In a report appearing today at Sina.com, Southern Weekend exposes a provisional system used at a local party newspaper in Anhui Province since October 18 that makes promotion of journalists conditional on “positive reports” recognized by national level media. The Southern Weekend article details a system that seems to work as an official glass ceiling for journalists seeking promotion to higher positions and offers an inside look at how local governments are working to tighten control of the news at party publications.
In a section on professional assessments for “high-level” (高级) reporters and editors (a specific employment designation) the so-called “provisional standards” for promotion at the party newspaper of an unnamed “prefectural city” in Anhui include the following requirements: “Every year no less than three positive articles about Anhui should appear in major central media, and no less than 30 articles for employees engaged full-time in supplying major central media”. By major central media, the guidelines refer to People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, Economic Daily, China Central Television and China People’s Radio, according to Southern Weekend.
“Emphasizing positive news” is a key rule of China’s propaganda regime. An Anhui official explained use of the word “positive” in the requirements by saying they referred to reports written in line with another key propaganda concept, “correct guidance of public opinion”.
“As for those masters holding high-level positions, if they’re not familiar with specific policies, how can they keep a grasp on correct guidance of public opinion?” Southern Weekend quoted one local official as saying in defense of the standards.
While Southern Weekend’s report is not overtly critical, it focuses on the difficulties faced by journalists working under such rules. The report opens as a story about one journalist (name changed in the report) whose promotion is barred by the new rules. We’ll have to wait and see how the authorities respond to this frank airing of propaganda rules which does not take their legitimacy for granted.
Top COMMENTS at Sina.com (4:02pm):
I encourage them to write fake stuff.
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As an Anhui resident I have no words!
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As a national citizen I have no words!!
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This is how officialdom is in Anhui, they’re all mediocre. The old heroes have been sent away, or co-opted.
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These kinds of leaders should be removed!!
[Posted by David Bandurski, October 26, 2006, 4:00pm]

Local police in Chongqing admitted they had wrongfully detained a local government worker, Qin Zhongfei (秦中飞), for writing and transmitting by mobile phone a poem satirizing local leaders in the municipality’s Pengshui County. The announcement came just weeks after Chinese commercial media took Qin’s story (and his satirical poem) to a national audience [Coverage by Danwei.org and Law Professor’s Blog].
Qin Zhongfei’s lawyer, Li Gang (李纲), told reporters yesterday that they had received formal notification of the case’s dismissal because “criminal action should not have been taken against Qin Zhongfei”. Qin has also received 2,125.7 yuan (US$260) in “national compensation” from the prosecutor’s office for the error, media reported.
The investigation against Qin by local Pengshui County police began on September 1, and Qin was arrested on September 11. By October 19 various commercial media in China, including Southern Weekend and Southern Metropolis Daily, were attacking the action against Qin.
In a Southern Metropolis Daily “personal viewpoint” column on October 21, a professor from Nanjing wrote: “About this case, one can’t help recalling U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s speech in 1941 on the ‘Four Freedoms‘. Two of Roosevelt’s freedoms were, ‘freedom of speech and expression’ and ‘freedom from fear’. Qin Zhongfei has, for the sake of the first freedom, lost the second”.
Internet users responding to news the case against Qin had been dropped asked what might have happened had media not stepped in. “First of all, if the media hadn’t gotten involved, this case might have gone all the way,” wrote one netizen. “Qin Zhongfei is nothing compared to China, Chongqing and Pengshui County. It’s no big deal for them to punish you without cause, to break up your family, to take 10 or 20 people associated with your family and drag them down into hell for eternity. So the media gets involved, so what? They send over a few cops to get Qin Zhongfei out, they apologize and pay him a bit of money, but nothing happens to the officials. It’s a wrongful case, so the national government pays!”
Another responded: “Wrongful case, the government pays? Doesn’t the money paid [to Qin] come from the blood and sweat of the taxpayers? In this county, at the People’s Congress, at the Politics and Law Committee, at the Public Security Bureau, at the Procurator’s Office . . . don’t any of them know the law?”
[Posted by David Bandurski, October 26, 2006, 11:10am]

