Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

China leads the world in media corruption, says expert

In September last year, as China saw a series of media scandals, we ran several articles addressing the phenomenon of media corruption. We refer readers back to “Who Warped China’s Media?“; “China’s Corrupt Media“; and “Why News Extortion is So Hard to Uncover.”
Today we offer an excellent follow-up on the issue from one of China’s most knowledgeable media scholars, Foreign Languages University professor and former CMP fellow Zhan Jiang (展江).
Back on October 22, 2014, Zhan Jiang took part in an online discussion at 21ccom.net about media corruption, its causes and possible solutions. The website published the full text of Zhan’s interview yesterday.

Professor Zhan Jiang
Professor Zhan Jiang discusses media corruption in China with 21ccom.net in October 2014.
As much discussion of media corruption inside China centers on rotten journalists, as though the only relevant dimension is moral, Zhan Jiang’s interview is refreshingly frank. He explains why media corruption is endemic and, you might say, institutionalized.
We’ve translated only about half of the interview, but we strongly encourage readers of Chinese to study the rest.

Host: Hello everyone, I’m 21ccom.net editor Jiang Baoxin (蒋保信). I’m also the hosts of today’s conversation. Hello, Professor Zhan. This is the second time you’ve been a guest in the studio at 21ccom.net, isn’t it?
Zhan Jiang: That’s right. It’s been two or three years since the last time.
Host: After we pre-announced this online discussion, we promoted it on our WeChat public account as well, and web users submitted many valuable questions. Today we’d like to seek your expertise on these questions, which I’ve gathered today along with my own questions. Why don’t you first say hello to our web users.
Zhan Jiang: OK. Hello, everyone. 21ccom.net is a very influential sit for gathering social consensus and sharing ideas, and I’m really honored to be your guest.
Host:Looking back on the last couple of years, I think we can say it has been quite an eventful period for the media. If I can use one phrase to sum up my own feelings, I think it would be “a land of wailing and despair.” This has to do, I think, with the Chinese media’s own problems, and also with the larger backdrop of [China] in transition. I think this is a good time, Professor Zhan, to have you speak on the theme of “The Troubles Facing Chinese Media, and the Way Out” (中国媒体的困境和出路).
China Leads the World in Media Corruption
Host: In 2014, the anti-corruption drive advanced into the media. First, we saw an investigation into CCTV2, with Guo Zhenxi (郭振玺), Rui Chenggang (芮成钢) and others being arrested. After that, we had the investigation into the 21st Century Business Herald, where erstwhile angels of professional journalism became prisoners. This was a great shock to media colleagues. One of the major social roles of media is supervision, but we see that China’s media itself has become a corruption disaster zone (腐败的重灾区). What happened?
Zhan Jiang: First of all, media corruption is an outgrowth of political corruption and commercial corruption. A general level of corruption persists in our political and commercial cultures, and so the media cannot be the exception.
Specifically, corruption in China’s media also has to do with the pressures and challenges brought on by new media. And it has to do with the problems facing journalists themselves. For example, is it corruption for journalists to accept red envelopes? Even though everyone accepts red envelopes, this too is a form of corruption. And so, if we talk about the intrinsic and extrinsic reasons for corruption, there are many.
However, regardless, the level of corruption in China’s media is staggering. How staggering exactly? Search across the world and I’m sure you won’t find another country facing media corruption as serious as what you find in China. To be a bit less polite about it, China’s leads the world in media corruption.
Two Forms of Media Corruption: Collusion and Extortion
Host: How do we we see this corruption manifesting?
Zhang Jiang: From what we’ve seen exposed most recently, we’re talking chiefly about corruption that involves blackmail. This is about using the pressure of a prospective news report to squeeze economic benefit from the other side. In the past this was exercised in a subtle way. Later, it became explicit.
This sort of blackmail happens as companies take out advertising in the newspaper [in order to stave off negative coverage]. Or in some cases it means media establishing “strategic cooperation partnerships” (战略合作关系) with local [governments and/or companies]. In fact, this is little more than a [mafia-style] “protection fee” (保护费). Commercial enterprises and local government exchange economic benefits in order for the media to abstain from negative reporting on their activities, or negative editorials. Sometimes it even means deleting negative posts from internet users on various online media. This is what we can call extortion-style corruption (勒索型腐败).
Judging from recent events, it seems that this extortion-style corruption is particularly serious in China — and its easier to expose. When there is a particularly severe conflict between the extorter and the extorted — for example, you extort money from me [as a hush fee] — and afterward I find a way to expose this fact.
But there is another type of media corruption that is harder to expose, but its consequences are at least as severe. I call it collusive corruption (勾结型腐败). The traditional way is to demand from you an “open-mouth fee” (开口费). I do positive propaganda for you, filing a story for you, or I get you on the TV screen in exchange for some sort of favor. This sort of collusion is also shocking, but it’s far more difficult to detect, because it generally happens through private exchange, and both sides in the exchange benefit. It’s difficult to expose.
Collusive corruption is different from extortion-style corruption in the sense that it tends to happen at more powerful media. More vulnerable media, like weaker small Party media, industry publications — few people read these anymore. Their circulations and ability to attract advertising are very weak. Who is going to seek them out? Those who want to be seen in the media are naturally going to opt for powerful official media, especially state media. And of course they may also choose more powerful regional media. These days when we see “positive propaganda” (正面宣传) being done in the media that is not at the behest of senior Party leaders, there is very often corruption involved. The media accepted payment from them. . .
When we look at media corruption [in China], we have to look at both types of corruption.
We Must First Punish Media Personnel Involved in Illegal Acitivities
Host: Corruption in China’s media isn’t a matter of one or two bad apples, isn’t that right? It’s systemic.
Zhan Jiang: That’s right. Without question it is corruption for reporters to accept red envelopes, but this isn’t the most serious. In China, which do you think is greater, the number of journalists who take red envelopes, or the number of journalists who don’t? Right now, the journalist who doesn’t take the red envelope is seen as somehow unusual. And in some places, media bosses understand that journalists will accept red envelopes as a matter of course, and so they’ll factor red envelope money into their basic pay. A few years back I heard the female editor at a television station in the capital of a certain northwestern province say that their wages weren’t very high, only about 3,000 yuan per month, but their media bosses knew that every month they would be accepting red envelopes on the job. They considered that every red envelope would contain around 400 yuan, so five red envelopes would come to 2,000 yuan. So they logged their actual wages as 5,000 yuan.
Today, if we want to deal with the problem of media corruption, the difficulty is immense. Generally speaking, most journalists probably will not go and carry out news extortion. But for them, accepting red envelopes is nothing. Everybody does it. Changing this habit is very difficult. I hope that in dealing with media corruption, we first punish those media personnel carrying out illegal activities, and then move toward greater regulation in the industry. But of course this has to be a process.
Host: So is it a Chinese thing for reporters to accept red envelopes?
Zhan Jiang: Yes. It’s ordinary for journalists to receive red envelopes when attention a news conference, and journalists will accept free travel as well, which is something not permitted in American or European media. Of course, in Western media history, there were cases of journalists accepting “red envelopes” or some such thing, but in these cases they were severely criticized, because it is generally believed that this damages the reputation of the media . . .
As I understand it, in Western countries journalism wasn’t a very high paid career from the start, and so most people were mentally prepared for this before they entered the industry. If the income level wasn’t something you could accept, you didn’t choose this profession. In Britain, the United States, France and Germany — in none of these countries are journalists paid high salaries. Perhaps only Japan is the exception, where journalists do earn high salaries. In comparison, I think the average income of journalists in China is probably somewhere in the middle, not high and not too low.
I once asked a French journalist why anyone would want to be a journalist when the wages were so low. He joked that with the global economy being so bad he was happy to have a job at all. Then he said: In France, we think journalism is an interesting profession, and so it’s OK if the pay is lower [than for other professions].
Host: What ideas do you have about how to solve the problem of media corruption in China?
Zhan Jiang: As I’ve said before, media corruption in China is tied up with political and commercial corruption. In fact, corruption exist in many sectors of Chinese society — including healthcare and education. So dealing with media corruption isn’t an isolated matter. Fortunately, China’s anti-corruption drive is going well, and corruption is being targeted in politics and business.
Corruption is an interconnected chain, with links among various industries and sectors. There is a tight relationship between business and the media, and so if corruption can be combatted in the business sector this will help to restrain media corruption to some extent. That’s the larger perspective.
In terms of specifics in the media, I think some of the following things can be done.
First, there should be an exit system for media. If a certain media doesn’t suit social demand, if it cannot attract and audience and advertisers, then it should fold.
Not having an exit system is a major problem. I’ll give you an example. There is a certain industry publication that has been mentioned repeatedly over the years by the General Administration of Press and Publications because of its news extortion activities.
To put it another way, this newspaper relies on blackmail to survive. If it didn’t conduct itself this way where would the advertising come from? And how would it support its large newspaper staff? But the paper has not shut down. Why? Because its sponsoring institution (主管部门) is a certain department of the State Council. As the paper was being disciplined, the department sprang into action to successfully save the paper. Ultimately, the punishment against the newspaper was to refer the head of its Henan bureau to the justice system. China Central Television even did a program about this earlier this year. It was called, “The Secret of a Press Station” (记者站的秘密).
This is a specific case of systematic news extortion. But because there was no exit system [for this government-backed newspaper], the paper was ultimately allowed to live through a process of sacrificing the pawn to save the queen. And how will it survive from now on? Will it continue to extort money with the threat of news reporting? Must the state financially support such a publication?
There is no way, in fact, that the publication will be able to rely on state support. Because only a handful of official media, like the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency and a number of treasured Party publications, are now able to receive support. For those more peripheral official media that no longer have a place, the only possibility is an exit system. Under the current tough situation facing even the most competitive of media, they have no choice available to them other than extortion.
Therefore, we must build an exit system [for media like this]. Actually, the former head of the General Administration of Press and Publications, Liu Binjie (柳斌杰), floated this idea quite some time ago, of letting the sun set on those media that are no longer relevant. This is the right idea. But this idea can’t be implemented, because media are still regarded as primarily an ideological industry (意识形态产业), having their own special function [aside from profit and sustainability], and for the sake of this function — and the interests of certain government departments — it’s very difficult to shut these media down.

