Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
During a high-level conference on propaganda and ideology held this week, President Xi Jinping held his ground, and seemed to reaffirm his confidence in Wang Huning, the top Party leader in charge of ideology. To help us understand the significance of Xi’s keynote speech at the event, I’ll focus first on two points of background and one point of timing.
The first point of background is the criticism Xi Jinping has received since July this year. Not long after the “ink-splashing incident” (泼墨事件), in which a young woman, later confirmed to be Dong Yaoqiong (董瑶琼), posted a video to the internet in which she throws ink on an image of the president, a wave of criticism of Xi appeared both domestically and internationally. This criticism has included more open denunciation of excessively positive and exuberant propaganda, of which the documentary film “Amazing China” has been one of the most representative examples.
The second point of background is the upcoming 40th anniversary of the start of economic reforms in China. How this anniversary will and won’t be commemorated in the state media has been an important, lingering question this year.
Finally, regarding timing. It was five years ago, on August 19, 2013, that Xi Jinping held another important conference on propaganda and ideology during which he introduced the notion of “public opinion struggle,” or yulun douzheng (舆论斗争), coming several months after the release of the so-called “Seven Don’t Speaks,” a communique circulated by the Party’s General Office that banned discussion of a range of issues. The fifth anniversary of the “8.19 speech” was commemorated by Party media over a period of several days, so this also presented the perfect opportunity for Xi to hold another important conference. A High-Level Affirmation of Propaganda Work
Xi’s latest speech is essentially an affirmation of his speech on propaganda and ideology from five years ago. In this recent speech, he says, “The policy decisions and deployments of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on propaganda and ideological work are completely correct, and the broad masses of officials on the front lines of propaganda and ideological work entirely deserve our confidence.”
The conference was chaired by Wang Huning (王沪宁), the standing committee member in charge of ideology whom many suspect has been a key mastermind of Xi’s projection of authoritarian resolve and national strength. This is the second of two high-profile appearances Wang Huning has made this month — the first being his solo reception of a visiting delegation from Vietnam. We can interpret these as a process of endorsement (背书) by which Xi is signaling that Wang has his confidence.
As for the speech itself, we can see no obvious differences from the speech five years ago. As far as we can glean from official reports of the speech (as yet, no full-text version has been made available), Xi Jinping does not appear to have mentioned the hardline phrase “public opinion struggle.” However, there was another hardline phrase: “We must adhere to the truth with a clear banner, firmly refuting falsehoods” (要旗帜鲜明坚持真理，立场坚定批驳谬误).
Those inclined to a normative Western reading of “truth” and “falsehood” should understand that this is not an affirmation of truth as you might understand it — but rather an affirmation that it is the Party’s prerogative to define that truth, and its obligation to do so according to the clear direction of the top leadership. Which is why Xi follows immediately with: “We must exert pressure to ensure Party organizations at all levels act without negligence, exercising unflagging control of the [Party’s] position, unequivocal in holding those responsible [for lapses] to account.”
One clear difference in the recent speech versus that 2013 speech is Xi’s emphasis on his own stature and position. Five years ago, he had not yet introduced his banner term, “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), or the notion of the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), first on the list being “consciousness of the core” (meaning the primary leadership role of Xi himself). This time, he calls on the entire Party to study and implement his own “thought,” though he does not in this instance combine “thought” with “Xi Jinping.” He urges them to “firmly establish the Four Consciousnesses, resolutely protecting the authority and centralized leadership of the Central Committee, firmly grasping the correct political orientation.”
Party discourse notwithstanding, this is a far more direct injunction: Listen to me, follow me. Reform Anniversary: Where are Mao, Deng and Jiang?
2018 marks the 40th anniversary of China’s Opening and Reform policy. In his speech, Xi does not mention this fact as a point of background. And there is one phrase in particular that deserves attention: “To raise the banner, we must hold the banners of Marxism and of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics up high, persevering in using Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era to arm the entire Party, to teach the people, and to promote our work.”
According to past practice within the mainstream Party discourse, when speeches come to the part about the development of ideologies, Marxism must come along with a string of others — “Leninism,” “Mao Zedong Thought,” “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” the “Three Represents” (Jiang Zemin) and the “Scientific View of Development” (Hu Jintao). In his recent speech, Xi Jinping omits five of these six. This is particularly significant because one of these, “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” is of course intimately linked with China’s reform path over the past four decades.
For Xi to neglect mention of Deng altogether gives us an inkling of the fuller picture. No mention of Deng + no mention of opposing the extreme left + an emphasis on the Party’s and his own authority + an affirmation of the ideological direction set five years ago. All of this added together equals resolute opposition to the right.
It has been more than a week since education authorities in the Beijing district of Shijingshan notifed parents through their official WeChat public account that one of the areas oldest and largest migrant schools, Huangzhuang, was to be closed, effectively immediately. The notice, “A Letter to Parents” (致家长的一封信), said the students would be redistributed, but the details of this redistribution are as yet unclear, according to reports from overseas Chinese media. Meanwhile, more than 300 migrant children who were enrolled in a summer program at the school have been shut out, their parents without clear short-term options.
The school’s principal, Chen Enxian (陈恩显), told overseas Chinese media that local authorities had closed the school without prior notification, padlocking the gates and preventing anyone from entering. [Caixin’s August 16 slideshow of photos taken of the empty school grounds.]
A “letter” issued through WeChat to parents at Huangzhuang, a migrant school on the outskirts of Beijing.
Why has the school been closed? According to a report from the Global Times, the company that holds the land said the lease was being terminated due to “illegal” use of the land. Another source told the paper, however, that the land was to be designated as green space. In fact, the school’s closure can be seen as the latest in a series of moves by authorities in Beijing — and in other Chinese cities — to force out migrant workers and their families.
For Huangzhuang, the writing has been on the wall for many months already. Southern People Weekly, a magazine based in Guangzhou, ran a feature report in January on migrant schools in Beijing that noted that Huangzhuang School had received “verbal notice” back in October 2017 that it had been refused the necessary permits and would have to be demolished. Back in December last year, the New York Times also reported in its coverage of the extended crackdown on the migrant population in Beijing– which included coverage of forced closures of migrant schools — that Huangzhuang School had already been slated for demolition.
The Global Times report mentioned that “the company that holds the land” had pointed to illegalities. But trace the lines of ownership and you quickly realize that “the company” is simply the local government’s hand at work.
Back in January, theSouthern People Weekly report noted that Huangzhuang’s lease was with the Huamu Branch Company of Beijing Jindu Gardening and Forestry Corporation (北京金都园林绿化有限责任公司花木分公司). Beijing Jindu Gardening and Forestry (北京市园林绿化集团有限公司) is operated in turn by Beijing Landscape and Forestry Group (北京城建集团有限责任公司) — a link noted clearly on the group’s “About” page. And who runs Beijing Landscape and Forestry Group? Its single shareholder is the People’s Government of Beijing.
The group’s legal representative is its CEO and Party branch chief, Chen Daihua (陈代华), who in this 2016 interview appearing on Beijing’s city government website made clear that in the early 1980s the group was originally the Beijing Command of the Infrastructure Engineering Corps of the People’s Liberation Army (中国人民解放军基建工程兵北京指挥部), and was restructured in 1983.