Last week China’s 21st Century Business Herald reported that information industry officials had tasked a “Weblog research group” with exploring the creation of an identification system for the country’s blogging population, requiring all users to register with their real names. The news drew anger from commercial media and Internet users, sparking a debate over privacy, anonymity and freedom of expression.
21st Century Business Herald cited a source on October 19 as saying that the Ministry of Information Industry had asked the Internet Society of China, an association of Internet industry companies under the thumb of Internet ministers (the same group that issued a self-censorship contract earlier this year), to address six Internet “agenda items”, including the scope of a “blog identification system” (博客实名制) like that recently implemented for mobile phones in China. The association formed the “Weblog research group” on August 2, with representation from 13 Internet companies including, said Youth Daily (Shanghai), people.com.cn, Qianlong, Sina.com, Sohu.com and Netease. Microsoft, which operates its MSN Spaces blog service in China, is also a member of the Internet Society of China and listed on the group’s Website [BBC on alleged Microsoft self-censorship of blogs]. Other US Internet companies, including Yahoo!, have been criticized by human rights advocates for cooperating with the efforts of the Internet Society of China. One topic of skepticism among Chinese media and Internet users has been the nature of this organization and what right it has to make decisions touching on the rights of hundreds of thousands of Internet users in China.

[ABOVE: Microsoft (China) listed among members of the Internet Society of China]
The next day, October 20, criticisms of the proposed identification system started coming from commercial media in China, reminiscent of other recent public policy-related rallies, including that against China’s draft emergency response law and Internet regulations in Chongqing.
Zhu Sipei (朱四倍) wrote in the New Express that officials were resorting to identification systems as a kind of crude last “straw to clutch at”, as though by implementing such systems in all areas of society they could solve public management issues with one stroke.
Zhu attributed the use of identification systems to an entrenched “paternalism” in the government, or the notion that leaders must check personal freedoms for the good of the people. The writer refered to the theories of economist Janos Kornai [JSTOR paper 01][JSTOR paper 02][Elena Lankova on paternalism and state socialism]:
I believe the fact that identification systems have become popular forms of management underscores a cultural and technical predicament. Speaking to deeper causes, paternalism is an important reason for the birth of these identification systems.
In China, ‘Managing you for your own good’ (管你，是为你好) is a manifestation of the government’s paternalism. From our tradition of father-mother officials [local magistrates] to comprehensive support under the planned economy, we have always been accustomed in our hearts to being citizen-children (子民), yearning for and receiving the care of the government. Under the market economy, the government’s direct participation in the economy has lessened, but intrusion and control and surveillance are a common occurrence. This kind of parental attitude can be glimpsed everywhere in government control and surveillance actions. But does our society need this kind of paternalistic logic?
It can be said that as identification systems encroach on public rights and benefits they have no way of gaining the people’s respect. If a system is does not have the consent and trust of the public, not only does it have no way of gaining legitimacy, it will carry enormous social costs. Paternalistic logic makes clear to all that identification systems face the prospect of failure [abortion] even before they are born.

An editorial in yesterday’s Southern Metropolis Daily questioned the nature of the Internet Society of China and why it had the power to “trample” on the speech freedoms of Internet users.
According to reports, the government is kicking around the idea of a “blog identification system”. Some say it’s “already decided”, others say it’s not yet been approved. But amidst a furor of opposition online Yang Junzuo, secretary of the “Internet Society of China” and the “Self-Discipline Work Committee”, has already said that “rolling out an identification system for blogs does not merit fear of what influence it will have”.
Freedom of expression is no doubt relative, but what we’re seeing here is: an association whose nature we do not understand, and a committee whose nature we likewise don’t know, can without reservation trample on the speech freedoms of all Chinese bloggers.
This Secretary Yang says: We cannot speak rashly and say unreasonable things simply because of Internet freedom.
Speaking rashly is not doubt a bad thing; before we speak we should moderate what we are going to say. But again what we’re seeing here is: an association whose nature we do not understand, and a committee whose nature we likewise don’t know, can presume to teach us what is reasonable.
The editorial’s tone is angry, and concludes with the bitterly sarcastic suggestion China simply shut down the Web altogether:
Therefore, I advocate completely blocking off the Internet, even to the point of cancelling all Weblogs and the Internet – then we can be sure we don’t have any of this “unreasonable” online behavior. Come to think of it, even if China doesn’t have an Internet, I really think we should continue to preserve, or even expand, the “Internet Society of China”, preserving and honoring the grand contributions these two secretaries (we could raise it to 20 secretaries) have done for freedom, control and surveillance, reason and order.
Web postings to the Southern Metropolis Daily editorial at Sina.com grabbed the sarcastic tone with gusto:
Yeah. I wholeheartedly agree with putting a lid on the Web! Let’s return to that great and pure age of stone tablets! Then we’ll never again have to get a handle on these illegal blogs!
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Cancelling the Web? This is a good idea, but it doesn’t really go far enough. I think we should should cancel words and language altogether. Only in this way can we control speech “at the roots”.

