Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Reporter Claims Self-Defense for National Security

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week our top story for China’s media is the case of Kong Linlin (孔琳琳), the CCTV reporter who made a scene at the UK Conservative Party conference in Birmingham. Kong’s case is an interesting (and quite discouraging) look at the growing assertiveness of Chinese official voices, both media and diplomatic, in international contexts. We can surely expect similar displays of bullying and outrage in the future over issues China’s regards as being in its core national interest. In this case, the issue was Hong Kong.
The discussion internally in China of the Kong Linlin case was limited to social media platforms, and the overwhelming majority of responses seemed to be positive and in support of Kong’s temper tantrum as a matter of patriotism. We translate a portion of a rare WeChat post adding a bit of context to the case — talking about how such shows of “patriotism” are the real role of state media in China, which have little interest in professionalism as much of the rest of the world understands it.
One of the most disturbing aspects in China on the Kong case is the tacit support and legitimization of violence when it is seen as serving the fundamental interests of the Party and state. Facing questions of whether it was proper to strike others as she did in Birmingham, Kong responded on Weibo with a smiley face emoticon: “It’s not hitting when it’s legitimate self-defense (正当防卫).” Note that the Chinese here for “legitimate self-defense” suggests defense not just of Kong’s person but of the body, as it were, of the Chinese nation.
 
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
September 29, 2018 to October 5, 2018
➢ CCTV reporter heckling panel at an event of the UK Conservative Party receives support from official state media
➢ Decision on discipline of actress Fan Bingbing for “shadow contracts” and tax avoidance made public, she is fined 800 million yuan
➢ Bloomberg releases a report on “spy chips” from China
➢ National Radio and Television Administration launches campaign to clean up advertisements, emphasizing “guidance”
➢ New regulations give broad police inspection powers over companies providing internet services
[1] CCTV reporter heckling panel at an event of the UK Conservative Party receives support from official state media
On September 30, as the Human Rights Council of the UK Conservative Party held a fringe event on the situation in Hong Kong during its annual Conservative Party Conference in Birmingham, panel members, included several prominent Hong Kong pro-democracy figures, were heckled by a reporter for the official China Central Television, Kong Linlin. As the hosts of the panel tried to get the woman to leave, she appeared to slap and event volunteer twice. The exchange was captured on video.
On October 1, the Chinese Embassy in UK issued a statement saying that “the Human Rights Council of the UK Conservative Party had used the annual party conference event to highlight anti-Chinese splittist forces (反华分裂势力), and the Chinese side expresses serious concern and fierce displeasure. We resolutely oppose the intrusion on Hong Kong affairs by any person or any organization.”
Addressing the embassy statement, the deputy chairman of the Human Rights Council of the UK Conservative Party, Benedict Rogers, said the absurdity of the Chinese Embassy statement was clear to anyone who viewed the video from the scene. More than 80 eyewitnesses at the event saw this Chinese journalist slap our volunteer twice, Rogers said. Rogers said that the journalist should immediately apologize, and the Chinese government should withdraw its statement.


A spokesperson for the China Media Group said on October 1: “Kong Linlin, the journalist for the European Center of China Central Television, has already been released. The China Media Group expresses its sympathy to Kong Linlin.”
For nuance on the Kong Linlin story inside China, it was necessary to look at the reflections appearing on the WeChat platform. One example we found was a post at “Shen Mutian” (沈目田), which was called: “Media Must Be Surnamed Party, And Journalists Must Be Surnamed Party.” This was a reference to President Xi’s speech on media policy in February 2016, when he stressed that all media work in the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. That speech came with visits to Kong’s outfit, China Central Television, and to the People’s Daily.
Here is a translation of a portion of the “Shen Mutian” post:

CCTV, which takes the lead in shouting the the media must be surnamed Party, has recently also “sought sunlight for the nation” (为国争光). A CCTV female reporter called Kong Linlin made a big fuss at the annual conference of the UK Conservative Party, engaging in a verbal war of words and even hitting people. Kong Linlin’s “patriotic” move received a lot of support from “patriotic” internet users. Afterward, some suggested that it was not right to hit people. Through her Weibo account, Kong Linlin explained by saying that legitimate self-defense (正当防卫) is not the same thing as hitting people, and the post came with a smile emoticon.
Concerning this question, former journalist Luqiu Luwei (闾丘露薇) said that this journalist based in London had exposed a core aspect of the Chinese media system: that the media serve the Chinese Communist Party, and that they must revere the Party. Daring to ‘show the sword’ was precisely the prerogative of these propaganda workers, and so seeing the high-level support officially and the energetic support back home is not at all a surprise. This is [for them] about responsibilities, and demanded by the media system. The definition of a journalist officially in China is very different from the professional definition provided in classrooms overseas. This is common knowledge.

Key Chinese Sources:
China News Service (中新网): 中国记者在英保守党年会被警方带走 中方要求道歉
CCTV Online (央视网): 央视发言人：央视记者孔琳琳已被无指控释放
WeChat public account “Shen Mutian” (沈目田): 央视女记者大闹英国保守党年会
WeChat public account “Shen Tuoshou” (沈舵手): 媒体姓党，记者也姓党
[2] Decision on discipline of actress Fan Bingbing for “shadow contracts” and tax avoidance made public, she is fined 800 million yuan
Actress Fan Bingbing (范冰冰), one of China’s most recognized celebrities, resurfaced as tax authorities in China announced that she had been fined for “shadow contracts” and tax evasion. In an apology shared widely across social media, Fan said she was sorry and would “engage in deep reflection” over the matter, that she felt “ashamed and guilty” (羞愧、内疚).


An October 3 announcement from tax authorities said that in the process of making the film “Unbreakable Spirit,” directed by Xiao Feng, in which she stars with American actor Bruce Willis, Fan Bingbing received “shadow contracts” that enabled her to evade more than 6 million yuan in personal income taxes, and more than 10 million yuan in small business taxes. In total, the authorities said, the actress would have to pay more than 800 million yuan in fines and back taxes. In language reminiscent of public confessions seen in recent years in China, she also thanked the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party for the opportunities afforded to her.
Online in China, views of the Fan case were varied. Some wondered at the fairness of Fan receiving only fines for tax evasion involving enormous sums when Li Xiaohang (李晓航) a former airline stewardess involved in cosmetics sales, received a prison sentence of 3 years for evading just over 1 million in taxes.
The WeChat public account “People’s Daily Commentary” said: “We will not offer special treatment because the violator of the law is a public figure. At the same time, we will not afford public figures punishments that exceed what is necessary.”
Key Chinese Sources:
Xinhua Online (新华网): 税务部门依法查处范冰冰“阴阳合同”等偷逃税问题
Weibo Account of Fan Bingbing (@范冰冰): 致歉信
CFI.net.cn (中财网): 为什么空姐代购逃税被判刑 范冰冰却只用交罚款？
WeChat public account “Xinhua News Agency” (微信公众号”新华社”): 范冰冰案教育警示文艺影视从业者遵纪守法
WeChat public account “People’s Daily Commentary” (微信公众号”人民日报评论”): 范冰冰“阴阳合同”案：法律面前没有例外
Guangming Daily (光明日报): 更须重警示守规矩立德行
[3] Bloomberg releases a report on “spy chips” from China