Understand these connections behind the story of the fate of Huangzhuang School, and by extension the fate of migrant workers in the capital, and you understand why this story is regarded as sufficiently sensitive by the authorities to warrant censorship of discussion on social media.
The following are two examples of related posts on Weibo that were removed yesterday:
2018-08-20 14:54:08 | Beijing’s largest school for migrant children has been closed, but the question left in its wake: what will these 1,800 children of migrant workers do? How will the city authorities manage the aftermath? This is the question that will test the level of city management. I just saw a comment from a web user that said: ‘How can a city as big as Beijing not accommodate 1,800 migrant children? . . . . They seem so desperate.’ I was talking with a local person yesterday, and he said: ‘Beijing people are the most desperate; if migrant workers can’t make it, they can return home, but where do Beijingers go? . . . Full Text: http://m.weibo.cn/1306014463/4275105527914554 2018-08-20 14:54:08 | 北京最大打工子弟学校关停，而遗留问题是，这1800名外来打工子弟孩子怎么办？ 城市管理者如何善后解决，这是考验一个城市管理的水平。 刚看到网友评论：偌大个北京城，竟然容不下这1800名外地孩子……听上去很惨。 昨天我跟本地人聊天，他说：北京人最惨，外地人大不了回家，北京人回哪? 外来务工人员…全文： http://m.weibo.cn/1306014463/4275105527914554 2018-08-20 13:55:56 | 【Beijing’s Largest Migrant School Closed / Has 20-Year History】The Hengzhuang School located in Beijing’s Shijingshan District has a 20-year history as a school, and the vast majority of the school’s students don’t have Beijing residency permits. Now, over a dispute over land-use, the inability to renew its education permit and other problems, the school has no way to continue operating. And now, 1,800 migrant students face the tough alternatives of either returning to their hometowns or falling through the cracks. The teachers will either lose their jobs or be redistributed. Full text: http://m.weibo.cn/1887344341/4275094890800576 2018-08-20 13:55:56 | 【北京最大打工子弟学校关停 拥有20年办学史】位于北京市石景山区的黄庄学校有着20年的办学史，学校绝大部分学生都没有北京市户口。日前，由于用地纠纷、办学许可证无法换新等问题，校址不再具备继续办学条件，1800名打工子弟面临着回老家或接受分流的两难境地，教职工也在失业或接受分配中抉择。7月，…全文： http://m.weibo.cn/1887344341/4275094890800576
China’s nightly official newscast, Xinwen Lianbo, is not generally the kind of programming that gets the blood flowing. Its regurgitation of the political news of the day is a political ritual, more about the Chinese Communist Party’s construction of power than about relevance to television viewers. But when Xiang Ligang (项立刚), chief executive of the telecom industry news site cctime.com, remarked on social media over the weekend that “those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality people,” things got very heated indeed.
Made just before midnight on August 18 to Weibo, here is what Xiang’s post said:
“Those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality people. They don’t need to know the major things happening in the country, and they aren’t capable of doing great things. People in China who do great things must watch Xinwen Lianbo.”
Many internet users, infuriated by the apparent political-class implications of Xiang’s remarks and his supercilious toadying to the Party, leapt to the attack. Where did Xiang get off deciding who was “low-quality” and who was “high-quality”?
“Low-quality people?” wrote journalist Yan Lieshan (鄢烈山) on Weibo. “They’ve never watched China Central Television, but watch the Cantonese programming on Hong Kong television instead. I stopped watching Xinwen Lianbo a long time ago, and only occasionally come across it in the hotel when traveling. Or maybe I spot it on the TV in some buffet restaurant. If Xiang Ligang is a high-quality person, then I’ll happily be a low-quality person.”
“That’s just what I am, a low-quality person who can’t do great things,” wrote Weibo user Jiang Guangda (@江广达_41207). “So from this day forward I am boycotting cctime.com, up until the point it goes bankrupt!”
In his rebuttals to critics online, Xiang Ligang suggested that “low-quality people” were those who had “glass hearts” (玻璃心), or were overly sensitive, and who refused to take responsibility, to which user Qiuyue Changsa (@秋月长飒) responded: “I’d like to ask you: When you turned off the comments on your Weibo post, would that be considered having a glass heart, and refusing to take responsibility?”
The tiny spark of Xiang Ligang’s phrase “low-quality people,” or xiadengren (下等人), caused such an online conflagration that even China’s commercial media pitched in on the story. The following is a short interview Xiang did with Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily.
SMD: why did you send out the Weibo post with the phrase, “Those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality.”? Xiang Ligang: It started when I noticed that in the Taiwanese news, aside from some political discussion programs and some entertainment programs, there wasn’t much in the way of content, compared to a science and technology program I’d seen on CCTV-2 that had a lot more value. So I posted an said that.
Later someone commented on that post that in China there was only Xinwen Lianbo, and that made me angry, so I wrote a Weibo post about Xinwen Lianbo, and in that I said the thing about low-quality people not watching Xinwen Lianbo. 。 SMD: How do you view the way things have developed and been communicated? Xiang Ligang: I never thought this thing would escalate to the point it has. It’s definitely been played up by just a few people. And I don’t really want to waste my time on this matter.
This was just my own personal attitude, something I shared within a small group. And most of my fans are those who pretty much share my outlook on things. But later certain Big V’s started started pushing this and seized on that phrase, “Those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality,” so things really spread like wildfire. These people, you could say, have values really opposed to mine, and they seized on this phrase to launch an attack against me. SMD: What did you mean when you said “low-quality people” in your post? Xiang Ligang: I have a very clear definition about low-quality people. In my eyes, high-quality people are first and foremost those who do real things. People who have ideals and who take things on. People who face life with courage and strive for self-improvement. And finally, people who love themselves, love their family, love their hometown, and love their country. It’s not at all how it was made out online, just referring to people who have money and are living well. Who are low-quality people? People that are lazy and greedy, who are ungrateful, who don’t take responsibility — they harbor dissatisfaction and hatred toward society. SMD: How do you view the critical responses online? Xiang Ligang: I’m essentially a conservative. I believe that right now social stability and economic development are good. This is my basic outlook on life.
So why are many people attacking me? Some ordinary internet users are just seeing that one line and feeling it’s totally unacceptable, and I can understand why they are upset. I think its normal for them to attack me. Then there’s another group of people who know what my values are and who just despise me. Later a bunch of people told me that they despise me because I support the idea of patriotism. These people, in my view, are low-quality people. This kind of person really rubs me the wrong way. This is just my attitude in life.
These people don’t have an effect on me. I just go about my own business. I don’t rely in this life on Weibo, or on seeking conflict.
Chen Jieren (陈杰人), the blogger and popular “Big V” taken into custody by authorities in Hunan province back in June, appeared in court yesterday. But this was not a court of prosecutors and defenders, of cross-examinations, legal arguments or objections. It was the court of the People’s Daily. The court of Xinhua News Agency. The court of the Global Times.
In a raft of reports, central state media attacked Chen as an “internet pest” who had “polluted the online space,” who had deceived millions of online fans into believing he is a man who cares deeply about truth and justice. In fact, the reports said, he is a deranged profiteer, raking in millions through intimidation and extortion, all in the name of watchdog journalism.
