Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
In the dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party, the term “one position as the highest authority,” or dingyuyizun (定于一尊), has for decades been used in a decidedly negative sense — to suggest power and position that escapes necessary constraints. But in recent weeks this negative phrase seems to have been dusted off, and a fresh coat of paint applied. It now rings as an affirmation of the need for resolute leadership.
On July 5, the People’s Daily reported a speech Xi Jinping made to a national work conference on Party appointments, known as “organization work,” or zuzhi gongzuo (组织工作), that was held in Beijing from July 3-4. “The Central Party is the mind and the backbone,” the paper quoted Xi as saying, “and the Party must have one position as the highest authority (定于一尊), making the final decisions.”
Less than two weeks later, according to a report from China’s Legal Daily newspaper, Chen Yixin (陈一新), secretary-general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (and the former Zhejiang official and key Xi ally who oversaw the controversial push to remove crosses from churches), said at a commission study session: “We must firmly defend the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, firmly defend the Central Party as the one position of highest authority, making the final decisions . . . ”
Back at last year’s 19th National Congress, Xi Jinping actually made use of the phrase, but not with positive connotations. In one section of his voluminous political report, Xi Jinping said of China’s political system: “No one political system should be regarded as the only choice; and we should not just mechanically copy the political systems of other countries.” Here I have italicized and bolded those words in the official English translation of the political report that correspond to the Chinese phrase dingyuyizun. The idea here is that when it comes to political systems in the world, there is not one choice above all others. The right system, in other words, is a matter of social, cultural and historical context. Dingyuyizun is a classical phrase with origins in the Records of the Grand Historian (史记), a work by court official Sima Qian dating back to 94BC. In the Records of the Grand Historian, the three-character phrase dingyizun (定一尊) is used to describe the centralized rule of Qin Shihuang, the first emperor of China.
Since the People’s Daily was launched in 1946, the phrase “one position as the highest authority” has appeared 76 times in this reference book of official discourse. In nearly all of these instances the phrase is used in negatively — to criticize the ideas of feudal society, to criticize bureaucratism (官僚主义) within the Communist Party, to criticize the fascist rule of the Gang of Four. In the 1990s, the phrase was even used to criticize the Falun Gong spiritual movement. Here are just a handful of examples of the phrase at work in the Party’s history:
August 11, 1956: “Vicious criticism is not frightening. What is frightening is to allow viciousness to take on a leading role, with one position as the highest authority.” April 18, 1988: “History has already shown that banning diverse schools of thought, and setting one position as the highest authority necessarily results in the suppressing of the people (钳制人口), widespread fear of speaking out (万马齐喑), and the throttling of thought.” September 19, 1988: “Persecution for one’s writing is an extreme manifestation of feudal autocratic politics, and it is really about feudal rulers seeking to shackle thinking, suppress opinion and reach one position as the highest authority in politics.”
As we gaze across the expanse of People’s Daily time, we find that the first time that “one position as the highest authority” was ever used in a positive way occurred just a year ago, on June 16, 2017. Not surprisingly, that article dealt with the standing of Xi Jinping within the Party. “Various central departments of the state unswervingly defend through their real actions, the final decision-making authority and single position in highest authority of the Central Party with Xi Jinping as the core.”
Lest you be in any doubt that the one position of highest authority is Xi Jinping himself.
China has a serious problem with inflation. No, I’m not talking about inflationary pressures on the economy, though those numbers have been up. I’m talking about inflation of the national ego. The country, encouraged by relentless state propaganda, has grown full of itself — and this may dangerously diminish its basic capacity for self-reflection.
This, in any case, is the concern being voiced by a number of influencers inside China in recent weeks. And it may be the concern, as the SCMP reports, driving the reshuffle at the top of the State Council Information Office, which is responsible for the country’s overseas messaging.
But these reservations about the dangers of over-confidence have been brewing for some months, particularly in light of growing evidence that China’s more aggressive foreign policy stance, and its grandly stated ambitions to lead the world in areas ranging from technology and innovation to economic and political systems, has spooked many countries. For some in China, trade tensions with the United States are a much-needed wakeup call — even, perhaps, a reminder of the genius of the Deng Xiaoping injunction to “hide our strengths and bide our time.”
Back in September of last year, weeks ahead of the 19th National Congress, where Xi Jinping’s stature was political inflated to an extent we have not seen since perhaps the Mao era, Luo Jianbo (罗建波), head of the China Foreign Policy Center at the Central Party School, wrote a clear warning about the prematurity of China’s coming of age as a global power.
Luo’s article, in which he suggests that China is its own worst enemy, is still trending on WeChat. We offer a quick translation.
The curtains have closed on the Belt and Road Forum hosted by China. This is certainly the first time up to now that China’s call has received such widespread attention internationally. Chinese have reason to proud and encouraged. But the blanket praise by domestic media and scholars, and the emotions of conceit being expressed online, are cause for concern.
I still recall when the G20 meeting was held in Hangzhou in 2016, and everyone, whether officials or scholars, was saying that China had the “medicine” to cure the world of its economic woes. I remember this feeling that everyone was drunk and we were alone, that all nations were in decline and we were rising.
At this Belt and Road Forum some went even further, starting off on this drunken dream about how China now has “world leader” status. Some even wrote about how China is now the “savior” of the world.
Luo Jianbo (罗建波), head of the China Foreign Policy Center at the Central Party School.
Whether at the Hangzhou International Conference Center or at Yanqi Lake near Beijing, every time foreign leaders walk down that 50-meter stretch of red carpet and shake hands with Chinese leaders, many of us are overcome with excitement. And this precocious yet definitely immature sense of national greatness is still perhaps undergoing rapid inflation.
This premature sense of national greatness is shown not only in the Great Leap Forward mentality of “surpassing Britain and America,” and in the blind optimism about our own development achievements. It can also be seen in the explosion of narrow-minded nationalism and exclusionism that has followed recent frustrations and difficulties in our foreign relations. And again it is expressed in the disdain, contemp and superciliousness expressed toward certain smaller nations. In fact, these attitudes actually show a deficiency of true confidence among our people, and an immature sense of national greatness.
My goal in writing this is not to disparage China itself, but rather to explain that in the process of progressing toward status as a world power, Chinese must develop a sense of maturity, a steady big nation feeling and mentality.
Chinese should recognise with confidence that China is a developing nation, but that it is by its nature a big nation. In times of insufficient national strength, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders of the older generation never viewed our country as a small country or a weak country.
Chinese must also see that a national spirit with patriotism at the core is necessary to the achievement of national development and national rejuvenation. A certain degree of national pride, confidence and responsibility is also prerequisite in fostering national unity and in stimulating national growth.
Therefore, fostering a mature sense of national strength is necessary. It is about confidence without arrogance, pride without conceit.