A report published on October 4 in Bloomberg Businessweek alleged that Chinese spies had hacked into the networks of nearly 30 U.S. companies, including Apple and Amazon, by using a “tiny microchip, not much larger than a grain of rice,” imbedded in server motherboards sourced from China. The report, which quickly sent ripples through tech and foreign policy communities in the U.S., seeming to substantiate calls for a harder line on China (one lawmaker calling it the “holy grail of hacking”), was denied by at least three of the major companies involved, Apple, Amazon and AMD. Super Micro, the supplier mentioned by Bloomberg as the source of infected motherboards, denied that its products contained such chips, which it said had never been found in its products.
Official state media in China remained silent about the case through October 5, but there was some discussion across tech sites and WeChat public accounts about which version of the story to believe. A post at the WeChat public account “Gui Xing Ren” (硅星人), did a full summary of the Bloomberg report and related coverage and then proceeded to look carefully at a number of “odd points” in the stories. The post bore the headline: “Bloomberg Exposed ‘Spy Chips’: I Can Buy One on Taobao for 1 Yuan” (彭博社曝光的“间谍芯片”，我在淘宝1块钱就能买一个).
Key Chinese Sources:
Huxiu (虎嗅网): 解码中国超微超级间谍芯片丑闻：我们知道些什么？谁在说真话？
AND: 一篇彭博报道引发的中美科技股血案
WeChat public account “Gui Xing Ren” (微信公众号”硅星人”): 彭博社曝光的“间谍芯片”，我在淘宝1块钱就能买一个 
[4] National Radio and Television Administration launches campaign to clean up advertisements, emphasizing “guidance”
A notice from the National Radio and Television Adminstration on September 30 announced that the agency would carry out a “cleanup campaign” (整治工作) from now through the end of 2018 to eliminate 9 types of television advertisements are false and misleading. According to the notice, called “National Radio and Television Administration Notice on Special Cleanup Work for Television Advertising” (国家广播电视总局关于开展广播电视广告专项整治工作的通知), this campaign is being carried out under the principle that advertisements, like all content, must “strictly grasp correct guidance of public opinion, energetically promote socialist core values, fully place social benefit in the first position,” “resolutely implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important statements on how advertisements must also adhere to guidance, endeavoring to sing the main theme [of the Party], promoting truth, goodness and beauty, transmitting positive energy and arousing positive spiritual forces.”
Key Chinese Sources:
WeChat public account “National Radio and Television Administration” (国家广播电视总局): 国家广播电视总局关于开展广播电视广告专项整治工作的通知
Tencent (腾讯网): 广电广告专项整治，这些领域是重点
[5] New regulations give broad police inspection powers over companies providing internet services
According to an October 4 report from the official Xinhua News Agency, the new “Regulations on Internet Security Supervision By Public Security Organs” (公安机关互联网安全监督检查规定), released by the Ministry of Public Security last month and due for implementation on November 1, 2018, will extend broad policing powers to local and central-level authorities in ensuring cybersecurity broadly defined. The regulations stipulate that public security organs may enter places of business where companies are engaged in the provision of internet services, inspecting computer rooms and offices, and requiring “responsible persons” of these companies or employees dealing with network security to explain information and procedures relevant to cybersecurity. The regulations specify that copies of these materials and information can be made available to police on request.
Official media in China explained the regulations as a means to provide greater security from such dangers as hacking, but the breadth of the regulations ensures that they can also be applied for the purposes of information control. In fact, police in China have long had the power to act in the way outlined in these new regulations, but these serve the purpose of formalizing this power.
The full text of the new regulations is available here.
Key Chinese Sources:
Xinhua Online (新华网): 公安部发布公安机关互联网安全监督检查规定
Public Security Bureau Website (公安部网站): 公安机关互联网安全监督检查规定（公安部令第151号）

How Will China Respond to the Victor Mallet Case?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

There is so far no official media response from China on the decision by Hong Kong authorities to deny a visa to Victor Mallet, the Asia news editor of the Financial Times. The story is most certainly a sensitive one, dealing as it does from China’s perspective with issues of national security and national sovereignty — and with the tinder-dry issue of separatism.
We can assume that China’s foreign ministry is closely monitoring international coverage, and can anticipate that at some point we will have a statement running through all of the sovereignty bullet points and claiming respect for Hong Kong’s decisions on this matter. At some point, too, we might expect a few attack pieces from more peripheral state media, like the Global Times.
Before these moves, however, it might be fruitful to review some of the previous official voices on the August event hosted by the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club, which is likely at the heart of Mallet’s visa denial.
Interestingly, one of the attack pieces back in August from the Global Times was fairly dismissive of the impact of the decision by the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club to host a talk with pro-independence activist Andy Chan. Here is what the paper said:

The actions of the FCC this time around is a classic case of foreign forces interfering in the affairs of Hong Kong and all of China. On the one hand, their actions should be censured and exposed. On the other hand, everyone is clear that this is a routine clash, and that once Hong Kong and Beijing have registered their attitudes there is no need for everyone to think too much (高看) of the vile actions of the FCC. This was a dirty stunt by certain people, and we can’t let it taint the agenda of Hong Kong and the whole country.

No need to worry then. This is conflict as usual in Hong Kong. A momentary heightening of tempers.
Except that it now clearly isn’t. The denial of Mallet’s Hong Kong visa is a clear escalation that will surely ripple through Hong Kong society and transform views globally about how credible the “one country, two systems” arrangement remains. And this is why it will be important to watch the way China characterizes the incident, and how it responds to the resulting international public opinion.
The provide just a bit more retroactive context, we translate below the August 15, 2018, report in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily, another of the more important (among few) semi-official voices emerging in response to the Andy Chan event. We say “semi-official” because the overseas edition of the People’s Daily is not exactly the same beast as the domestic edition of the People’s Daily. We don’t yet have responses from the core-most official media — the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency and CCTV — and until we do the article below will be one of the closest approximations we have to an “official” view of the matter, and the attitude of the leadership, outside of statements from the foreign ministry.
We have italicized certain portions in the translation we think are of particular significance.
_________________________________
HKSAR Government Says
Openly Spreading “Hong Kong Independence” Speech is Unacceptable
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office in Hong Kong Issues Condemnation
People’s Daily (Overseas Edition)
August 15, 2018, page 4
By Lian Jintian (连锦添), Chen Ran (陈然)
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region issued a statement on August 14 expressing deep regret over the decision of the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club to invite a speaker promoting “Hong Kong independence” to give a lunch talk. A spokesperson for the HKSAR Government said that anyone openly proclaiming or promoting “Hong Kong independence,” and any organization providing a platform for such speakers, was entirely inappropriate and unacceptable.


The HKSAR Government spokesperson emphasized that the Basic Law clearly stipulates that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is is inseparable part of the People’s Republic of China. Promoting “Hong Kong independence” is an open violation of the Basic Law, and even more directly harms national sovereignty, national security and territorial integrity. 
The statement reaffirmed that the government fully attaches importance to press freedom and freedom of speech, but these freedoms are not absolute (这些自由并非绝对), and must be exercised in accord with the law. In recent decades, the Hong Kong government has all along supported the work of the Foreign Correspondents Club, but this meeting providing a platform to a speaker promoting “Hong Kong independence” entirely treats with contempt Hong Kong’s statutory duty to uphold national sovereignty, and it cannot be accepted.
The Hong Kong office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on August 14 severely condemning the invitation by the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club of a speaker promoting “Hong Kong independence.” The statement emphasized that China’s Constitution and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have a bottom line and limitation, and “Hong Kong independence” is a violation of the Constitution and the law, and fundamentally does not belong to the category of freedom of expression (言论自由范畴). On the major question of opposing “Hong Kong independence,” the Central Government [of the People’s Republic of China], the SAR Government and the full people of China will not permit “Hong Kong independence” forces and the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club to step on this red line, crossing the bottom line. The statement pointed out that we encourage the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club to carry out introspection, to correct this wrong, to take actual actions to respect the laws of the People’s Republic of China and the SAR, with that respect including for the feelings of 7 million Hong Kong compatriots and 1.4 Chinese people. Any statements regarding the futile attempt to divide Hong Kong from China will be punished in accord with the law.
A joint statement by 32 pro-establishment lawmakers strongly condemned the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club for inviting a speaker promoting “Hong Kong independence.” Related matters have also stirred the resentment of various quarters of Hong Kong society. Hong Kong National People’s Congress Delegate Ma Fung-kwok (马逢国) said that in providing a platform to a “Hong Kong independence” speaker, the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club was complicit in harming national security, and the conduct was extremely inappropriate. On August 14, more than 10 groups gathered outside the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club, opposing the group’s us of property of the Hong Kong government to aid the promotion of “Hong Kong independence.”
 