Huaxi Metropolis Daily quoted on industry insider yesterday as saying: “There’s no telling what kind of influence this thing could have on the market”.
Yangcheng Evening News wrote in an editorial that “responsible freedom” could come only when citizens’ rights and benefits were protected:
That ‘freedom is relative’ is not wrong, and it’s also correct to say that ‘only responsible freedom is healthy freedom’. But the condition has to be that freedom is preserved – only when there is a freedom in which rights and benefits are guaranteed thoroughly by the law does the possibility of abuse of that freedom arise . . .
Wanting to pass a blog identification system to make people take responsibility for their expression is a false problem. Only when freedoms are guaranteed does the question of “abusing freedom” arise. Only when there is freedom of expression can we talk about self-restraint . . .
—————–
[ON “identification” and “anonymity”]

Beijing Youth Daily
Basic Reasons for Identification and Anonymity
October 16, 2006

The news that an identification system (实名制) [“real-name system”] will be in place for mobile phones by year’s end has lately brought a great deal of discussion.
From going online to making a bank deposit or buying a mobile phone – the news and appeals have not stopped in recent years. Within this discussion the question of anonymity is often seen as a person’s right (权利) and the identification system is portrayed as meaning responsibility and duty. So as soon as one raises the question of identification systems, people can’t help but be sensitive to the question of rights – on the Web, this is sensitivity about the freedom to express oneself (自由表达权); when we make bank deposits or buy mobile phones, it’s a concern about our own privacy. All of these [concerns] are reasonable.
But what are the basic reasons for employing anonymity or identification? I’m afraid [to answer] this requires going back and considering the issue of rights and responsibilities between people and basic human logic and sensibilities.
Both anonymity and identification concern the social relationship between people. Different principles apply to various levels of society.
First of all, public and private are different levels. Public affairs and private affairs are also different levels. A person’s expression concerning public affairs constitutes public opinion (舆论). It should not be subject to “forced identification” (强制实名), just as is the case with street-side conversation which cannot be subjected to forced identification.
But if a person’s speech is directed at one individual this does not constitute “public”, but rather a connection between one individual and another individual. In such cases the speaker should be identified, whether online or offline. But when a particular person goes online and at one instance addresses the public and in the next instance addresses an individual, how do we determine the issues of anonymity versus identification? This is a conundrum present only on the Web. In my view, the first thought should be with protecting their right to public expression, and afterwards with his civil responsibility as an individual. Actually, in the event that there is no identification and the rights of another are intruded upon, it is possible to obtain evidence about the identity [of the anonymous person in question] through technical means. As, for example, in recent cases of online defamation.
Unlike public anonymity, our contacts and existences as individuals are generally all identified, whether it be national hukou registration (ID cards), marriage licenses or interactions among friends, relatives or colleagues. We interact as identified and recognized friends and colleagues – including by telephone; we also use real names to make contact with various government offices, registering for this or that permit.
On the personal level identification is the principle and condition under which we ordinarily accept interaction. If you don’t know a person’s name or surname, you don’t invite them to your home. We cross paths with innumerable people on the streets but don’t ask each for their name. But if you have an interaction with someone, you want to know their name . . .
But why is it that when you purchase something in an ordinary situation no one demands your identification? When you buy a tube of toothpaste the shop doesn’t have any reason to demand you prove your identity. This is because this interaction is not between two individuals, but only an exchange of objects (a product for money). When two individuals interact identification is required because these individuals must take responsibility in the interaction; for money and things there is no need for identification and knowing names, only for exchange according to an agreed-upon price.
Well then, why does using the telephone require registration? This is not a simple exchange between buyer and seller . . . but a question of long-term service, and this service assumes such relationships as credit, and in the credit relationship an interpersonal relationship is subsumed in the exchange of goods for money . . . The telephone is fundamentally different from the Internet in the sense that it is basically a tool for interpersonal communication, and not a tool of public expression (the two are best not confused). . . .
Of course, it’s understandable that people want to remain anonymous to protect their privacy and avoid being sold out by businesses, because the protection offered by anonymity is simply reliable judging from present circumstances. But taking a more long-term view, many of our rights should not rely on anonymity for their protection, because the vast majority of social interactions and social events cannot go on anonymously. It is therefore necessary to build a system that protects both the right to privacy and the right to expression, including a system for seeking responsibility in cases where rights are violated. We cannot simply rely negatively on anonymity.

