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Tag: journalism in China

Who Supervises the Sky Eye?

This spring, Fu Song (付松), a former investigative reporter who now regularly updates his public WeChat account Chasing the Moon and Counting Stars (追月数星) with stories of ordinary people seeking redress against local officials, police and courts, stumbled across a major scoop.

He learned from one of his readers that a national science institution was quietly offering paid access to one of the country’s most highly secured facilities — a remote astronomical observatory nicknamed “China’s Sky Eye” (中国天眼) that is the world’s largest single-dish radio telescope. Fu traveled to the location about two hours’ drive south of Guiyang to check the story out for himself. His investigation, released on his WeChat account in October, made headlines across the country, and prompted China’s top science academy to launch a full investigation.

China’s Five hundred-meter Aperture Spherical Radio Telescope (FAST) located in Guizhou. Via Wikimedia Commons.

But Fu’s was not just a simple story of a hard-nosed reporter whose work brought results in the real world. In a post and a video last week, he exposed wave after wave of retaliatory actions against him and his collaborator over the weeks following the investigation. His content is a gripping account of the myriad pitfalls facing Chinese journalists — and the fact that it has since been deleted only punctuates these challenges.

“I felt a wave of dizziness,” said Fu as he related his experiences. “I simply couldn’t understand why the price of making a report under my real name was so high.”

The Investigation

Set in the karst hills of China’s southwestern Guizhou province, the Five-hundred-meter Aperture Spherical Radio Telescope, or FAST, is tucked away in a natural basin, where scientists use it to listen for the subtlest of radio signals from deep space. When FAST was launched in 2019, the provincial government launched protection measures and regulations to prevent electromagnetic interference, which included restrictions on unauthorized phones, tablets, and other devices on-site that could emit radio waves and damage the technology.

But Fu discovered that civilian tech could easily get through the electromagnetic “quiet zone” (静区), as long as one could pay. For as low as 2,688 yuan, or about 400 US dollars, tourists were offered an “exclusive” deal: one night in a twin room at the FAST Light Years Away (中國天眼光年之外酒店) hotel in Guizhou, plus a guided tour that allowed visitors to approach the ring beam directly — far closer access than the public viewing area — with phones in tow.

FAST Light Years Away hotel. Photo by Fu Song via WeChat.

How could such access be possible? Fu confirmed through public records that the FAST Light Years Away (中国天眼光年之外酒店) was indirectly owned by the National Astronomical Observatories of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), which oversees FAST. The profiteering scheme seemed also to have official endorsement: the legal representative of the hotel’s operating company, Zhao Baoqing (赵保庆) is also a manager of the FAST observation base.

Since the hotel opened in 2020, Fu found through publicly-accessibly data and interviews, it had received tens of thousands of guests. Other vendors on the Chinese booking platform Ctrip were also offering FAST “experience” tickets. Scientists told Fu that the electromagnetic interference caused by tourists’ cell phones on site could have contaminated its data. In his initial October 10 investigation, Fu added that he had filed a complaint with central authorities on the Observatories’ potential illegal activity.

Two days later, CAS published a notice stating that it had opened an investigation into the matter. From there, the story was quickly picked up by central and local Party media, including CCTV, Xinhua, and The Paper, and became a trending topic on Weibo under the hashtag “book a 2688 yuan hotel stay and you can drive to the center of the FAST telescope” (2688元住酒店自驾进天眼核心区).

The Backlash

It wasn’t until about a week later that the trouble started. In a since-deleted video and article, both posted on October 20, Fu detailed his frustration with local authorities in Guizhou, who had called him several times after filing the complaint. According to Fu’s own account, his friend who accompanied him on the FAST tour had been questioned by police. Later, Fu received a call from someone who identified themselves only as a “regional leader” (辖区领导), who had called to check in on Fu and emphasize that his activities must comply with the law. He then received a call from an individual who claimed to be from the “administrative department” (行政主管部门), who asked Fu what he had done and then notified him that he had been reported and would be investigated. Fu had also received a call from CAS, which informed him that they were investigating the matter. These phone interactions were recorded by Fu and published in a video, which was taken down for “breaking rules” (违规).

Fu’s initial longer video, which includes his phone calls with authorities — now missing from his re-upload (below).