Missing Compliments

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

Back in June this year, ahead of the July 1 anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), politburo member Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), director of the CCP’s General Office, delivered an instruction talk, or dangke (党课), to a group of offiicials. The substance of Ding’s talk was not made public at the time, but when it did surface several weeks ago it generated a lot of hubbub and discussion online.
Why the interest? Because Ding’s remarks, and how they have subsequently been treated in China’s political discourse environment, again provide clues to the political environment in China.
The point of keenest interest as news of Ding’s remarks made the rounds was the language he used to describe President Xi Jinping and his leadership. “Having read the works of General Secretary Xi Jinping, having listened to the general secretary’s instructions, coming to appreciate the general secretary’s feelings, I have a rather deep understanding of the general secretary’s longstanding devotion, his continued devotion, his selfless devotion,” Deng said.
He then introduced “three terms” (三个关键词) that to his mind summed up the essence of Xi. They were as follows:

“goes willingly into a sea of bitterness” (甘入苦海) — meaning Xi takes a courageous and good-humored attitude to adversity, bravely facing it.
“attends to public affairs day and night” (夙夜在公)
”dedicates himself to the cause of the Party” (以身许党).

Ding Xuexiang has a rather elevated status within the Chinese Communist Party, and the three terms he employed in praise of Xi Jinping naturally drew some interest in light of general questions about Xi’s strength and stature within the leadership.
But the pattern of propagation of these three terms online was also an area of interest. What does this pattern tell us?
First, we can see that the “three terms” were not propagated broadly across the usual platforms one would expect once news of Ding’s remarks emerged. If the terms were coming into broader “mainstream” use — as part, that is, of the Party’s official line — then we would expect to see the terms used and explained at People’s Daily Online, Xinhua Online and on official WeChat accounts and the like.
But reports on Ding’s speech were carried instead by commercial portals such as Sina, Netease, Sohu and Phoenix Online. And if we probe further, turning to a national database of newspapers for the entire period following Ding’s speech, from July through to the end of September, we find that not a single paper used Ding’s “three terms” of praise for Xi.
So the terms are absent not just from high-level, central Party media, but also from provincial and city-level Party newspapers.
Some websites have suggested that Ding’s speech was “an internal speech” (内部讲话). But this is in fact untrue. It was a public speech published in Secretariat Work (秘书工作), a journal run by the Secretariat of the General Office of the Central Committee. But when I conducted a targeted search within this website, I discovered something strange. The edition including the Deng Xuexiang lesson should have come out in July. It is now October, but the July edition has yet to appear on the journal’s website.

The period immediately after last year’s 19th National Congress brought a wave of personality worship (个人崇拜), and the three terms used in praise of Xi Jinping at the time were: “endorsed by the whole Party” (全党拥护), “love by the people” (人民爱戴) and “worthy of the title” (当之无愧). For a brief time, a number of local and regional media even used the highly honorific phrase “great leader” (伟大领袖). But these three phrases rapidly cooled off, possibly due to a personal directive from Xi Jinping to make it stop. Last month, just three local newspapers in China made use of these particular terms.
So how do we explain the pattern we are witnessing here with Ding’s remarks on Xi Jinping?
It could simply be that now is not the time to stroke Xi’s ego or elevate his greatness — any more, that is, than is already being done. In July, Xi Jinping faced numerous challenges. So the personality worship still continues in all sorts of ways, but it may lack fresh kinetic energy.
At the outset of the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao (林彪) praised Mao Zedong for “defending and developing Marxism-Leninism with genius, with creativity and with totality” (天才地、创造性地、全面地继承、捍卫和发展了马克思列宁主义). This was a high compliment, and at that time “with genius, with creativity and with totality” (天才地、创造性地、全面地) became “the three adverbs” (三个副词) used in praise of Mao. But as Lin Biao and Mao had their falling out, Mao saw that the “three adverbs” were struck from official documents, and he indicated that he found the “Four Greatnesess” (四个伟大) used to praise him “disagreeable” (讨嫌).
For now, Ding Xuexiang’s three terms of praise have gotten the cold shoulder from official media at all levels. Being on the outside, it is difficult for us to know exactly why. Is this something compelled by the circumstances? Or is it that Xi faces headwinds within the Party?
Or is it, perhaps, just that Xi Jinping finds these three terms “disagreeable”?

The Return of "Socialist Transformation"

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

As the 40th anniversary of reform and opening approaches in China, we have seen the emergence online in September of quite a number of posts or speeches from various quarters expressing some level of opposition to reform and opening.
On September 11, a post by Wu Xiaoping (吴小平), a finance expert and web entrepreneur, suggested that “China’s private sector has already done its job in aiding the development of the state economy, and it should now leave the stage” (中国私营经济已完成协助公有经济发展的任务, 应逐渐离场). Wu’s suggestion that China’s private sector should yield to the state so that China could consolidate its strengths and prepare in a unified and concerted way for an economic showdown with the United States and other major competitors generated a great deal of debate last month.
The very same day as Wu Xiaoping’s provocative post, Qiu Xiaoping (邱小平), deputy director of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, delivered a speech at a meeting in which he suggested employees of private companies should “participate in the management of enterprises, and share in the fruits of enterprise development” (参与企业管理、共享企业发展成果).


Just five days later, on September 16, a professor from the local Party school in Changsha published an even more eye-catching article under the headline: “China Is in its Second Wave of Socialist Transformation” (中国正处于第二次社会主义改造).
“The Chinese Communist Party has never deigned to disguise its viewpoint and intention: the annihilation of the private ownership of property,” the author wrote, adding that “the time is ripe for China to enter its second era of socialist transformation.”
This series of anti-reform remarks caused quite a stir on the internet in China. How was it that “socialist transformation,” or shehui zhuyi gaizao (社会主义改造), this phrase already seen very rarely in the media, had again become a focus of discussion?
With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, a system of new democracy (新民主主义制度) was put into place. From 1952 to 1956, a process of so-called “socialist transformation” was carried out across sectors, from agriculture and handicrafts to the capitalist commercial sector. It was from this process of “transformation” that the basic system of socialism in China was established. Mao Zedong carried out a wide-scale program of elimination of the private sector, and he sought to rapidly and completely realize what he called “large in size and collective in nature,” or yida ergong (一大二公). This phrase, first appearing in a commentary in the People’s Daily on September 3, 1958, referred to the establishment of people’s communes – which opened the curtain for China to a series of social and political calamities.
The following graph shows the occurrence of the phrase “socialist transformation” in the People’s Daily from 1957 to 2017 in ten-year increments, based on the total number of articles in the People’s Daily database including the phrase. Consider the the dramatic decline in use of the term happens also as the People’s Daily itself expands in size through to the present day.

After the start of economic reforms in the late 1970s, the phrase “socialist transformation” grew cold in the People’s Daily. The same trend could be observed at Party Congresses. From the 8th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in 1956, to the 11th congress, held in 1977, on the cusp of reforms, the phrase was always treated positively in the political report—with the exception of its absence from Zhou Enlai’s political report to the 10th congress, composed while Zhou was ill. The reports to the 9th and 10th congresses both emphasized that once the socialist transformation had been completed, the “class struggle,” or jieji douzheng (阶级斗争) would still exist, and that the “dictatorship of the proletariat” (无产阶级专政) would still need require strengthening.
After reforms being, we see the situation change. In Hu Yaobang’s political report to the 12th congress in 1982, the term cannot be found. In Zhao Ziyang’s political report to the 13th congress five years later, it appears three times. But let’s have a look at three points of context:

[1]
……Beginning from the latter part of the 1950s, owing to the influence of the “left,” we were impatient for success and blind to quality, mistakenly believing that with only our subjective desires and by relying on mass mobilization, we could drive dramatic increases in productivity; mistakenly believing that the bigger and more communal the system of socialist ownership the better. We even for a time placed the development of productivity in a secondary position, keeping “class struggle as the central task” even after socialist transformation.
……从五十年代后期开始，由于”左”倾错误的影响，我们曾经急于求成，盲目求纯，以为单凭主观愿望，依靠群众运动，就可以使生产力急剧提高，以为社会主义所有制形式越大越公越好。我们还曾经长期把发展生产力的任务推到次要地位，在社会主义改造基本完成后还”以阶级斗争为纲.”
[2]
…… Our country, from completion of the socialist transformation of the privatized means of production in the 1950s, to the basic realization of socialist modernization, requires at least more than a century, and we are in the primary stage of socialism.
……我国从五十年代生产资料私有制的社会主义改造基本完成，到社会主义现代化的基本实现，至少需要上百年时间，都属于社会主义初级阶段.
[3]
…… Our nation’s current political system was born from the war of revolution and firmed up in the process of socialist transformation, and it developed [further] through a process of large-scale mass movements and constant strengthening of command programs. It is unsuited to the carrying out of economic, political, cultural and other modernizations under conditions of peace, and unsuited to the development of a socialist commodity economy.
……我国现行的政治体制，是脱胎于革命战争年代而在社会主义改造时期基本确立的，是在大规模群众运动和不断强化指令性计划的过程中发展起来的。它不适应在和平条件下进行经济、政治、文化等多方面的现代化建设，不适应发展社会主义商品经济.

