A Web user from a city south of Guangzhou is suing a popular local Website for blocking his login ID, shutting down his mailbox and erasing his Web postings, according to a report in Southern Metropolis Daily. The case has been accepted by the Zhongshan Intermediate Court.
The Web user, named in the report as Mr. Liang, is suing the Website for allegedly violating his personal copyright. He is asking that the site reinstate his ID and Web postings.
In China, where the Internet is strictly controlled by legions of Web police and various government offices, including the Public Security Bureau, the case also implicates the state’s censorship regime. A representative from the Website told Southern Metropolis Daily that Mr. Liang’s postings, made under the Web alias “Xiandai Ximin” (现代刁民), included “negative content damaging to government organs” and that they had “received a notice from Internet management authorities”.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 22, 2006, 12:40pm]

Public disclosure of information has been a major topic of debate in the Chinese media this year. June brought controversy over China’s draft emergency law (we still haven’t heard the last word on this). In July came a row over disaster coverage, which focused on how to ensure release of reliable information about events like floods and typhoons. Most recently, China’s highest court announced new rules limiting media coverage of judicial proceedings, which some media have called backstepping on court transparency. Backgrounding it all, we have the proposed “Ordinance on Government Information Release” (政府信息公开条例) on the State Council’s legislative calendar this year, which Caijing magazine editor Hu Shuli has called “another new milestone” [SEE Hu Shuli, “The Imperative of Information Freedom”, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2006, p. 62-63].
In an editorial in Beijing Youth Daily on September 18, Ma Shaohua (马少华), a professor of journalism at Renmin University, wrote about the Chinese court’s announcement that it was building a press announcement system (新闻发布体制), which came alongside the new limitations on court coverage. He wrote: “At the core of the above prohibitions is the formation of the press announcement system. The press announcement system did not originate with the courts. Over the last two years it has been built up progressively by government at various levels. What is its basic goal? Is it to give the people a faster and more authoritative channel for information, or is it to limit, lessen and control information?”
Yesterday’s Southern Metropolis Daily featured a second editorial from Ma Shaohua, in which he attacked the court’s reasons for limiting media coverage. CMP wrote on September 14 that Chinese media were citing the problem of “public opinion verdicts” as the court’s reason for the new limitations. Some Western media have tacked the court rules onto the long list of recent disappointments on press freedom, suggesting all are part of a concerted crackdown ahead of the 2008 Olympics [See “Silent Games”, Newsweek]. That conclusion is premature and probably too reductive.
In his Southern Metropolis Daily editorial, Ma Shaohua returned to the question of “public opinion verdicts”, or what he called “media verdicts” (媒体审判). He responded to suggestions by Chinese officials that China is not alone among modern nations in limiting court coverage: “The rather strict limits on media coverage of court trials in some countries is not primarily to limit [the media’s] influence on judges of cultivated experience, but to prevent their influence on those ordinary people who comprise juries — because those standing in the important position of deciding innocence or guilt are ordinary people, and so may be influenced by the media. Our justice system does not have such juries”. Western judicial systems, said Ma, did not simply deal with media coverage by issuing bans. What was most important, he said, was balancing the various interests involved in a case (the public’s right to know, the right to personal privacy, etc.). This should not mean the outright denial of one of these (i.e., the public’s right to know).
All of these issues — from disaster coverage to judicial transparency — hinge on the relationship between the public welfare and the public’s right to know. The theme was raised again yesterday in yet another Southern Metropolis Daily editorial. This time the issue was public safety:
Southern Metropolis Daily
September 21, 2006
Two weeks ago a rumor circulated in Zhuhai and Zhongshan: a criminal was on the loose in Zhongshan who had repeatedly plundered homes and murdered people. The mood of terror spread. The emellishment of certain details pressed young girls to stay off the streets. The impact on citizens was enormous. Only on September 10, when Zhongshan Daily finally printed a wanted circular issued by the public security bureau, did the mood simmer down.
My first recollections of serial killers take place in northeast China . . . I remember fliers with black-and-white pictures posted on electric poles and shop doors. At the time there was no Internet and even telephones were scarce. Those fliers on the electric poles were talismans that meant criminals would find no place to hide. In the Internet age, Ma Jiajue (马加爵), who murdered four people, and drug kingpin Liu Zhaohua (刘招华) who had pursued by police for years, were captured shortly after their stories appeared on China Central Television. The sources coming forward were ordinary people. This tells us that only with disclosure of information can popular terror be avoided and the power the people contribute to breaking cases.
Zhongshan’s Public Security Bureau has always placed importance on information disclosure, and has regularly publicized public security information . . . in relevant media, which have reported and publicized [information]. In this case, appropriately timed public disclosure of information about a criminal suspect not only helped people understand the real situation and increase their knowledge of how to protect themselves, it also showed that political and public security organs have the ability to make people confident their safety is protected.
But we should notice that there is still a gap between the beginning of the investigation and disclosure of information. Of course, details that might help put people on guard and protect themselves, such as the suspect’s mode of operation and target profile, are still unclear during this time. But this has to do with China’s lack of a safety information disclosure system (危险信息公开的制度) or detailed rules on how to handle [such information]. Moreover, the readers reached by media publicizing such information are limited, and vast populations of migrants find it difficult to access such information. These are issues that the Public Security Bureau, the media and the people should consider more closely for dealing with dangerous incidents (危险事件). Southern Metropolis Weekly recently published “A Personal Safety Guide for the City”, which offered readers knowledge on how to manage the safety of their persons, family and property. Created with assistance from police, it included safety maps of a number of cities, including Shenzhen, Shanghai and Beijing, revealing areas of high crime. This was an innovation in the publicizing of city safety information.
Government offices have said that provincial and local level cities are in the process of establishing a network of political and public security organs. As a member of the justice system, the writer earnestly hopes that related Websites can forge a way to a system of safety information disclosure, telling [people] how to prevent crime, teaching ordinary people how to protect themselves . . .making public those areas where crime is highest and providing information about modes of operation and target profiles, publicizing information about murder cases, and using example cases to educate the population. We deeply believe that only by uniting the people and the police [through information disclosure], by mobilizing citizen participation, can we protect persons and property and ensure the criminals have no place to hide.