[Posted by David Bandurski, October 23, 2006, 6:00pm]

Last week Chinese censors reiterated a prior ban on all coverage of an incident at a county school in China’s western Gansu Province where the principal was allegedly found to have drawn blood from scores of pupils over several years to “cure” them of diseases, according to CMP sources. The story, first reported by Hong Kong’s Wenweipo and later by other media in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, is a good case study about why Chinese media censors sometimes ban stories that have little apparent impact on leadership circles.

Wenweipo, a newspaper run by the central party in Beijing but outside the purview of the central propaganda department (being in Hong Kong), reported on September 13 that the principal of an elementary school in the county of Weiyuan, Gansu Province, used a razor blade to cut the neck or abdomen of his pupils, and then sucked blood from the wounds. More than 30 students are reported to have suffered since the principal’s appointment to the position in 2000. The principal allegedly explained to his pupils that drawing blood was a cure for disease. He reportedly threatened pupils with expulsion if they revealed to others what he had done. Investigators are also alleging sexual abuse of some of the students.
The story did not appear in mainland print media, but was picked up by news editors at two mainland Websites, China Finance Information Network and 21cn, on September 15. Both sites mentioned Wenweipo as the source of the story.
Several days after the above-mentioned web coverage, propaganda leaders took notice of the story. By September 10, according to CMP sources, a ban was in place.
The news was also posted under aliases on a number of small websites and personal blogs, most of which also sourced the Wenweipo report. One netizen noted back on September 15 that the item had not appeared in domestic media: “Who would have thought such a thing could happen, and it’s reported by people in Hong Kong. Media here on the mainland probably wouldn’t dare cover it”.
So why are censors worried about the story now, weeks after the first news came out? And what is the danger to begin with in reporting a story about a local incident of abuse by a school principal? After all, Chinese media have been reporting small-time cases of official abuse of power and corruption under the mandate of “supervision by public opinion” (or “watchdog journalism”) since the late 1980s.
We can only speculate as to the particular motives of bans in China, which are delivered informally over the telephone or at “breeze sessions”, or chuifenghui, but we do know Chinese leaders are highly sensitive to human rights-related criticism from outside China. It is possible censors are concerned that the Gansu story might fuel more international coverage turning attention to the rights of children there. This is an area regularly watched by international press and human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch.
In the past, censors have banned similar news stories for the perceived damage they could cause to China’s human rights record. Back in 2005, CMP sources cited bans on a story about an orphanage in Hunan Province that was found to have been trafficking babies for profit. Mass media were ordered not to report on the case, which “involved sensitive problems such as human rights”, the CMP source said.
Another possible motive for banning the Gansu story is its link to the sensitive area of education in China. There have been a number of cases lately involving issues of student rights or welfare. A student riot at Zhengzhou University in Henan Province on June 15 was not reported on the mainland [coverage at ESWN].
A final observation about the recent Gansu report is the increasing boldness of Hong Kong’s Wenweipo, which has pushed the envelope on a number of recent stories despite the fact it represents the views of the central party in Beijing. When Chinese media reported the crash of a military “transport” plane in June this year, the Wenweipo revealed that the plane was actually an Airborne Warning and Control System (Awacs) aircraft, representing a bigger strategic setback for the Chinese.
[Posted by Brian Chan and David Bandurski, October 19, 2006, 10:25am]