Looking at these three contexts, we see that the 13th congress did not offer a positive affirmation of the notion of “socialist transformation.” Zhao Ziyang’s purpose in raising the term was to delineate and emphasize reform.
From the 14th congress to the 17th congress, the phrase “socialist transformation” disappeared altogether from the political reports that came every five years. In fact, the economic system instituted after the onset of reform and opening was essentially a denial of socialist transformation. China not only pushed back to the era of new democracy, but drew even closer to capitalism.
Since the 18th National Congress of 2012, when Xi Jinping came to power, the situation has been more complex for the term “socialist transformation.” In the political report to that congress, delivered by Hu Jintao but drafted with Xi Jinping in the lead, the phrase ended its long hiatus, appearing once more:

…… The first generation of the collective leadership of the Central Committee, with Comrade Mao Zedong as the core, led the entire Party and the people of the entire nation in completing the new democratic revolution, carried out a process of socialist transformation, firmed up the foundational system of socialism, and successfully realized the greatest social transformation in the history of China, laying the basic political conditions and system foundations for all development and progress in modern China.
……以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体带领全党全国各族人民完成了新民主主义革命，进行了社会主义改造，确立了社会主义基本制度，成功实现了中国历史上最深刻最伟大的社会变革，为当代中国一切发展进步奠定了根本政治前提和制度基础。

This passage was a high-level affirmation of the socialist transformation of the 1950s, and it is of a piece with the “two undeniables” (两个不能否定) that Xi Jinping introduced early in his first term: “[We] must not use the period of history after reform and opening to deny the period of history prior to reform and opening; [we] must not use the period of history prior to reform and opening to deny the period of history after reform and opening.”
But in the most recent political report for the 19th congress last year, we again see the term “socialist transformation” disappearing.
This absence in the 19th congress report is something to consider. On September 27, Hu Deping (胡德平), the son of Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) and former deputy head of the United Front Work Department, delivered a speech called “Remaining Alert to New Joint State-Private Ownership Under the Banner of Sharing” (警惕打着共享的旗号搞新的公私合营). The term gonghe siying (公私合营) in this headline, which roughly translates “joint state-private ownership,” is closely association with the socialist transformation process of the 1950s. That process began in June 1953 after an investigation conducted by the United Front Work Department that resulted in the drafting of “Opinion on the Use, Limitation and Transformation of Capitalist Commercial Businesses” (关于利用、限制、改造资本主义工商业的意见).
Hu Deping’s speech revealed that a Central Committee document in 1991 had directed that the owners of private businesses not “like in the case of the 1950s be subject to socialist transformation.”
Cao Xihua (曹习华), the author of the article that began this discussion, “China Is in its Second Wave of Socialist Transformation,” is an assistant professor at the Changsha Municipal Party School. Materials online show that he has lectured on “the spirit of the 19th congress” at many departments and companies.
Professor Cao may not actually realize that the most recent political report to the 19th congress already took the step of toning down affirmation of the 1950s socialist transformation. But he is surely sensitive to the larger atmosphere in recent years of “the state advancing while the private sector retreats,” or guojin mintui (国进民退), and perhaps he felt that talk of a “second wave of socialist transformation” had a certain ring to it.

Informants in the Chinese Classroom

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Tracking Control.

Teachers hold your tongues. What you say in a Chinese classroom may or may not be held against you. Xu Zhuanqing (许传青), an assistant professor at the Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, learned this lesson the hard way back in April. She was alleged to have made, during a class on probability theory, unspecified remarks suggesting Chinese people were inferior to Japanese. A notice from the university dated April 4 said Xu had been disciplined as a result of her “inappropriate comparisons,” which were “reported by a student after class.”

In early June, Xu Zhuanqing’s case became a focus of interest on WeChat and Weibo, in part due to the popularity of a post on Weibo by user “LiuHu9plus” (刘虎9plus), who introduced a concept to the discussion around the disciplining of Professor Xu that was unfamiliar to many, and an open secret to many others — the use of “student informants,” or xuesheng xinxiyuan (学生信息员), to keep tabs on China’s classrooms.

In a May 30 post, LiuHu9plus wrote: “A professor at Zhejiang University says he originally thought ‘student informants’ only carried out surveillance of teachers in the humanities and social sciences. But after seeing this disciplinary decision [against Xu], they realized that teachers in science and engineering were treated in the same way.”

The topic of “student informants” was cracked wide open. Who were these classroom spies? How and under what conditions were they deployed? By whom? How long had this been going on?

As interest rose, the spotlight turned to other cases. Also in April, Zhai Jiehong (翟桔红), an assistant professor at Wuhan’s Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, was stripped of her teaching responsibilities after she was accused of criticizing recent amendments to China’s Constitution.

In a story about Xu and Zhai with a suggestive headline about “Cultural Revolution winds returning” (文革风重来), Hong Kong’s Sing Pao Daily News quoted a university professor in Shanghai as saying the problem of students informing on their teachers was worsening. “At university students inform against their teachers,” the professor said. “In the future, out in society, who will they inform against?”

The sentiment was echoed in a WeChat private group, where one user remarked, referring to the former East German secret police: “We are all Stasi” (人人都是斯塔西).

Discussants on social media then started digging, and exposed the various “informant systems” (信息员制度) in place at universities. In fact, they realized, universities in China had organized teams of student informants as early as 2008. Ferreted out by one user, a document from the Hunan University of Commerce showed that this was characterized as “intelligence work” (情报信息工作) that was “secretive in nature” (具有隐秘性). It was also paid work. Generally, student informants would receive between 20 and 50 yuan for providing a single piece of information, and for information regarded as more critical they could be paid 200 yuan.

Informant systems were in place not just at universities, however. Others contributing to the discussion found evidence — most of it right out in the open — that the same systems were being implemented in middle schools and even in primary schools. And beyond the education system, there were even “stability maintenance informants” (维稳信息员) being cultivated and deployed in rural townships.

These systems, which in the beginning had been treated as highly secret programs, had in recent years become increasingly open, and it was possible even to find academic papers online that studied these systems. Take, for example, this 2012 paper published in Vocational and Technical Education Forum, a journal openly circulated by Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University. Written by Yan Guirong (闫贵荣), a scholar from the Tianjin Vocational Institute, the paper is rather explicitly titled: “A Study of the Building and Operation of Student Informant Systems in Professional Schools: Drawing on an Exploration of Practices at the Tianjin Vocational Institute.”

This paper, accessed through the CNKI database of Chinese periodicals, a leading resource for academic studies in Chinese, was shared and discussed in June as attention turned to the issue of “informant systems” and “student informants,” or xuesheng xinxiyuan (学生信息员), a term that appears in the paper. Search the CNKI database now, however, and you find that the paper is missing. In its place is a notice that reads: “The paper you are looking for does not exist.
 