The latest update on Fu’s WeChat account was on October 20, when he deleted and re-uploaded the above-mentioned video, this time without the clips of the phone calls between himself and the authorities.

So far, there have been no updates on the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ investigation. But Fu’s original investigative articles remain live on his WeChat account. For outside observers, the question of why Fu’s video depicting government pressure would be censored, while his original journalistic investigations could remain, is a puzzling one.

Fu Song’s re-upload of the video, now lacking his phone calls with authorities.

The answer lies in the concept of “supervision by public opinion” (舆论监督), a phrase translated by Chinese advocates of a freer press as “watchdog journalism” which has also been embraced by the Party as a means of “monitoring” societal problems toward the goal of stability. Xi Jinping’s moves to control a comparatively freewheeling press in the 2010s also meant ensuring their alignment with Party goals — one of which has famously been to rein in corruption by “hunting tigers and swatting flies,” or going after both high-ranking Party members as well as local bureaucrats. While the media played a far greater role in exposing corruption in previous decades — including among high-ranking officials — what Fu’s case shows is that, however rare supervision has become, there are still journalists determined to open up space for critical coverage.

But the broader Chinese media response exposes the limits of independent reporting. As a journalist working outside the formal CCP-led press structure — which the Party itself terms “mainstream” — Fu’s revelations could not be taken at face value as “reporting.” In China’s highly controlled press space, the “right to report” (采访权) is a privilege afforded only to licensed journalists and their licensed outlets. When Chengdu’s Red Star News, published by the local Party-led media group, picked up the story, quoting Fu’s work and adding its own reporting, it referred to him only as a “tourist.” Once Red Star had red-washed the reporting, making it safe for other outlets to use, the story could go national, provoking the CAS’ public announcement of its investigation.

“I simply couldn’t understand why the price of making a report under my real name was so high.”

While the facts Fu exposed might have been tolerated as they became the subject of nationwide reporting, his exposure of the pressure he faced was a far more sensitive matter — particularly as the FAST story was already in the spotlight. Local authorities were already likely facing pressure from central authorities to address what may become a major corruption scandal. Now, Fu’s video suggested authorities were pressuring him to keep quiet, just ahead of the Party’s fifth plenary session, which would push for greater Party discipline. As far as local authorities were concerned, it seems, Fu’s “supervision” work ended with his initial exposure of the scandal; it’s now on the implicated officials to try to clean up the mess.

Scripting the Source

“Many of our interviews aren’t done on the spot these days,” says Wu Ting, a journalist who works in television news production at Jiangxi Television, a provincial-level state broadcaster in China. “Instead, higher-ups set the direction for us in meetings ahead of time, and we just complete the filming on-site.” This may seem a surprising admission from a working journalist, but it is not an isolated phenomenon, Wu told Tian Jian. 

In recent years, the way some media outlets in China conduct interviews has changed. No longer do interviews need to unfold before the camera lens. Rather, their basic framework can often be set before the recording ever begins. At some television stations and for documentary-style feature segments, interviewees receive talking points before taping and some are even required to recite lines prepared for them. The interview, in other words, is no longer something generated on the spot. It is a programmed output.

The trend is expanding across many kinds of programming, says Wu, including current affairs reporting, segments on social issues and profile interviews. “If we can find someone who is willing to go on camera and say things the way we want, all the better,” she says. “We go back to them again and again, and give them a few hundred yuan for travel expenses as compensation.”

To explore this trend, Tian Jian interviewed several media professionals who have worked at Chinese television stations. For reasons of personal safety and to protect their employment, all interviewees in this article except Su Yutong and Liu Dongmei have been identified by pseudonyms.

Huang Miao, director of the news features department at Zhejiang Television, who has also worked on documentary-style programs, said that since the pandemic, public frustration has been growing under pressures like unemployment and mortgage payments. Yet the content, settings and structure of feature interviews must still follow official rules, so what gets said in an interview is often decided ahead of time. “That includes the dialogue between reporters and interviewees,” she said. “Content that once came out of live interaction has been moved up to the planning stage. The on-camera question-and-answer has become more a visual rendering of a set narrative than a process of producing information.”