Your public account is history

The recent shutdown of 133 WeChat public accounts offering history related content is part and parcel of a broader ideological tightening in China that reaches across media, the arts, education, entertainment and the internet.
It is no surprise that the move comes just as the General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announced new guidelines for ideological work at Chinese universities, “championing the concepts of Marxism, the Chinese Dream, socialist core values and traditional culture.” After all, the formation and interpretation of every single one of these values hinges to a great extent on how one understands China’s history and its place in the world.
Now, as ever, history is a matter of immediacy for China’s leadership.

The Eight Nations Alliance parades
The Eight Nations Alliance parades in Beijing after intervening in the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. The event is mentioned in a commentary in today’s People’s Daily as one distorted by WeChat public account “This is Not History.”
China’s leaders reserve the right — the power, that is — to shape the country’s historical discourse, which has always been an integral part of its overall project of “public opinion guidance.” This is why the approach of important historical anniversaries, like that of June Fourth or the Cultural Revolution, has always set leaders on edge.
WeChat is coming under attack because it has emerged as an alternative platform offering unwelcome versions of history through public accounts, or gonghao (公号), that can attracts tens or even hundreds of thousands of viewers. Public accounts are the new bedrock of We Media, or zimeiti (自媒体), in China, and they have prompted a wave of content experimentation.
I think we can safely suppose that WeChat is very, very far from out of the woods.
Readers might note two pieces in particular in the official People’s Daily, published today and yesterday in the “People’s Commentary” section on page five. Yesterday’s “commentary” is written by Xu Danei (徐达内), generally speaking a very credible Chinese expert and columnist writing on new media trends in the country.
Xu’s piece begins by enumerating the welcome conveniences offered by WeChat, and then moves on to the dangers — rumours and unverified information. It’s an argument we’ve heard from Chinese officialdom over and over again, concerning news portal sites, then Weibo, and now WeChat: rumours are a scourge, a public health threat, and they must be mobilised against.
Xu’s commentary concludes with a bootlicking caution that seems quite out of character: “Of course, Tencent has been advancing the platform all along, with the reporting and complaints function on the backend constantly improving. Recently, the ‘original content’ label (原创标签) has also been tested, and can be seen as a further effort at advancement on Tencent’s part. I’m sure that as a mature internet company, it can continue to do better and better.”
Today’s piece on page five deals directly with those history related public accounts that were recently expunged from WeChat. Rather than comment — I think it speaks rather nicely for itself — allow me to just give readers a taste.

“A Respect for History is the Bottom Line in Enjoyable Reading” (尊重历史是制造悦读的底线)
People’s Daily, People’s Commentary
By Ma Zhifei (马知非)
Stories from history can be full of life, but ensuring that the people read true stories, and the acceptance of accurate Party histories and national histories, that is the bottom line in satisfying public demands.
Recently, in accord with the law, the Cyberspace Administration of China (国家互联网信息办公室) ordered the shutdown of 133 public WeChat accounts that were disseminating distorted views of history, including “This is Not History” (“这不是历史”). And the body said it would strengthen its enforcement online, scrutinising those communication tools and platforms that web users reported as having salient problems. When this news [from the Cyberspace Administration] came out, the reaction online was strong.

PD page 5 January 21 2015

“To know our path, we must first know history.” Living as we do in a country with a deep history, understanding the history of the Party and the nation is naturally something every person desires. The richness of history related materials available to us in the new media age is, by and large, a very good thing, demonstrating that our country and its people hanker for a better understanding of historical events . . . Enthusiasm for history is becoming a larger social wave.
But if what enters this flood is not pure water from the source, if instead it is polluted, the damage can spread quickly. If the research of history is not undertaken on the basis of systematic study of actual historical materials . . . then there is no way to draw out the true experiences of history, or to reveal its true principles.
The WeChat public account “This is Not History” previously made a number of posts purporting to “test” facts concerning the intervention in China of the Eight-Nation Alliance (八国联军侵华) [during the 1900 Boxer Uprising], the Battle of Pingxingguan [in 1937], and other events. The method used was essentially the haphazard assembling of historical facts in a far-fetched manner, or their presentation in a one-sided or slanted manner.
What deserves our reflection is how this sort of WeChat public account trampling on history became so “hot”? Their articles sought to titillate with claims of “revealing secrets” or claims that “You didn’t know.” Once you clicked into the articles you found that the style of these historical stories or little-known anecdotes was quite different from traditional historical reading materials — so they could easily leave a deep impression.
Add to this the impact of online promotion [through social networks] and people were left with the impression from the sheer number of readings and shares through friend forums (朋友圈) that many others were reading this just as they were. What followed was the baseless manufacture of a “hot topic,” and what began as something people either believed or were skeptical about became fodder for conversation around the dinner table, as though people were privy to a “secret” others didn’t know. With time, falsehood became truth, having an imperceptible impact on people’s views of history.
. . .
The shutting down those WeChat public accounts that distorted history has earned applause from many serious historians, but the public appetite for content about history has not abated. These shutdowns are just the first step. What we need even more is for history to enter mass communications in a way that is true and systematic, and at the same time accessible and popular. Once we have strangled these false histories, we must consider how we can ensure that authoritative history “flies into the homes of the ordinary folk.”

Qian Gang analysis deleted from Weibo

The following post by Xu Xingqi (徐幸起), posted at10:12AM today, January 20, 2015, was censored just more than 40 minutes later. The post summarises arguments and discourse analysis posted recently by CMP director Qian Gang (钱钢). [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]

Qian Gang: [They] talk about “governing in accord with the constitution” but can’t talk about “constitutionalism”; they talk about “the independent exercise of the powers of trial and prosecution” but can’t talk about “judicial independence.” According to this logic, how will they treat “rule of law,” and how will they treat human rights? They say we must adopt the best fruits of human civilisation, but if every globally accepted principle is quarantined off in this way, can they really advance true reforms? And how can we even talk about “the modernisation of national governance systems and governance capacity?