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 22, 2006, 12:05pm]

Over the weekend domestic media questioned proposed measures that would mean deportation of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers from Beijing before the 2008 Olympic Games.
The measures, reportedly announced by Beijing 2008 Environmental Construction Headquarters officials on September 14, would mean use of a strategy of “comprehensive return to the countryside” (整建制劝返回乡) and “strengthening of aid programs” to deal with Beijing’s massive population of migrant workers and vagrants, including an estimated one million construction workers [Reuters coverage via The Guardian].
The news, reported by Beijing media on Friday, met with denial from officials. But several papers continued to express their doubts the next day, and a prominent editorial a Henan commercial newspaper dragged in the issue of freedom of expression, saying China’s less privileged should have a voice in policy decisions directly impacting them:
Henan Commercial Daily
September 16, 2006
The Beijing Olympics are Olympics for the whole of the country, not an Olympics to be held after the peasants have been weeded out; the Beijing Olympic site is being constructed with the sweat of migrant workers, and without their labors there would be no beautiful Olympics. Now, in order that the Olympics show her prettiest side to the world, and because this group, migrant workers, obtrudes the city’s image, they are to be “returned to the countryside”. This kind of dispensing of people once they’ve done their task goes against the spirit of a humane Olympics.
But what I care about more than the idea of this “returning” is the question: were peasants included in the discussion about this “returning”. According to news reports, “returning” [of migrant workers] is Beijing’s initial suggestion for dealing with [this issue]. What we can be sure about is that the voices of policy-makers are included in this suggestion, the voices of Beijing residents might be included in this suggestion – but the voices of peasant workers have been excluded. This is an intrusion on the rights of participation of a group that has done its part for the Olympics.
If migrant workers had been consulted in this opinion about “returning”, I am confident these migrant workers would not have wished to accept it, and not simply because they want to be a part of the Games themselves. The Olympics are one thing, but for these migrant workers the most important thing of all is being able to work and make money to support themselves and their families …
The disregard for those governed in governing measures has lately become a common sight in social management. One recent example is the resumption of the “residency permit” system in Zhengzhou City. We won’t talk here about whether these methods [in Zhengzhou] are pertinent or not, but clearly in the discussion of reinstituting the “residency permit” system, there was no inclusion of the voices of the migrant groups who were affected.
Freedom of expression (言论自由) is the greatest freedom. Without freedom of expression there can be no equality of rights and benefits. By looking at the decisions of Beijing concerning the “return” of migrant workers we can see the trueness of this. Because if there is no opportunity for equal expression, then there is no avoiding the implementation of those measures that are disadvantageous to oneself and intrude on one’s rights. For the weak segments [of our society], the opportunity to speak is more important than a table of food.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 18, 2006, 11:53pm]