Because hers is a state-run outlet, Huang said, its reporting must meet the requirements of the propaganda department. “What they want to see is that we ‘sing the main melody’ (唱好主旋律), guide the audience and spread ‘correct thinking,’” she said, referring to Chinese Communist Party language for ideological control. “That means we have to tell interviewees what to say. Some interviewees are given a few fairly standard lines, and they can’t really stray far from them.” 

“You can change the tone, but you can’t change the meaning,” she adds.  

Risk Management First

Behind this change lies a shift toward what these journalists call “risk management.” In the past, the risks a news story posed in China were dealt with during editing and publication, when stories could be reviewed, revised or rewritten. Today, some of those risks are neutralized before reporting even begins, so that content meets set requirements from the moment it is created.

Su Yutong, a former reporter for Beijing Radio who now lives in Germany, said the practice reflects the climate of public opinion in recent years. “Some interviewees are prone to grumbling and complaining, so sometimes the script is written in advance. The interviewee reads it over first, and then reads it out word for word.”

Such practices are not uncommon in news work, she said. “Sometimes people dig up footage or photos and find they’re several years old. That kind of thing we could see coming. But now even interviews have been reduced to reading from a script. It has reached an extreme.”

Four editors and reporters in Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Beijing and elsewhere told Tian Jian that interviews based on pre-prepared scripts are fairly common. This up-front control can include supplying the range of questions in advance, limiting the direction of answers, setting up frameworks to steer around sensitive topics and, in some cases, handing interviewees ready-made lines. What they say is confined within boundaries drawn beforehand.

Gu Le, an insider at Shanghai Oriental Television, said that controlling what interviewees say has become part of news censorship, with programs going through multiple rounds of review before broadcast. “The most important thing now is to keep anything uncontrollable from appearing. Rather than deleting it later, it’s better to prevent it from appearing in the first place,” Gu said. 

Gu pointed to a recent viral interview with motorcycle entrepreneur Zhang Xue as an example. Zhang founded the brand ZXMOTO in 2024, and its bikes won two straight races at the World Superbike Championship round in Portugal in March 2026. In a post-race interview, when a reporter prompted him to thank the Chongqing government for its support, he replied, “Not a single penny.” When another reporter, from the Chongqing Communist Youth League, asked what drove him, he replied, “Why don’t you just tell me what to say, and I’ll say it?” Social media users passed the clip around as a rare case of an interviewee going off script.

According to Pan Yi, a veteran Chinese journalist, this shift has also changed the source of journalists’ professional anxiety. Where they once worried about whether a story would get published, they now worry about whether trouble will follow “the moment words come out of [an interviewee’s] mouth.”

“This kind of pressure has warped journalists’ professional instincts, shifting their focus from uncovering stories to assessing risks,” said Pan. “Today’s journalists are less ‘looking for people’ than ‘looking for characters.’ Our function has been drastically watered down. We’ve been reduced to casting directors for a grand narrative, responsible only for finding interviewees who fit neatly into a predetermined script. As for the risks behind the content, editors-in-chief and media platforms hedge against them through rigorous self-censorship.”

Dai An, a communication scholar at the Communication University of China, said the goal is to head off risks in advance and keep problems from arising during interviews. By filtering out uncertainty at the very start of the process, news production becomes highly “controllable.” “This approach completely stifles the room for authentic expression,” he said. “Complex truths that might otherwise have sparked debate in the newsroom are shut out of view the moment the shutter clicks or the recorder switches on.”

Under this approach, reporters are no longer focused on providing information, but on avoiding statements that deviate from expectations. What can and cannot be said is often settled before the interview begins, and whether a segment airs smoothly depends on whether it stays within those boundaries.

“Scripting” the Editorial Process

As pre-interview controls have tightened, the role of interviewees in Chinese news has also changed. Once seen as sources of information and voices for different viewpoints, they have been folded into predetermined narratives, and their room for expression has noticeably narrowed.

The shift has not gone unnoticed by news consumers. Despite the government’s professed crackdown on fake news, suspicions that reporting and editing are “scripted” have persisted, frequently drawing the attention of the public and international media.