The Chinese-language version of Qian Gang’s article was published at FT Chinese.

The long shadow of the Pu Zhiqiang case

On January 11, Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强) celebrated his 50th birthday behind bars. It’s impossible to know what emotions Pu, a lawyer known for his deft and candid style, was feeling on that day. But many of his supporters, including lawyers, legal scholars and media professionals, took to social media to wish him happy birthday — a uniquely Chinese form of collective resistance. Just one of the posts made to Weibo that day prompted 2,300 shares, and more than 500 comments.
Meanwhile, some well-known lawyers and legal experts were more direct in voicing their anger over the campaign authorities have waged in recent months against right defense lawyers in China. Among them, Peking University law professor He Weifang (贺卫方) wrote: “With one hand they overturn unjust convictions, and with the other they orchestrate new ones. Is there anything more ridiculous?”

pu cover
Pu Zhiqiang is featured on the cover of Guangzhou’s Southern People Weekly in January 2013.
It was He Weifang who spoke out fearlessly in 2011 to defend another wronged lawyer, Li Zhuang (李庄), who was falsely accused by authorities in Chongqing (then under the rule of the princeling Bo Xilai) of inciting his client to false testimony. In a forcefully worded blog post at the time, “For the Sake of Rule of Law, For the Sake of that Thread of Rationality in Our Hearts,” He Weifang criticized the wrongs committed in the name of Bo Xilai’s “Singing Red and Striking Black” (唱红打黑) campaign, and how members of the Chongqing legal community had stood idly by as judicial independence was trampled and criminality became the law.
“In the face of intrusions on judicial independence and violations of legal procedure,” Professor He wrote, “the academic community must be clear and resolute in its criticism and opposition.”
The arrest and expedient trial of Beijing lawyer Li Zhuang shocked the legal community in China at the time. The eventual fall of Bo Xilai in one of China’s most high-profile corruption cases ever was applauded by the same legal community. What no one had predicted was that rights defense lawyers in China would fare even worse under President Xi Jinping, and that the media would likewise be put in a chokehold.
However one chooses to view it — in terms of the degree of repression involved, or in terms of the absurdity of the charges — the Pu Zhiqiang case today is far more shocking than the Li Zhuang case ever was in Bo Xilai’s Chongqing. Pu Zhiqiang, who through skillful debate, ingenuity and drama, defended the likes of Tan Zuoren (谭作人) and Ai Weiwei (艾未未), is now locked up behind bars, incriminated by his own words (因言获罪).
What we should find especially concerning is that Pu Zhiqiang’s own defense lawyer, Qu Zhenhong (屈振红) has also been detained. This being the case, it’s difficult to imagine anyone else daring to step forward to defend this defender. It took courage enough in the present climate to extend birthday wishes to Pu Zhiqiang on Weibo.
The Pu Zhiqiang case is a classic case of speech repression. Among the four crimes listed are the “crime of provocation” (寻衅滋事罪), the “crime of inciting racial hatred” (煽动民族仇恨罪), and the “crime of inciting separatism” (煽动分裂国家罪). These charges rely solely on 30 or so posts made on Chinese social media.
The last accusation is for the “crime of illegally obtaining the personal information of citizens” (非法获取公民信息罪). This refers to research Pu Zhiqiang conducted in cooperation with several well-known Chinese media, including Caijing magazine, Southern Weekly and The Beijing News. This too is ultimately about freedom of speech, the question that has most exercised Pu Zhiqiang throughout his legal career.
When you look at the list of recent political prisoners in China, perhaps all of these cases involve incrimination through speech (因言获罪). There few if any instances of activities extending beyond the acts of speech themselves — no setting up of organizations or planning of social movements. Each and every case stopped far short of that. Viewpoints posted on Weibo. Articles written. And these bring serious consequences.
The famous Chinese lawyer Chen Youxi (陈有西) has said: “Even if I see this through the eyes of officialdom, I must speak truthfully: In arresting Pu Zhiqiang, you have made a grave mistake. Those who orchestrated this are doing a great disservice. Release him, immediately.”
I’m not sure whether this is Chen’s opinion on the case, or whether he is being strategic about it — to suggest, that is, that senior leaders may not have wished for this. But I think, in any case, that this is a serious underestimation of the capacity for control that central Party leaders have, and particularly of the iron-fisted ways of Xi Jinping, China’s “striker of tigers.” It may be true that President Xi does not know the ins and outs of each individual case. Nevertheless, I believe those pursuing such cases down below have a pretty clear idea of the leadership’s intentions. I don’t doubt that Xi Jinping has set the tone.
There is one thing we can be sure of. If the case against Pu Zhiqiang does lead to a conviction, this will cast a very long shadow over the legal community and over speech in China.
This article was originally published in Chinese at Deutsche Welle.

Who gave "judicial independence" a death sentence?

In recent weeks, China has slipped into a place of turmoil with respect to its discourse on the concept of “judicial independence,” or sifa duli (司法独立). The recent hostility in official circles toward what has long seemed a point of consensus within the Chinese Communist Party sends a worrying signal for rule of law in the country.
On January 7, more than 100 websites in China re-posted an article from the Party’s official People’s Daily called “Our Rule of Law Cannot Travel the Same Road as the West’s ‘Judicial Independence'” (我们的法治不能走西方“司法独立”的路子). The article, written by politburo member Zhang Chunxian (张春贤), the top leader of China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, kicked up a storm of confusion on China’s internet. Over the past three decades of reform, the slogan “judicial independence” has been consistently upheld as something positive. Why, now, were the tables turning?
In the Maoist Era, the Term Goes “Black”
In China’s pre-reform period, political discourse was a simple matter of black or red. Anything that wasn’t red, meaning accepted as a part of Mao Zedong’s official discourse, was by definition “black” — unwelcome and dangerous.
After 1949, the Chinese Communist Party announced that it would “repeal all laws, acts and judicial systems of the reactionary and repressive Kuomintang government.” From that point on, the notion of “judicial independence” was mercilessly criticized, branded a “black word” (黑色词语).
One of the chief goals during the first few years of Communist rule in China was to redefine the relationship between the country’s new rulers and the administration of justice. When the Provisional Organization Procedures for People’s Courts (人民法院暂行组织条例) were promulgated in September 1951, Communist authorities emphasized that courts at every level must accept the leadership and oversight of corresponding government leaders (People’s Daily, September 5, 1951). The case was made more directly in the October 30 edition of the People’s Daily that same year, which stated that “judicial work must actively serve politics” (司法工作必须积极地为政治服务)
From 1952 to 1953, judicial organs in China engaged in what was described as a struggle “to oppose the old legal concepts” (反对旧法观念). Among the concepts on the chopping block: the belief that it was a violation of the principle of “judicial independence” for Party chiefs at the city and county levels to serve concurrently as presidents of the local court (法院院长); the belief that it intruded on the rights and responsibilities of judges to allow court presidents priority in the issuing of sentences; the belief that allowing military judge advocates to actively repress counter-revolutionaries obstructed the independent exercise of judicial organs (People’s Daily, August 22, 1952); the belief that “criminal law is subject to universality” (刑法具有世界性), that it must stress “the protection of the rights of the individual” and that “all are equal before the law” (People’s Daily, October 17, 1952).
Despite this “struggle,” China’s new constitution, introduced in 1954, maintained some notion of court independence, saying in Article 78 that “the people’s courts shall exercise trials independently, subject only to the law” (人民法院独立进行审判,只服从法律). Furthermore, the constitution made clear in Article 83 that “the people’s prosecutors at various levels shall exercise their powers independently, without interference from local state organs.”
All notions of independence were tossed out the window during the 1957 Anti-Rightist Movement. The idea of judicial independence was roundly condemned in the October 9, 1957, edition of the People’s Daily. The official front-page commentary was called, “Serious Struggles Are Still Ahead on the Front Lines of the Legal System” (在政法战线上还有严重的斗争):