As Chen’s lawyer, Tong Zongjin (仝宗锦), rightly pointed out in a Weibo post that was promptly censored, these attacks in the state media — and their reported “confessions” — are a flagrant violation of the principle of presumption of innocence, and amount to trial by the media. “Neither Xinhua News Agency nor the law enforcement officers who told Xinhua reporters about the case have the right to ‘hand down a judgment’ in a case that is still under investigation,” Tong wrote.
It might be possible to debate the facts in Chens’ case, if they were available and transparent, and ask whether there is any basis at all to the allegations made against him. But the crushing, schoolyard-bully language of the state media attacks offers another kind of transparency. The reports are an illuminating gaze into the dark insides of a system that will enforce, through violence when necessary, its supreme right to the truth, that will dismiss as “fake news” all facts that are politically inconvenient or challenge vested interests — a tactic that goes back many decades within the Party discourse, no reference needed or intended to Donald Trump.
The real target of the state media barrage is the claim to independence — of journalism, of thought, of conscience — and the tools that potentially empower those claims. “The development of the self-media must be legal and orderly,” says the People’s Daily piece, referring to the universe of public accounts that have emerged on platforms like WeChat in recent years. “They cannot be allowed to develop barbarously, or even to become online criminal forces.” The kicker is a lingering threat: “The police will not rest in bringing to justice those ‘harmful pests’ of the internet, who pollute the online space with malicious hype seeking illegal profit, regardless of how popular they may be, or how much they manage to package themselves as bright defenders of justice.”
The facts in the Chen Jieren case, laid out like damning exhibits in the state media attacks, are nothing more than a distraction, a bonfire of shame and invective to send a signal to the whole of Chinese society: Do not dare claim the truth for yourself; it is the Party’s through and through.
Maliciously Hyping and Provoking Trouble, Frenzied Profiteering Through Extortion
— Getting to the Bottom of Online Big V Chen Jieren
(People’s Daily, August 17, 2018, page 9)
“Actually, I cheated you all. On the surface, I appeared bright and blameless, a Big V flying the flag of equality and justice — when in fact I was angling for personal gain, and I committed many shady acts and was essentially an online parasite.” This was the confession of online Big V Chen Jieren as he faced interrogation. “I apologize to you all for betraying your goodwill and trust. The internet is a place where information can be very confusing, and the last thing you need is for your eyes to be betrayed by a hypocrite like me.”
Over the past few years, Chen Jieren has made a name for himself through his self-media account (自媒体账号) as someone who “criticizes the government,” “dares to speak” and “dares to expose information,” to the extent the his fans reached into the hundreds of thousands. But on the afternoon of July 7, a notice from police in Hunan caught people off guard: suspect Chen Jieren had already been taken in by the police and subjected to compulsory criminal measures.
As the police have progressed more deeply into the case, the true face of Chen Jieren has gradually been uncovered. The Chen Jieren case is a “clan-style” gang offense of online criminal forces (网上黑恶势力性质的), and this gang has donned the cap of the law and of supervision by public opinion [OR: “watchdog journalism”], taking the internet as a criminal platform, and unrestrainedly conducted extortion and blackmail, wantonly seeking profit, so they are suspected of the crimes of extortion and blackmail, and of carrying on illegal business activities. Over a period of several years, the Chen Jieren gang established 21 accounts, including the “Jieren Observation Viewpoint” (杰人观察视角), “Jieren Observation Heights” (杰人观察高度), on Weibo, WeChat, Toutiao and other self-media services, issuing more than 3,000 posts of various negative forms, hyping, attacking and exposing, and altogether they manufactured around 200 negative public opinion situations (负面舆情) in 11 provinces, raking in funds in the 10s of millions, seriously misleading members of the public watching and listening, seriously disturbing online order, and doing serious damage to grassroots governance and to social stability. . . .
Chen Jieren was born in Qingshuping Township (青树坪镇), Shuangfeng County of Hunan province, to an ordinary peasant family. His parents were disabled, and the household was struggled with poverty. He worked in the local government and for well-known media, but he was fired by news media because of fake news (假新闻).
In recent years, information technologies have developed. These days, “Everyone has a microphone,” and Chen Jieren clearly recognized the commercial opportunity. He neglected the general knowledge that “on the internet there is not land outside the law,” and he discarded the principle that “self-media must also have professional journalism integrity.” Through unrestrained packaging and hyping, he steadily expanded his influence, seeking fame and fortune.
Open Chen Jieren’s self-media accounts and you find that they are filled with shiny but spurious titles like “veteran media professional,” “scholar of legal culture,” “expert on brand development” and “crisis management,” that he was selected to the list of “top 100 influential Chinese thought leaders” . . . . Read the posts in his accounts and their eye-catching headlines, the enumerations of “evidence,” and add to this the inflammatory nature of his writings, and all of this might easily give you the impression that Chen Jieren is someone who “calls for the truth and upholds justice.”
From 2003 to now, Chen Jieren has been involved in the media industry for many years, and he is clear about how to write articles so that they attract eyeballs. When he realized that writing articles could mean huge economic gain, he started to see this as a road to making money, and he saw the law and journalism as tools for earning money,” Chen Jieren’s lover Liu X said during interrogation. On May 31, 2018, Zhao X Geng (赵某庚), the driver for a certain transport company in Shaodong County, Hunan province, felt unwell on the job, and three days later passed away. Zhao X Geng’s family sought out Chen Jieren for help in seeking compensation. Chen Jieren instructed his brother, Chen Weiren (陈伟人), to negotiate, and the first time he met with the niece of the victim, Peng X, he accepted 26,000 yuan as a consultation fee and reached an agreement: for a settlement [with the company] of under 400,000 yuan, they would take a 10 percent service fee; for anything exceeding 400,000 yuan they would take a 30 percent service fee.
After this, Chen Jieren directed his younger brother Chen Weiren to post “Li X Yan, Black-Hearted People’s Congress Delegate From Hunan’s Shaodong County, Causes Death.” Chen Jieren also arranged for the child [of the victim] to appear outside the transport company with a banner . . . putting pressure on the local government and the transport company.
Right after, Chen Jieren and the others demanded that Li X Yan compensate the Zhao family. “At the time, I took charge getting the compensation down to 700,000 yuan. A few minutes later, older brother called to cuss me out, saying I had to keep with to the 880,000 previously agreed,” says Chen Weiren. Ultimately, Chen Jieren and the others received a profit of 263,000 illegally from the deal.
“Considering myself a lawyer, when I would write things online to manufacture a disturbance, I would normally employ legal analysis, creating the impression that I was speaking from the law, but behind the scenes it was connected to a lot of personal gain, and this is something that the masses of internet users had no idea about.” In Chen Jieren’s eyes, writing essays, manufacturing public opinion, making social media posts, all of it could be turned into business.
. . . . [Long list of alleged crimes removed here] . . . .
The dignity of the law cannot be trampled, and the goodness of the people cannot be abused. Chen Jieren has ultimately been brought to justice. “I wrongly believed that without belonging to any particular media, I could act in my own way. For the sake of profit, I habitually spoke selectively and with bias, polluting the online space, and violating the overall spirit and direction of the national legal and regulatory system for the internet. I should pay the price for my own illegal actions,” Chen Jieren says with remorse.
