk and People First Style.” But that headline, too, bent awkwardly under the weight of the Party’s stiff and colorless discourse — as though state media and the system they reflected lacked even the vocabulary to talk about plainness.
In any case, the demand to talk straight tangled very quickly with tightening internal Party discipline. Party officials were instructed to fall in line, and to avoid “improper discussion of [the policies] of the central Party,” or wangyi zhongyang (妄议中央). With officials big and small, the tigers and the flies, falling under the roving eye of Wang Qishan and his powerful anti-corruption investigators, it was absurd to suppose now was the time for anyone to ad-lib or be candid.
Like M.C. Escher’s ants, there’s no getting off the self-referential strand of CCP discourse. Source: cea+, posted to Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.
Any observer of China with a working knowledge of the country’s political culture should understand that talk of plain talk is just another way to make official talk. Straight talk, in Chinese politics, is always meta-straight talk. Strive as it might to escape its own twisted self-referentiality, Party language is held back by the necessity of its roots in the power of the Party-state. It would take a true political outsider to speak a plainer political tongue — and it’s no secret at all that the CCP does not take kindly to political outsiders.
Xi Jinping’s supposed plainness was only ever a luxury to be enjoyed by a leader who had managed to cement his power to an unprecedented degree.
Let us not forget that the most important measure we will have of Xi Jinping when the 19th National Congress of the CCP is held in less than two week’s time will not be what is plainspoken on the sidelines — (there are no sidelines) — but how the Xi-era discourse is hard-stamped into the political report, and precisely what imprecise terminology becomes enshrined in the Party’s charter in order to form Xi’s legacy.
Speculation is rife over what Xi Jinping’s “banner term,” or chief political slogan, will be. He certainly cannot be given his own “-ism,” something only Marx has ever been allowed in Chinese. And he might not achieve his own “thought,” which would set him on equal historical footing with Mao Zedong. But he could very well get his own “Xi Jinping Theory,” bringing him right up alongside Deng Xiaoping. Or he might be “crowned” (his name used) with something fresh, like “the Xi Jinping Concept.”
From the outside, this discourse game seems plainly absurd. But its supreme importance tells us a great deal about the workings of Chinese politics, in which language is a complex chess game marshalling pieces of discourse that go in and out of vogue across the playing board of history.
Despite a professed distaste for embellished political language, Xi Jinping will no doubt become the most embellished Communist Party leader of the reform era. His status has already been elevated substantially in the Party discourse, a clear reflection of his consolidation of power. At the 6th Plenum of the 18th National Congress one year ago, he was designated “the core” (习核心), something neither of his predecessors in the post-Deng era managed.
In the coming weeks, as China’s game of lingua-politics enters its phase of greatest intensity, it will be a great time for all China observers to remark and explore its obscure language rituals — including the state manufacture of “plainness.”
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On a related note, about the interesting ways the political system in China is designed to perpetuate and amplify the Party’s discourse, I thought I would also share a partial translation of a recent interview with Li Changping, an official at the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. The “interview,” done by the commission itself to promote its own work ahead of the 19th National Congress, is an excellent example of how even the act of explanation/clarification of policies and programs must generate yet more formalistic language. If I were to give my own title to this official post, I would call it: “How Not to Conduct an Interview.”
Reporter: Hello! For the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, what is the status of ideological work within the context of overall work? How does the Ethnic Affairs Commission grasp and implement ideological work? Li Changping: General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out that ideological work concerns the fate and future of the Party, and the long-term peace and stability [of the government], that it concerns the cohesiveness of our ethnic groups, and that it is a task of first-level importance in the work of the Party. Only by considering the general situation, grasping the overall trends, focussing on the major matters, accurately finding the entry points and points to focus energy, planning in line with conditions, and accommodating conditions, can we effectively uphold our responsibility to revolve around the central Party leadership as we serve the general situation.
Owing to the ubiquitous, long-term, complex, international and important nature of ethnic issues, this means ethnic issues are an important part of ideological work. Since the Party’s 18th National Congress, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission has placed a high priority on ideological work, obtaining step-by-step results through strengthening of the Party’s leadership of ideological work, implementing a responsibility system for ideological work, and fully advancing the Party’s theories, directives and policies — greatly advancing new developments in ethnic unity. It can be said that the extent of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission’s attention to ideological work is such as we have never before seen! Specifically, this is happening in the following areas:
First, faced with new stage-by-stage characteristics in ethnic work, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission has clarified the priorities of ideological work, upholding and improving the degree of autonomy in ethnic regions, upholding the joint and united struggle of ethnic groups and their common prosperity and development, upholding, consolidating and developing the equality, unity, mutuality and harmony of socialist ethnic relations — resolutely, determinedly and with full effort serving the ethnic regions and minorities.