The Beijing News added its dissenting voice to the issue of court transparency in a page-two editorial today. The criticism follows articles by Southern Metropolis Daily and Shanghai Securities News arguing that new rules limiting media access to judicial information in China, announced Wednesday, are a step in the wrong direction:
Let’s first look back on a moment in history. On April 15, 1998, Xiao Yang (肖扬), newly serving as director of the Supreme People’s Court said in an education and reorganization meeting of the national court system: “The open hearing of court cases, aside from allowing free observation by the people, should progressively allow live television and radio broadcasting, and permit news media to report according to the facts with an attitude of responsibility toward the law.” This expression was read as an implementation of the principle of open hearings (公开审判) by the People’s Court, and a symbolic turning point for the strengthening judicial transparency.
People expressed a high degree of support for this position. And when analyzed, the statement explained quite well the relationship between the courts (judicature) and the media: for the courts, “cases [should be] heard openly” (公开审案), according to the law; as for media, they should report according to the facts, and with “responsibility toward the law”.
Eight years passed, and on September 12, 2006, Xiao Yang again expressed his principle of open hearings, and his understanding of the relationship between judicature and the media. He said: “The political responsibilities of judicature and the media are one and the same, and [in their goals of] strengthening, promoting and protecting social equality and justice, they are one and the same. Positive cooperation and well-intentioned communication should lead their relationship.”
. . . But then, the very same day, at a national court conference on press relations (新闻宣传工作会议), some news gave the public cause for misgivings and uneasiness. This news was of “forbidden areas” in the release of internal information, including “other information the leaders of the court determined could not be released” . . . Peoples’ misgivings are: have the principles of court transparency the Court has been proposing and putting into effect been shaken in some way? Has the media’s situation of reporting according to the facts and with “responsibility” now met with limitations? And will the actions of the courts, for this reason, be position outside the purview of supervision by public opinion (舆论监督) [NOTE: this refers to media supervision or Chinese watchdog journalism]? . . .
Now a number of industries have like the court system set up their on press release systems. The appearance of press spokespersons has no doubt remedied some oft-seen insufficiencies of information disclosure of the past, and can move us from “passive revelation” (被动披露) to “active disclosure” (主动公开). However, the relationship between any organ of official power and the media is not just one of making “positive” news public, but assumes media supervision of official power organs according to the law – clearly, the likelihood of press spokespersons taking the initiative in inviting the press to do critical news reports is not very high.
The people have expressed uneasiness at “limitations on court reporting”, and this is about their expectation of judicial impartiality under media supervision. If the eyes of society and the public are present in our stately courts, and judges feel the power of supervision on all sides, only then can judicial impartiality be realized beyond doubt.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 15, 2006, 12:22pm]