In order to oppose our party’s leadership of politics and law work (政法工作), rightists still raise slogans such as the so-called ‘judicial independence’ and ‘independent trial,’ seeking to set the justice system at odds with the people’s democratic dictatorship.

rmrb

In the 1950s in China, the concept of judicial independence was eradicated completely. In both the 1975 Constitution (75宪法) promulgated in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, and in the 1978 Constitution (78宪法) introduced a few years later, the word “independent” was stricken from the language about the power of courts and prosecutors.
The 1975 Constitution even specified that “the powers of prosecutorial organs shall be exercised through public security organs at various levels,” and “the prosecution and trial of cases must implement the mass line.” (The “mass line,” which Xi Jinping has so far made a centrepiece of his administration, is a Mao-era means by which the Party seeks to consolidate power and extend the reach of the state by “cultivating closer ties with the people.”)
“[F]or many counter-revolutionary cases of a criminal nature,” read the 1975 Constitution, “discussion and criticism by the masses must be encouraged.”
It was not until the 1980s that judicial independence finally reemerged, undergoing a complete color transformation. The concept’s time on death row finally ended.
The Blending of Light Red and Light Blue
In the past, I have used the following spectrum to talk about political discourse in China in the post-Mao era.
spectrum

The dark red area on the far left refers to Mao-era discourse, signalling the leftist language of that era. Most of these terms are no longer in regular use — at least within the dominant Party discourse reflected in state media. Recently, however, we have seen some of these terms reemerge.
The “mainstream” Party discourse is the territory of the light red, second from the left on my spectrum. These terms are used regularly — though with widely varying degrees of intensity — by those in power.
Next comes the area of the light blue discourse. These are terminologies that can coexist with the light red, but are favored among intellectuals and in civil society. In the Chinese context, light blue discourse is more progressive and transformative.
At the rightmost end of the spectrum is the dark blue, discourse that remains unspeakable in China because it threatens the position of the Party.
To a large extent, China’s political history since the start of economic reforms can be seen through the shifting relationship and mutual sparring of these four primary discourses.
Each color grade is of course dynamic. For example, the slogan “the Four Basic Principles” (四项基本原则), was an extremely popular term in the light-red band during the Deng Xiaoping era, a term of currency, but in the subsequent eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, it slipped into the deep red zone, coming to signify an atavistic clinging on to the Maoist aspirations of the extreme left.
The relationship between the light red and the light blue is a tricky one. When light red discourse becomes more progressive, light blue discourse tends to become more visible and assertive. In some instances, the discourses may blend and interchange. Conversely, when light red terms stiffen (tending toward the deep-red end of the spectrum), light blue discourse fades and goes into retreat. In this latter case, we might even see light blue terms previously tolerated by the light red “mainstream” shifting over into the dark blue.
A shift toward the dark blue seems to be happening right now to the term “judicial independence.”
At the outset of economic reforms in the 1980s, a number of “black words” of the Mao Zedong era were rehabilitated. In the official People’s Daily, both “separation of powers” and “judicial independence” became terms having positive connotations. The two eventually traveled very different paths, however. While separation of powers was quickly discarded on the junk heap of deep-blue taboos, judicial independence found a place of security among the light reds.
On September 15, 1980, the formation of China’s Constitution Revision Commission was announced. The body’s chairman, Ye Jianying (叶剑英), gave a speech in which said that in the new constitution, “principles of democracy and equality, and the principle of judicial independence, should receive fuller actualization” (People’s Daily, September 16).
The 1982 Constitution enshrined the idea of judicial independence. Article 126 states:

Article 126. The Supreme People’s Court is the highest judicial organ. The Supreme People’s Court supervises the administration of justice by the local people’s courts at different levels and by the special people’s courts; people’s courts at higher levels supervise the administration of justice by those at lower levels.

Legal scholars generally acknowledge that a fair number of advances were made in Chinese law in the 1980s. The principle that all are equal before the law was re-introduced. The idea that rule by man (人治) was preferable to rule of law was largely discredited. And, at least in theory, the idea of judicial independence carried the day (People’s Daily, January 27, 1989).
Even in the tumult that followed the crackdown on democracy demonstrators in June 1989, the idea of judicial independence was reaffirmed at the highest levels. On September 26, 1989, General Secretary Jiang Zemin announced during a press conference: “We absolutely cannot have the Party stand in for the government, and we absolutely cannot have the Party stand in for the law” (People’s Daily, September 27, 1989).
During the decade plus that Jiang Zemin was in power, the Chinese Communist Party seemed to affirm — in its discourse at least — the internationally accepted principal of judicial independence. During this same period, China’s signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which it has yet to ratify) and its entry into the World Trade Organization both contributed to the domestic advancement of the notion of judicial independence.
On April 6, 1999, the People’s Daily ran an article by legal expert Li Buyun (李步云) called, “Milestones in Ruling the Nation in Accord With the Law” (依法治国的里程碑). Li outlined 10 standards for “nations under socialist rule of law”:

1. Full legal systems (法制完备)
2. Popular sovereignty (主权在民)
3. Protection of human rights (人权保障)
4. Checks and balances (权利制衡)
5. Equality under the law (法律平等)
6. Supremacy of the law (法律至上)
7. Administration according to the law (依法行政)
8. Judicial independence (司法独立)
9. Due process of law (程序正当)
10. A Party abiding by the law (党要守法)

For the first 10 years of the new century, judicial independence was a feature of China’s light-red discourse, but it was simultaneously a favored light-blue term, used widely in commercial media and on the emerging internet.
“Judicial independence” was widely used up until Hu Jintao’s second term in office, when the prevailing weather on the terrain of political discourse changed.
Light-Blue Terms Under Assault After 2008
In my view, we have seen an across-the-board tightening of the media and public opinion in China since Xi Jinping came to power. But in fact, the cycle of tightening began in the latter half of Hu Jintao’s administration.
In 2008, as the proponents of the “China Model” grew vocal, “universal values” and other light-blue terms went into retreat. At the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee the following year, there was an ideological mobilisation against the right.
This ideological turn was written clearly in the plenum’s “Decision,” which urged the Party to draw a clear line between Marxism and its opponents, between the existing economic system and privatisation, between democracy under socialism with Chinese characteristics and Western capitalist democracy.
The time had come, it seemed, for choosing sides.
In the months that followed, the People’s Daily published a series of articles to strike the chords in this new ensemble of ideological reshuffling. One of those articles, “The People’s Mastery Is the Core and Basic Nature of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” (人民当家作主是中国特色社会主义民主的本质和核心), was the first broadside in China’s official Party press against the notion of judicial independence (People’s Daily, April 8, 2010). But the attack was faint-hearted.
It should be noted that voices within the Chinese Communist Party are by no means unanimous. On April 14, 2011, in an address to a newly-appointed crop of State Council advisors at Zhongnanhai, Premier Wen Jiabao outlined what he saw as core concepts in policy research. Among these he included “adhering to governing the nation according to the law, and building a socialist nation ruled by law, in particular [recognizing] the need to ensure the independence and impartiality of the judicial system” (People’s Daily, April 15, 2011).

tencent

On the eve of the 18th National Congress in 2012, the Chinese government issued Chinese Judicial Reform, a white paper that stated:

The basic objective of China’s judicial reform is to ensure that the people’s courts and people’s procuratorates exercise their rights to jurisdiction and prosecution independently and impartially according to the law, building a fair, effective and authoritative socialist judicial system, in order to protect the legal rights of the masses, preserve fairness and justice in society, and provide strong and reliable judicial protection for the long-term stability of the nation.