Second, facing the changing and developing nature of ethnic work, our focus will be on deepening propaganda and education work according to the new governance concepts, ideas and strategies of Comrade Xi jinping as the core, steadily firming up the leadership position of Marxism within the ideological field, firming up the common ideological foundations for mutual struggle by the whole Party and the whole people. . .
Third, . . . [We have spared readers this lengthy section] Reporter: The global system is undergoing profound change, and economic globalization has brought interaction, exchange and competition with different cultures that has grown ever more fierce; the comprehensive deepening of reform has entered a key strategic moment and deepwater point, social change has accelerated, interest patterns have shifted, psychological understandings, value concepts and social consciousness all now show many new characteristics, and tides of thought in society have shown many new trends. Lately, the people of all ethnic groups in China eagerly await the victorious opening of the 19th National Congress of the CCP, so how will the cultural propaganda units of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission further their ideological work and make a concrete show of force? Li Changping: . . . . [Well, we’ll spare you — supposing you get the point.]
This phone could be yours. The only price: your enthusiastic involvement in censorship of your fellow citizens. Photo by Julian Gong Min available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.
The ad offered performance bonuses for those who “effectively reported the most,” and even promised monthly “material rewards” including iPhones and tablets.
Free gear, in other words, for those young internet users who could demonstrate an aptitude and appetite for systematic snitching. And the iPhone, the device that perhaps more than any other symbolizes the idea of mobile empowerment, becomes a carrot inducing constraints on this very power.
The Weibo advertisement further illustrates the way internet censorship in China — increasingly the heart of censorship, period — has become an open and to some extent legitimised endeavor in recent years. Gone, it seems, are the days when media control thrived on secrecy, and the undocumented phone call from the propaganda official to the newspaper editor was the nature of the beast.
It’s difficult to gauge, in a closed information environment like China’s, how people actually feel about constraints on expression and information, but it does seem that the notion of “cybersecurity,” which points to real and personal threats to citizens everywhere in the world, has helped to mask the more insidious forms of political censorship designed to buttress the Party’s dominance over the whole society. Who, after all, doesn’t want to be safe?
Here, in any case, is a translation of the Weibo advertisement for “Weibo Supervisors,” followed by a translation of the text on the first 3 slides accompanying the post.
Weibo Manager
September 27, 12:05 from 360 Security Browser
[We seek] #Weibo Supervisors#
In order to implement our company’s responsibilities, strengthen netizen supervision, clean up the Weibo community environment and effectively handle indecent, illegal and harmful information. Under the leadership of the Beijing Municipal office of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Weibo has established a special community supervision mechanism, and we announce publicly to all users that we are seeking 1,000 Weibo Supervisors. Weibo Supervisors use a special reporting mechanism to report and handle indecent, illegal and harmful information, and the website issues online subsidies to licensed Weibo Supervisors on the basis of reporting statistics, and presents these [subsidies] to Weibo members. At the same time, we offer material rewards monthly to those Weibo Supervisors who have effectively reported the most [cases], with prizes including iPhones, domestically produced phones or tablets, etc. We invite all web users to actively register to participate as Weibo Supervisors. For registration methods and other relevant information please see the following: SUPERVISING AND CLEANING UP WEIBO TOGETHER
[Weibo Supervisor] 01 What is a Weibo Supervisor?
In order to implement our company’s responsibilities, strengthen netizen supervision, clean up the Weibo community environment and effectively handle indecent, illegal and harmful information. Under the leadership of the Beijing Municipal office of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Weibo has established a special community supervision mechanism, and we announce publicly to all users that we are seeking 1,000 Weibo Supervisors. Weibo Supervisors use a special reporting mechanism to report and handle indecent, illegal and harmful information, and the website issues online subsidies to licensed Weibo Supervisors on the basis of reporting statistics, and presents these [subsidies] to Weibo members. 02 What are the conditions?