On April 16, 2022, for example, CCTV’s flagship evening newscast, “Xinwen Lianbo,” reported that some supermarkets in Shanghai had reopened during the city’s Covid-19 lockdown, with “ample goods and normal stock.” Internet users later questioned whether the footage had been staged. The next day, the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee’s propaganda office released an official response stating that the footage had been shot on April 15 in Jinshan District, which was “nearing zero-Covid” status. But a photographer using the name “Fei Diwen” (費迪聞) later claimed on WeChat that he had shot the footage himself on March 31 at an RT-Mart supermarket in Yangpu District, and that CCTV had used it without permission.

Such controversies are not isolated. On December 10, 2025, CCTV-4’s program “National Memory” (國家記憶) aired the first episode of “The Call of the Times” (時代呼喚), a documentary series about China’s high-speed rail. Some scenes of railway construction bore a “Doubao AI” (豆包) watermark in the lower right corner, the mark of ByteDance’s AI assistant. Railway enthusiasts online noticed that the construction footage “defied common sense.” The episode was then taken down from CCTV’s website — and when it was reposted, the footage had been replaced.

Screenshot from the original episode of the CCTV documentary series “Chinese High Speed Rail: The Call of the Times” with AI-generated images. Via 复兴号铁路 on WeChat.

Guo Yajun, a scholar at Peking University’s School of Journalism and Communication, said the phenomenon reflects an adjustment in how news is produced as a whole. “When an interviewee’s statements are controlled in advance, the interview is no longer a process of gathering information, but the confirmation of a predetermined narrative.” 

“The media no longer generate content on the spot,” he said. “Instead, they move the uncertainty to the stage before the interview begins.”

Guo said that while this mechanism helps contain public opinion risks in the short term, it will undermine the basic function of news in the long run. “News has traditionally relied on bringing different pieces of information together in pursuit of the truth. Once expression is uniformly restricted, audiences no longer confront reality itself, only a single, filtered version of it. As the public keeps noticing this gap, trust will gradually erode, and the media’s credibility will fall further.”

The Changing Role of Journalists

Faced with preemptive control and predetermined narrative frameworks, journalists are no longer in the business of uncovering information and building narratives. Their job has become managing risk.

Liu Dongmei, a former reporter at Hefei Radio in Anhui province, said that beginning in 2023, the first question before an interview was no longer “what to ask,” but “what not to ask.”

“The station instructed us that preparing for an interview wasn’t just about collecting information and drafting questions, but also about assessing the potential risks posed by the interviewee,” Liu said. “In the end, I could only find interviewees through classmates’ referrals or by approaching people I knew. Since we were on good terms, they would just say, ‘Tell me what you want me to say, and I’ll go along with it.’ I actually felt pretty awkward about it.”

A Chinese reporter stands nearby, holding a script for the interviewee to read from. (Screenshot from Xiaohongshu)

Liu found it hard to adapt. Three months into the job, she quit reporting and moved to another industry. She said that by the time she realized her work was shifting from “identifying questions” to “managing risks,” she had already decided to leave. “Where else — in foreign media, Hong Kong or Taiwan — is news reported like this? You focus only on the risks a story might pose to the station, never on its news value.”

As censorship permeates the day-to-day operations of every media outlet, journalists’ professional roles are being reshaped — from a focus on content to a focus on structure. In the process, journalists are no longer just reporters. They have also become regulatory checkpoints within the news system. Their work is not only to present reality but to ensure that expression stays within the bounds the authorities deem acceptable.

Shifting Boundaries

With the move toward pre-interview preparation and the changing role of journalists, the nature of news storytelling itself has begun to change. Content no longer comes primarily from on-site interaction but is increasingly built on a prearranged framework, producing a more uniform overall presentation.

The Chinese journalists, journalism instructors and media professionals interviewed for this story all described a similar situation in their workplaces: the information that reaches readers often already carries a clear stance and bias, making it hard for some readers to grasp the full course of events in stories about mass incidents or so-called “revenge against society,” a phrase used for random acts of violence. 

Liu said that for news and programming, propaganda departments typically draw up a plan in advance that the media must follow. “The ‘preset structure’ of news has been around a long time, and many people have grown used to working this way. Whether they are fresh out of journalism school or reporters with years of experience, they all work within the same framework. That includes the questions and answers, which are settled before the interview takes place. The interview itself is largely just a supplement to what’s already there.”