 
 

Debate Rages Over Treatment of Chinese Tourists

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The following is our quick roundup of several key stories in the Chinese media this week. On the policy side, the story to watch most closely is that last in our lineup — language in the share prospectus of Chinese mobile content provider Qutoutiao, which listed on Nasdaq last week, saying the company may offer “shares with special rights” to a state-owned Chinese media firm in order to assist with its application for an “Internet news license.”
Another big story this week was the accusation by state media that police in Stockholm, Sweden, treated three Chinese tourists cruelly by refusing to let them remain in a hotel many hours ahead of their scheduled booking. Cue online rage — and some skepticism too.
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
September 15 to September 21, 2018
➢ Party Media Do Intensive Coverage of Taiwan Spy Case, Keeping Close to Official Line
➢ Film Director Reveals Problem of Falsified Ratings, National Radio and Television Administration Launches Investigation
➢ Chinese Tourists in Sweden Claim Police Abuse, Opinions in China Deeply Divided Over the Issue
➢ The Chinese Economists 50 Forum Opens in Beijing, Discussion of Public Versus Private Sector Role in Economy a Focus
[1] Party Media Do Intensive Reporting on Taiwan Spy Case
On September 15, the official nightly news program Xinwen Lianbo (新闻联播) reported that China had uncovered a major Taiwanese spy operation in 2018. The “Focus” news program on China Central Television ran a two-part special program called “Wei Qing Die Ying” (危情谍影) over two consecutive days, introducing what it characterized as several “representative examples” of breakthroughs into alleged Taiwanese espionage operations. According to official news reports, Taipei had sought to lure mainland Chinese students in Taiwan into taking part in spying activities.
For this sensitive story, the only sources available inside China were official state media sources, and reports showed little or no variation in facts and details. Experts commenting on the coverage outside China said the case reflected growing tensions between China and Taiwan.
Key Chinese Sources:
China Central Television, “News Probe” (央视《新闻联播》): “2018-雷霆”专项行动：破获百余起台湾间谍案件
China Central Television, “Focus” (央视《焦点访谈》): 20180915 危情谍影（上）
WeChat Public Account “Zheng Zhidao” (微信公众号“政知道”): 这次披露的台湾间谍案，和之前有何不同？
Hunan Daily (海南日报): 海南公布两起台湾间谍案：旅行社司机兼职拍摄三亚某军用机杨
Global Times (环球时报): 社评：高度警惕台湾间谍诱骗大陆学生
Xinhua Online (新华网): 国台办发言人：台湾有关方面应立即停止针对祖国大陆的情报破坏活动
[2] Film Director Reveals Problem of Falsified Ratings, National Radio and Television Administration Launches Investigation

On September 15, film director Guo Jingyu (郭靖宇) exposed through his social media account the problem of ratings fabrication for television serials in China, writing that before his latest serial, “Niang Dao” (娘道), was broadcast a satellite broadcaster he did not name demanded he purchase ratings before the program could be broadcast.
Guo called on the television industry to unite against such practices, rooting out the problem of false ratings. Guo also alleged that another of his serials, “Tian Sheng Chang Ge” (天盛长歌), was dropped by a broadcaster after just 14 episodes because he could not afford to pay their exorbitant ratings fees.
On September 16, the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) announced through its official WeChat account that it was launching an investigation into the practice. One has to wonder: How could officials at the NRTA have been previously unaware of such abuses?
Key Chinese Sources:
Weibo Account ‘@GuoJingyu (新浪微博@郭靖宇)
Qilu Evening News (齐鲁晚报): 郭靖宇捅破收视率造假“窗户纸”
WeChat Public Account “National Radio and Television Administration” (微信公众号”国家广播电视总局”): 总局就收视率问题展开调查
China Business Journal (中国经营网): 严肃查处收视率造假行为

The National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) announces through its official WeChat account that it will launch an investigation into fraudulent ratings.
[3] Chinese Tourists in Sweden Claim Police Abuse, Opinions in China Deeply Divided Over the Issue
On September 15, Chinese media widely reported the story of the alleged abuse of three Chinese tourists in Sweden that took place almost two weeks earlier, on September 2. The coverage ran at many outlets under the headline “Chinese Tourists Cruelly Treated by Swedish Police” (中国游客遭瑞典警察粗暴对待). The story quickly became the focus of anger and heated debate within China, with opinions divided.
For some, the story was confirmation that Westerners apply a double standard to Chinese, treating them with prejudice and disdain. For others, the story once again highlighted ugly behavior by Chinese tourists abroad, who lashed out with extreme actions when rules or misfortunes went against their favor. Still others, noting the high-level register of anger from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs over what they felt was a trivial matter suggested the real issue was diplomatic tension between China and Sweden.

Screenshot of video shared online of Chinese tourists in Stockholm, Sweden, being forced out of a local hotel.
The incident in question occurred on September 2 outside Generator Stockholm, a hotel located in the center of Stockholm. A Chinese guest, Mr. Zeng, arrived with his parents after midnight, with a room booked for later in the day — with check-in generally not possible, as most travellers should know, until mid-morning or early afternoon. Mr. Zeng suggested they be permitted to wait in the chairs in the hotel’s lobby. Staff at the hotel called the police, who according to accounts in the Chinese media then dragged Mr. Zeng’s father from the hotel. When a police vehicle arrived, the three Chinese were placed — “forcibly” (强行) according to official Chinese media reports — in the vehicle and taken to the skogskyrkogården area of Stockholm, near a subway station, church and cemetery. The Chinese Embassy in Sweden said publicly that it had on numerous occasions tried to hold “serious negotiations” (严正交涉) with the Swedish side over the incident.
While the position in Chinese media coverage clearly focused on the incident as an outrage against Chinese tourists, some internet users also questioned whether Mr. Zeng and his parents had “unreasonably made a scene” (撒泼) and “acted out to demand special treatment” (碰瓷), both relatively common behaviors in China.
Before long, these criticisms were also attacked in state media as anti-China conspiracies. On September 19, the WeChat public account “China Anti-Cult” (中国反邪教) ran an article called “Behind the Inverted Storyline of the Chinese Tourism Incident in Sweden: What is Hiding There?” (中国游客瑞典受辱事件剧情反转的背后，究竟藏着什么?) . The article alleged that the Falun Gong spiritual cult overseas had sought to tar the reputations of Mr. Zeng and his family by accusing them of “making an unreasonable scene” (撒泼) and “stirring up trouble” (胡搅蛮缠). On September 20, the WeChat public account “People’s Daily,” the official WeChat account of the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, re-posted the article.
Key Chinese Sources:
WeChat public account “CCTV News” (微信公众号”央视新闻”): 中国游客遭瑞典警方粗暴对待，一家三口被扔坟场！
And: 中国游客遭瑞典警方粗暴对待 任何原因都不该成为粗暴执法的理由
WeChat public account “Global Times” (微信公众号”环球时报”): 看完能气炸中国人！瑞典就是这么一个国家？！
WeChat public account “China Anti-Cult” (微信公众号”中国反邪教”: 中国游客瑞典受辱事件剧情反转的背后，究竟藏着什么？
WeChat public account “People’s Daily” (微信公众号”人民日报”): 中国游客瑞典受辱事件剧情“反转”的背后，究竟藏着什么？
[4] The Chinese Economists 50 Forum Opens in Beijing
The 20th annual gathering of the Chinese Economists 50 Forum was held on September 16 at China’s historic Diaoyutai Guest House. This year’s event commemorated the 40th anniversary of economic reforms in China. The theme of the forum was “New Missions for Reform and Opening in the New Era” (新时代改革开放的新使命), a title making obvious reference to the banner ideology of President Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era,” which has been prominent in the official discourse across disciplines since entering the Party Charter in October last year.