As the end of 2006 approaches the likelihood of China taking action on the proposed Ordinance on Information Disclosure [Caijing’s Hu Shuli at FEER], entered in the State Council’s legislative calendar this year, unfortunately diminishes. But public access to information has become an issue of growing importance in recent years — not just to media, who increasingly see themselves as defender’s of the public’s right to know, but also to the ordinary citizens, who see it as an effective way of checking runaway corruption. This year the debate over China’s draft emergency management law and a row between Fujian provincial party officials and outside commercial media and the national Xinhua News Agency brought the issue of information disclosure into focus.
The following chart, using data obtained from the Wisenews database of mainland Chinese newspapers, shows the rapid rise of “information disclosure” and “information transparency” as terms of importance.

[NOTE: Search conducted for “information disclosure” or “information transparency”]
The terms were virtually missing in 1999, with the database showing only five articles for that year. In the first nine months of this year occurrence by article totaled 2,897, on track for a 16 percent increase over 2005.
Below is an October 12 editorial appearing in Western Economic Daily, a commercial paper in Lanzhou in China’s western Gansu province. It is a good example of how predominantly commercial media are approaching the issue of information disclosure and the public’s right to know. In this case the issues are environmental protection and official cover up:

Western Economic Daily
Lying Officials are Harmful to Government Honesty
By Lu Zeguan (staff editorial writer)
An inspection team for “cleaning up illegally polluting enterprises” comprising officials from seven State Council ministries including the State Environmental Protection Administration and the Development and Reform Commission … arrived at Guizhou’s Liupanshui City. Liupanshui’s vice-mayor, Ye Dachuan (叶大川) lied through his teeth to the inspection team.
That a government official lied through his teeth is not news. China Central Television’s “Focus” [an investigative news show started in the 1990s] regularly reveals cases in which plenty of officials face the camera and lie through their teeth, their eyes steady, their faces not flushing, their hearts not quickening … [Talks about case of Shaanxi official jailed 13 years for lottery-related corruption].
[Talks about corrupt behavior and lying among officials as basically rooted in poor morality] … Of course, in building up a knowledge and sense of honesty, of speaking the truth to the people, mere moral education is not enough. More important is the creation of institutions and guarantees.
Creation of a mature system can check the power of officials, ensuring they cannot cheat the people with lies. First of all, government information must be open and transparent. If there is not open and transparent information and all situations are locked in official safe boxes, well then, officials can completely lie to the people. It’s in the human character to be self-interested and think about benefit to oneself. When personal interest and reputation are involved, anyone might do what they can to protect their interests and reputation. If a government official’s hold on information is exclusive and the vast majority of people are kept in the dark, well then, in all probability they will choose the language most beneficial to themselves and avoid language that is disadvantageous. So disclosure of information is the precondition for putting an end to official lies.
Secondly, under this precondition of information transparency and the public’s right to know,
we must safeguard the right of the people to supervise [leaders]. The people should have the right to supervise and make inquiries of government bodies and the work of government officials by entrusting representatives to make inquiries before the People’s Congress, making petitions by letter and call, or through the mass media. While the people’s right to supervise power is guaranteed by the Constitution, there are no specific laws or regulations that make this actually happen. With open and transparent information and with people empowered to monitor government power, leaders who lie through their teeth will become laughingstocks before the people. Officials with government and social status will doubtless be more fearful when they open their mouths to speak …

[Posted by David Bandurski, October 16, 2006, 2:55pm]