rmrb 2

Before the 18th National Congress, light-blue terms were being used actively on the internet, particularly on social media. On October 22, 2012, veteran Chinese editor Hu Shuli (胡舒立) wrote on Caixin Media (“Judicial Independence, Political Reform and the 18th Congress“) that she believed judicial reform would become a key agenda of the 18th National Congress on which there might be some breakthroughs. “In the multitude of judicial reform issues,” Hu wrote, “judicial independence is the core content.”
Contrary to the buoyant expectations of many intellectuals in China, public opinion sank after the 18th National Congress. A new round of intensified discourse tightening came. And in the spring and summer of 2013, as the “Seven Don’t Speaks” went into force, judicial independence became a target.
“Judicial Independence” Under Fire
When we observe China’s political discourse against the backdrop of political events, we notice a strange disconnect. Just as the purge of public opinion was in full swing in 2013 — a general tightening in the media, on the internet, in academia, in arts and culture — Xi Jinping’s “reform” took center stage.
The topics addressed at the third and fourth plenums of the 18th Central Committee (November 2013 and October 2014) were the “comprehensive deepening of reform” (全面深化改革) and “ruling the nation in accord with the law” (依法治国). For pro-reform currents inside and outside the Party, both of these are long-standing issues of concerns — but they cause, at the same time, great consternation and unease among vested interests in the Party, including forces on the extreme left for whom the deep-red discourse has currency.
In the wake of each of these key meetings, the reform discourse they briefly encouraged leveled off rapidly, and opposition discourse flooded the void. Following the recent Fourth Plenum on rule of law (or, as some would prefer, rule by law) the crux of official “interpretations” loudly promoted in Party media was the Party’s leadership of so-called rule of law. And as the notion of “constitutionalism” was roundly attacked, so too was “judicial independence.”
Back to the January 7, 2015, piece written by Zhang Chunxian, this politburo member writes:

Our nation’s rule of law is different from the West’s so-called ‘constitutionalism’, and the crux of this is the organic unity of adherence to the leadership of the Party, the principle of the people’s mastery (人民当家作主), and ruling the nation in accord with the law. Our rule of law is not the rule of law of the ‘separation of powers,’ and we cannot take the road of the West’s ‘judicial independence’ or ‘judicial neutrality.’ On this question we cannot be vague. We must be confident and resolute . . . (People’s Daily, January 7, 2015).

netease

Somewhat anomalously, the People’s Daily reported the day after Zhang’s piece ran that Gansu province had introduced a “ten-point ban” (十条禁令) on government leaders “interfering in judicial independence.” Here, right on the heels of a senior leader’s excoriation of the notion of judicial independence as foreign and unwelcome, was the same idea being used in a positive sense.
So how does the Party now regard this term? As the Party proclaims its interest in “comprehensively promoting rule of the nation in accord with the law,” does it support the idea of judicial independence? Or is it prepared to scrap the idea altogether?
Over thirty plus years of reform and opening, the Chinese Communist Party has relaxed its position on a number of terms originating from the West, adopting them to its own ends. These include “market economy, “human rights, “rule of law” and others. At the same time, the Party has locked a number of sensitive terms away in the vault of unacceptables: “multi-party system” (多党制), “nationalisation of the military” (军队国家化), “separation of powers” (三权分立).”
“Judicial independence” has so far been safe, probably because it differs somewhat from solidly taboo terms in the deep-blue zone. In the 21st century, China’s senior leaders may not publicly speak the words “judicial independence,” but terms of similar import have nonetheless remained a part of the official discourse.
Consider this brief history of the concept of judicial independence in the political reports issued on a five-year basis since the 13th National Congress in 1987 — political reports perhaps being the most important measure of Party consensus that we have:

13th: “[S]afeguard the right of judicial organs to exercise their powers independently”
14th: “[S]afeguard the independent exercise of trial and prosecution by people’s courts and prosecutors”
15th: “[G]uarantee that judicial organs exercise the powers of trial and prosecution independently and fairly in accord with the law.” (“Safeguard” changed to “guarantee” and “fairly” added)
16th: “[G]uarantee that trial organs and procuratorates independently and fairly exercise the powers of trial and prosecution in accord with the law.”
17th: “[G]uarantee that trial organs, procuratorates independently and fairly exercise the powers of trial, prosecution in accord with the law.”
18th: “[E]nsure that trial organs, procuratorates independently and fairly exercise the powers of trial, prosecution in accord with the law.” (“Guarantee” is changed to “ensure”).

From Zhao Ziyang’s political report in 1987 to Hu Jintao’s political report 20 years later in 2007, the principle of judicial independence remained intact (as an idea) at the highest levels. And the principle has clung on since the 18th National Congress in 2012.
During the Third Plenum in 2013, the language was as follows: “[E]nsuring the independent and fair exercise of the powers of trial and prosecution in accord with the law.” The language at the recent Fourth Plenum was: “[I]mproving and ensuring the system for independent and fair exercise of the powers of trial and prosecution in accord with the law. Leading cadres of Party and government organs at all levels must support the independent and fair exercise of the powers of trial and prosecution by courts, procuratorates in accord with the law.” And the language became even more specific: “[We will] build a records, notification and responsibility system for cases in which leading cadres interfere in judicial proceedings, meddling in particular cases.”
Without a doubt, the above-mentioned examples of language on the role of the courts in China perpetuate the principle of judicial independence set down by Ye Jianying in the 1980s. The most recent language, moreover, is the clearest and most concrete.
So what’s happening now?
The very substance of last year’s Fourth Plenum was rule of law, and the specifics of the meeting had to do with judicial reform. And yet, in the wake of the Fourth Plenum, a gnawing fear of constitutionalism, of the checking of power, of any form of institutional change, seems to have gripped China’s elites.
Meng Jianzhu (孟建柱), secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, said recently:

The determination in our country’s Constitution that the people’s courts and people’s procuratorates must independently exercise the powers of trial and prosecution is built on the foundation of the unified exercise of state power by the Party leadership and the National Party Congress. The emphasis is on independent trial of cases in accord with the law, and this is fundamentally different from the judicial independence of Western countries (People’s Daily, November 7, 2014)

China’s political discourse is knee deep in trouble. The more Party leaders try to “draw a clear line” (划清界限), as they like to say, the more things get muddled.
They talk about “governing in accord with the law” (依宪执政), but they can’t talk about “constitutionalism” (宪政); they talk about the “independent exercise of the powers of trial and prosecution” (独立行使审判权、检察权), but they can’t talk about “judicial independence” (司法独立). Guided by such logic, how will they approach rule of law? How will they approach human rights?
Many times before, the Chinese Communist Party has talked about “borrowing from all of the achievements of human civilization” (吸收人类一切文明成果). If lines of quarantine are established in this way around each and every globally shared principle, how does the Party suppose it can pursue real reforms? And how can it talk seriously about what it calls “the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity”?
Situated outside Party politics, it is impossible for us to determine who exactly has handed down a death sentence to the concept of judicial independence. We can expect, however, that as the gloves come off, as “judicial independence” becomes the target of open hostility, the Party’s declarations about “the independent and fair exercise of the powers of trial and prosecution” can only become naked falsehoods. And all efforts at judicial reform in China can only become wasted energy.

News and propaganda resolutions for 2015

You’ve packed away your Christmas tree. You’ve broken your New Year’s resolution. Now it’s time to get down to business. You have an entire year of censorship and propaganda to work out.
Such, in any case, would be your lot if you worked inside China’s vast information control apparatus. January is the month of national meetings, events where the gears are greased with unctuous injunctions from “the center” — with phrases like “raising high the banner” and “unifying thought and action with the demands of the CCP leadership.”

GAPPRFT meeting
The General Administration of Press Publications Radio Film and Television holds its annual meeting in Beijing January 5-6, 2015.
On January 5, politburo standing committee member Liu Yunshan (刘云山), who served as propaganda minister from 2002 to 2012, addressed the National Propaganda Ministers Meeting. Liu talked about the “strategic deployment” of the “Four Comprehensives” (四个全面): 1) grasping correct guidance of public opinion; 2) strengthening propaganda and explanation [of the Party’s policies]; 3) creating a favorable atmosphere; and 4) promoting the implementation of the central leadership’s decisions and deployments.
Liu Yunshan’s equation, essentially, is this:

Censorship of news media and the internet (and all other forms of culture) in line with the Party’s interests PLUS active propaganda to convince the public that the Party’s position, views and actions alone are correct EQUALS a smooth and untroubled public opinion environment that allows the Party to maintain its dominance and accomplish what it sets out to do.