Screenshot of the official website of the Chinese Economists 50 Forum.
The consensus among those commenting on this year’s meeting seemed to be that the views being aired regarding the state of the domestic economy were unusually frank. The state and role of the private sector was reportedly an issue of intense interest, particularly given the recent post by economist Wu Xiaoping (吴小平) arguing that the private sector should now take a back seat to the private sector so that China could consolidate its national strength and effectively counteract the trade actions taken by the United States — a view that last week was criticized by some state media.
Ma Jiantang (马建堂) the deputy director of the Development Research Center of the State Council, said at the forum that the concerns of many in the private sector have to do with fair competition, insufficient rule of law and inadequate intellectual property protections. Other issues, he said, included debt and financing. But the deeper question addressed at the meeting was “how to view the private sector” (怎么看待民营经济). A common theme in discussions at the forum, related to all of the above concerns, was the phenomenon of “the state sector advancing while the private sector recedes” (国进民退).
Key Chinese Sources:
Phoenix Online (凤凰网): 纪念中国经济改革开放四十年暨50人论坛成立二十周年学术研讨会
The Enterprise Observer (企业观察报): 聚焦国企混改 激辩民企发展 2018中国发展高层论坛专题研讨会及中国经济50人论坛在京召开
Deep Blue Finance (深蓝财经): 纪念改革开放四十年暨50人论坛成立二十周年学术研讨会（全程实录）
Sina Finance Topics (新浪财经专题)
[5] Qutoutiao Lists on Nasdaq, May Seek “Special Management Shareholding” from State-Owned Media Company
On September 14, the Chinese mobile content provider Qutoutiao Inc listed on the Nasdaq exchange. In its initial share prospectus, the company said it was considering the provision of “special management shares” (特殊权利股份) to a Chinese state-owned enterprise in order to advance its application for an “Internet News Service License” (互联网新闻服务许可证). In August this year, a foundation directly under People’s Daily Online and Shanghai -based news group The Paper (澎湃新闻) both became strategic investors in Qutoutiao.

In its initial share prospectus from August 2018, Qutoutiao explains how it might in the future issue “shares with special rights” to a state-owned Chinese company in order to obtain an internet news license.
In order to better exercise control over information platforms, the Central Office of the Chinese Communist Party and the General Office of the State Council released in January 2017 a document called “Opinion on the Healthy and Orderly Development of the Mobile Internet” (关于促进移动互联网健康有序发展的意见), which proposed “the carrying out of pilot projects in the holding of special management shares in [companies] in sectors such as online information and online video. In May 2017, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) released new regulations called “Provisions for the Administration of Internet News Information Services”(互联网新闻信息服务管理规定), which included language about “implementing a special management share system for internet news information service providers meeting the criteria.” Wang Sixin (王四新), a professor of politics and law at Communication University of China, said the “special management share” system is directed principally at news and information platforms that have already “developed strongly” (做大做强), a Chinese phrase that generally refers to firms that have scaled to include a range of information services. The special management share system, he said, is about making sure that the state has “voting rights” (表决权) where these major platforms are concerned.
There are already precedents for the special management share approach. In January 2017, the personalized news reader platform ZAKER received major investments from the Guangdong South Media Integration Development Investment Fund (广东南方媒体融合发展投资基金), the Shenzhen Newspaper Group (深圳报业集团), Jiangsu Modern Express Media Co., Ltd. (江苏现代快报传媒有限公司) and other state-invested media firms. In August 2017, People’s Daily Online announced that it had purchased at 1.5 percent stake in the website Tiexie.net (铁血科技), making the site an early pilot in the special management share concept.
Key Chinese Sources:
Huxiu.com (虎嗅网): 上市前夕给澎湃发1%“特殊股”，趣头条能过“牌照关”吗？
P5W.net (全景网): 趣头条登陆纳斯达克，成为移动内容聚合第一股

American-Made Typhoons

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Among the posts deleted from China’s popular Weibo platform today was the following bizarre missive from Chinese journalist and novelist Wang Zhanguo (王湛国), who currently has more than 92,000 fans.  The post made the tongue-in-cheek suggestion that the tropical storm that recently swept across the Philippines and south China was a super weapon conjured up by the United States.
Though made in jest, Wang Zhanguo’s post was accompanied by the image of a group chat on the WeChat platform in which one user seriously discussed the possibility that the typhoon was man-made. The post suggested giant waves could be generated by ocean going vessels coordinated by satellites.

The authorities were surely keen to avoid the spread of such rumors, particularly given the currently tense relations between China and the US.

Original user id: Author Wangzhan
Date: 2018-09-19 08:02:06
Censored time: 2018-09-19 08:49:42.229529
Content:
Typhoon Mangkhut has already passed. Even if it hadn’t we would not having anything to fear. No doubt this was an atmospheric weapon deployed by the American imperialists, the same thing they previously used when invading Vietnam. This is nothing new. These days the gallant masses have already reverted to Yin Yang Tai Chi Theory (阴阳太极理论) to decode the world!
______
Original user id: 作家王湛
Date: 2018-09-19 08:02:06
Censored time: 2018-09-19 08:49:42.229529
Content:
台风山竹过去了。它没过去也不可怕，这个无非是美帝的气象武器罢了，过去侵略越南时已经用过，并不是什么新鲜玩意儿，现在我英勇的人民群众早已根据阴阳太极理论找到破解之道了！ ​
 

 

The Breakdown of the Feedback Loop

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In a post earlier this week, we took a look at an article the latest edition of Seeking Truth (求是) journal by the president of Xinhua News Agency, Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照), which sought to unpack the “spirit” of President Xi Jinping’s speech last month to a national conference on propaganda and ideology. Cai’s article laid the official discourse on thick, emphasizing the core status of President Xi Jinping and his banner term (旗帜语), “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.” He also stressed the importance of what is now being called the “15-character mission,” or shiwuzi shiming renwu (15字使命任务).
All of Cai’s language boiled down to a single unmistakable message — the need to assert the absolute dominance of the Chinese Communist Party, with Xi Jinping as its core leader, in all media and propaganda work. Journalists at Xinhua, said Cai, must “maintain a high level of uniformity in terms of political positions, political orientation, political principles and political path with the Central Party with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, firmly preserving the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the Party’s Central Committee and within the entire Party.”

An article in the August 31 edition of Xinhua Daily Communication is titled: “Grassroots Propaganda Offices Must Cure ‘Sensitivity to Supervision'”.
How odd it seems then that it is also Cai Mingzhao’s own Xinhua News Agency that in recent weeks has bemoaned the fact that journalists, particularly at the local level, not longer criticize Party and government officials. On August 31, in the wake of Xi Jinping’s address to the work conference on propaganda and ideology, Xinhua Daily Communication (新华每日电讯), a paper published by the news agency since 1993, ran a piece that criticized local officials in China of “having a sensitivity toward supervision by public opinion” (舆论监督敏感症). It bemoaned the fact that certain media, and particularly journalists working at the local and regional levels (as opposed to the center), have “lost their capacity to conduct supervision by public opinion.” They have, instead, “nurtured the habit,” said the paper, of “reporting only the good news, not the unpleasant news,” or baoxi bu baoyou (报喜不报忧).
How should we understand this deep inconsistency — between Cai’s genuflection and his agency’s call for a more critical, even adversarial, attitude?
In the West, the notion of “watchdog journalism,” that journalism plays an important role in holding institutions accountable, is subject to considerable discussion and debate. But whether or not one accepts this “normative vision” of journalists in pursuit of the public interest, few certainly would take seriously the notion that enforcing broad uniformity of political views around a single political figure could encourage or ensure accountability within a political system. In China, this idea is not just taken seriously; it is regular feature of discourse about the role of the press and of journalism.
The Chinese Communist Party has deep tradition of media control. Think of the way Cai’s recent statement in Qiushi about the need for “politicians to run the news agency” recalls Mao’s language about “politicians running the newspapers,” meaning that the press should be wielded as a tool of the Party. But there is also a coexisting notion that the media should, empowered by the Party, serve a supervision role as well. One of the most important phrases to encompass this idea is “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督), a difficult term to come to grips with within a system that does not have a robust system of press supervision.
At times, the term “supervision by public opinion” can denote the exposure at one stratum of political power of negligence or misconduct at a lower stratum. More often than not, however, the exposure isn’t of misconduct within the Party or government at all, but of corporate or individual misconduct. Think of the way, for example, that China Central Television recently exposed — once again — possibly fraudulent doctoring of health related search results by the Chinese search engine giant Baidu.
This sort of top-down monitoring through the media has sometimes been called “swatting at flies and letting the tigers run free,” a phrase that in fact sums up quite well the fundamental problem at the heart of the Party’s notion of monitoring by a press under strict control. Party leaders are the tigers, and when “supervision by public opinion” is conducted at all, we can best imagine government officials lounging at their leisure as they swat the flies idly with their tails.
However, there have been times in the past four decades when Chinese scholars and journalists have in complete seriousness discussed “supervision by public opinion” as being in much the same vein, if not essentially the same practice, as what we call in the West “watchdog journalism.” Here’s a 2011 piece from Forbes that reviews our book on the subject, looking at a number of important stories covered in the Chinese media from the late 1990s to the early 2000s — some of the best examples still of Chinese investigative journalism in practice.
Since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012, in-depth and investigative reporting have become extremely difficult in China. And though the disruption of the news industry by digital platforms, and changing commercial models, may have some role in shaking up the practice of journalism, the primary cause is without a doubt the intensification of controls on reporting, and on information more broadly. Xi Jinping has redoubled the emphasis on the primacy of the Chinese Communist Party, telling media in March 2016 that they must be “surnamed Party.” He has stressed that reporting must “spread positive energy,” or zhengnengliang (正能量).
Xi Jinping has brought journalism to heel. But herein lies the problem. When journalism is well and truly restrained, when leaders at every stratum of power have emulated the General Secretary’s attitude of dominance, ensuring the media are dutifully “surnamed Party,” when every particle of the Party’s molecular structure is vibrating with “positive energy” — how can problems be exposed and addressed at the higher strata of political power?
“Supervision by public opinion” provides a crucial, if hugely imperfect, feedback loop within China’s political system. And when press control brings too much quiet, this fact can be disquieting. When propaganda is too effective, the feedback loop is broken.
This is a very real dilemma now facing the Chinese political system and the media. As the Xinhua Daily Communication piece concludes, likening problems in society to the pests infesting the trees:

“Some scholars compare the supervision conducted by the media to woodpeckers who peck the parasites out of trees. Bad news does not originate with the messenger, and the trees are not sick because the woodpeckers seek out parasites. This simple logic should be understood by those propaganda officials who are ‘oversensitive to supervision by public opinion.'”

The metaphor sounds perfectly reasonable. But there is the simple logic of the woodpecker, and then there is the simple logic of the parasite. Can the two really coexist?

China's Propaganda Mission in 15 Characters

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In the latest edition of Seeking Truth (求是), the Chinese Communist Party’s chief official journal of theory, the president of Xinhua News Agency, Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照), conveys to his ranks the “spirit” of President Xi Jinping’s speech last month to a national conference on propaganda and ideology.
The text, naturally, is a dense layering of official terminologies, the vast majority of them generally familiar to those poor souls who routinely wade through the tide pools of Party discourse. Everything centers, tellingly, around the figure of Xi Jinping and his defining ideological concept.

Cai tells the front line soldiers of Xinhua that they must “maintain a high level of uniformity in terms of political positions, political orientation, political principles and political path with the Central Party with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, firmly preserving the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the Party’s Central Committee and within the entire Party.”
He tells them they must “take the propagation of Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era as their chief and principal matter” (要把习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想的宣传作为头等大事). They must “promote the penetration of Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics into the hearts of the people” (推动习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想深入人心). They must “emphasize positive propaganda” (正面宣传为主), working to “raise the quality and level of positive propaganda” (提高正面宣传质量和水平), which means organization of such themes as, well, “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era at the Grassroots” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想在基层).
Even when it comes to foreign propaganda and the battle for minds — which Cai, echoing Xi, calls a “public opinion struggle” — Xi Jinping’s banner term takes precedence, despite how counter-productive this may seem when the Party is dealing with audiences for whom CCP ideology and terminology is necessarily alien. Beginning a section on “applying energy to properly telling the China Story,” Cai writes: “[We] must innovate our discourse system for external propaganda, taking Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era as the highest priority in discourse innovation.” This is meant to be the heart — the spirit — of the strategy by which “the governing concepts and strategies of the Chinese Communist Party are thoroughly explained to international society.”
Worthy of note in Cai’s piece, however, is the emphasis of what is being referred to since last month as the “15-character mission” (15字使命任务). This refers to:

  1. raising the banner (举旗帜) — about upholding a contemporary, 21st-century version of Marxism (with Chinese characteristics), and educating the population about its leading status in China
  2. gathering the hearts of the people (聚民心) — about creating social and political cohesion through control of the message, with related concepts such as “emphasizing positive propaganda” and upholding “correct guidance of public opinion”
  3. nurturing new people (育新人) — about educating the population, including the next generation, in socialist morals and “socialist core values”
  4. invigorating culture (兴文化) — about building a unique Chinese culture (the language strongly imbued with exceptionalism) that is under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, but in which “society participates”
  5. developing our [national] image (展形象) — about building up China’s international “discourse power,” raising its voice in the world, telling the Party’s notion of the “China story,” and explaining the Party’s unique forms of governance to the international community

Concerning the third of these, “nurturing new people,” we refer readers to a series on this topic at China Heritage.
A translation of the first section of Cai’s piece follows.

“Raising the Communication Power, Guiding Capacity and Credibility of News and Public Opinion”
September 16, 2018 / Seeking Truth (求是)
By Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照)
General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech to the National Propanda and Ideology Work Conference sparkled with the light of Marxist truth, and it is a programmatic document to guide propaganda and ideology work under the new circumstances. The study and implementation of the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech is a major political task of those hereafter on the front lines of propaganda and ideology. Xinhua News Agency is the main force, main channel and main position of news and public opinion work, and we must set the example in the study and implementation of the spirit of Xi Jinping’s important speech, conscientiously raising our political position, strengthening our political consciousness, bringing our thought and conduct in line with the spirit of [Xi’s] speech, firmly holding to the position and demands that Central Party has for Xinhua News Agency, applying ourselves to foundational and strategic work, applying ourselves to crucial work and key points, applying ourselves in terms of work quality and level, thoroughly raising the communication power, guiding capacity and credibility [of our news], better carrying out the responsibility and mission given us by the Central Party.
. . .
General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that completing our mission for propaganda and ideology work under the new circumstances requires that we must take our guidance from the Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era (新时代中国特色社会主义思想) and from the spirit of the 19th National Congress of the CCP, strengthening the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), adhering to the Four Confidences” (四个自信), consciously raising the banner, gathering the hearts of the people, educating the youth, invigorating culture and developing our [national image] . . . These 15 characters, raising the banner (举旗帜), gathering the hearts of the people (聚民心), nurturing new people (育新人), invigorating culture (兴文化) and developing our [national image] (展形象), all closely concern the realization of the “two centenary goals” (“两个一百年”奋斗目标) . . . . The political precondition for properly realizing this mission is the firm establishment of the “Four Consciousnesses,” and we must arm our minds with Xi Jinping Though of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, maintaining throughout a high level of uniformity in terms of political positions, political orientation, political principles and political path with the Central Party with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, firmly preserving the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the Party’s Central Committee and within the entire Party, firmly preserving the authority of the Central Party and its unified leadership. The ideological foundation for properly realizing this mission is the firm establishment of the “Four Confidences,” and we must find our ideological nourishment in the roots of the Chinese land, raising our confidence and courage, adhering to the use of Chinese theory to explain Chinese experience, and to the use of Chinese positions to observe international questions, so that our propaganda and ideology work has clear Chinese characteristics (中国特色), Chinese style (中国风格) and Chinese form (中国气派). In accomplishing this mission, adherence to the correct political orientation is crucial, [and we] must strictly implement a responsibility system in our ideological work, firm in our orientation, grabbing [correct] guidance, holding our position, strengthening the political and leadership responsibility of our team, implementing the principle of party nature (党性原则) and the policy of politicians running the agency (政治家办社方针) throughout the full process of our news reports and at every juncture.