When news came late last month of the sacking of Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu on corruption charges, there was little sign of dissenting opinion in China’s domestic media. All news reports and commentary were carefully controlled. But in a Page 2 editorial today, purportedly written by a newspaper reader, Southern Metropolis Daily asked slightly tougher questions about the Chen Liangyu case and its relationship to larger questions of governance and public opinion in China:
Letter to the Editor
Southern Metropolis Daily
October 6, 2006
The big news of last month should have be the uncovering of a corrupt official at the highest levels. On the day the news came of this official’s removal, I, the humble Mr. Li, searched tens of thousands of Web pages. What I, the humble Mr. Li, found were all positive reports about Chen, singing his praises. Only when I clicked “most recent news on Chen Liangyu” did I find news of his removal.
On the Xinhua News Agency website [xinhuanet.com.cn] there were more than 10,000 postings for the news of the high official’s fall. If these comments were really from the hands of ordinary Web users, they might be said to be the seething of popular opinion. Those postings that could make it onto the site all voiced the same message, primarily that “Chen Liangyu’s removal from office gave satisfaction to the general population”. Judging from their language those making comments felt intense anger at Chen. But what is harder to understand is where exactly this popular opinion was before Chen Liangyu was removed from office? When you search for news about him before his removal, absolutely everything is positive, everything sings his praise! I, the humble Mr. Li, am not suggesting I don’t believe Chen Liangyu wasn’t corrupt. What I wonder about is of those officials now in their posts singing hymns of anti-corruption, how many are actually clean? Mr. Li feels saddened by this suppression of popular opinion.
Another form of opinion [on the Internet] is of the “Long Live!” variety. But the way I see it, even though ordinary people can cure their diseases, get educations, purchase homes, get jobs, earn their pensions, all of this should just be the basic responsibility of leaders. With the burden of “The Four Mountains” [living space, education, healthcare, pensions], and given how tough it is to find a job, why should we have to cry out “Long Live!”?
As Mid-Autumn arrives, the humble Mr. Li would like to go off on his own spiel:
In the city in which the humble Mr. Li lives, we refer to our leaders, big and small, as “Spring and Autumn Officials”. “Spring and Autumn” refers to the Spring and Mid-Autumn Festivals! [At these times] companies big and small are busy giving out “gifts of regard” [money or gifts to officials]. This is about building up personal connections rather than just working! What more can we possibly say?
Li Yilong
(This column reflects only the personal views of the writer)
[Posted by David Bandurski, October 6, 2006, 12:32pm]

Bowing to public pressure, the Chinese municipality of Chongqing revised regulations requiring private at-home Internet users to register by October 30, according to a local newspaper [Coverage at Sina.com here].
The revisions, announced today in the Chongqing Evening Post, specify that: “Those requiring registration at the Public Security Bureau are limited to Internet companies (互联单位), corporate users (接入单位) and information service companies (信息服务单位). [Individual] users are not required to go through these procedures”.
The original regulations, made public on July 7, prompted criticism from media and online chatrooms. Many Chinese, including those outside Chongqing, felt the regulations went too far, infringing on personal freedoms. “So is everyone who goes online a criminal?” asked one netizen responding on Sina.com shortly after the regulations were announced. “Do they think that by [requiring] registration they can control criminal online behavior? … Those who made this policy should study those portions of the Constitution dealing with the people’s basic rights. So can you trample on people’s basic rights just to control criminal behavior?”
One month after local officials made the announcement, national media continued to debate the issue. Caijing, a leading Chinese business magazine, said in an August 7 editorial directly addressing the Chongqing policy that the Internet is an important tool for citizen participation in debates over public policy. The editorial called apathetic citizens the “greatest enemies of freedom”.
Coverage of the revised regulations in today’s Chongqing Evening Post said the July announcement had brought “widespread attention from city residents”.
A few postings from Sina.com concerning the revisions follow:
I don’t know which person in a high place it was who thought of this rotten idea. But recognizing the error of it and making changes, that’s a very good thing.
—————-
From the time these regulations came out you could see the level of Chongqing city leaders — primary school graduates.

—————-
This really is the pride of the people of Chongqing. I’m so happy.
—————-
You don’t have to drop your pants to fart.
—————-

Do you have to register to crawl into bed in Chongqing? Well then, everyone should just avoid the place.
—————-
To put it softly, whoever thought of having people going online in their homes heading to the Public Security Bureau to register wasn’t right in the head! But seriously, this impacts the international perception of China. They can see how far we are from a political culture of governing by established principles.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 27, 2006, 11:55am]

Web users responded quickly to news of the removal of Shanghai’s top leader, Chen Liangyu in a broadening pensions scandal. The removal of Chen, a close protege of former president Jiang Zemin, has intensified speculation that Hu Jintao is moving against political enemies ahead of a key leadership conference next year. [Coverage from Bloomberg][Coverage from AFP][Coverage from People’s Daily]