The development of the self-media must be legal and orderly. They cannot be allowed to develop barbarously, or even to become online criminal forces. We must cut away those law-breakers who seek to gain underhanded profit by the internet.
“The masses in society must be alert to all instances of those with impure motives masquerading as justice, raising their ability to distinguish. If they are blackmailed by someone, they must not give in, but must use the weapon of the law to protect themselves; relevant departments and units should also ensure robust systems of entry, content review, responsibility etcetera are in place for self-media, creating a proper and healthy online environment,” the police said. The police will not rest in bringing to justice those “harmful pests” (害虫) of the internet, who pollute the online space with malicious hype seeking illegal profit, regardless of how popular they may be, or how much they manage to package themselves as bright defenders of justice.
Highlights from our round-up of top-five Chinese media stories from the past week include messaging from the central Party media on the need for the country to steady itself and be ready for “wind and rain” given domestic and international pressures on the Chinese economy, and a surprising hat-tip to former President Jiang Zemin in a provincial-level Party paper.
Also of interest, a brief invitation from the overseas edition of the People’s Daily for Google to return to China is pulled from Facebook and Twitter.
This Week in China’s Media August 4, 2018, to August 10, 2018
➢ Central Media Issue “Declaration” on the Domestic Economy
➢ People’s Daily (overseas edition) Welcomes Google Back to China on Facebook and Twitter, Then Deletes Post
➢ Shaanxi Daily Looks Back on Jiang Zemin Inspection Visits in 40th Anniversary of Reform Coverage
➢ New Tax Procedures Introduced to Combat “Unreasonable” Pay Levels in Entertainment
➢ Puyang Broadcast TV in Henan Demand Wages [1] Central Media Issue “Declaration” on the Domestic Economy
On August 7, the official Xinhua News Agency ran an article called “Creating a Good Life Come Rain or Shine” (风雨无阻创造美好生活) that amounted to a “declaration” (宣言) of purpose on China’s future and development in times of adversity. “It is normal for there to be wind and rain,” the article said, using a two-character phrase frequently used in Chinese to denote hardship and adversity. “But regardless of what kind of wind and rain, there is no way it can impede the march of the Chinese people toward good lives.”
The article, which was carried the next day on the front page of the People’s Daily and many other newspapers, was the fourth time in recent months that such “declarations” were released by state media. While references to the United States” or “Sino-US [relations]” did not appear in the article, it can be read as a response to ongoing trade tensions. At one point, the article said, directing its ire clearly at the Trump administration: “There are certain people who don’t wish to see the lion stir or the dragon rise into the air, who don’t want to see 1.3 billion people living good lives, and so they seek unilateralism, protectionism, trade bullying (贸易霸凌主义). This is something that cannot be avoided, and must be challenged and met.”
At the recent session of the Party’s Politburo on July 31, the phrase “change in the midst of steadiness” (稳中有变) was raised. China News Service, the country’s second official newswire, reported that “change” related to a number of news problems and challenges internally in China, and to clear changes in the “external environment” (外部环境). In its own assessment of the macroeconomic situation in the past three years, the Guangming Daily, a paper published by the Central Propaganda Department, said that China had made progress in “preventing and resolving major risks” (防范化解重大风险), but that the trade war with the United States and other external environmental challenges had “clearly expanded uncertainty.” Key Chinese Sources:
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 宣言：风雨无阻创造美好生活
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 宣言：改革开放天地宽 People’s Daily (人民日报): 宣言文章为何刷屏？穿越“风雨”说信心
China News Service (中国新闻网): 政治局定调中国经济：“稳中有变”如何应对？ Guangming Daily (光明日报): 经济运行稳中有变 改革开放勇往直前 [2] People’s Daily (overseas edition) Welcomes Google Back to China on Facebook and Twitter, Then Deletes Post
On August 6, the overseas edition of the CCP’s official People’s Daily turned to Facebook and Twitter, both services blocked in China, to say amidst speculation that Google planned a return to China that the company was welcome, but that the precondition was that it abide by China’s laws and regulations. The posts have already been deleted. On August 8, Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po newspaper posted images of the posts to its official Weibo account (@香港文汇网). These too have now been deleted.
According to a report from Hong Kong’s Ming Pao on August 9, some university students inside China reported that they could access Google Scholar from campus, but the service was unavailable if they were not on the campus internet network. Key Chinese and Other Sources:
Sohu.com: 人民日报发文欢迎谷歌回归 但前提是“遵守中国法律”
Free Weibo (自由微博): 香港文匯網：【人民日报发推欢迎Google回归后又删除】 Newsweek: Google Welcome in China but Must Comply With Censorship: State Media Business Insider: Chinese state media tentatively welcomed Google back to China, then deleted all trace of its invite
Ming Pao News (明报新闻网): Google學術搜尋重返內地校園 [3] Shaanxi Daily Looks Back on Jiang Zemin Inspection Visits in 40th Anniversary of Reform Coverage
On August 10, Shaanxi Daily, the official newspaper of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee, published a four-page series called, “Comrade Jiang Zemin Inspects Shaanxi” (江泽民同志视察陕西) as part of an ongoing series dealing with the 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening. By August 12, the text of the online electronic version of the print page was already unavailable, although the image of the page itself could still be viewed. In 2018, news mentioning “Jiang Zemin” has been extremely rare in China, in part a reflection of the dominance of Xi Jinping — and this is the first time Jiang has appeared this year in a provincial-level Party publication.
The “Comrade Jiang Zemin Inspects Shaanxi” article looked back on five visits Jiang made to Shaanxi province between 1989 and 2002, and emphasized how Comrade Jiang Zemin cared for the development of Shaanxi and had defined the direction for the province in terms of reform and “socialist modernization” (社会主义现代化). Key Chinese Sources: Shaanxi Daily (陕西日报): 江泽民同志视察陕西 [4] New Tax Procedures Introduced to Combat “Unreasonable” Pay Levels in Entertainment
News reports this week in China said that since August 1 this year a new taxation system had been applied to the film industry, with taxes on incomes rising suddenly from 6.7 percent previously to 42 percent, and that authorities were demanding that tax payments be made in a lump sum every six months. On August 11, iQiyi, Youku, and Tencent Video joined with major production companies Daylight Entertainment (正午阳光), Huace Film and TV (华策影视), Ciwen Media (慈文传媒), Youhug (耀客传媒) and New Classics Media (新丽传媒) to issue a document called “Joint Declaration on Inhibiting Unreasonable Compensation and Preventing Negative Trends in the Industry” (关于抑制不合理片酬，抵制行业不正风气的联合声明). They pledged in the document to jointly resist “sky-high” payments for entertainers and tax evasion, and to be open about contracts. The statement specified clear standards for paying of star entertainers, with the maximum not to exceed one million RMB for individual episodes, and 50 million RMB for films.
According to Xinhua News Agency, the Central Propaganda Department and the State Administration of Taxation jointly issued a “Notice” in June demanding that the problem of excessive pay be dealt with and a system of “sunshine contracts” (阴阳合同) be put in effect in order to ensure the healthy development of the industry.