We cannot forget. It was just a few years ago that people were still discussing how to understand the [Deng Xiaoping] injunction to “hide our strengths and bide our time, doing what we can.” But recently this has become a thing of the past. Concerning China’s development and the history of its foreign realtions with Chinese characteristics, some are already disatisfied with the incremental approach and want to push more forcefully. However, it is still my view that we need to have a clear understanding of our own development and our place in the world.
What does it mean to be a great world power?
Being a major world power is not just about having a massive economy and market, but requires also strong production capacity in terms of science and innovation and knowledge. It means having a global military presence as well as strong cultural influence, and it means having a voice that is heard in international institutions.
In terms of being a major world power, it is extremely important to do your part to contribute to the global economy, but you alsoo need to have a strong influence in addressing major world problems like global warming, and that you play a role in building global consensus and even provide the direction for global development.
China now has more and more “presence” in the world as a major power, but it lacks international influence and international discourse power in a full sense. Some foreign experts refwr to China as a “partial power” — and while that may not be music to the ears there is a lot of sense in it.
To accurately understand China’s basic national circumstances and its stage of development, we need pay close attention to the dialectical relationship between 3 things that haven’t changed, and 3 things that are unprecedented.
The report to the 18th National Congress of the CCP emphasized that “our country is still for the long-term in the primary stages of socialism and this basic national situation has not changed, and the daily increasingly material and cultural demands of the people remain in tension with social production, so the international status of our country as the world’s largest developing country has not changed.”
On this basis, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party pointed out that “we are approaching the center of the world stage to an extent that is unprecedented, we are approaching the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people to an extent that is unprecedented, and we have capacity and confidence to reach this goal to a degree that is unprecedented.
These three unchanged situations demand that we observe our own inadequacies, that we maintain strategically fixed and historically patient. The three unprecedented situations should motivate us to maintain optimism and confidence while we break new ground and stride ahead.
China has never realized the great rejuvenation of its people, has never become a major world power in the full sense. At this critical stage, maintaining an appropriately low profile (低调) has clear meaning for our long-term development goals.
The genius of “hiding our strengths and biding our time” was in avoiding the major barbs and tensions in the world, enabling us to avoid becoming the focus of tensions in the world. In the world before, this was essentially about remaining modest and guarding against pride and impatience, working to resolve our own problems and build up our core national competitiveness. At the same time, it means actively developing our relationships with the outside world, preserving and extending strategic opportunities for Chinese development.
Previously, we would declare earnestly to Americans time and again that empires faded because of the over-extension of the strength. But we must constantly remind ourselves that it is even more crucial for a major nation that is rising to conceal its strengths and bide its time, gathering strength. The recklessness and impetuousness of Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union in the 20th century are all classic examples.
If we take a fact-based attitude, we discover that America took a calm and unhurried approach in its rise as a major power that perhaps we should learn from. The GDP of the United States in 1900 had already surpassed that of Great Britain, but it was only at mid-century that it fully took on its role as world leader. In the midst of several major crises in the 20th century, including the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Vietnam War of the 1960s, the United States was able to reconsolidate its national power through strategic adjustments. Beginning with the Obama presidency, and continuing with a strengthening of an American-style “hide our strengths and bide our time” under Trump, we are seeing another instance of America making strategic adjustments to deal with a set of difficulties. At this time, as the US is more focused on domestic development and applying its strengths to create hard power, there is important practical meaning [for China] in the strategic thinking of “hiding one’s strengths and biding one’s time.”
From the standpoint of overseas relationships, China must be practical and steady in advancing its strategies internationally, including the “Belt and Road” construction that is so heatedly debated right now. As a call for cooperation, “Belt and Road” without a doubt helps promote China’s rejuvenation and global development, and could be called a representative practice and innovation of major nation foreign relations with Chinese characteristics (中国特色大国外交). However, in the actual implementation there have been substantial concerns such as “premature advance” (战略冒进), “rejoicing in grandiose deeds” (好大喜功) and “having too great an appetite” (贪大求全). If we are more cautious (低调), we might envision “Belt and Road” as a comprehensive elevation of China’s opening to the outside world, its significance in mutual connections and communication, production cooperation and human-to-human interaction — all to promote the transition of China’s development and its full moving out into the world . . .
However, relevant [government and Party] organs have placed such a degree of priority on the program and its strategic unpacking by experts that “Belt and Road” has been portrayed as a major strategy (大战略) — [ie., as more of a movement]. The repeated declarations by China’s government, and the anxiousness of relevant departments to see an “early harvest [of results]” (早期收获)”, in particular the full-fledged rush into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor without a consideration of costs, has given people outside China a sense that China is too impatient in the building of its “Belt and Road,” and this has fed a sense of concern internationally.
As a call for cooperation, of course the advancement of “Belt and Road” cannot be separated from government direction, but its focus should be on enterprises, social organizations and public initiatives, and it should advance in an orderly way, with full consultation and comprehensive assessment processes — prudently and dependably. But the implementation of “Belt and Road” has come with a degree of disorder and messiness, with various departments and regions and industries all fighting to be first to the door, to become advance soldiers on the beachhead of “Belt and Road.”
In Venezuela and other countries, hefty loans from China have put them in a real bind. In Myanmar, Thailand, Sudan and elsewhere, problems arising from development loans, and the lack of clear business gains from China-invested enterprises in many countries, have long ago sounded warning bells.
At an economic level, the focus with “Belt and Road” is on “going out” [into global markets], but the real difficulty is in coming back — meaning to find real capital growth, or the enrichment of experience and technology.
Many of the glories [of “Belt and Road”] are just not real. To give just a small example, over the past few years, in order to meet the needs of relevant government departments, many works of classical literature, or works on political governance by Chinese scholars, have flowed out of China’s gates on a massive scale. Behind this push is a vast expenditure of state resources, but no real demand from the international market. This sort of clamor and enthusiasm is not based on any market logic, and it cannot continue indefinitely.
So what exactly is “Belt and Road”? If we define it was an economic cooperation platform and a channel for the interaction of cultures, its meaning is already important, and the work that has been done is already substantial. But if we impatiently see it instead as a major “global governance” platform, seeking not only to resolve development challenges facing the world, but also to resolve the even more complex questions about governance globally, this is clearly too much too fast — and it might give us a great deal more responsibility than we are capable of handling. So-called global governance is about coordinating the strong and consoling the weak, and at its core it is a matter of the redistribution of global responsibilities and obligations.
. . . .
We must recognize that China’s has very little knowledge or experience in its history of “going out.” The voyage of Zheng He in the 15th century, while it raised prestige and made friends, bringing visits to China for a time, was a major drag on national power for 30 years until it came to a sudden end, leaving scarcely a mark on the history of sea navigation. Nor did it have much influence on China’s development or its consciousness of sea power.