Web postings, or gentie, responding to news of Chen’s removal posted at the top of popular Web portal Sina.com had reached 9,210 by 4:03pm Beijing time. One hour later the number had risen to 14,998.
Chinese media coverage of corruption cases can often amount to a ritual demonization of the official in question and generally shuns exploration of institutional factors. Many of the postings at Sina.com seem to follow this pattern, venting anger and praising Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. But cooler voices are there too. Translations of selected postings follow:
My first thought was total surprise, my second thought was that Hu [Jintao] and Wen [Jiabao] have a lot of guts, my third thought was that the ordinary people of China have hope!!!!!!!
————-
Throwing the book at corrupt officials means the central party is serious in its war on corruption. The people are in support!
————-
The important thing isn’t getting corrupt officials it’s doing reform to get rid of the systematic [problems] that provide a fertile ground for corruption. Otherwise, we’ll just have the following soap opera: one the one hand we’ll be getting rid of corrupt officials and on the other our current system will be constantly creating new ones. Getting corrupt officials and system reforms is a question about fundamentals versus quick fixes.
————-
I think the central party should look into this further and find out who it was who promoted this corrupt official! They should look into his predecessors and the predecessors of his predecessors.
————-
This makes people so happy, that the central party represents the interests of the grassroots and does something real. Thank you! These kinds of things are actually common in Shanghai. They’ve all been covered up and people don’t dare open their mouths because they’re afraid. I want the address and contact telephone for the 100 person corruption investigation team [working in Shanghai].

————-

Actually, the power of Chinese officials is too great. It’s lack of oversight that has created this situation.

————-
The hope of the Chinese people lies in President Hu and Premier Wen!
————-
We need to go further in understanding the protracted nature and complexities of the war against corruption … Party organizations at various levels need to actively strengthen education and management of party cadres, particularly those in leadership positions … and the checking and supervision of power needs to be strengthened …
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 25, 2006, 5:03pm]

A Web user from a city south of Guangzhou is suing a popular local Website for blocking his login ID, shutting down his mailbox and erasing his Web postings, according to a report in Southern Metropolis Daily. The case has been accepted by the Zhongshan Intermediate Court.
The Web user, named in the report as Mr. Liang, is suing the Website for allegedly violating his personal copyright. He is asking that the site reinstate his ID and Web postings.
In China, where the Internet is strictly controlled by legions of Web police and various government offices, including the Public Security Bureau, the case also implicates the state’s censorship regime. A representative from the Website told Southern Metropolis Daily that Mr. Liang’s postings, made under the Web alias “Xiandai Ximin” (现代刁民), included “negative content damaging to government organs” and that they had “received a notice from Internet management authorities”.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 22, 2006, 12:40pm]