Web Users Expose Faked Police Photo

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week we had a range of Chinese media stories, including two debates happening online and in the news pages — one about a finance expert’s suggestion that China’s private sector should “yield” to the public sector in light of economic pressures and the need to concentrate national strength, and another about the authenticity of a police propaganda photo (above).
Also this week, a notice on changes at the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) suggests the body will no longer be responsible for the management of journalists’ press credentials in China,  news publishing, the printing business and other areas, but will focus instead on online video and strategies for convergence across networks (telecoms, radio and television and the internet).
Also on our list is the apology from Netease for unspecified content violations, which we covered several days back.
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
September 8 to September 14, 2018
➢  Idea that “the Private Sector Should Leave the Field” Subjected to Criticism
➢  Special Funds Approved for Political and Ideological Education at Chinese Universities高校思想政治工作专项资金设立
➢  Netease Finance Announces “Rectification” of Platform
➢  Authenticity of Hunan Propaganda Photo Called Into Question
➢  National Radio and Television Administration Announces Personnel and Other Adjustments
[1] Idea that “the Private Sector Should Leave the Field” Subjected to Criticism
On September 12, finance expert Wu Xiaoping (吴小平) published an article online called “China’s Private Sector Has Already Achieved the Task of Assisting Public Sector Development, and It Should Now Leave the Field” (中国私营经济已完成协助公有经济发展的任务，应逐渐离场), arguing that the role of the private sector has been to “assist the public sector in achieving leapfrog development,” and that this goal has already been achieved. For this reason, wrote Wu, “in the next phase, it will not be so easy for the private sector to expand blindly.” Wu further noted that the United States and other developed economies have are coordinating to contain China’s rise, and the country would face unimaginable pressures and obstacles if it could not find ways to consolidate its national strength.
Wu Xiaoping’s arguments were attacked in many Party media. On the 13th, the Economic Daily, the China Business Times and The Beijing News all issued responses emphasizing the so-called “two unmovables” (两个毫不动摇) – the idea, emerging in the political report to the 19th National Congress of the CCP in October 2017, that both public and private sector development must be encouraged and supported. The WeChat public account “People’s Daily Commentary” (人民日报评论) said that in a period of difficult transition for the Chinese economy the role of the private sector was more crucial than ever.
Some commentaries appearing on WeChat argued that there was merit to Wu Xiaoping’s arguments and that the strong reaction reflected collective concern over the direction the economy was heading.
Key Chinese Sources:
People’s Daily (人民日报): 踏踏实实把民营经济办得更好（人民时评）
Economic Daily (经济日报): 对”私营经济离场论”这类蛊惑人心的奇谈怪论应高度警惕——“两个毫不动摇”任何时候都不能偏废
China Business Times (中华工商时报): 毫不动摇地坚持我国基本经济制度
WeChat Public Account “People’s Daily Commentary” (人民日报评论): 人民日报评民营经济：只会壮大、不会离场
The Beijing News (新京报): “私营经济应离场论”, 实为不懂国情之怪论
The Beijing News New Media (新京报新媒体) [link already disabled]: 建议“私营经济退出”，称”2018年A股大牛市”，吴小平是谁
WeChat Public Account “Phoenix Online Finance” (凤凰网财经): 私营经济应离场？谬论刺激的焦虑才是真问题!
[2] Special Funds Approved for Political and Ideological Education at Chinese Universities
Special funds from China’s Central Treasury have been approved for political and ideological work at China’s universities (高校思想政治工作专项资金), entering the overall budget for the Ministry of Education. In recent days, the Ministry of Education has released a document called Provisional Regulations for the Management of Special Funds for Political and Ideological Work at Universities (高校思想政治工作专项资金管理暂行办法), providing the specific applications, management and principles of the special fund at Chinese universities.
The provisional regulations stipulate that uses of the special fund include: carrying out study and propaganda campaigns at Chinese universities on Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era; cultivating of “advanced models” (先进模范) and “superb exemplars” ( 优秀典型) for use in political and ideological education that have national relevance; developing lessons and methods for promoting praise for “excellent Chinese traditional culture” on campuses, and for creating a healthy campus culture; conducting research on political and ideological work at universities, and other programs.
Key Chinese Sources:
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 教育部：设高校思想政治工作专项资金，建立监管长效机制
Guangming Daily (光明日报): 高校思政工作专项资金怎么用
Gov.cn (中国政府网): 教育部关于印发《高校思想政治工作专项资金管理暂行办法》的通知
[3] Netease Finance Announces “Rectification” of Platform

On September 11, Netease issued a “Rectification Notice” (整改公告) that said: “Owing to a number of serious problems that have occurred in the process of operating the Netease Finance Channel, it is decided that from September 11, [2018], effective 12PM, [the channel] will cease content refreshing and carry out a deep and thorough rectification, energetically purging illegal conduct.
Analysis of the incident by the WeChat public account “Mei Tong She” (媒通社) speculated: “[The reason is] perhaps that the ‘Daily Stock Market Conversation’ column contained idle (空类) commentaries that affected investor sentiment; [or it could be that] Netease Finance recently ran images speculating about the circumstances facing actress Fan Bingbing (范冰冰), and said ‘Fan has already been detained and will face legal repurcussions,’ but so far there has been no public statement from the government as to the handling of the shadow contract case against Fan Bingbing — and the risk entailed by the speculation from Netease Finance was high.”
Key Chinese Sources:
Zhejiang Online (浙江在线): 网易宣布停止财经频道更新 大力整顿违规行为
WeChat public account “Mei Tong She” (微信公众号“媒通社”): 好奇心日报恢复更新一周后，网易财经宣布停更整改
[4] Authenticity of Hunan Propaganda Photo Called Into Question

On September 9, many social media accounts in China heaped doubt on the authenticity of a photograph appearing at Hunan’s “Eternal Flash Photography Exhibition” (永恒瞬间摄影展), held to commemorate 40 years of reform in the province. Titled “Policeman Catching Falling Woman With His Bare Hands” (民警徒手接坠楼女子), the photograph shows a young woman in a white top and striped skirt caught in mid plunge from a building. Beneath her, a police offer steps up confidently to receive her in his arms.
Sharing the picture across numerous sites, internet users questioned whether a real-time photograph of such quality would ever be possible. On September 10, the propaganda office of the Hunan Provincial Public Security Bureau made a public explanation for the photo, saying that in fact it had been taken by a production team to reenact a scene from July 2016. It had been created especially for the exhibition.
Key Chinese Sources:
Jinri Toutiao (今日头条): 永恒瞬间摄影展照片：民警徒手接坠楼女
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报): “徒手接坠楼女”照片怎么来的 “精彩抓拍”引发照片真假争论 湖南警方释疑：系事后情景再现
[5] National Radio and Television Administration Announces Personnel and Other Adjustments
On September 11, the Central Institutional Organization Commission, an agency of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, published new guidelines on its website for the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA). A comparison with similar guidelines released in 2013 for what was then the State Administration of Press Publication Radio Film and Television (SAPPRFT) shows a number of changes to personnel and departments within the NRTA.
The language of the notice removes reference to “responsibility for the supervision and management of the issuance of press cards for journalists nationwide” (负责全国新闻记者证的监制管理), and also removes content about the office taking responsibility for news publishing (新闻出版), copyright management (著作权管理), digital publishing (数字出版), printing business (印刷业务), and the coordination of national campaigns against indecent content (扫黄打非). However, in the area of management of online video programming, a great deal of language has been added — suggesting that this will be an area of focus for the agency.
The number of offices within the NRTA will now be 13, down from 22 previously. The new regulations stipulate that the responsibility of the “new media convergence development office” (新增媒体融合发展司) will be to “draw up major reform measures for radio and television, promoting the reform of systems and mechanisms; coordinating the convergence of the three networks (meaning telecoms, radio and television, and the internet), promoting the innovative and coordinated development of new media, new technologies and new industries.”
In terms of personnel, the office will be reduced almost to half, with 263 staff as opposed to 508. There will be one director and 4 deputy directors.
Key Chinese Sources:
Central Institutional Organization Commission (中国机构编制网): 国家广播电视总局职能配置、内设机构和人员编制规定
WeChat public account “Chuanmei Toutiao” (微信公众号”传媒头条”): 国家广播电视总局三定方案发布，这些变化要知道
WeChat public account “Chuanmei Cha Hua Hui” (微信公众号”传媒茶话会”): 广电总局“三定”方案出台！不再负责新闻记者证监制管理！

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