In the 1950s and 1960s, China’s reached out to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and while there were clear gains in its foreign relations, the emphasis was only on political cooperation, overlooking economic interests. The accounts were only political. And in the 1980s there were major policy adjustments on this front. Today, as China is a major overseas investor, we face another era of massive “going out.” The big questions now are how to achieve sustainable development, and how to advance our own interests while attending to the interests of others. “Belt and Road” must draw on the lessons of history.
The Chinese have long cherished the notions of datong (大同), or Great Harmony, and tianxia (天下), or All Under Heaven. At the same time, Chinese culture cares greatly about the “middle way” (中庸之道), or maintaining balance and harmony . . . about introversion and self-examination. . . .
Most important, perhaps, is that we should work to resolve our own internal development issues. Over the past few decades, China has achieved rapid economic development and amassed many experiences and ideas that deserve consideration. Scholars at home are busiest trying to work out the secret of China’s development model, or describing its experience managing state affairs. But we have, intentionally or unintentionally, overlooked the fact that we have not yet worked our way through the “middle-income trap” (中等收入陷阱), for which we might look to countries that in their development successfully achieved political transition (like South Korea), or countries that successfully achieved good governance (like Singapore).
As China faces the “middle-income trap,” Chinese must not indulge in blind optimism. We need to sincerely and practically consider how we might resolve challenges and problems emerging in the course of our development. In fact, we can do our best to refute the idea of a “China threat,” or to line up evidence against the argument that China is a “fragile superpower.” But if we think about things cooly, we realize that the extreme difficulty of such problems as the gap between rich and poor, social tensions, environmental pollution, slow-moving economic structural reforms and political reform, all point to the fact that domestic problems are where China must put its fullest focus, and expend its energy.
The hopes of ordinary Chinese are generally very simple. They want a more harmonious society, a fairer social order, and more prosperous lives. We must actively work to answer these desires, and this is the basic precondition of all of our internal work and foreign affairs.
I recall a topic hotly debated online by young internet users: Who is really China’s enemy? Is it America? Japan? Russia?
If we think about things cooly, perhaps none of them are. China’s enemy is itself.
If China’s economy continues to develop, if people’s lives improve, if our style of governance grows clearer, society more harmonious, the environment more beautiful, and if on this foundation China’s national strength steadily grows, we could certainly see China’s international image improving and its prestige gaining, and the realization of the Chinese dream of rejuvenation will happen. I eagerly await the arrival of that day.
At long last, the CMP discourse climate report for the full month of June 2018 is available. The biggest takeaway for the month? The report shows the emergence of various forms of “Xi Jinping _____ Thought” (习近平xx思想). For example, on June 14, the People’s Daily referred for the first time to “Xi Jinping News Thought” (习近平新闻思想).
We can also glimpse in the media the following related forms: * Xi Jinping Economic Thought (习近平经济思想) * Xi Jinping Foreign Policy Thought (习近平外交思想) * Xi Jinping Literature and Art Thought (习近平文艺思想) * Xi Jinping Strong Military Thought (习近平强军思想) * Xi Jinping Education Thought (习近平教育思想) * Xi Jinping Ecological Civilization Thought (习近平生态文明思想) * Xi Jinping Party Building Thought (习近平党建思想) * Xi Jinping Rule of Law Thought (习近平法治思想)
Besides these we have others that come with quotation marks: * Xi Jinping “Three Sector Convergence Thought” (习近平”三产融合思想”) * Xi Jinping “Tackling Poverty Thought” (习近平”脱贫攻坚思想”) * Xi Jinping “Rural Revitalization Thought” (习近平”乡村振兴战略思想”)
In our view, the proliferation of various forms of “Xi Jinping Thought” across policy areas suggests that we are nearing the point where President Xi Jinping’s “banner term,” or qizhiyu (旗帜语), the unwieldy “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), becomes normalized as “Xi Jinping Thought.” It’s very likely this process could happen within the year.
We were pleased to discover today that RUC News Workshop (RUC新闻坊), the official WeChat account of Renmin University of China’s School of Journalism and Communication, has posted a helpful timeline and summary of the development of the ongoing vaccine scandal in China. We share a translation of the timeline below.
This is obviously a story with potentially huge implications for China’s leadership. Under Xi Jinping, the Party has managed quite effectively to keep scandal out of the headlines, something evident before Xi’s hardline February 2016 speech on media policy. This story, with its clear indication of deeper institutional problems, will surely be aggressively curtailed by censors in coming days. But its development is in many ways eerily familiar — not unlike the bursts of coverage, and often decent reporting, that we grew accustomed to seeing in the heyday of the commercial press in China, up through the Hu Jintao era.
RUC News Workshop notes that the incident, which is being referred to in Chinese as the “Changsheng Bio-Tech Problem Vaccine Incident” (长生生物问题疫苗事件), first unfolded on July 15, but was slow to gain public attention — finally culminating yesterday with an official response from Premier Li Keqiang. RUC News Workshop divides the scandal so far into three phases.
July 15-July 20: The vaccine scandal goes on for 6 days, but failed to draw strong attention from media and from the public [on social media].
July 21: An article called “Vaccine King” (疫苗之王) posted to a WeChat public account is shared widely through WeChat groups, “lighting the fuse” of commentary and analysis of the story.
July 22: The vaccine scandal is fiercely discussed and steadily heats up. Finally, CCTV News, the People’s Daily, The Beijing News and other “mainstream,” meaning Party-run, media finally make their voices heard.
Our translation of the RUC News Workshop timeline follows, with some edits and cuts for clarity — and a few notes and links here and there.
TIMELINE July 15, 2018
A notice issued by the China Food and Drug Administration says that fabricated productions records had been discovered for rabies vaccines produced by Changchun Changsheng Life Sciences Limited (长春长生生物科技有限责任公司), known for short as Changchun Changsheng (长春长生). According to the notice, the company had been ordered to stop production, and its Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certification (生产质量管理规范证书) had been revoked. According to a news report by the Shanghai-based outlet Jiemian, the investigation had been prompted by an older staff member working inside a production facility who had come forward. July 16, 2018
Changchun Changsheng’s share price sinks and several large shareholders dump their holdings. July 17, 2018
Changchun Changsheng issues a public response to the situation, assuring customers there are no problems. Changchun Changsheng’s parent company, “Changsheng Bio-Technology Company” (长生生物科技股份有限公司), known for short as Changchun Bio-Tech (长生生物), issues a statement saying that all rabies vaccines that have entered the market comply with quality regulations and there is no cause for concern. July 19, 2018
The incident is further fueled as Changchun Bio-Tech issues a statement saying that its subsidiary, Changchun Changcheng, had previously received a penalty notice (处罚书) from health authorities in Jilin province notifying them that a batch of their DPT vaccines did not comply with safety regulations. The notice [which dated the start of the investigation to October 2017] said that the company’s DPT vaccines had been deemed “inferior medicines” not meeting standards. The company had been fined 3.44 million yuan, and some of its vaccine stocks were seized.