Key Chinese Sources:
36KR.com (36氪): 抵制天价片酬！9家公司联合声明：单个演员片酬不超5000万
National Business Daily (每日经济新闻): 天价片酬，再见！每经影视对话联合声明方：明星片酬税费由演员承担
Central News Agency Taiwan (中央通讯社): 傳中國官方出手 明星稅率從6%飆至42%
WeChat Public Account “Black Bamboo Zhang” (微信公众号”紫竹张先生”): 税务总局出手了，明星税率从6%改为42%
China News Service (中国新闻网): 明星天价片酬再见！5000万，不能再多了
Xinhua News Service (新华社): 中宣部等部门联合印发《通知》 治理影视行业天价片酬“阴阳合同”偷逃税等问题
[5] Puyang Broadcast TV in Henan Demand Wages
This week, images made the rounds in WeChat private message groups and on social media in China of employees from Puyang Broadcast TV in Henan province gathering at the local Petition Office (信访局) to demand unpaid wages.
In June this year, internet users posted images on Weibo and WeChat reporting that journalists at Qiqihar Broadcast TV in Heilongjiang province were demanding payment of back wages, and that the station was already three months behind in payment. Key Chinese Sources:
Baidu Tieba “Puyang Bar” (百度贴吧”濮阳吧”): 最近网上濮阳电视台讨薪的事是真的么？有人知道吗？？？
WeChat Public Account “Fanren Fanyu” (微信公众号”凡人钒语”): 不要以为戴顶“党媒”的帽子，就可以搞特权！
WeChat Public Account “Riji Bu Fanhuang” (微信公众号”日记不泛黄”): 又见广电职工拉横幅讨薪，媒体界还有铁饭碗吗？
Mobile news from state media. The headline reads: “Director of Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission: Ensuring Full Coverage of Public Surveillance By 2020”
But the experiment is already expanding across the breadth of China. At a conference back in June — a video conference, no less — Chen Yixin (陈一新), the director of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, urged the rapid and full implementation of what the Chinese Communist Party calls “Project Dazzling Snow” (雪亮工程). Chen spoke in glowing terms of the project, a comprehensive video surveillance network intended to cover communities in rural China down to the village level, as a “thousand-mile eye” (千里眼) protecting the security of the people.
It was the duty of all officials involved, Chen said, to “make even bigger contributions to promoting the modernization of social management and the building of a peaceful China.”
When it was first approved by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party back in 2016, “Project Dazzling Snow” was envisioned as having “full geographic coverage, full network sharing, full time coverage, and full operational control,” meaning that the system would be nationwide, capture every nook and cranny with the exception perhaps of private homes, and would be readily accessible to law enforcement with 24/7 data — at the push of a button, to use an old-fashioned term.
In a political culture in which digitalization is often treated as a noble political end in itself, the project would “raise the digitalization of law and order and prevention in society,” and would “efficiently protect the life and property of the masses.”
But how did such a delightful image, that of glistening and crystalline snow, come to describe a project that to a great many people outside of China’s control obsessed political culture must seem a devilish ambition?
In Chinese, the phrase “dazzling snow” refers to brightness and clarity. In the 1940s, the phrase was most usually associated in discourse of the Chinese Communist Party with words like “sword” (刀剑) and “eyes” (眼睛). For example, there were phrases like, “sword as dazzling as snow” (雪亮的战刀), and “the eyes of the people are as dazzling as snow” — the latter phrase meaning that China’s masses are discerning, or penetrating.
In fact, the phrase “The eyes of the people are as dazzling as snow” has long been a standard within the official Party media in China. It has been used to declare China’s resistance against imperialism, against the Kuomintang, and in support of class struggle. The image below is of a 1955 report in the People’s Daily on the suppression of the so-called “Hu Feng Counter-Revolutionary Clique,” referring to the campaign launched against the writer Hu Feng, who argued among other things that writers should have autonomy and not be directed by politicians.
The name “Project Dazzling Snow” derives directly from “the eyes of the people are as dazzling as snow.” The project first emerged under this name in Sichuan province. By September 2015, when the National Development and Reform Commission, the Central Public Security Comprehensive Management Commission and other departments jointly issued an “Opinion” on increasing nationwide video surveillance for public security reasons, the phrase had come into use across the country. Finally, in January this year, the phrase “Project Dazzling Show” entered a Number 1 Central Document (中央一号文件) for the first time, being mentioned in a document called “Opinion from the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council Concerning Implementation of the Village Revitalization Strategy” (中共中央国务院关于实施乡村振兴战略的意见).
The notion of “village revitalization,” or xiangcun zhenxing (乡村振兴), which also appeared in Xi Jinping’s political report to the 19th National Congress of the CCP last fall, seems to have become closely associated with blanket public security surveillance of the countryside — a less catchy cousin of “Project Dazzling Snow.”
The coming of age in the state media of “Project Dazzling Snow” happened more than a year ago, on June 14, 2017, as the phrase appeared for the first time in the Party’s official People’s Daily .
The People’s Daily report dealt with implementation of video surveillance in the Jin’e Subdistrict of Longchang County in Sichuan province, where 10 villages were brought into the new system of “Project Dazzling Snow.” The article described the set up of “command centers” at the county and subdistrict levels, a “platform” at the level of each local police station, and a “[computer] workstation” (工作站) in each village. All of the major streets and roads, said the report, were covered by 24-hour, 360-degree video surveillance.
“Project Dazzling Snow” is now in the midst of a concerted nationwide implementation push, with Chen Yixin emphasizing in his June meeting that full national coverage was to be achieved by 2020, just two years from now. The chilling implications of mass video surveillance in Xinjiang are already being felt, and now the rest of the country can expect to be equally “secure.”
The CMP discourse climate report for the month of July 2018 is now available. The biggest trends this month? Well, we see, not surprisingly that two terms continue to dominate: “Belt and Road” and “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.”
And what about the terms related to Xi Jinping’s predecessors? There has been some talk in recent months about “disappearing Deng Xiaoping”. So what do we see in the discourse? This month we actually see a slight downturn in reference to all three banner terms of Xi Jinping’s predecessors: “Deng Xiaoping Theory” (Deng); the “Three Represents” (Jiang Zemin), and the “Scientific View of Development” (Hu Jintao). Judging from the context in which the terms were used in May and June, this decline has to do with the completion of events to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx.
Also this month, we take a look at the various terms related to “MeToo” in China, as a number of high-profile allegations of sexual harassment, in particular by prominent members of the Chinese media, became an issue of focus across social media.
7月语象速递|米兔，迷途
By 喵酱
2018年进度条已经过半。一眼望去，词云还是熟悉的模样：图中16字长语和一带一路已连续霸屏6个月。
”
根据香港大学新闻及传媒研究中心中国传媒研究计划（CMP）划分的六级语温梯度（沸、烫、热、暖、温、冷），7月关键词语温分布如下：
This week we have news of some important reshuffling at the top of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). Zhuang Rongwen (庄荣文), a deputy director at the CAC who was previously in the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, will now take over as director of the CAC, replacing Xu Lin (徐麟), a close ally of Xi Jinping. State media would say only that Xu would be “assigned to other responsibilities,” but it is very likely Xu will be announced this month as the new head of the State Council Information Office, in charge of China’s overseas propaganda strategy.
In other CAC news, it was reported this week that formal charges of corruption have been brought against former CAC chief Lu Wei.