Chinese media responded today to moves by the Supreme People’s Court to limit media access to court information. The criticisms, which argued for a more robust role for the press in monitoring the courts, were reminiscent of media attacks against China’s draft emergency management law in June this year.
Two of the most outspoken responses came from Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily and Shanghai Securities News. Both articles said the rules, announced by top court officials on Tuesday, went too far, limiting the media’s ability to play a role in greater judicial transparency.
The Southern Metropolis Daily editorial suggested the new rules were designed to prevent “public opinion verdicts”, cases in which media coverage and Internet opinion purportedly influence judicial outcomes and negatively impact the independence of the courts [pdf_southern-metro-daily-lede-editorial.pdf]. But the paper stressed that the public’s right to know should not be violated on the pretext of preventing “public opinion verdicts” from occuring, and said the court should restrict access only when merited in specific cases. [A Washington Post story said the move was part of a crackdown on news media ahead of a leadership conference next year and designed to limit domestic coverage of sensitive corruption cases like that against former Beijing vice-mayor Liu Zhihua].
Selections from the Southern Metropolis Daily and Shanghai Securities News editorials follow:

Southern Metropolis Daily
September 14, 2006
HEADLINE: The Public’s Right to Know is a Valuable Basis for Favorable Interaction between Media and the Administration of Justice

In the last few days, a representative of the Supreme People’s Court made explicit its discipline rules on information release, and a number of measures have drawn attention. Among these are: the formal establishment of an information release system for the two levels of the court; for those cases that are major, particular, or which have national influence, the Supreme People’s Court will be responsible for the release [of information]; five categories of content, including “other information the leaders of the court determined could not be released”, must not be disseminated without exception; without the approval of judges and other personnel, no media interviews will be accepted.
While the Supreme People’s Court insists these measures are for the sake of the courts and society, they are without a doubt a tightening of controls on media speech (媒体舆论) …
… The right to know about judicature is an important part of the public’s right to know, and it behooves judicial bodies to thoroughly respect this … There’s no doubt that the role of spokespersons as gatekeepers of information for government offices far exceeds the role originally conceived, as communicators of government and public information …
This time the Supreme People’s Court has clearly prohibited the release of five types of information, including “other information the leaders of the court determined could not be released”, and this puts media supervision of the courts between a rock and a hard place. Actually, as of recent the right of our country’s media to cover the news (新闻采访权) has not been given a clear guarantee by law. In other words, the media, whose voice lacks protection, is clearly in a position of weakness relative to judicial bodies that serve as units of public power (公权部门). In such a situation, without persistent advances in openness of the judicial system, media supervision of the courts is a mere theoretical possibility …
This is an instance of the Supreme People’s Court wishing to resolve the problem of what have been called “public opinion verdicts” [media and Internet opinion mobilizing public outrage and influencing the outcome of court cases]. Media should unconditionally support the idea the courts not be intruded upon, that they reach decisions impartially, but as to these “public opinion verdicts”, we must be very clear about narrow-minded understandings that might exist on [this issue]. Only when there is a twisting of case facts [by the media], or the media seek to pressure the court’s decisions … does this constitute a “public opinion verdict” [NOTE: the implication seems to be that the court should intervene only on a case-to-case basis]. When media reports on the courts are impartial and objective, the right to interview and report must not be violated on the pretext of [stopping] “public opinion verdicts”. In a modern country, opinion freedom [NOTE: writer avoids saying “freedom of speech”] and impartial courts are two fundamental values, neither of which can be discarded. If opinion freedom is sacrificed in the name of “public opinion verdicts” then even the impartiality of the courts will be difficult to safeguard.
—————–
Shanghai Securities News
September 14, 2006
[Introduction to Supreme People’s Court measures]
… The writer believes these measures need to be discussed. Media access to court information is beneficial in promoting transparency of the courts, beneficial to supervision by the public, beneficial to getting rid of court manipulation and achieving an impartial justice system …
In March 1999 the Supreme People’s Court formally promulgated its “Regulations Concerning Strict Implementation of a Public Court Decision System”, which emphasized: with approval of the People’s Court, news reporters may make a record of, record, photograph, film and broadcast court proceedings live. This kind of specific regulation respected the news reporter’s right to interview (采访权) and protected the public’s right to know, because “media opinion supervision” (新闻舆论的监督) is actually supervision by the people, the people supervising the party and government through the vehicle of the press. But now the Supreme People’s Court dictates that “judges and other [court] personnel must not without exception make bold to accept interviews from reporters” — this is clearly disadvantageous to the interchange of information between the public and the courts, and could possibly put an end to what has been an improving relationship between the courts and the media …
… The public’s right to know arises to a decisive degree from reporting by the media. Only by obtaining their right to know can the people come to understand the activities of the government, the courts and other manifestations of public power, and offer suggestions and criticism to carry out a supervisory function. Lately the media’s right to interview has met with obstacles from local [governments] or [government] offices. If the courts again “draw boundaries” on news coverage, this might worsen the situation. Our country’s constitution stipulates that people have the right to criticize or offer opinions to any government office or government official. Any kind of rule placing curbs on this stands the risk of violating the constitution. Therefore, any “boundary drawing” on the right to interview is unfortunate, and I advise it be corrected quickly.