This formula, with its prevailing notion of “public opinion guidance,” is hardly news. “Guidance” has reigned supreme for more than a quarter century, ever since the violent crackdown on democracy demonstrations in June 1989.
But it is imperative, in the view of top leaders, to remind Party officials that the control of information and public opinion is imperative. And so the Propaganda Ministers Meeting makes the front page of the official People’s Daily (just left of the photo of the Chinese search vessel “Nanhai Jiu 101“).

pd 1.6.2015

Also held earlier this month was the National Internet Propaganda Management Work Meeting (全国网络宣传管理工作会议). For reasons still unclear, however, little has been reported at all of this session in Beijing. In fact, there was no news that it had been held at all until local media in Shaanxi province reported on January 9 that provincial internet authorities had held their own meeting to “transmit the important official instructions on internet work made by General Secretary Xi Jinping, and the spirit of the National Internet Propaganda Management Work Meeting.”
A number of links to coverage of the Shaanxi meeting, some giving headline treatment to what the local report revealed about the national meeting, have already been taken down — like these from Phoenix Online and from the news portal operated by the official China News Service.
404 phoenix online propaganda meeting

404 for ChinaNews on Internet Meeting

More is available, though little still revealed, about a third national meeting on censorship and propaganda — the two-day National Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television Work Conference (全国新闻出版广播影视工作会议), which opened in Beijing on January 5, the same day as the Propaganda Ministers Meeting.
Presiding over the event was Cao Fuchao (蔡赴朝), deputy minister of the Central Propaganda Department and Party chairman of the government office with China’s most ill-conceived acronym, the General Administration of Press Publications Radio Film and Television (GAPPRFT) — which, spoken properly, should sound like blowing a raspberry.

In reviewing work in 2014, Cai Fuchao pointed out that over the past year, the front line [forces] in news, publishing, radio, film and television had raised the banner high, firm in their faith [in the socialist cause], deeply studying and implementing the spirit of the series of important speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping, ensuring that various work initiatives developed in a healthy manner along a correct path; they dared to take up [their work], overcoming difficulties, solidly advancing the deepening of reform . . .

The men and women on the front lines of Chinese propaganda were, in other words, good soldiers. They fought the hard fight for public opinion control. And, through and through, they “adhered to the center” and “achieved new results in serving the overall situation.”
Cai Fuchao outlined for his colleagues nine key aspects of propaganda work, from the “deepening of reform” to “strengthening rule of law thinking” (the subject of the recent Fourth Plenum).
But the core sense was encapsulated in item one:

1. To further deepen the study and implementation of the series of important speeches by Xi Jinping, keeping a firm grasp on guidance of public opinion (牢牢把握正确舆论导向), consolidating and expanding the main public opinion position (巩固壮大舆论主阵地) . . . [and again] under the command of the spirit of the series of important speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping, to do a bigger and stronger job of positive propaganda (做大做强正面宣传). To put in effort on “propaganda capability” (会宣传), raising the capacity and level of public opinion channeling (提高舆论引导能力和水平). To implement the principle of the Party’s control of ideology (落实党管意识形态原则), and maintain strict propaganda discipline in the news (严明新闻宣传纪律).

All of these terms are familiar. They suggest that the dominant discourse of information control in China — at least that refracted through the Central Propaganda Department and GAPPRFT — is unchanged, save for the important fact that these control imperatives are now made to orbit around the “spirit of the series of important speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping.”
Is there anything new? Answering that question may depend on what was said at the mysterious National Internet Propaganda Management Work Meeting. What were those “important written comments” by Xi Jinping?
As I’ve argued elsewhere, the internet and social media are now the heart of information control in China, and it is possible that both the Central Propaganda Department and GAPPRFT are now being marginalized in favor of the Cyberspace Administration and its chief, Lu Wei (鲁炜).
Concerning Cai Fuchao’s list of nine key aspects, we might also wish to note number seven, which deals with the international dimension of propaganda. This concerns, says Cai, the “thorough implementation of the central leadership’s expansion and deepening of new requirements and new deployments in the strategic layouts of diplomacy.”
That’s a mouthful, but it essentially means China’s leaders want to continue to develop China’s “international communication capacity” (国际传播能力), its ability to get its own message out — by which of course Cai Fuchao means the message as narrowed through the lens of Item 1 on the agenda, “guidance” and bigger and better “positive propaganda.”
The key, Cai says, is to “tell China’s story well” (讲好中国故事), and “transmit China’s voice” (传播中国声音).
Interestingly, Cai mentions a few specific initiatives by name, the first three quite new attempts at public diplomacy. Get your notebooks ready, reporters. Here they are:
1. The Silk Road Film Bridge Project (丝绸之路影视桥工程), an initiative that includes the Silk Road International Film Festival (丝绸之路国际电影节). This news, I’ll confess, escaped me, though apparently the first festival was held this past October in Xi’an. It is hosted by GAPPRFT.
2. The Silk Road Book Project (丝路书香工程), which focusses on the publishing, translation and promotion of Chinese language books in and about the Silk Road region. The project was formally announced in December last year, just over a month ago.
3. The China-Africa Film Cooperation Project (中非影视合作工程), apparently started back in 2013, with an annual budget, according to this Sina article, of 50 million yuan. Every year the project takes 10 domestic Chinese television dramas and 52 films and translates them into six African languages for distribution.
4. The Classic China International Publishing Project (经典中国国际出版工程), a GAPPRFT initiative that since October 2009 has translated Chinese books into foreign languages for distribution.
 

Spying and prying in an economic zone

An economic development zone in China’s Zhejiang province found itself in the midst of an internet storm today after eagle-eyed readers discovered on its official website a list of equipment expenditures by the local police substation. The list included the 49,000-yuan purchase of surveillance equipment enabling police to remotely hijack Android and iPhone handsets for surveillance purposes.

wenzhou full

The content on the listing reads as follows:
Name: Mobile Trojan
Brand: Wuhan Hongxin (武汉虹信)
Description: For targeted use for Android phones or already jailbroken iPhones, enabling real-time monitoring of mobile conversations, instant messages, photos and other information (专门针对安卓手机或苹果已越狱手机,可实时监控手机通话,短信和照片等信息)
Unit Cost: 49,000 RMB
Purchased From: Wuhan Hongxin Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd. (武汉虹信通信技术有限责任公司)
Here is a close-up:
close up

The expense list, posted to the website of the Wenzhou Economic and Technology Development Zone on December 15, 2014, was removed by early this afternoon, yielding the following notice:
page not found

Posted initially to social media in China, screenshots of the development zone webpage were shared this morning on Caijing.com.cn, the online version of Caijing magazine. The Caijing post was also shared at Sina.com, one of China’s top web portal sites.
caijing on wenzhou zone

Posts originally available at other major web portals, including Sohu.com and QQ.com, had been deleted by early this afternoon. Just in case, here is a downloadable PDF version of the Caijing story: 温州经济技术开发区公安分局购入可实时监控手机的木马_政经时政_政经频道首页_财经网 – CAIJING.COM.CN.
QQ 404
A 404 error comes up for the post at QQ.com about the purchase of mobile surveillance equipment at the Wenzhou Economic and Technology Development Zone. Users are directed instead to a site for charitable donations helping missing children.
The Wuhan company that appears, on the basis of the now-deleted report, to have manufactured and sold the equipment in question is Wuhan Hongxin Telecommunication Technologies Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of the Fiberhome Technologies Group. The company is a state-owned enterprise directly under the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.
More about the company at Bloomberg Businessweek.
A Google Advanced Search of the company’s website turns up no public product listing for a “mobile trojan” (手机木马) technology.

A letter to Beijing police

The following open letter addressed to officials and officers in the Beijing Public Security Bureau was written by former CMP fellow Zhai Minglei (翟明磊), a veteran journalist who has been an active independent writer and NGO activist since leaving Guangzhou’s Southern Weekly more than a decade ago. The letter, posted yesterday to the website of the New Citizen’s Movement, addresses the recent formal arrest of activist Guo Yushan (郭玉闪), and the sustained crackdown on intellectuals and activists in China.