A: Registration for at least one year [on Weibo]
B: A social creditworthiness score of at least 80%
C: A binding mobile phone number
We invite all who are willing and enthusiastic to take part in the management of the community, and those users who have experience monitoring to register as supervisors. 03 What is the Working Mechanism?
Weibo Supervisors use 业余时间 to conduct effect reporting against indecent, illegal and/or harmful information on Weibo on the condition of fairness and impartiality. [They must] take part in online trainings and offline events as organized by the site.
Knowing Deeply: Loving Keenly, a collection of Xi Jinping’s speeches and writings from the 1980s.
The idea of the “China story” as a coherent narrative reflecting the Party-state agenda, as a product of centrally conceived “soft power,” is not so new. The phrase appeared in the Party’s official People’s Daily as early as 2004, and a 2010 piece in the newspaper under the pen name “Guo Jiping” (国纪平), short for “important commentary on international affairs,” or you guanguoji de zhongyao pinglun (有关国际的重要评论), was adamant that “China’s story must become a world story.”
But what distinguishes Xi Jinping, or so we are told, from the wooden general secretaries of the recent past, is his gift and penchant for the telling of stories.
Following the release in June this year of Xi Jinping Tells A Story (习近平讲故事), a collection of stories and parables drawn from Xi’s public and private addresses, Yang Zhenwu (杨振武), the publisher of the People’s Daily, was dazzled by the profound messages Xi managed to get across through simple and relatable anecdotes:
Telling stories well has been a common characteristic of celebrated statesmen and thinkers in China and beyond since ancient times — and it is a clear characteristic of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s leadership style. Whether in his conference addresses, in conversation during his inspection tours, in his speeches during his overseas visits, or in his printed articles, he proves to be adept in using stories to convey deeper meanings and to move people. Woven through these stories is the tao (way) of Chinese history and culture, the tao of Chinese reform and development, the tao of Chinese participation in global governance. They convey the general secretary’s profound thoughts on internal and foreign affairs, on national security, on the governance of the Party, the nation and the military. They are concrete and vivid, relatable and profound, opening a window on the study of the spirit of [Xi’s] series of important speeches.
Xi has said repeatedly that “telling stories is the best form of international dissemination” when it comes to telegraphing China’s messages to the world. So how are Xi Jinping’s stories faring beyond the captive audience of his own state media, and those fellow statesmen whose job it is to be obsequious?
While the “going out” of Chinese media and Chinese publishing remains an important priority for officials, much of it now wrapped up in the idea of “One Belt, One Road,” there is little evidence that foreign audiences are buying — off the bookshelves, anyway — this line about Xi and the profundity of his visions. Despite the endorsement by Mark Zuckerberg, the English-language edition of Xi’s The Governance of China is ranked #220,000 among books at Amazon; that compares, just consider, to a #107,391 ranking for Minxin Pei’s latest, China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay.
China Daily, published by the Information Office of the State Council, dusts off the Reslan blood donation story earlier this year.
As for those engaging yarns that we are told animate Xi’s “important speeches,” they tend to be played up by Chinese state media alone. One oft-cited example, noted by Caixin two years ago in a piece on the president’s storytelling chops, came in a speech at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University in 2013. It was the story of Tulenov Ruslan, an exchange student from Kazakhstan who was said to have donated five liters of blood in China (not all at once, thankfully) after learning that his relatively scarce blood type, rhesus negative (known in Chinese as “panda blood”), was in urgent need.
Ruslan’s sacrifice for the sake of the Chinese people was amplified across the various foreign channels of China Daily and Xinhua News Agency. But it appeared nowhere else.
As for “using stories to convey deeper meanings,” we might inquire what message Xi Jinping’s story of Kazakhstan blood sacrifice is supposed to convey. Couldn’t the “panda blood” story actually come across as a crass yarn about China’s demand for Kazakh oil and gas, implying that China’s continued economic well-being requires that it sap Central Asia of its precious resources?
The problem with parables, you see, is that their meanings have to translate.
Which brings me to another core question when it comes to Xi Jinping’s visibility as a global storyteller: Who is it that translates, prints and distributes the general secretary’s stories outside of China? And when this does happen, is it a matter of appeal, or a matter of pulling strings?