The first page of the notice issued by authorities in Jilin province to Changchun Changsheng. SOURCE: The Paper. July 20, 2018
The news, based on the previously mentioned notice, that problems with the vaccines had apparently been discovered, prompting an investigation, by October 27, 2017, drew anger from many Chinese. According to the timestamp accompanying the notice as it was made public on the official website of the Jilin Food and Drug Administration, it had not been posted until July 18. The gap between now and the start of the investigation by the Jilin Food and Drug Administration into the sale of these 250,000 doses of vaccine in Shandong was already close to 9 months. But Changchun Changsheng had made no mentioned whatsoever of the notice from health authorities in its 2017 annual report.
It is worth noting that in November 2017 another batch of DPT vaccines had shown problems, this time from Wuhan Institute of Biological Products Co. Ltd. (武汉生物制品研究所有限责任公司) — [whose website is now taken down]. And in 2016, another batch of DPT vaccines from Changchun Changsheng had failed to pass inspection. July 22, 2018
Responses come from official media. CCTV Finance runs a report saying the vaccine problem must be thoroughly investigated, and that “comprehensive oversight mechanisms” (完善的监管机制) and emergency response systems must be put in place. The official Xinhua News Agency points out that mishaps cannot happen when it comes to vaccines, and that “loss of confidence” [in vaccines] is even more terrible than “loss of efficacy.” The Food and Drug Administration issues a notice on the case, saying it has already ordered vaccine manufacturers across the country to inspect their processes, ensuring production is strictly compliant with GMP production standards. The Food and Drug Administration says it will also carry out unannounced inspections across the country, dealing strictly with lawbreakers.
At 11PM on July 22, an article appears on the website of China’s central government: “Li Keqiang Issues Official Comment on the Vaccine Incident: We Must Give the People of the Country a Clear Explanation” (李克强就疫苗事件作出批示：必须给全国人民一个明明白白的交代). The article says: “Premier Li Keqiang has issued official comments on the vaccine incident: This vaccine scandal has crossed a moral red line for the people, and we must give the people of the country a clear explanation.”In his official comments, Li Keqiang demands that the State Council immediately dispatch an inspection team, conducting a thorough investigation of the entire chain of vaccine manufacture and distribution. The full facts must be ascertained, he says, and those companies and people responsible be “resolutely punished and in no way appeased.”
Two stories this week underscore the Party’s determination to strengthen control over all activities and content on cyberspace by ensuring companies and staff are tied as closely as possible into the process of enforcing “guidance.” This is essentially the progressive application to cyberspace of the notion of “Party spirit” in the media, which Xi Jinping reiterated in his February 2016 speech on news and public opinion.
First, we have the founding of the Party committee of the China Federation of Online Social Organizations (中国网络社会组织联合会), a group created back in May this year, and about which very little has been reported. The federation essentially groups together, under the watchful eye of the Cyberspace Administration of China, organizations that are registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs but deal in some way or another with cyberspace. Second, we have a public apology by Baozou Comic, which had its social media accounts closed down back in May for content violations, combined with an interesting set of articles on the service’s website attempting to make amends for its political errors. The Baozou Comic case — following on the abject apology from Toutiao in April — is another clear example of how the Party is more readily using public shaming techniques to enforce loyalty and implement its censorship guidelines.
This Week in China’s Media July 14 — July 20
➢ Party Committee Formed for the China Federation of Online Social Organizations to Strengthen Party Control ➢ Four Agencies Coordinate to Launch “Sword Web 2018” Campaign Against Online IP Infringement and Piracy
➢ Baozou Comic Issues Apology, Says It Has Corrected Its Problems and Will Start Over
➢ Douyin Makes First Announcement of Global Monthly Users, Scale Outstrips Weibo
[1] Party Committee Formed for the China Federation of Online Social Organizations
On the afternoon of July 19, the Party committee of the China Federation of Online Social Organizations (中国网络社会组织联合会) was formally founded in Beijing. Attending the ceremony, Gao Xiang (高翔), deputy director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, said the Party needed to “properly grab and practically grab the effective coverage of online social organizations, the federation’s Party committee guiding, supervising and inspecting the 300 member units to raise the Party’s organizational strength, working to implement the Party’s full coverage of organizations.” This was Party code for the need for the Party to exercise full control over all social organizations operating in cyberspace. The China Federation of Online Social Organizations, founded in Beijing in May 2018 in a ceremony attended by the CAC’s top official, Xu Lian (徐麟), now represents 300 of online social organizations, which a June 2017 document from the CAC defines as “social organizations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs that carry out work on the cyberspace domain.”
Examples of participants in the China Federation of Online Social Organizations include the China Electronics Chamber of Commerce (CECC) the Cybersecurity Association of China (中国网络空间安全协会), and the China Youth New Media Association (中国青少年新媒体协会) associated with the Chinese Communist Youth League. But members apparently also include executives from major tech firms and online media, such as Alibaba (CEO Jack Ma is listed as a vice-president) and People’s Daily Online (CEO Ye Zhenzhen is listed as a vice-president).
At the founding back in May, state media identified the group as “our country’s first national, federated and hub-type social organization that voluntarily connects online social organizations, formed by 10 national online social organizations with the Cyberspace Administration of China as a sponsoring institution.” The stated mission of the federation is to “promote the development of online social organizations . . . under the leadership of the Party and the government.” Key Chinese Reports: Online Communication Magazine WeChat public account (网络传播杂志): 重磅！中国网络社会组织联合会党委成立大会在京举行
Cyberspace Administration of China Website (中国网信网): 中国网络社会组织联合会在京成立 [2]Four Agencies Coordinate to Launch “Sword Web 2018” Campaign Against Online IP Infringement and Piracy
Four government agencies announced on July 16 that they would coordinate in a campaign to strike hard against intellectual property right violations and piracy on the internet. The special action, they said, had begun in early July and would extend for four months. The agencies include the Cyberspace Administration of China, the National Copyright Administration, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Ministry of Public Security.
According to the notice, the campaign will focus on three particular areas of violation according to China’s Copyright Law: 1. reposting of copyrighted content, focusing on so-called “WeMedia,” or zimeiti (自媒体) on WeChat public accounts and other platforms that illegally copy and share material; 2. sharing of short videos in violation of copyright, focusing on such platforms as Douyin, Kuaishou, Watermelon Video and Bilibili; 3.violations in priority areas such as animation, video streaming and audiobooks. Key Chinese Reports: China Intellectual Property News (知识产权报): “剑网2018”专项行动将重点整治短视频等领域侵权行为
Beijing News Online (新京报网): “剑网2018”专项行动将重点整治短视频等领域侵权行为 [3] Baozou Comic Issues Apology, Says It Has Corrected Its Problems and Will Start Over
Baozou Comic, the popular comic sharing site that had its accounts on Weibo and WeChat shut down indefinitely by authorities back in May, has now posted an apology dated July 11 on its website, saying its “fundamental error was that our education in socialist core values was insufficient.” In an effort to rectify its problems, underscore its missteps and begin operating afresh, Baozou has posted several sections on its website as part of a “‘New Start’ Special Series.” These include a section called “Journey With The Homeland’s Martyrs, Making Deep Apologies” (英烈故土行，深刻致歉), which describes visits by the Baozou CEO and staff to official memorials to martyrs and heroes across the country.