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 14, 2006, 3:45pm]

A top official with China’s Supreme People’s Court outlined yesterday a series of “forbidden areas” for China’s domestic media in reporting on legal cases in China. This latest news came as foreign media tried to make sense of a September 10 announcement that foreign newswires would not be permitted to offer news content directly to end users in China, and work out its possible impact on domestic media.
The court announcement, delivered by Supreme People’s Court vice-director Cao Jianming (曹建明), said news reports on the courts in China would have to “strictly comply” with propaganda discipline and the internal discipline rules of the courts. Cao provided a list of “forbidden areas” for news reporters, with “state secrets” and “commercial secrets” topping the list. Ending the list was an ambiguous rule that said media could not report “other information the leaders of the court determined could not be released”. [AP coverage here].

Many respondents on Internet forums saw the news as a step back in progress toward a more transparent court system in China. “In the last few years, the biggest sign of progress in law has been the opening up of trials,” wrote one respondent to the news at Sina.com, a popular Chinese Web portal. “Aside from a few cases dealing with national security and the rights of special groups, all cases should be heard openly. Open trials and verdicts allow citizens to see how the laws and constitution created and obeyed by them are being put into practice. This is an extremely important principle. For the Supreme People’s Court to put out this kind of decision which can’t even look the people eye to eye, it’s really disgusting, it’s a major step back”.
“Everyone knows about corruption in the courts. Great! Now the media can’t even look into it”, wrote another.
Domestic media have so far not commented directly on the court’s announcement, but openness of information has been a hot-button topic for media this year. When officials in June announced new regulations for coverage of emergency events which promised fines for media “making bold” to report against regulations by local authorities, Chinese newspapers and magazines attacked the move, arguing for a more direct role for the media in the handling of emergency situations The debate in the media over openness and accuracy in reporting of disasters has continued this month.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 13, 2006, 5:35pm]

Mainstream Chinese media have not yet commented on regulations issued yesterday through Xinhua News Agency that formalize already strict limitations on cooperation between Chinese media and foreign newswires, but critical blogs and web postings (with a trickle in support) are already multiplying. The following are postings (or gentie) that appeared this morning on Netease (163.com), where there were already more than 1,000 postings on the subject:

Things are looking more and more like North Korea.

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It’s a good idea, cutting down on those foreigners slandering, rumormongering and vilifying the people of our country!

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We’re moving further and further backward!!