One of the most important stories of the week, however, might be sharp criticism leveled by Chinese state media at the Apple Store for alleged “loopholes” that have resulted in the provision of “illegal” apps for download. One focus of the reporting is the need for more comprehensive regulation of app sales in China — and that could mean greater scrutiny in the not-too-distant future.
This Week in China’s Media July 28, 2018 to August 3, 2018
➢ Former Deputy Propaganda Minister Lu Wei (鲁炜) Formally Charged in Corruption Case
➢ Zhuang Rongwen (庄荣文) Appointed Director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Xu Lin Set For New Appointment
➢ Cybersecurity Authorities Nationwide Shut Down 720,000 Accounts in 2nd Quarter 2018, Ministry of Culture and Tourism Investigates 27 Websites
➢ Apple Store Criticized by China Central Television and Other Central Party Media
➢ The Beijing News Criticizes Calls at Tsinghua University for the Firing of Hu Angang [1] Former Deputy Propaganda Minister Lu Wei (鲁炜) Formally Charged in Corruption Case
According to a notice made on the website of the Supreme People’s Court on July 30, the corruption case against former deputy propaganda minister and Cyberspace Administration of China chief Lu Wei (鲁炜) has now been referred to the prosecutor’s office in Ningbo, Zhejiang province, for investigation and prosecution (审查起诉).
Prosecutors have listed Lu Wei’s alleged crimes as follows: “The plaintiff Lu Wei used the opportunity offered by his positions as a member of the Party leadership group, secretary and deputy director of Xinhua News Agency; as a member of the municipal standing committee, minister of propaganda and deputy mayor of the people’s government of Beijing; as director of the State Internet Information Office (国家互联网信息办公室); as deputy director of the State Council Information Office; as head of the office of the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization; as a deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department and other positions, in order to seek benefit for his own person. [He] used the convenience of his personal position and status, and the conduct of other national government staff, to obtain improper benefits for himself, illegally accepting substantial sums and goods of value (巨额财物), and he should face criminal responsibility for graft and bribery in accord with the law. Key Chinese Sources:
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China (高检网): 检察机关依法对鲁炜、莫建成、张杰辉三案提起公诉 [2] Zhuang Rongwen Appointed Director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Xu Lin Set For New Appointment
On July 31, the Cyberspace Administration of China held a conference of cadres at which Zhou Zuyi (周祖翼), deputy director of the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party announced that Zhuang Rongwen (庄荣文) had been appointed the new head of the CAC, replacing Xu Lin (徐麟), who was appointed to the post in June 2016. It is not yet clear what new position was being prepared for Xu Lin, but some have speculated that he is due to take over as head of the State Council Information Office, taking charge of China’s external propaganda efforts.
In related news, the “Office Leadership” section of the CAC website was updated this week, showing that Liu Liehong (刘烈宏) has been serving since last month as deputy director of the CAC. According to Liu’s online resume, he was previously the chief executive officer of China Electronics Technology Group, a state-owned technology equipment manufacturer. Key Chinese Sources:
China News Service (中国网信网): 中央网信办召开干部大会
People’s Daily Online (人民网): 刘烈宏任中央网信办副主任 [3] Cybersecurity Authorities Nationwide Shut Down 720,000 Accounts in 2nd Quarter 2018, Ministry of Culture and Tourism Investigates 27 Websites
In the second quarter of 2018, the Cyberspace Administration of China and its local and regional offices expanded their enforcement operations across the country, according to state media reports. Inspections were conducted for various types of websites suspected of hosting illegal content. An estimated 446 websites were called in for discussions by authorities, and warnings over illegal content were issued to 167 sites. Jointly with Chinese telecoms authorities, cyberspace authorities cancelled permits and shut down 1,888 sites, and referred 336 cases for investigation by judicial authorities. Violation by the websites in question resulted in the closure of an estimated 720,000 accounts hosted on these web-based platforms.
Focusing on Bilibili (哔哩哔哩), the video sharing site, Kuaikan Comics (快看漫画) and other animation and video sites, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism has instructed its local Cultural Market Enforcement Teams (地方文化市场行政执法总队) to conduct inspections (link to Beijing local office here). Key Chinese Sources:
China.com.cn (中国网): 传播危害国家安全信息等 1888家网站72万账号被关闭
China National Radio Online (央广网): 文化和旅游部集中执法检查27家网站 下线10万条违规视频 [4]Apple Store Criticized by China Central Television and Other Central Party Media
On July 31, the “Live News” (新闻直播间) program of CCTV News directly criticized the Apple Store for management “loopholes” (漏洞) in the services offered to Chinese users, alleging the offering of “illegal” apps, including those offering online gambling. At the same time, China Youth Daily, a newspaper published by the Chinese Communist Youth League, ran a report called “How a Disguised Lottery App Made It Onto the Shelves” (“伪装”博彩App是如何上架的). The report interviewed Chinese lawyers to suggest that while the domestic Chinese app market is managed by a wide array of departments, including the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the Public Security Bureau and others, there is still no management system directly dealing with apps. The report argued the need for new policies to better and more directly regulate the app industry. Key Chinese Sources:
CCTV (央视) “Live News” (新闻直播间): 苹果官方应用商店管理存漏洞 非法APP借马甲上架 逃避监管 China Youth Daily (中国青年报): “伪装”博彩App是如何上架的
[5] The Beijing News Criticizes Calls at Tsinghua University for the Firing of Hu Angang
On August 3, The Beijing News, a newspaper administered by the top leadership of Beijing municipality, ran a commentary responding to calls online by Tsinghua University alumni for the removal of Hu Angang (胡鞍钢), the director of the university’s National Situation Research Center (国情研究院), for his controversial comments over the past year — including in his book “China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower” — that many argue over-hype China’s strengths. Key Chinese Sources:
The Beijing News Online (新京报网): 高校“浮夸学风”问题需认真对待
Sina.com (新浪网): 胡鞍钢终于说清楚：中国综合实力是怎么超越美国的？
In the dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party, the term “one position as the highest authority,” or dingyuyizun (定于一尊), has for decades been used in a decidedly negative sense — to suggest power and position that escapes necessary constraints. But in recent weeks this negative phrase seems to have been dusted off, and a fresh coat of paint applied. It now rings as an affirmation of the need for resolute leadership.
On July 5, the People’s Daily reported a speech Xi Jinping made to a national work conference on Party appointments, known as “organization work,” or zuzhi gongzuo (组织工作), that was held in Beijing from July 3-4. “The Central Party is the mind and the backbone,” the paper quoted Xi as saying, “and the Party must have one position as the highest authority (定于一尊), making the final decisions.”
Less than two weeks later, according to a report from China’s Legal Daily newspaper, Chen Yixin (陈一新), secretary-general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (and the former Zhejiang official and key Xi ally who oversaw the controversial push to remove crosses from churches), said at a commission study session: “We must firmly defend the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, firmly defend the Central Party as the one position of highest authority, making the final decisions . . . ”
Back at last year’s 19th National Congress, Xi Jinping actually made use of the phrase, but not with positive connotations. In one section of his voluminous political report, Xi Jinping said of China’s political system: “No one political system should be regarded as the only choice; and we should not just mechanically copy the political systems of other countries.” Here I have italicized and bolded those words in the official English translation of the political report that correspond to the Chinese phrase dingyuyizun. The idea here is that when it comes to political systems in the world, there is not one choice above all others. The right system, in other words, is a matter of social, cultural and historical context. Dingyuyizun is a classical phrase with origins in the Records of the Grand Historian (史记), a work by court official Sima Qian dating back to 94BC. In the Records of the Grand Historian, the three-character phrase dingyizun (定一尊) is used to describe the centralized rule of Qin Shihuang, the first emperor of China.