In fact, if we dig a bit deeper into state media coverage of the president’s latest collection, Xi Jinping Tells A Story, we find interesting backstories that make the international release of the general secretary’s profound stories seem a great deal more like vanity publishing on a grand scale. Xi Jinping Tells A Story has recently been back in the headlines. The People’s Daily reported on the front page of its September 19 edition that close to 1.5 million copies of the book had been distributed, and that it had been “widely praised.” The praise, in fact, was a familiar rehashing of the kudos Xi received back in June. Xu Jiong (徐炯), a press control official in Shanghai, echoed the remarks of publisher Yang Zhenwu, saying Xi’s book deftly used storytelling to convey “the way,” or tao, of Chinese development.
Yang Jingjie (杨镜洁), a student at Beijing Foreign Languages University who attended a public discussion event for the book explained to those gathered that she had discovered in Xi Jinping’s book the “golden key” to bring together China and the outside world, and she hoped that more and more young people in China would discover this key too, becoming “convincing tellers of China’s story.”
“A single story can beat out a dozen arguments,” she said.
Finally, the People’s Daily noted that as soon as the book had been released, “the renowned international publisher Springer contacted the People’s Publishing House wanting to buy world English rights for the book.” Springer Nature confirmed in an e-mail to CMP that they “have signed a letter of intent with the People’s Publishing House,” but could not offer further details.
But Russian and Japanese versions were also touted by Chinese state media as examples of the book’s broad appeal.
Rights to the Japanese edition of Xi Jinping Tells a Story were reportedly snatched up by Duan Press (侨报社), which Japan’s Kyodo News has described as “a publishing house in Japan that specialises in books on Sino-Japanese relations, many of which are written by Chinese authors and translated into Japanese.”
The publishing outfit is run by Duan Yuezhong (段跃中), who founded it in 1999. Duan has consistently over the past two decades published books in Japanese that mirror very closely the mainstream official view. He is a regular guest appearing in Chinese official media to discuss the challenge of “telling China’s story in Japan,” and the way he understands that story aligns perfectly with China’s own external propaganda, to the point of parroting its latest official vocabularies. Currently, the personal introduction on Duan’s Weibo account reads, in a nod to a propaganda buzzword Xi Jinping introduced back in 2012: “Gathering positive energy for China-Japan, spreading good voices for Japan-China.” The homepage of Duan Yuezhong’s Weibo account, with an introduction at bottom left invoking the Xi Jinping term “positive energy.”
At a public signing ceremony two years ago, Duan and his press obtained the Japanese rights to a series of Chinese-language books including The Eastern Battlefield (东方主战场), an edited volume accompanying an official China Central Television documentary commemorating the 70th anniversary of the victory against fascism, and How the CCP Makes Progress — both books published by New World Press (新世界出版社), a division of China International Publishing Group (CIPG), the central-level publisher responsible for the overseas distribution of Party and government publications as part of its overseas propaganda efforts.
The Chinese-language website for Duan Press is full of articles from Xinhua News Agency and the People’s Daily about recent Japanese releases, and interviewing Duan about his work promoting China’s voice in Japan. Duan is apparently getting a lot of attention for its release of Chinese books onto the Japanese market — but this attention is coming almost exclusively from the familiar Chinese state media outfits, which makes this look very much like an inside job.
Russia is another interesting case of apparent self-dealing. At the Beijing International Book Fair (BIBF) in August, a signing ceremony for the foreign editions of Xi Jinping Tells a Storywas held in the exhibition area of the People’s Publishing House, and it was announced that the Russian edition of Xi’s book would be published by Chance International Group (尚斯国际集团). Roman Gerasimov (far right) attends the signing ceremony for the Russian rights to Xi Jinping Tells a Story at the Beijing International Book Fair.
Chance, in fact, was quite active at this year’s BIBF, its general manager, Roman Gerasimov (the guy with the dark beard), attending several signing events at the fair. There was the signing of the deal over Xi Jinping Tells a Story, and with Beijing Publishing House signing of Russian-language rights to In the Name of the People, the book produced from the 55-episode hit propaganda series on the anti-graft drive orchestrated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (and which television regulators praised as a must-see propaganda flick ahead of this fall’s 19th National Congress of the CCP.) The book was also cited by state media as a bright point of success in the strategy of “going out” for Chinese publishing. Finally, with Joint Publishing, Chance signed a deal for the Russian edition of a book about the Analects by Beijing Normal University professor Yu Dan (于丹).