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Xinhua News Agency’s behavior first of all can not violate the principle of “freedom of expression” as stipulated in the constitution! Xinhua is not the government and is not the law!
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Offering no opinion is the best opinion one can offer!
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“Xinhua News Agency, according to national laws, administrative procedures and relevant State Council regulations, formulates “Management Procedures for Foreign News Agencies Disseminating News and Information in China” (below called “procedures”), to be in effect from the day of announcement.”
Xinhua News Agency!!!!!
[Making] regulations!!!!!!!!
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Actually things have always been done this way, they just haven’t been as flagrant as this time.
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Don’t intrude on our right to know!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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What are they afraid people will say?? If everything’s open and aboveboard, what do we have to fear?? Where has our Party’s tradition gone????
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Living in an information age, people’s eyes are discerning (ie. “as bright as snow”). Can we be so easily hoodwinked?
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I firmly support Xinhua’s management procedures. If we don’t strictly control things, well then they will have no scruples, and will say anything. How is it possibly OK to let ordinary Chinese people know anything? So, I firmly support Xinhua’s management procedures.
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Does Xinhua News Agency have this kind of power????
This is classic playing both athlete and referee …
This kind of action really treats the people like idiots…
Is this ultimately about the good of the country, or about what’s good for Xinhua???
I’m afraid it’s so that [Xinhua] doesn’t receive any competition from foreign newswires.
[See ESWN for more coverage]
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 11, 2006, 12:45pm]

More than two weeks ago, the China Media Project reported that in the aftermath of Typhoon Saomei Chinese media continued to debate the role of journalists in the handling of emergency events. That debate, which in this case centers on national versus local party media, has not relented, as China’s official Xinhua News Agency spars with Fujian’s top official, Lu Zhangong.
A wire report from Agence France Presse yesterday mostly missed the point, failing to offer the proper context and erroneously pitting Lu Zhangong’s words against a newspaper, Haixia Metropolitan Daily, that has in fact been one of his greatest advocates in the debate — and which he controls. Here is what happened, as summarized by Hong Kong’s Ming Pao on September 1:
While the powerful typhoon Saomei, which struck Zhejiang and Fujian last July, has already dissipated, the war of words between Fujian Party Secretary Lu Zhangong and Xinhua News Agency continues, again raising doubts among Internet users as to the publicized number of dead as a result of Saomei . . .
As Saomai slammed Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, the Zhejiang bureau chief of Xinhua News Agency took his team to the disaster area to cover the story. At that time Fujian’s Fuding City had reported just over 30 deaths to their superiors, but after Xinhua reporters visited the area the number of dead rose to 216. Fujian Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Fujian Party Committee [the province’s top leaders], said in a report on August 19 that Lu Zhangong, on an inspection tour of Fuding, had said: “Some media, including reporters from outside the province, wrote many false reports based on hearsay, and the news was stirred up on the web. I worry about whether the cadres of Ningde will make it through faced with social pressures like this, whether they can continue without interference and do what we need to do in serving the people . . .” Using this quote, one Website [in support of Lu Zhangong] published a piece called, “The Saomei Disaster: Tormenting the Media’s Conscience”. It pointed its lance directly at Xinhua News Agency.
On August 26, Xinhua News Agency’s Zhejiang bureau released an article, “For the Conscience of News Workers — A Front-line Account of Saomei Reports”. It recounted their experiences on leaving the Shacheng area of Fuding on August 13: “Our media vehicle was just about to set off when 40 or more people rushed around us, and we heard again their painful pleas, ‘You must tell the truth!” The implication was that the local people of Fujian did not trust the reports made by their government and wished for Xinhua News Agency to reveal the truth.
After this exchange, the volleys continued. On August 29, Haixia Metropolitan Daily issued a report defending the handling of Saomei by officials in Fujian. The article listed off the various inspection visits and other shows of action made by the likes of Lu Zhangong and governor Huang Xiaojing. Xinhua News Agency responded by gathering together reports by other Chinese media on Saomei and setting up a special online page devoted to the story.
Lu Zhangong’s next salvo came once again in Haixia Metropolitan Daily, in an editorial called “Supervision by Public Opinion [‘watchdog journalism’] Must Also Be Supervised” (August 30). The editorial was chock full of official media control buzzwords:
Correct guidance of public opinion (舆论导向正确) is for the good of the Party and the people; Incorrect guidance of public opinion is a calamity for the Party and for the people”. News media are the mouthpieces of the Party and people, charged with the important duty of leading society, influencing opinion (影响舆论), carrying forward a healthy atmosphere (正气) and creating cohesion. By upholding the basic principles of truth, comprehensiveness, objectivity and impartiality, and with positive publicity as the pillar (正面宣传为主), it must also strengthen supervision by public opinion (舆论监督), singing the dominant strain [唱响主旋律/i.e., “walk the party line”]. We see that the vast majority of news media take the high ground of responsibility to the Party, the people and history, cleaving to the ‘Three Closenesses’ and serving well as the ears and mouths of the Party and people, so that they have widespread trust among the masses. But we also see that some media reporters form subjective judgements, show favoritism or are swayed by their emotions in firing off their so-called “authoritative” reports.
And if there was any doubt about how Fujian officials felt about what role press supervision should have:
Whether or not supervision by public opinion [“watchdog journalism”] is correct or not is fundamentally decided by whether it benefits the path, direction and implementation of the policy decisions of the Party, benefits the solving of problems, benefits social stability, benefits the work of the Party and government, benefits the strengthening of the people’s trust in the Party and government.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 5, 2006, 1:07pm]