Zhai Minglei
Zhai Minglei, pictured in 2003 on a visit to the University of Hong Kong.
The Law is Our Only Common Tongue
— a citizen’s letter to the Beijing Public Security Bureau
By Zhai Minglei (翟明磊)
Officials and Yamen Bailiffs (衙役) of the Beijing Public Security Bureau:
I address you in this way not with the intention of slighting you. I hope only to underscore the fact that you are not independent public servants in any modern sense, but obey the will of particular leaders.
However we might view things, you and I do not share a common tongue. You round up intellectuals in Beijing, lacking any restraint whatsoever. You shut my friend Guo Yushan (郭玉闪) away in a detention center. You shutter away Kou Yanding (寇延丁), so that even now her whereabouts remain unknown. Xia Lin (夏霖), [Guo Yushan’s former defense lawyer], has likewise been criminally detained.
Need we speak of He Zhengjun (何正军), [a young NGO activist], or Huang Kaiping (黄凯平), [the founder of a think tank called the Transition Institute]?
What a carnival it has been these months, a regular old-style purge (瓜蔓抄).
But I should explain, perhaps, what I mean an “old-style purge.” When the Hongwu emperor Zhu Yuanzhang (朱元璋), the first emperor of the Ming Dynasty, and his son, the third Ming emperor Zhu Di (朱棣), pursued cases against those they suspected of treason, they began with the principal culprit and blazed their way down the list, from his colleagues to his classmates, from his clan members to his neighbors. A chain of gruesome tyranny.
So you go down your list until you reach Xu Xiao (徐晓), a well-known female editor who has no quarrel with the world, who makes no fuss about politics. Next, you get your paws on Xue Ye (薛野), a recognized publisher active in doing charity work. Then comes Liu Jianshu (柳建树), the chief executive officer of Liren University (立人大学), a non-governmental organization.
You roil up an atmosphere of terror, driving many public intellectuals in Beijing away from the capital. Under the clear ken of heaven, you leave a trail of broken homes and jobless workers. So dark is the fear now that even in the daylight people must raise their lanterns. We live, or so it certainly seems, through days absent the merest rays of justice.
Try reading this chronicle of violence against the minutes from the Beijing Forum on Literature and Art (北京文艺座谈会) and the contrast between candied rhetoric and bitter deed truly astounds.
All of these deeds leave the intellectual world, the legal world, the charity world, the world of conscience, the hearts of ordinary people, with an abiding sense of mourning. The work much of you do is in actual fact a blight on the Party and the government.
Rightness and wickedness, like ice and fire, cannot find common ground. Therefore, I have no real hope or expectation of true dialogue with you. But I find this recent slogan, “ruling the nation in accord with the law” (依法治国), so pleasant to the ear. The phrase awakes in me such a hopeful spirit of naivete. And having said that, perhaps our only common tongue is the notion of the law. So I’ll dispense with the other nonsense and try debating you on matters of the law.
In the midst of the jasmine revolution, I said to police here in Shanghai: There is no political movement in history that has not in due time been turned on its head. So, I said, abiding by the law protects not just me, but you as well. Before long, the tables turn. And lo and behold, the top cop who called the shots so viciously during that police campaign, Zhou Yongkang (周永康), has now become a national demon, a traitor to the people.
What should one do? I wonder if you realize, as you go about enforcing the law, that you might serve as policemen for life, as leaders come and go. According to international human rights law, carrying out the illegal orders of one’s superior does not constitute a viable defense against criminal responsibility. In the future, then, it might be you standing before the court.
Perhaps you believe no one has the power to prevent your gangster-like conduct. But the storm cannot last. Beijing will return to peace and reason. When that day comes you will be faced with the shame of what you have done.
My chief purpose in writing this letter is to show that there are still Chinese who do not fear the prison cell, who dare to face up against the mass of terror. Behind us stand legions of supporters. They pass along our calls. They raise funds in support. They hearten us with messages of encouragement.
In tested times, a scholar can die for a friend. Guo Yushan is a dear friend. And just as Yushan braved death to rescue [Chen] Guangcheng (陈光诚), how could fear stop my hand in coming to the aid of such a friend? I am willing to pay the price. Let us see if there is any true justice in this world of ours.
Friends have advised me against resisting in this Nazi age of ours. I don’t believe this is a Nazi age. Unlike Nazis, the evil forces working among you have no true convictions. They have only interests, and interests do not make fast friends.
We citizens do have convictions. Those convictions unite us, and they will continue to do so. You — by which I mean the wicked forces among you, and not all police — wield your power for only a time before it vanishes under the waves of history. You want to lock every intellectual of conscience behind bars, to bury them alive. You don’t realize we are only seeds. Your actions will not destroy us, but will only toughen our resolve.
In any age, principled struggle is meaningful. When the conscience of the people points the way, wickedness will be put in its place. The chief weapon of the citizen is the law, a weapon that is legitimate and reasonable and must be used. If we do not use the law, it becomes little more than scrap paper.
I will take up the law in this struggle, and I will pay whatever price.
 

Journal runs rare Xi tribute

In a rare homage yesterday to General Secretary Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party’s official theoretical journal, Seeking Truth (求是), ran a retrospective on its website summarising and linking to every article ever written for the journal by the current president.
Some suggested the tribute might be a sort of mea culpa by the journal, which on December 15, 2014, Issue 24 for the year, ran a piece by Ling Jihua (令计划), the former top Hu Jintao aide who is now under formal investigation for corruption.
Ling Jihua’s Qiushi article, bearing the copious title “Adhering to the Correct Path of Chinese Characteristics in Handling Ethnic Issues, Realizing the United Struggle for the Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People” (坚持中国特色解决民族问题正确道路 为实现中华民族伟大复兴中国梦团结奋斗), has since been removed from the journal’s online table of contents and expunged from the site, the original link now yielding a “deletion” notice.

deleted from Qiushi_Ling Jihua

The formerly active link for Ling Jihua’s article on the website of the official People’s Daily now leads to a cutsey 404 error in the shape of a red heart and the words: “Where has your page gone?” The notice then suggests readers might consider donating to the charity below.
people cpc 404

Fortunately, a version of Ling Jihua’s Qiushi article is still available from The Paper, a Shanghai-based online media platform that has in recent months proved itself an essential daily read.
The blanket deletions of Ling Jihua’s piece, which was published just days before the announcement of an official corruption investigation against him, has led to speculation from the Hong Kong Economic Times that publication of the article had run afoul of senior leaders in the Xi administration -- and that yesterday’s tribute was essentially “begging for mercy,” or qiurao (求饒), on the part of the journal.
Two days after the investigation of Ling Jihua was announced, Bo Zhiyue speculated in The Diplomat that Ling’s Qiushi piece had marked his attempt at “pledging loyalty to President Xi Jinping.” As Bo noted, Ling mentioned Xi Jinping no less than 19 times in his short article, running to just 4,231 words.
Just to give readers a taste of Ling Jihua’s language in the now missing Qiushi piece, here is a translated excerpt:

3. [We] must continue to protect the unity of our Mother Country. General Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized that “properly handling ethic issues and doing a proper job of ethnic work concerns the major question of national unity and territorial integrity. Unity is the greatest interest of the nation, and the common interest of our various peoples. . . Unity is a blessing; unrest and separatism are curses. Only with national integrity and the unity of our people, only with social stability, is there a favourable environment for development. Only then can we grasp the important strategic opportunity for realizing the great rejuvenation of our people. The overall conditions for ethnic unity, social stability and national unification are good. And yet, the hostile forces of the West still seize on ethnic issues to carry out ‘westernisation’ and ‘separatism’ against us. The situation we face is serious and complex.
Studying and implementing the important speeches of General Secretary Xi Jinping demands that we take national unification as the greatest interest of our various peoples, daring to struggle against the forces of ethnic separatism, the forces of religious extremism and the violent forces of terrorism. We must have a deep understanding that the basic principle of ethnic work is national unification. We must hold this line of unity as we handle ethnic issues, energetically praising the great national spirit with patriotism at the core, firmly crushing the separatist plots of hostile forces within our borders.