During the BIBF events, Gerasimov, which Chinese state media variously called editor-in-chief and general manager of “the Russian publisher Chance International Group,” was a visible representative of Russian interest — and no doubt his face, so suitably foreign, was a welcome addition to signing panels advertising the foreign appeal of Chinese books.
But to call Chance a “Russian publisher” is to gloss over a very colorful story — and, as I advertised from the beginning, this piece is about colorful stories.
According to a report from the official China News Service, Chance was created back in 2010 by a retired People’s Liberation Army soldier by the name of Mu Ping (穆平), a native of China’s Shaanxi province. Mu started small, he says, by selling Russian translations of Chinese books overseas. When he found he could make a bit of money this way, he sold off two properties he owned, borrowed a bit, and used this to support his fledgling press. The news report picks up the story:
The transition came in 2013. That year, General Secretary Xi Jinping raised his call for “One Belt, One Road.” Very quickly, as this call deepened in the countries and regions of the Silk Road, demand started for Chinese books just as for Chinese manufacturing, and the market was opened overseas.
At that time, the demand for Chinese books overseas started to increase. Publishing houses back home, says Mu Ping, started seeking them out, and business picked up.
In July 2016, Mu and his Russian publishing company linked up with Zhejiang Publishing United Group (浙江出版联合集团) to open what they advertised as Russia’s first Chinese bookstore, Chance Books (尚斯博库). Mu Ping’s new bookstore was located right in the heart of Moscow, with the goal, he says, of “providing a window on Chinese culture in Russia.”
But this was no ordinary partner. Zhejiang Publishing United Group was an enterprise directly under the Zhejiang provincial government — and from there the crystal stairs led straight up to Beijing, for the top leader of Zhejiang at the time, Party Secretary Xia Baolong (夏宝龙), had served as deputy party secretary in Zhejiang under Xi Jinping from 2003 to 2007 and was regarded as a member of the group of Xi loyalists referred to as the “New Zhijiang Army.”
The opening of Chance Books on July 5, 2016, was to all appearances not just a lively affair, but a very senior one diplomatically. Attending the ribbon-cutting ceremony was Vice-Premier Liu Yandong (刘延东), who has travelled to many countries preaching the virtues of “One Belt, One Road,” and who recently told a gathering in Hungary (English here) that the two sides must “continue to deepen cooperation” in a range of areas, including media and think tank development, “working together to tell our bilateral story of ‘One Belt One Road.'”
Marking what was billed as a landmark occasion for relations between China and Russia in the publishing field, Liu told Sputnik News:
Today is the 20th anniversary of the strategic partnership between China and Russia, and the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty. And so, on this day to remember, the opening of the first Chinese bookstore in Russia is also cause for celebration.
Back in July this year, the Global Times ran a photo profile of Chance founder Mu Ping, giving every impression this was a bootstrap story about a guy who just wanted to open a bookshop, never mind his backing from a powerful state publishing enterprise. Screenshot of Global Times coverage of the Chance bookstore in Moscow, showing founder and owner Mu Ping.
Mu was pictured holding holding up Russian writer Yuri Tavrovsky’s 2015 monograph about Xi Jinping, a book so uncritical in its portrayal that its Chinese-language edition was snatched up by none other than the publishing house run by the CCP’s Central Party School — as was, incidentally, Tavrovsky’s more recent book on “One Belt, One Road.” The shelves behind Mu Ping, meanwhile, were stocked with Russian editions of Xi’s The Governance of China.
Another image in the Global Times profile series showed a promotional placard, in both Russian and Chinese, for Xi Jinping Tells a Story. Appearing also, at least seven weeks ahead of the Beijing International Book Fair, was Mr. Gerasimov, editor-in-chief and general manager — though here, as he was pictured fiddling with the stock, his title was given only as a “salesclerk.”
When I mentioned the story of Chance International Group to a friend from the Czech Republic recently, he was not the least bit surprised. Xi Jinping’s book, he noted, had also been published in his country in what he called a “weird underground manner.”
I suspect that as China’s official story, and Xi Jinping’s copious works, fan out over the “New Silk Road,” there will be many such stories from Xinhua News Agency, China Daily and the Global Times about the “Russian,” “Hungarian” or “Latvian” publishers who have snatched up the publishing rights.
What an interesting fable indeed. And there must, surely, be a moral in there somewhere.
![[话筒]](https://img.t.sinajs.cn/t4/appstyle/expression/ext/normal/9f/huatongv2_org.gif "[话筒]")