The power of the Internet as a tool for rallying public opinion in China has drawn increasing attention from the Western press and China watchers in recent months. At the same time the Internet has come under more intense fire within China for the often uncivil nature of the speech that appears there, on personal blogs and in online chatrooms. Citing these problems officials have intensified controls on Internet speech, most recently through bans on so-called “malicious spoofs”, or e’gao. The following editorial, which appeared originally in China Review magazine and was republished by Southern Metropolis Daily yesterday, suggests that lack of civility and reason in online speech is a direct result of government censorship:

The benefits of the Internet are apparent to all, especially insofar as many people now have a channel for expressing their own thoughts, perspectives and feelings such as they never before had. But I also believe it’s inadvisable at the moment to get one’s hopes up too high over the Internet. I’d like specifically to address the healthy development of ideas and some of the rather unwholesome characters that have lately appeared on the Web – I’m talking about [the phenomenon of] online abuse. On the slightest provocation it becomes, “Kill X”; “you’re an ass!”; “Oh, hell!”; “I’ll kill your whole family” or some more extreme form of personal attack.
Why are things this way? Perhaps it is because our politics over the past century have been marked with a tradition of such cruelty, and because our longer-standing spiritual traditions lack the sort of deeper reckoning with our darker selves that might lead us to tolerance and reason. Perhaps it is because a great many of these scorn-heapers are inhibited in their actual lives and have no other avenue of release, and so use the Internet to vent their anger and resentment. This has already become one reason why people are calling for an intensification of controls on the Internet. But of course another reason [for this type of behavior online] is the management of the Web itself [NOTE: the writer avoids directly saying “government censorship”, presumably to avoid attracting too much attention]. Managers [of the Web] do not value and cherish it, and sometimes on the contrary inhibit and diminish the development of reason on the Internet, which helps to ensure that vituperation prevails.
I support the idea that the Internet be regulated. Still, I don’t think the issue is the revilers themselves, but rather ensuring we get rid of the market and incentive for such hatefulness. On the one hand, we need to promote the idea of self-discipline among individuals and Websites, to clear up the field on their own, including the development of strong critical opinion; on the other hand, we need to make sure that voices of reason expand on the Web, which means those sites with intellectual content and a sense of learnedness should expand and receive protection. The relationship between reasoned discussion and irrational scorn is one of inverse proportions [“as one is ascendant, the other is in decline”]. If Websites of authority that approach questions with reasoned thought and earnest exploration are few and far between, then naturally they deserve to be treasured. If among these are thoughts or viewpoints that are rather vehement or “unorthodox”, this means an intensity of ideas and not that the language is unreasonable or cruel.
But we have seen these Websites suffer repeatedly, so that scorn and meaningless personal attacks can flow unobstructed in the name of a number of ideologies, or prevail under the banner of noble generalities like “morality”, “justice” or “patriotism”. Meanwhile, moderate, reasoned and constructive viewpoints need only differ in understanding from the tenets and standards of some few managers [NOTE: i.e., party leaders] to meet with trouble and lose the Web platform through which they are expressed.
This kind of brutal and arbitrary management not only interdicts the development of moderate, reasonable and constructive intellectual Websites, but by its very method provides the paradigm for the brutal and peremptory.
For any normal society, an attitude of respect for reason has importance and precedence over what particular viewpoint one holds. That is to say, how one expresses oneself and resolves differences of opinion is more important than one’s actual position.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 3, 2006, 3:50pm]