Key Chinese Reports: IT Home (IT之家): 暴走漫画活了，发致歉信称改正错误重新出发 Online Communication Magazine WeChat public account (网络传播杂志): “暴走漫画”发致歉信！自媒体应有怎样的“网络伦理操守”？ [4] Douyin Makes First Announcement of Global Monthly Users, Scale Outstrips Weibo
On July 16, the short video app Douyin announced that its global active monthly users have reached 500 million. This is the first time the app announced global figures. The app announced last month that its domestic active monthly users had reached 300 million. Douyin said 40% of its users were now in the 24-30 age group, surpassing previously dominant 18-24 age group. Key Chinese Reports:
36KR.com (36氪): 最前线 | 抖音全球月活用户突破5亿，这个消息比预想的早了半年
Media Observer (传媒大观察): 3分钟速览每日传媒大事记（7月18日）
Messaging from US President Donald Trump on trade and China continues to be a sensitive area on Chinese social media, prompting deletion of posts on Weibo. In an interview with CNBC this week, Trump told “Squawk Box” host Joe Kernen that he was prepared if necessary to impose tariffs on all of China’s imports to the United States — citing the figure of 505.5 billion US dollars for 2017.
Sharing a link to this story in Chinese today, Feng Wei (冯玮), a professor of history at Shanghai’s Fudan University, who has more than 167,000 fans on Weibo, offered three observations:
2018-07-21 12:14:45 | 【Trump Prepared to Impose Tariffs on 505 Billion in Chinese Imports】Assessment: 1. This shows that Trump anticipates that China will not make concessions that satisfy him, and so the big door to negotiations is closed; 2. 505 billion concerns China’s entire manufacturing industry, its effect underestimated; 3. I fully oppose the harm done by the careless puffing of those so-called “experts” who are an abuse of public funds. It’s already clear, and the lessons are profound! http://t.cn/RgQJN43 2018-07-21 12:14:45 | 【特朗普准备对5050亿美元中国进口商品开征关税】评：1、此举显示，特朗普判断中国不会作出令他满意的让步，因此关闭谈判大门。2、5050亿将涉及中国涉美所有加工制造业，影响低估。3、我始终反对的那些滥用国帑胡乱吹的“专家”的危害，已经显现，教训深刻！http://t.cn/RgQJN43
Feng was presumably referring in his third comment to experts in China who have downplayed the impact of trade tensions with the United States, and played up Chinese strengths. In any case, his post, made at around 12:15PM Beijing time, had been removed by approximately 3:39PM.
Similar posts by Phoenix TV commentatorSong Zhongping (宋忠平), with over 9 million fans, and from the official Weibo account of Hong Kong Economic Daily (香港商報), were also removed today.
Trump’s July 15 remarks to CBS Evening News anchor Jeff Glor, in which he answered a question about the United States’ biggest “foes” — apparently not understanding the difference between foe and competitor — were also among the deleted posts on Weibo. In that interview, Trump said “China is a foe economically, certainly they are a foe.”
Screenshot of Trump interview with CBS Evening News, shared by Miaopai on Weibo.
At 2:46PM Beijing time today, Weibo user Dan Bin (但斌), a corporate executive with close to 12 million followers, shared a video link to the Trump interview, which he had posted to Weibo’s video channel. “Trump directly explains his views on trade,” Dan Bin’s post said. It was deleted in less than an hour, by 3:35PM, but the video remained on Weibo, with comments apparently disabled.
Last month we looked at the seemingly unstoppable political inflation of Xi Jinping, as a Party publication called for systematic study of international praise for China’s president, and as the Academy of Social Sciences in one province put out a call for “research” on his formative years in the village of Liangjiahe. The “genie of hype and triumphalism,” we said, would not be so easy to stuff back into the magic lamp of propaganda. [ABOVE: Screenshot of a recent video claiming China has technological superiority over the United States.]
But China seems in any case to be trying — wary perhaps of the unease self-aggrandizing discourse can generate internationally, and of the dangerous somnolence it can induce at home.
A cartoon appearing on Chinese social media today reads, “No to arrogant and boastful discourse.”
Yesterday, the Party’s official People’s Daily began running a series of commentaries on the pitfalls of “boastful and arrogant” discourse, warning that “certain media” had become careless. These “certain media,” we should note, were not fringe voices, but rather mainstream Party ones. The first piece criticized is sourced to China Central Television, and was shared on a number of official news sites back in March. The second is a video produced by Weichen Finance, posted to Tencent Video, that quotes Tsinghua University economics professor Hu Angang — who has in recent years loudly advocated the view that China’s current political system is superior to systems in the West — to support the view that China already has a technological edge on the United States.
Missing from the criticism in the People’s Daily, of course, is any acknowledgement that the Party’s own information controls, which have emphasized positive news, trumpeted “positive energy,” and militated against criticism, could possibly bear any responsibility for China’s inflated view of itself.
A partial translation of the first commentary follows.
EDITOR’S NOTE: The ideas expressed in written discourse (文风) are no small matter. Recently, we’ve seen repeated boastfulness and arrogance . . . which have impacted the credibility of the media, polluted the public opinion ecology and twisted the national psyche, being disadvantageous to public morals, to the coalescing of public feeling, and to the building of a clear online space. In order to amend the boastfulness and arrogance of certain media, and their flashy but empty discourse, and in order to implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s demand that written discourse be “brief, true and fresh” (短/实/新) . . . from today on the Opinion Channel of People’s Daily Online will issue a series of commentaries called “Three Critiques of Boastfulness and Arrogance” (三评浮夸自大文风).
_________
The good and bad of an article rests on whether it radiates the truth, and whether it reflects society. When written discourse is boastful and arrogant, when the headlines seek to jar [the reader] and offer specious facts, this is not only irreverent to the reader but forfeits the value of communication and pollutes the public opinion environment.
A March 2018 article sourced to China Central Television bears the headline: “In These Sectors China Has Chalked Up Many ‘World Firsts’!”
Online recently, articles talking about how “America is afraid” (美国害怕了), or “Japan is terrified” (日本吓傻了), or “Europe is filled with regret” (欧洲后悔了) have earned a great deal of hits. But read through these instant-hit articles and you see that they have little fresh to offer, and in fact are cause for concern. For example, some of them exaggerate and generalize and shout out that “In These Sectors China Has Chalked Up Many ‘World Firsts’!” (在这些领域，中国创下多个“世界第一”！无人表示不服).