Since the People’s Daily was launched in 1946, the phrase “one position as the highest authority” has appeared 76 times in this reference book of official discourse. In nearly all of these instances the phrase is used in negatively — to criticize the ideas of feudal society, to criticize bureaucratism (官僚主义) within the Communist Party, to criticize the fascist rule of the Gang of Four. In the 1990s, the phrase was even used to criticize the Falun Gong spiritual movement. Here are just a handful of examples of the phrase at work in the Party’s history:
August 11, 1956: “Vicious criticism is not frightening. What is frightening is to allow viciousness to take on a leading role, with one position as the highest authority.” April 18, 1988: “History has already shown that banning diverse schools of thought, and setting one position as the highest authority necessarily results in the suppressing of the people (钳制人口), widespread fear of speaking out (万马齐喑), and the throttling of thought.” September 19, 1988: “Persecution for one’s writing is an extreme manifestation of feudal autocratic politics, and it is really about feudal rulers seeking to shackle thinking, suppress opinion and reach one position as the highest authority in politics.”
As we gaze across the expanse of People’s Daily time, we find that the first time that “one position as the highest authority” was ever used in a positive way occurred just a year ago, on June 16, 2017. Not surprisingly, that article dealt with the standing of Xi Jinping within the Party. “Various central departments of the state unswervingly defend through their real actions, the final decision-making authority and single position in highest authority of the Central Party with Xi Jinping as the core.”
Lest you be in any doubt that the one position of highest authority is Xi Jinping himself.
China has a serious problem with inflation. No, I’m not talking about inflationary pressures on the economy, though those numbers have been up. I’m talking about inflation of the national ego. The country, encouraged by relentless state propaganda, has grown full of itself — and this may dangerously diminish its basic capacity for self-reflection.
This, in any case, is the concern being voiced by a number of influencers inside China in recent weeks. And it may be the concern, as the SCMP reports, driving the reshuffle at the top of the State Council Information Office, which is responsible for the country’s overseas messaging.
But these reservations about the dangers of over-confidence have been brewing for some months, particularly in light of growing evidence that China’s more aggressive foreign policy stance, and its grandly stated ambitions to lead the world in areas ranging from technology and innovation to economic and political systems, has spooked many countries. For some in China, trade tensions with the United States are a much-needed wakeup call — even, perhaps, a reminder of the genius of the Deng Xiaoping injunction to “hide our strengths and bide our time.”
Back in September of last year, weeks ahead of the 19th National Congress, where Xi Jinping’s stature was political inflated to an extent we have not seen since perhaps the Mao era, Luo Jianbo (罗建波), head of the China Foreign Policy Center at the Central Party School, wrote a clear warning about the prematurity of China’s coming of age as a global power.
Luo’s article, in which he suggests that China is its own worst enemy, is still trending on WeChat. We offer a quick translation.
The curtains have closed on the Belt and Road Forum hosted by China. This is certainly the first time up to now that China’s call has received such widespread attention internationally. Chinese have reason to proud and encouraged. But the blanket praise by domestic media and scholars, and the emotions of conceit being expressed online, are cause for concern.
I still recall when the G20 meeting was held in Hangzhou in 2016, and everyone, whether officials or scholars, was saying that China had the “medicine” to cure the world of its economic woes. I remember this feeling that everyone was drunk and we were alone, that all nations were in decline and we were rising.
At this Belt and Road Forum some went even further, starting off on this drunken dream about how China now has “world leader” status. Some even wrote about how China is now the “savior” of the world.
Luo Jianbo (罗建波), head of the China Foreign Policy Center at the Central Party School.
Whether at the Hangzhou International Conference Center or at Yanqi Lake near Beijing, every time foreign leaders walk down that 50-meter stretch of red carpet and shake hands with Chinese leaders, many of us are overcome with excitement. And this precocious yet definitely immature sense of national greatness is still perhaps undergoing rapid inflation.
This premature sense of national greatness is shown not only in the Great Leap Forward mentality of “surpassing Britain and America,” and in the blind optimism about our own development achievements. It can also be seen in the explosion of narrow-minded nationalism and exclusionism that has followed recent frustrations and difficulties in our foreign relations. And again it is expressed in the disdain, contemp and superciliousness expressed toward certain smaller nations. In fact, these attitudes actually show a deficiency of true confidence among our people, and an immature sense of national greatness.
My goal in writing this is not to disparage China itself, but rather to explain that in the process of progressing toward status as a world power, Chinese must develop a sense of maturity, a steady big nation feeling and mentality.
Chinese should recognise with confidence that China is a developing nation, but that it is by its nature a big nation. In times of insufficient national strength, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders of the older generation never viewed our country as a small country or a weak country.
Chinese must also see that a national spirit with patriotism at the core is necessary to the achievement of national development and national rejuvenation. A certain degree of national pride, confidence and responsibility is also prerequisite in fostering national unity and in stimulating national growth.
Therefore, fostering a mature sense of national strength is necessary. It is about confidence without arrogance, pride without conceit.
We cannot forget. It was just a few years ago that people were still discussing how to understand the [Deng Xiaoping] injunction to “hide our strengths and bide our time, doing what we can.” But recently this has become a thing of the past. Concerning China’s development and the history of its foreign realtions with Chinese characteristics, some are already disatisfied with the incremental approach and want to push more forcefully. However, it is still my view that we need to have a clear understanding of our own development and our place in the world.
What does it mean to be a great world power?
Being a major world power is not just about having a massive economy and market, but requires also strong production capacity in terms of science and innovation and knowledge. It means having a global military presence as well as strong cultural influence, and it means having a voice that is heard in international institutions.
In terms of being a major world power, it is extremely important to do your part to contribute to the global economy, but you alsoo need to have a strong influence in addressing major world problems like global warming, and that you play a role in building global consensus and even provide the direction for global development.
China now has more and more “presence” in the world as a major power, but it lacks international influence and international discourse power in a full sense. Some foreign experts refwr to China as a “partial power” — and while that may not be music to the ears there is a lot of sense in it.
To accurately understand China’s basic national circumstances and its stage of development, we need pay close attention to the dialectical relationship between 3 things that haven’t changed, and 3 things that are unprecedented.
The report to the 18th National Congress of the CCP emphasized that “our country is still for the long-term in the primary stages of socialism and this basic national situation has not changed, and the daily increasingly material and cultural demands of the people remain in tension with social production, so the international status of our country as the world’s largest developing country has not changed.”
On this basis, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party pointed out that “we are approaching the center of the world stage to an extent that is unprecedented, we are approaching the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people to an extent that is unprecedented, and we have capacity and confidence to reach this goal to a degree that is unprecedented.
These three unchanged situations demand that we observe our own inadequacies, that we maintain strategically fixed and historically patient. The three unprecedented situations should motivate us to maintain optimism and confidence while we break new ground and stride ahead.