When the content of an interview is prepared before recording, the way news is produced changes, too. Much of the information no longer comes from the scene, and exchanges between reporters and interviewees often amount to repeating predetermined lines. What audiences ultimately see is often nothing more than a selection of pre-approved statements.

Tian Yu is a freelance journalist covering Chinese-language current affairs and social issues, with a focus on China’s media landscape and public governance. This article originally appeared in Chinese at Tian Jian (田間).

Historical Revisions on Parade

For the Chinese leadership, the 80th anniversary of the country’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan in World War II is a major milestone — an opportunity to signal the power of the ruling Chinese Communist Party to people at home, and the country’s global ambitions to audiences abroad. These goals were on full display during the ritualized pageantry of the military parade yesterday in Beijing, attended by Russian leader Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un.

Preparations for the celebrations, coinciding with this week’s Tianjin meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an event that has sparked lively discussion and speculation about whether or not we are witnessing a fundamental shift in the world order, were months in the making. In recent days, the logistical preparations have brought the center of the capital to a literal standstill.

But in the days ahead of this week’s parade of high-tech weaponry, ideological moves of equal or greater importance have prepared the way for the CCP’s new historical consensus. This view rewrites the history of global war and peace to firm up the narrative of China’s centrality. It was the CCP, the story goes, that decisively won the war for Asia and for the world.

Backbone Narratives

On Sunday, the China Youth Daily, an official newspaper under the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), ran an article by Shi Quanwei (史全伟), a research fellow at the Party History and Literature Research Institute of the CCP Central Committee. Shi argued the CCP had been the “backbone” (中流砥柱) of the entire nation’s resistance during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Furthermore, Shi says it was the united front leadership, guerrilla warfare tactics, and exemplary governance of the CCP that made it crucial to China’s wartime resistance.

“The experience of three revolutions, especially the War of Resistance, has given us and the Chinese people this confidence,” he wrote. “Without the efforts of the Communist Party, without Communists serving as the backbone of the Chinese people, China’s independence and liberation would have been impossible.”

Just as the celebrations yesterday invited talk of the conspicuous sidelining of the United States as a global leader — and by extension what state media like to call the “US-led West”(美西方) — reconstructed narratives made much of the historically inflated importance of the US in the global conflict 80 years ago. 

Quoting from several global talking heads, the government-run China Daily pressed the point that the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the quintessential inflection point in American narratives of fascist resistance, had been given too central a role in the broader global story — as had the role of the United States in the Pacific theater. Instead, it was the CCP that had led the decisive grassroots resistance years before the belated American entry. As the descendant of one Soviet pilot was quoted as saying, glossing over the role of Republican forces in China at the time: “China’s resistance war was already underway before the Pearl Harbor incident. Chinese forces long tied down Japanese military strength and manpower, preventing them from extending their influence to the Pacific and the entire Far East region at that time.”

This wave of writing and commentary on WWII history was promoted through traditional state-run outlets and new social media accounts all through August. According to these pieces, the emphasis on the US role had for decades overshadowed, or inexcusably sidelined, China’s role in the global conflict.

On August 16, an article appeared on WeChat that claimed American academia had deliberately downplayed China’s role — which was to say, the role of the CCP. In recent years, the author wrote, the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US had led American historians to overlook China’s role in the Pacific theater, “fully exposing the United States’ political manipulation of history to gain political advantage.” 

A man identified as a descendant of a World War II-era Soviet fighter pilot praises China’s central role in the Pacific theater, accusing the US of broad historical revisionism.

That argument, of course, has many flaws — not least the absurd assumption that US historians (like Chinese ones?) are an organized and geopolitically-motivated force, lacking professional integrity and unable to distinguish between the present-day People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC). This latter was China’s recognized government during World War II.

But the nature of the messenger in this and many other instances of historical redrafting in recent weeks is perhaps more telling than the substance. The author of this piece, “How Has American WWII Historical Research ‘Drifted’?,” was a scholar from the American Academy (美国研究所), a unit within the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院) — a front organization operated by the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and charged with engaging with foreign scholars.