Some engage in arbitrary overrating, subjecting themselves to ridicule, shouting things like, “Never Fear: China’s Technological Strength Has Surpassed America, Reaching World #1” (别怕，中国科技实力超越美国，居世界第一).
Others resort to wishful thinking, accepting at face value isolated phrases from overseas and exaggerating them into “China Occupies the Center of the World Stage” (中国在世界舞台上占据中心位置) and “China is Now the World’s Largest Economy” (中国现在是全球第一经济体). The blustering articles have, first of all, not real facts to support them; second, no content to serve as blood and muscle; and third, no intellectual value whatsoever. They are just empty shells that cannot withstand the least bit of breeze. We have to understand that an article will not grow more colorful just because it makes a boast, and the country will not grow stronger because it is arrogant. If we excite such extreme emotions, and if we spread such prejudices, this could easily become a case of “Yelang thinking highly of itself” (夜郎自大), in which we arrogantly blow our own trumpet, and lead our society into a cognitive trap of splintered information and automated thought.
In communication studies there is a viewpoint that says that “the best editor is definitely an expert salesman.” For some media, boasting and arrogance has become like a huge balloon constantly inflating, in danger of bursting at the slightest touch. . . But the news is not about feeling pleasure (爽文). If you only think about sales and never about nutrition (讲营销不讲营养), if you only think about eyeballs and not about responsibility, you mislead the masses — even if it earns you a moment’s burst of traffic.
Most of the stories on our list this week received little or no attention outside of Chinese-language media. But there are, nevertheless, some important developments worthy of continued observation. At the top of this list should be the rollout by People’s Daily Online, the digital platform operated by the People’s Daily, of a so-called “third-party content review platform” (第三方内容审核平台). This week, 14 major digital platforms signed up with People’s Daily Online to formalize involvement in this platform. It’s unclear yet what exactly this platform will mean, and how it will operate — but the obvious goal is to further draw private technology companies into the orbit of Party-state media, ensuring that their content is not disruptive.
Also this week, Liu Yadong (刘亚东), editor-in-chief of Science and Technology Daily (科技日报), issued a warning on over-exuberance in China’s media about the country’s advantages in the science and technology fields, and other media discussed his remarks as a necessary corrective coming from “inside the system” as trade tensions with the United States and other countries come to the fore.
This Week in China’s Media June 23 — June 29
➢ Science and Technology Daily Editor-in-Chief: “Four Great Inventions” Hoodwink Leaders and the Public ➢ Minister of Radio and Television Outlines Party Dominance During Visit With Tech CEO Jack Ma
➢ Central Propaganda Department and Other Agencies Tackle “Yin-Yang Contracts” (阴阳合同) And Other Loopholes in the Entertainment Industry
➢ People’s Daily Online Launches “Third-Person Content Review Platform” [1] Science and Technology Daily Editor-in-Chief: “Four Great Inventions” Hoodwink Leaders and the Public
On June 21, at a salon on technology communication held at the China Hall of Science and Technology (中国科技会堂), and called “Where Are Our Bottlenecks?”, the editor-in-chief of Science and Technology Daily (科技日报), Liu Yadong (刘亚东), gave a keynote speech in which he criticized the widespread pushing — essentially propaganda — of the so-called “New Four Great Inventions” (新四大发明). These are: 1) the high-speed rail, 2) Alipay (支付宝), bike-sharing (共享单车) and online shopping (网购). Promotion of the idea of these “Four Great Inventions,” said Liu, misled both leaders and the general public, and Liu’s remarks were regarded by many in the media as “a shock coming from inside the system” (“体制内震撼发声”).
In Liu Yadong’s view, China still lags far behind the United States and other developed countries in terms of science and technology, and this has long been a consensus view in China as well. But Liu said that constant drum-beating within China about the “Four Great Inventions,” and remarks about “fully surpassing [the US]” (全面赶超) and “China now being first in the world in economic strength, science and technology strength and comprehensive national strength” (中国现在的经济实力、科技实力、综合国力都分别超越美国，成为世界第一) had now become a constant feature of media reporting.
Responding to Liu’s speech, the Global Times newspaper said it was a representative voice in what should be a period of self-reflection on China’s real capabilities. The reflection, it said, was demanded by the ongoing “trade war” (贸易战) with the United States and penalties facing China’s ZTE Corp. Key Chinese Reports: Science and Technology Daily WeChat public account (科技日报): 纯干货｜核心技术受制于人怎么破？杜祥琬倪光南都来支招了
Global Times (环球时报): 社评：科技日报总编强调中美巨大差距刍议
TMT Media WeChat public account (钛媒体): 体制内震撼发声：“新四大发明”忽悠了领导忽悠了公众忽悠了自己
A lead editorial in the Global Times responds to Liu Yadong’s criticism of over-exuberance on China’s science and technology strengths. [2]Minister of Radio and Television Outlines Party Dominance During Visit With Tech CEO Jack Ma
Nie Chenxi’s official portrait on the “News of the Communist Party of China” website.
On June 22, Nie Chenxi (聂辰席), the head of the China’s State Administration of Radio and Television (国家广播电视总局), met with Alibaba CEO Jack Ma (马云). During his visit with Ma, a tech billionaire who in many ways symbolizes China’s push for innovation, Nie emphasized the need to “deeply study Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era and the spirit of the Party’s 19th National Congress,” the former phrase being the president’s “banner term” (旗帜语), the phrase meant to sum up his policies and legacy. Nie also spoke of the need to emphasize the so-called “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识) — essentially, the need to have political awareness of the big picture as it impacts the Party’s position — and “Four Confidences” (四个自信), or confidence the country’s chosen political path (meaning CCP leadership), its guiding theories (meaning those of the CCP leadership), its political system (meaning one-party dominance), and in China’s unique culture.
Other phrases that played prominently in Nie’s mostly boilerplate speech were the “transmission of positive energy” (传播正能量), meaning more focus on positives in news and entertainment, and “preserving the country’s ideological and cultural security” (维护国家意识形态和文化安全).
Earlier in June, Minister Nie met with China Mobile CEO Shang Bing (尚冰), also emphasizing a long string of Party imperatives such as the need to “promote the main theme” (弘扬主旋律), “transmit positive energy” and “deeply study” the thought of Xi Jinping. Key Chinese Reports: Inside Telecoms WeChat public account (广电业内): 聂辰席会见马云，总局总台领导接连会见BAT巨头，透露了什么讯号？
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 聂辰席会见腾讯公司董事会主席兼首席执行官马化腾 [3]Central Propaganda Department and Other Agencies Tackle “Yin-Yang Contracts” (阴阳合同) And Other Loopholes in the Entertainment Industry
On June 27, the Central Propaganda Department, the Culture and Tourism Bureau, the State Administration of Taxation, the State Administration of Radio and Television, the State Film Bureau and others jointly issued a “Notice” (通知) demanding limits on exorbitant pay (天价片酬) in the film and television industries, and action to tackle such problems as “yin-yang contracts” (阴阳合同), a practice by which a relatively low-paying contract for actors is reported to the tax authorities while a second more lucrative contract is handled on the side.