China has never realized the great rejuvenation of its people, has never become a major world power in the full sense. At this critical stage, maintaining an appropriately low profile (低调) has clear meaning for our long-term development goals.
The genius of “hiding our strengths and biding our time” was in avoiding the major barbs and tensions in the world, enabling us to avoid becoming the focus of tensions in the world. In the world before, this was essentially about remaining modest and guarding against pride and impatience, working to resolve our own problems and build up our core national competitiveness. At the same time, it means actively developing our relationships with the outside world, preserving and extending strategic opportunities for Chinese development.
Previously, we would declare earnestly to Americans time and again that empires faded because of the over-extension of the strength. But we must constantly remind ourselves that it is even more crucial for a major nation that is rising to conceal its strengths and bide its time, gathering strength. The recklessness and impetuousness of Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union in the 20th century are all classic examples.
If we take a fact-based attitude, we discover that America took a calm and unhurried approach in its rise as a major power that perhaps we should learn from. The GDP of the United States in 1900 had already surpassed that of Great Britain, but it was only at mid-century that it fully took on its role as world leader. In the midst of several major crises in the 20th century, including the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Vietnam War of the 1960s, the United States was able to reconsolidate its national power through strategic adjustments. Beginning with the Obama presidency, and continuing with a strengthening of an American-style “hide our strengths and bide our time” under Trump, we are seeing another instance of America making strategic adjustments to deal with a set of difficulties. At this time, as the US is more focused on domestic development and applying its strengths to create hard power, there is important practical meaning [for China] in the strategic thinking of “hiding one’s strengths and biding one’s time.”
From the standpoint of overseas relationships, China must be practical and steady in advancing its strategies internationally, including the “Belt and Road” construction that is so heatedly debated right now. As a call for cooperation, “Belt and Road” without a doubt helps promote China’s rejuvenation and global development, and could be called a representative practice and innovation of major nation foreign relations with Chinese characteristics (中国特色大国外交). However, in the actual implementation there have been substantial concerns such as “premature advance” (战略冒进), “rejoicing in grandiose deeds” (好大喜功) and “having too great an appetite” (贪大求全). If we are more cautious (低调), we might envision “Belt and Road” as a comprehensive elevation of China’s opening to the outside world, its significance in mutual connections and communication, production cooperation and human-to-human interaction — all to promote the transition of China’s development and its full moving out into the world . . .
However, relevant [government and Party] organs have placed such a degree of priority on the program and its strategic unpacking by experts that “Belt and Road” has been portrayed as a major strategy (大战略) — [ie., as more of a movement]. The repeated declarations by China’s government, and the anxiousness of relevant departments to see an “early harvest [of results]” (早期收获)”, in particular the full-fledged rush into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor without a consideration of costs, has given people outside China a sense that China is too impatient in the building of its “Belt and Road,” and this has fed a sense of concern internationally.
As a call for cooperation, of course the advancement of “Belt and Road” cannot be separated from government direction, but its focus should be on enterprises, social organizations and public initiatives, and it should advance in an orderly way, with full consultation and comprehensive assessment processes — prudently and dependably. But the implementation of “Belt and Road” has come with a degree of disorder and messiness, with various departments and regions and industries all fighting to be first to the door, to become advance soldiers on the beachhead of “Belt and Road.”
In Venezuela and other countries, hefty loans from China have put them in a real bind. In Myanmar, Thailand, Sudan and elsewhere, problems arising from development loans, and the lack of clear business gains from China-invested enterprises in many countries, have long ago sounded warning bells.
At an economic level, the focus with “Belt and Road” is on “going out” [into global markets], but the real difficulty is in coming back — meaning to find real capital growth, or the enrichment of experience and technology.
Many of the glories [of “Belt and Road”] are just not real. To give just a small example, over the past few years, in order to meet the needs of relevant government departments, many works of classical literature, or works on political governance by Chinese scholars, have flowed out of China’s gates on a massive scale. Behind this push is a vast expenditure of state resources, but no real demand from the international market. This sort of clamor and enthusiasm is not based on any market logic, and it cannot continue indefinitely.
So what exactly is “Belt and Road”? If we define it was an economic cooperation platform and a channel for the interaction of cultures, its meaning is already important, and the work that has been done is already substantial. But if we impatiently see it instead as a major “global governance” platform, seeking not only to resolve development challenges facing the world, but also to resolve the even more complex questions about governance globally, this is clearly too much too fast — and it might give us a great deal more responsibility than we are capable of handling. So-called global governance is about coordinating the strong and consoling the weak, and at its core it is a matter of the redistribution of global responsibilities and obligations.
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We must recognize that China’s has very little knowledge or experience in its history of “going out.” The voyage of Zheng He in the 15th century, while it raised prestige and made friends, bringing visits to China for a time, was a major drag on national power for 30 years until it came to a sudden end, leaving scarcely a mark on the history of sea navigation. Nor did it have much influence on China’s development or its consciousness of sea power.
In the 1950s and 1960s, China’s reached out to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and while there were clear gains in its foreign relations, the emphasis was only on political cooperation, overlooking economic interests. The accounts were only political. And in the 1980s there were major policy adjustments on this front. Today, as China is a major overseas investor, we face another era of massive “going out.” The big questions now are how to achieve sustainable development, and how to advance our own interests while attending to the interests of others. “Belt and Road” must draw on the lessons of history.
The Chinese have long cherished the notions of datong (大同), or Great Harmony, and tianxia (天下), or All Under Heaven. At the same time, Chinese culture cares greatly about the “middle way” (中庸之道), or maintaining balance and harmony . . . about introversion and self-examination. . . .
Most important, perhaps, is that we should work to resolve our own internal development issues. Over the past few decades, China has achieved rapid economic development and amassed many experiences and ideas that deserve consideration. Scholars at home are busiest trying to work out the secret of China’s development model, or describing its experience managing state affairs. But we have, intentionally or unintentionally, overlooked the fact that we have not yet worked our way through the “middle-income trap” (中等收入陷阱), for which we might look to countries that in their development successfully achieved political transition (like South Korea), or countries that successfully achieved good governance (like Singapore).
As China faces the “middle-income trap,” Chinese must not indulge in blind optimism. We need to sincerely and practically consider how we might resolve challenges and problems emerging in the course of our development. In fact, we can do our best to refute the idea of a “China threat,” or to line up evidence against the argument that China is a “fragile superpower.” But if we think about things cooly, we realize that the extreme difficulty of such problems as the gap between rich and poor, social tensions, environmental pollution, slow-moving economic structural reforms and political reform, all point to the fact that domestic problems are where China must put its fullest focus, and expend its energy.
The hopes of ordinary Chinese are generally very simple. They want a more harmonious society, a fairer social order, and more prosperous lives. We must actively work to answer these desires, and this is the basic precondition of all of our internal work and foreign affairs.
I recall a topic hotly debated online by young internet users: Who is really China’s enemy? Is it America? Japan? Russia?
If we think about things cooly, perhaps none of them are. China’s enemy is itself.
If China’s economy continues to develop, if people’s lives improve, if our style of governance grows clearer, society more harmonious, the environment more beautiful, and if on this foundation China’s national strength steadily grows, we could certainly see China’s international image improving and its prestige gaining, and the realization of the Chinese dream of rejuvenation will happen. I eagerly await the arrival of that day.