And what of the outlet that published this piece — a drop in the wave of efforts to re-center China at the expense of the truth? It is a website launched in 2021 called “China’s Diplomacy in the New Era” (习近平外交思想和新时代中国外交), an outlet under the China International Communications Group (中国外文出版发行事业局), or CICG. The office, which masquerades as a press group, operates scores of online outlets including such government sites as China.com.cn, and has been tasked by Xi Jinping as a key vehicle for the CCP’s international communication. CICG’s parent is the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee. 

The social media account of “China’s Diplomacy in the New Era” — whose Chinese moniker bears the name of Xi Jinping himself — has been pushing a variety of articles on World War II in recent weeks. These mostly re-interpret the conflict through the lens of current geopolitics, colored with familiar state narratives, including contemporary Chinese claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea.

As the soldiers, tanks, missiles and drones goose-stepped and rolled along Chang’an Avenue on Wednesday, and Vladimir Putin had his smiling moment with Xi Jinping, some might have felt a sense of America sliding out of contemporary relevance. But behind the physical demonstrations of military might and the cementing of partnerships, there was an insistent narrative effort on all fronts to re-position China — and by extension, the CCP — at the center of the global historical narrative. For the leadership’s vision of a “new type of international relations,” nudging American leadership out of contemporary geopolitics is only half the battle; ensuring that it slips out of the history books may be equally important.

China Issues Approved News Source List

Earlier this month, China’s top control body for the internet and social media released its updated list of approved internet news information sources, a roster of outlets first issued a decade ago to curtail the sharing of articles and news reports by unauthorized sources — those without close Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government ties. The publication of the list starting in 2015 was part of a general tightening of control over news and information in the early Xi Jinping era, as the internet and social media came to dominate news consumption.

The 2025 list from the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), issued on August 14, includes 1,456 government-run media outlets whose content can be legally republished by other websites and news platforms — a carefully selected group that is meant to establish the CCP’s dominance over news content in China. All digital media platforms are forbidden from republishing news stories that originate from sources not included on the approved roster, including international media as well as public accounts on major platforms like WeChat and Weibo.

CAC Approved News Sources List

CAC Approved News Sources List (2021-2025)

Category 2021 2025 Change Growth Rate
Total Sources 1,358 1,456 +98 +7.2%
Central Level 286 286 0 0%
Provincial Level 992 1,074 +82 +8.3%
Government Platforms 80 96 +16 +20.0%
Source: Cyberspace Administration of China

The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) first introduced the system in 2015 as part of broader internet governance reforms under Xi that include the formation of the CAC as a powerful control and oversight body for cyberspace. The inaugural “Source List” included Caixin, a professional news outlet founded in 2009 by the highly-respected editor Hu Shuli (胡舒立), but the list was further tightened during the second iteration in 2021, at which time Caixin was removed. The 2021 list contained 1,358 approved sources, nearly four times the number in the 2016 list of just 340. These changes reflected the addition of official government accounts within the country’s expanding digital news ecosystem.

The CAC explained that the 2021 update followed three priorities: “adds a group” of trusted sources adhering to correct political orientation, “verifies a group” to update closures and name changes from institutional reforms, and “eliminates a group” of units with “poor regular performance” or lacking influence.

While the overall list grew by just 7.2 percent between this year and 2021 — from 1,358 to 1,456 sources — the distribution of this growth tells a more complex story about Beijing’s information control strategy. Central-level sources remained unchanged at 286 units, suggesting authorities consider the media structure at the national level to be complete. Provincial-level sources, meanwhile, expanded by 8.3 percent (from 992 to 1,074), reflecting efforts to strengthen regional information control infrastructure. This mirrors the trend since 2018 of encouraging the development of local and regional communication hubs, including the creation of “international communication centers” (国际传播中心), or ICCs, which are meant to enhance CCP messaging globally by leveraging provincial, city and county-level media resources.

Government platform sources showed the most dramatic growth at 20 percent, jumping from 80 to 96 units. Among the new additions are several municipal government social media platforms, including the official WeChat accounts of Shenzhen Municipal Government and Chengdu City Administration, reflecting a push in recent years to centralize local news creation by government agencies while adapting to social media-driven information consumption.

The CAC warned that websites not adhering strictly to the approved source list “will be punished according to law and regulations.”