The “Notice” emphasized that compensation standards would be set for the television and film industries, making clear the maximum compensation levels for actors and for program guests. Key Chinese Reports: People’s Daily (人民日报): 中宣部等部门印发通知 治理影视行业天价片酬“阴阳合同”偷逃税等问题 [4] People’s Daily Online Launches “Third-Person Content Review Platform”
On June 25, People’s Daily Online, the digital portal operated by the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper, hosted a forum on “management of internet content risks” (互联网内容风险管理). At the forum, 14 major digital content platforms signed agreements with People’s Daily Online for participation in a “third-party content review platform” (第三方内容审核平台). The media included Jinri Toutiao (今日头条), Pear Video (梨视频), Migu (咪咕文化) and Kuaishou (快手). According to media reports, discussion at the forum centered around “how to strengthen internet content management.”
In one report, Quantum Cloud (量子云), another of the initial 14 companies to sign on to the People’s Daily Online platform, responded to the news of the new agreement: “Taking on the responsibility expected of us by family users, Quantum Cloud follows People’s Daily Online and other mainstream [Party] media as the benchmark, upholding the banner of content with mainstream [Party] values, steadily expanding the strength of our content review (内容审核力度), actively transmitting positive energy and socialist core values.”
It is not yet clear exactly how the “third-party content review platform” will operate. Key Chinese Reports:
Caijing Online (财经网): 量子云签约入驻人民网“第三方内容审核平台”
China.com: 量子云首批入驻人民网“第三方内容审核平台”
At a seminar in Beijing last week, Liu Yadong (刘亚东), the editor-in-chief of a newspaper published by the Ministry of Science and Technology, warned in a public speech that China risked a crisis of over-confidence by constantly hyping its achievements and capabilities. Liu’s remarks, and the positive response from many quarters, including the Global Times newspaper, typically outspoken in its go-China nationalism, are a reaction in part to alarm and pushback from the West over China’s boldly stated ambition to lead the world in key technology sectors by 2025.
But the genie of hype and triumphalism will not be so easy to coax back into the lamp. Hype, after all, is at the heart of Xi Jinping’s leadership in the so-called “New Era” — and of the manufacture of legitimacy by the Chinese Communist Party of which he is “core.”
In recent days, even as the chatter over Liu Yadong’s remarks was fresh, we had further illustration of just how deeply the atmosphere of worship surrounding Xi Jinping is affecting scholarship in China. This came in a notice posted by the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences to its official website, calling for submissions for new research projects dealing with the “Great Teaching of Liangjiahe (梁家河大学问).
The first page of the application form for scholars wishing to apply for research funding for projects concerning the “Great Teaching of Liangjiahe.”
For those unfamiliar with the significance of Liangjiahe, the village where Xi Jinping spent seven supposedly formative years as a sent-down youth during the Cultural Revolution, I recommend Chris Buckley’s wonderful story last fall in the New York Times. The story of Xi’s time in Liangjiahe has become the most basic foundation of the myth of Xi, of a politics of adoration built atop a narrative of sacrifice and hardship, in a place where Xi is imagined to have set down deep roots among the common people.
On this issue, I want to hand the microphone over to Guo Yuhua (郭于华), a highly respected professor of sociology at Tsinghua University, who made a smoldering post yesterday to her WeChat public account addressing the research call from the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences. But first, here is just a bit of the text from that call:
In order to further deepen the research of the great teaching of Liangjiahe, and in order to understand the foundation and source of General Secretary Xi Jinping becoming the core of the Party, commander of the army and leader of the people, and the originating context and logical fountainhead of Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, steadily enhancing the “Four Consciousnesses,” and making firm the “Four Confidences,” the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences has decided to undertake topical research on the “Great Teaching of Liangjiahe” (梁家河大学问).
The call offers a list of possible topics for new projects, and makes clear that budgets will be determined once project proposals are accepted through an “impartial, equitable and competitive” process. Applications are to be sent to Office 210 of the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences on Xiaozhai Road East in Xi’an, just a short walk down the street from the Shaanxi History Museum.
Our translation of Guo Yuhua’s WeChat post follows.
Topics of Splendor (伟光神创的课题)
By Guo Yuhua (郭于华)
From the WeChat public account Yuhua’s View on Society (于华看社会)
When I first saw that the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences had issued a call for research projects on “The Great Teachings of Liangjiahe (梁家河大学问), I thought for sure this was some sort of spoof. I was entirely prepared to laugh. But once I read through all of the materials explaining the process, with entries such as “topic direction” (选题方向), “application requirements” (申请条件), “research fees” (研究经费), and even “application acceptance” (申请受理) and “method of contact” (联系方式) — and once I came across other such notices from universities across Shaanxi province — I came to realize this was no joke.
After reading carefully and working things out, I realized the problem was my own shallowness. With a better understanding now of the key topical points, the following themes emerge: A Great Period of Time (伟大的时间)：
“Seven years” (七年) has now become a catchphrase. Among the topics listed under “topic selection,” we can note that topics 1 through 7 all begin with the phrase “[During the] seven-year period as a sent-down youth in Liangjiahe” (梁家河七年知青岁月), and this seven-year period is closely tied up logically with “[Xi Jinping] Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (新时代中国特色社会主义思想), with “the development thought of [placing] the people at the center” ( 以人民为中心的发展思想), with “the idea of ecological civilization” (生态文明思想), “the thought of three industry integration for the new era” ( 新时代三产融合思想), “the thought of a decisive war on poverty in the new era” (与新时代脱贫攻坚思想), ”the strategic thought of rejuvenating the countryside in the new era” (新时代乡村振兴战略思想), and “the thought of grassroots Party building in the new era” (新时代基层党建思想). All of this demonstrates that seven years is now regarded [by the CCP] as a great period of time (伟大的时间段), a period critical to Chinese history if not even world history. It is the time period, we can say, in which “time began”! A Brilliant Place (光辉的地方)：
“Liangjiahe” (梁家河) is of course also a keyword,” and none of the topics provided can depart from this place. It is related to what they are calling “jia-style and jia-teaching” (家风家教), and “scientific content and the values of the era” (科学内涵和时代价值), and connected also to “spiritual nutrition and the building of spirit” ( 精神养分和精神塑造). It is a “great teaching” formed from the hybrid of “China’s excellent traditional culture” ( 中华优秀传统文化) and “red cultural genes” (红色文化基因).