As mainland Chinese media continue to throw their support behind two Chinese journalists facing a costly libel suit from a Taiwanese manufacturing company in a Shenzhen court [wrap-up of coverage at ESWN] [Summary of contrarian positions at Danwei.org], a term generally cold-shouldered in Chinese media, press freedom (新闻自由), is emerging discreetly in the debate.
While proxy terms like “freedom of expression” (言论自由) and “watchdog journalism” (舆论监督) appear more frequently in China’s officially controlled media, press freedom (lit. “news freedom”) remains politically sensitive and is typically reserved for pejorative uses, like “so-called press freedom” or “bourgeois press freedom”, or for references to media outside China (such as the current controversy over the Gillian Chung photos in Hong Kong, see ESWN).
In an online essay in 2004, Beijing University professor Jiao Guobiao blasted the Central Propaganda Department for clamping down on the use of the term [more at ESWN]: “Everyone knows that China’s doesn’t have too much press freedom, but rather too little press freedom. I ask, who is it that takes what pitifully little press freedom we have and gives it yet shorter weight? It is the Central Propaganda Department. Press freedom is a measure of a society’s degree of sophistication. Sages in the West have said, we can do without government, but we can not do without press freedom.
The Central Propaganda Department, which sees press freedom as its enemy, won’t even allow the words ‘press freedom’ to be used at will
. This is clearly a brazen trampling on the most basic principles of civilization.” [Chinese text available here]. Jiao was later removed from his university position for this criticism, which propaganda officials saw as a supreme act of brazenness.
News of the recent lawsuit against mainland journalists, brought by Foxconn against a reporter and editor at China Business News, was first spread through online forums on August 24 then taken national by The Beijing News on August 26.
The lawsuit alleges that a June 15 story written by Wang You (王佑), in which the reporter detailed a range of alleged labor violations by at a Foxconn facility in Shenzhen, was libelous. The suit also names China Business News editor Weng Bao (翁宝) as a defendant. Foxconn is demanding a public apology and seeking 10 million yuan in damages from Weng Bao and 20 million yuan from Wang You, and the court has reportedly complied with the company’s request that the assets of the defendants be frozen pending a decision.
The Beijing News yesterday said a petition was circulating on the Internet called “Opposing Foxconn’s Use of Corporate Resources to Attack Journalists and Intrude on Press Freedom”.
In a page four report on the case today, Nanfang Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Guangdong Party Committee, quoted Yu Guoming, a well-known media expert from Renmin University, as saying that the case involved a company “using loopholes in our nation’s laws to limit press freedom”. Shanghai Securities Daily also paraphrased Yu Guoming as saying the case was a “violation of press freedom”.
A number of Chinese media referred to a December 2004 case in which the Association of Taiwan Journalists (ATJ) launched a petition supporting reporter Kuang Wen-chi, who was being sued by the chairman of Hon Hai Precision Industry, the TSE-listed company that owns Foxconn. The 2004 petition urged international brands like Apple Computer against choosing manufacturing partners that “ignore human rights and impinge on press freedom” [English coverage here].
According to Article 35 of China’s constitution, citizens of the People’s Republic of China nominally “enjoy freedom of speech, of the press [出版自由/lit. “publishing freedom”], of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.” But the term “press freedom”, regarded as part of “publishing freedom” [出版自由], continues to be politically charged.
Media censors in China — the very same ones Jiao Guobiao criticized — likely view use of the term as less objectionable in the Foxconn case because it involves a claim of rights against a private company from Taiwan rather than against the Communist Party or Chinese leadership.
[Posted by David Bandurski, August 30, 2006, 2:15pm]