Public disclosure of information has been a major topic of debate in the Chinese media this year. June brought controversy over China’s draft emergency law (we still haven’t heard the last word on this). In July came a row over disaster coverage, which focused on how to ensure release of reliable information about events like floods and typhoons. Most recently, China’s highest court announced new rules limiting media coverage of judicial proceedings, which some media have called backstepping on court transparency. Backgrounding it all, we have the proposed “Ordinance on Government Information Release” (政府信息公开条例) on the State Council’s legislative calendar this year, which Caijing magazine editor Hu Shuli has called “another new milestone” [SEE Hu Shuli, “The Imperative of Information Freedom”, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2006, p. 62-63].
In an editorial in Beijing Youth Daily on September 18, Ma Shaohua (马少华), a professor of journalism at Renmin University, wrote about the Chinese court’s announcement that it was building a press announcement system (新闻发布体制), which came alongside the new limitations on court coverage. He wrote: “At the core of the above prohibitions is the formation of the press announcement system. The press announcement system did not originate with the courts. Over the last two years it has been built up progressively by government at various levels. What is its basic goal? Is it to give the people a faster and more authoritative channel for information, or is it to limit, lessen and control information?”
Yesterday’s Southern Metropolis Daily featured a second editorial from Ma Shaohua, in which he attacked the court’s reasons for limiting media coverage. CMP wrote on September 14 that Chinese media were citing the problem of “public opinion verdicts” as the court’s reason for the new limitations. Some Western media have tacked the court rules onto the long list of recent disappointments on press freedom, suggesting all are part of a concerted crackdown ahead of the 2008 Olympics [See “Silent Games”, Newsweek]. That conclusion is premature and probably too reductive.
In his Southern Metropolis Daily editorial, Ma Shaohua returned to the question of “public opinion verdicts”, or what he called “media verdicts” (媒体审判). He responded to suggestions by Chinese officials that China is not alone among modern nations in limiting court coverage: “The rather strict limits on media coverage of court trials in some countries is not primarily to limit [the media’s] influence on judges of cultivated experience, but to prevent their influence on those ordinary people who comprise juries — because those standing in the important position of deciding innocence or guilt are ordinary people, and so may be influenced by the media. Our justice system does not have such juries”. Western judicial systems, said Ma, did not simply deal with media coverage by issuing bans. What was most important, he said, was balancing the various interests involved in a case (the public’s right to know, the right to personal privacy, etc.). This should not mean the outright denial of one of these (i.e., the public’s right to know).
All of these issues — from disaster coverage to judicial transparency — hinge on the relationship between the public welfare and the public’s right to know. The theme was raised again yesterday in yet another Southern Metropolis Daily editorial. This time the issue was public safety:
Southern Metropolis Daily
September 21, 2006
Two weeks ago a rumor circulated in Zhuhai and Zhongshan: a criminal was on the loose in Zhongshan who had repeatedly plundered homes and murdered people. The mood of terror spread. The emellishment of certain details pressed young girls to stay off the streets. The impact on citizens was enormous. Only on September 10, when Zhongshan Daily finally printed a wanted circular issued by the public security bureau, did the mood simmer down.
My first recollections of serial killers take place in northeast China . . . I remember fliers with black-and-white pictures posted on electric poles and shop doors. At the time there was no Internet and even telephones were scarce. Those fliers on the electric poles were talismans that meant criminals would find no place to hide. In the Internet age, Ma Jiajue (马加爵), who murdered four people, and drug kingpin Liu Zhaohua (刘招华) who had pursued by police for years, were captured shortly after their stories appeared on China Central Television. The sources coming forward were ordinary people. This tells us that only with disclosure of information can popular terror be avoided and the power the people contribute to breaking cases.
Zhongshan’s Public Security Bureau has always placed importance on information disclosure, and has regularly publicized public security information . . . in relevant media, which have reported and publicized [information]. In this case, appropriately timed public disclosure of information about a criminal suspect not only helped people understand the real situation and increase their knowledge of how to protect themselves, it also showed that political and public security organs have the ability to make people confident their safety is protected.
But we should notice that there is still a gap between the beginning of the investigation and disclosure of information. Of course, details that might help put people on guard and protect themselves, such as the suspect’s mode of operation and target profile, are still unclear during this time. But this has to do with China’s lack of a safety information disclosure system (危险信息公开的制度) or detailed rules on how to handle [such information]. Moreover, the readers reached by media publicizing such information are limited, and vast populations of migrants find it difficult to access such information. These are issues that the Public Security Bureau, the media and the people should consider more closely for dealing with dangerous incidents (危险事件). Southern Metropolis Weekly recently published “A Personal Safety Guide for the City”, which offered readers knowledge on how to manage the safety of their persons, family and property. Created with assistance from police, it included safety maps of a number of cities, including Shenzhen, Shanghai and Beijing, revealing areas of high crime. This was an innovation in the publicizing of city safety information.
Government offices have said that provincial and local level cities are in the process of establishing a network of political and public security organs. As a member of the justice system, the writer earnestly hopes that related Websites can forge a way to a system of safety information disclosure, telling [people] how to prevent crime, teaching ordinary people how to protect themselves . . .making public those areas where crime is highest and providing information about modes of operation and target profiles, publicizing information about murder cases, and using example cases to educate the population. We deeply believe that only by uniting the people and the police [through information disclosure], by mobilizing citizen participation, can we protect persons and property and ensure the criminals have no place to hide.

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 22, 2006, 12:05pm]