To put it more directly, Liangjiahe is a place deserving of resplendence! A Sacred Leader (神圣的领袖)：
The period of time and this place all center on the core, on the commander (统帅), on the leader (袖的). Needless to say, their resplendence cannot outshine the sacred light of the leader. This goes without saying. The Topic of Innovation (创新的课题):
This set up of topics can be referred to the tradition of the unprecedented (空前绝后), the idea that here no ancients tread (前无古人), and none that follow can possibly exceed. Oh, what greatness! Oh, what mightiness! What boundless and unlimited creativity! How fully it displays the spirit of the social sciences under Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era. For this, we can only offer our enthusiastic “likes”!
June 26, 2018
Over the weekend, Reference News (参考消息), the newspaper published by the official Xinhua News Agency that clips news coverage from around the world, ran an interview with Yan Xuetong (阎学通), director of the Institute for International Relations at Tsinghua University and one of China’s leading foreign policy experts. In the interview, Yan discusses the rise of China and substantial changes — but not yet fundamental, he says — to the global political and economic system.
At the website of Reference News, the interview carried the headline, “Push for Independence in Taiwan Would Be the Biggest Crisis in the Future for China-US Relations.” At the website Aisixiang (爱思想) the headline was instead: “‘Chaos and Disorder’ Are Becoming the Normal State of the World.”
The following is a partial translation of the interview with Yan, for whom the return of bipolarity in world affairs is clearly a fait accompli.
Editor’s Note:
As a well-known scholar of international relations, and director of the Institute for International Relations at Tsinghua University, Yan Xuetong (阎学通) has long observed the shift of global power and researched China’s foreign policy strategies. In his books Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten Years and The Transfer of Global Power, he explicates his theory of “moral realism” (道义现实主义) and his views on “political determinacy” (政治决定论), that “the success of a rising power comes when its political leadership is stronger than that of dominant countries.”
This year, as the West bursts out with the concept of “sharp power” (锐实力), whipping up a fresh round of “China Threat Theory” (中国威胁论), and is reduced to a “New Cold War” (新冷战) mentality, the familiar old predicament of China’s rise (崛起困境) has emerged once again. How can [China] accurately grasp the development of world affairs and determine a strategy for China’s rise? How can China face the risks and challenges that attend its rise? How can China’s international leadership be constituted? With these questions, our reporters sought out Director Yan Xuetong. The Nature of the Global Order Has Not Fundamentally Changed Cankao Xiaoxi: In the world today, it seems that “chaos and disorder” have become the ordinary state of things. How do you see the state of affairs today? Yan Xuetong: We see different changes in the state of the world along different dimensions. When we compare today to the 20 years following the break up of the Soviet Union (1992-2011), we see that the world is moving now from a unipolar situation in which the United States is supreme, to a bipolar world in which the supreme powers are China and the United States. We are moving away from a state in which international norms are led by Western liberalism (西方自由主义) to a state where international norms are no longer respected; the international system is moving from a West-centered model to one in which power is redistributed; and [at the same time], the nature of the international system (国际体系) remains the hegemonic system of the post world war period, with no fundamental change in its nature.
The making of the new world order will take some time. The process of redistribution of power is the process of power devolution (权力分散) and the reconstitution of influence (势力重组), and so the normal state of things is chaos and disorder. In the midst of this process, as there is a lack of a dominant set of values, the bond of old norms is weakened, and new norms have not yet been built. The use of strategies of competition that do not respect norms or uphold commitments will become the normal state, and the worship of resourcefulness and lack of strategic credibility (战略信誉) will become a path that many countries are inclined to.
As nuclear weapons will prove a deterrent to war by any major power, these countries will tend to use economic sanctions as a means of competition, and protectionism will carry the day. Major powers will not wish to bear the costs of global governance and the preservation of order. Global governance and regional cooperation will stop in their tracks, and it’s possible that regionalization will see a reverse trend, including in the European Union. We could quite possibly be in a situation in which there is no global leader. The situation in the world right now has only undergone a change in degree (程度变化), and not a fundamental change in nature, a change in terms of the order but not a change in terms of systems — and this can’t be compared with the changes brought on by the two world wars. If we compare the situation of the past 50 years to what we face now, we can say that we are in an intermediate phase of change, because the changes now have not yet reached the immensity of what we saw with the end of the Cold War. A “Bipolar System” Will Take Shape Within Five Years Cankao Xiaoxi: Back in 2013 you predicted that by 2023 a bipolar system between China and the United States would establish itself. Is this still your view, and why? Yan Xuetong: After the Cold War, the United States became the absolute leading power in the world, but its leadership position of late is not like that of the 1990s. In 2013, I predicted complete bipolarization by 2023. Looking at things now, we can ascertain even more clearly that multipolarity is impossible, and a bipopular system (两极格局) within five years is extremely possible.
We can judge the international system by comparing the strength (实力) of the major powers and their strategic relationships. Lately, the world’s third-ranked power cannot in terms of national strength be compared on the same level as China or the United States. By 2023, this gap will widen even further. Strategic relationships have also become quite clearly a matter of other major nations choosing between the United States and China. The international system after 2018 will be decided by the relative development speeds of the major powers. I believe that there is no science to determining what the international situation will be like after 10 years. The most I’ll project ahead is 10 years. Within 10 years, there is no way that China will be on par with the United States. The growth of our country’s comprehensive national strength (综合国力) has already slowed down, and there is a risk that this rate of growth in strength could continue to decrease.
Once the bipolar system is established, there will be a real question of whether the concept of “the West” as it is now used in international relations will be applicable. “The West” was originally a geographic concept, later it became a cultural concept, and in the wake of the Cold War it became a political concept. The present [process of] bipolarization has meant that Western countries and developing countries alike are experiencing internal splits, and the remaking of political strength will very possibly not happen any longer along Western and non-Western lines, but along ideological lines. . . . When Western countries no longer influence international politics in a unified manner, the political concept of “the West” will no longer objectively suit the study of international relations. The Risks of Trump Uncertainty Cankao Xiaoxi: You have said before that with the rise of China, we will face greater troubles and threats. Trade tensions between China and the United States have impacted the bilateral relationship. In the future, what risks and challenges do we need to prepare for? Yan Xuetong: From the standpoint of international relations, within the next two years, one of the biggest problems we will face is how to deal with Trump’s unpredictability. Because he essentially makes decisions according to his own, there is little continuity between these decisions, and it is very difficult to predict, and so we must ensure that bilateral tensions do not spread to the ideological sphere. The core of the Cold War was about ideology, and only by preventing ideological tensions can we prevent a Cold War. Over the next five years, ideas of independence in Taiwan could develop further, bringing the risk of a full-fledged standoff between China and the United States, which we must be one guard against. Over the next 10 years, the biggest danger on the outside will probably be the question of Taiwan independence. For this we need to build effective prevention mechanisms to avoid [a crisis].