Beyond speculation about the reasons for the Xi Jinping Qiushi retrospective and its possible links to the Ling Jihua corruption investigation, the online list, which offers summaries and links to Xi Jinping pieces going all the way back to October 1996, is a fascinating look at the leader’s rhetoric over the past more than 17 years.
The language is — as always with official CCP hooey — tough to muddle through. But we recommend it nonetheless for China politics junkies and other masochists.
A few tidbits in translation follow.

What Has Xi Jinping Talked About in Qiushi?
In recent years, Xi Jinping has published a series of important articles in Qiushi — about the deepening of reform (深化改革), about the mass line (群众路线), about reforming [official] work styles (改进文风), about socialism and other aspects. [He has] raised many new ideas, new concepts, new summaries, new judgements. What has General Secretary Xi talked about in Qiushi? Qiushi Online has brought together for the reader many important writings from over the years on subjects including reform, anti-corruption and historical responsibility.

xi jinping

1. He talked about a nation under rule of law (法治国家)
Issue 1, 2015
Pull-out quote: “The deployments at this plenum concerning the comprehensive promotion of governance of the nation in accord with the law (依法治国) are about the self-strengthening and self-raising of our Party’s national governance (治国理政), and is not undertaken under pressure from others.”
2. He talked about deepening reforms (深化改革)
Issue 21, 2014
Pull-out quote: “Our Constitution, as an expression of our basic law, is a reflection of fruits of the Party’s leadership of the people in carrying out revolution, [national] construction and reform, and it establishes the leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party emerging from history and the choice of the people.”
3. He talked about implementation of the “spirit” of the Third Plenum (三中全会)
Issue 1, 2014
Pull-out quote: “And so this Third Plenum researched the comprehensive deepening of reform, not the promotion of reform in one sector, not the promotion of reform in a few sectors, but the promotion of reform in all sectors — this is a consideration made from the overall standpoint of our national governance system and governance capacity.”
4. He offered an explanation of the Third Plenum “Decision”
Issue 22, 2013
Pull-out quote: “And so, we say that only socialism can save China; only economic reform and opening can develop China, develop socialism and develop Marxism.”
  
5. He talked about historical responsibility (历史重任)
Issue 1, 2013
Pull-out quote: “Today, the baton of history has been passed on to us. History and the people have bestowed upon us a great responsibility, which will be tested by our actions . . . The basic theories of the Party, its basic policies and tenet and experiences, and its basic demands, define our direction and our long-term [goals]. Everyone must deeply abide by them, conscientiously carry them out, never relaxing in their determination, never fearing any risks, and never being subject to any interference.”
6. He talked about a program of action (行动纲领)
Issue 23, 2012
Pull-out quote: “A vast body of fact tells us that if the problem of corruption grows more and more severe, it will by necessity destroy the Party and the nation! We must be alert! In recent years serious violations of law and discipline have occurred within our Party, of a very odious nature, with a damaging impact on politics . . . ”
7. He talked about the CCP Charter (党的章程)
Issue 23, 2012
Pull-out quote: “Leading cadres at various levels must take the study of the Party charter as a compulsory course, and comrades taking up new posts must take the study of the Party character as their first course of study, taking the lead in compliance with the Party charter’s various stipulations. [They must] take the lead in doing what the Party charter says Party members must do; and they must take the lead in not doing what the Party charter says Party members must not do.”
8. He talked about the mass line (群众路线)
Issue 15, 2012
In the era of revolutionary war, thousands upon thousands of Chinese Communist Party members acted not for their posts, not for money; they did no fear adversity; they did not fear prison; they faced hardship with stoicism, not fearing to give their lives; they truly sacrificed for their beliefs and faith . . . Today, the conditions for our ruling Party are much improved, and some Party members hesitate to press ahead in the face of tensions; they are pessimistic and lose hope in the face of difficulty; some even can’t resist the temptations of power, money and carnal desire, and they fall to become corrupt ones. The fundamental reason for this is that their political ideals (政治理想) and political beliefs (政治信念) have gone wrong.”
9. He talked about the purity of the Party (党的纯洁性)
Issue 6, 2012
Pull-out quote: “To maintain the purity of the Party style, we must clear away salient problems in Party style building in a timely manner. Among these we must pay special attention to lazy governance, the creed of seeking good relations with all ( 好人主义) and other such bad trends. When all we seek is good relations [with other officials], we don’t point out problems, we turn a blind eye to errors . . .
. . . .
24. He talked about economic structures (经济结构)
Issue 4, 2001
“Structural adjustment as the main line has already become a consensus within our Party. How to formulate ideas about structural adjustment on the basis of local resource situations is the crux of whether or not structural adjustments can be handled properly. In the case of Fujian, the focus of structural adjustment must be the optimising of industrial structures . . .
25. He talked about liberation of thought (解放思想)
Issue 1, 1999
“The liberation of thought and seeking truth from facts are the intellectual line of our party. They are the intellectual treasure that has allowed our Party to move from victory to victory in our socialist reform and construction — and they are the spirit of Deng Xiaoping Theory.”
26. He talked about economic development (经济发展)
Issue 10, 1996
Pull-out quote: “Transitioning our form of economic growth is one crucial step in our goal of realizing socialist modernisation; it is an objective demand of our national economic and social development. Judging from economic development in Fuzhou over the past few years, insisting on the seeking of truths from facts, and proceeding from real circumstances, is crucial to promoting the transition of economic growth methods.”

18 China bans in 2014

The following post from “Zhou Yan 310” (周燕310), which includes a list of 18 “bans” in 2014, was deleted from Weibo sometime before 10:47AM today, December 31, 2014. The post was live for just 25 minutes before being removed by censors. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
The post simply includes a tag that reads, “#Goodbye2014 #18BansIn2014” (告别2014#2014十八禁), with a shortened link to another Sina Weibo account.
But the substance of the deleted post, a list of 18 bans in China in 2014, is included as a jpeg. A brief summary of the first 12 items on the list follows:

1. Ban on Religious Freedom. On April 3, Yongjia County in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, issued a notice saying that the ‘Sanjiang Church’ (三江教堂) in the area was an illegal structure. The church was demolished on April 28.
2. Ban on American Sitcoms. On April 26, the General Administration of Press Publications Radio Film and Television (GAPPRFT) issued a ban on The Big Bang Theory, The Good Wife, NCIS and The Practice, demanding that they be “taken off the shelves” on the internet.
3. Ban on the Use of LINE. Beginning on June 2, many users in China of the LINE application reported that something was wrong. Beginning on the night of July 1, users of the application in mainland China suddenly could not access it.
4. Ban on Press Freedom. On June 18, the General Administration of Press Publications Radio Film and Television issued a notice prohibiting news reporters from reporting across industries and cross-regionally. It prohibited reporters from reporting negative news storeis without the prior consent of their news organizations.
5. Ban on Press Freedom (2). On June 30, GAPPRFT issued a document called, “Professional Conduct Information Management Guidelines for Members of the Press” (新闻从业人员职务行为信息管理办法), which banned journalists from posting “information about professional conduct” on blogs, Weibo, public or private WeChat accounts, or other social media, as well as on online forums in public lectures or in any other forums.
6. Ban on Instagram. On July 7, media reports said that Instagram had been removed from most third-party app providers in China. The reasons for the removal were unclear . . . From September 28, 2014, onward Instagram was completely blocked inside China, the reason being that photos had been circulating of the Occupy Central movement in Hong Kong.
7. Ban on Internet TV. On June 24, GAPPRFT shut down third-party video content channels for internet TV. On July 8, GAPPRFT forced the installation of their own proprietary TVOS Smart TV operating systems for internet TV boxes. On July 14, GAPPRFT again ordered that all internet TV boxes must stop providing time-lapse and replay functions.
8. Ban on Religious Freedom (2). Between August 4 and August 20, as the 13th Xinjiang Athletic Games were held in Karamay, the government banned the wearing of veils, headscarves or large beards on public transportation.
9. Bans on Independent Film Forums. On August 23, the 11th Beijing Independent Film Festival was forced into cancellation by police in Beijing’s Tongzhou District. Film critic and artists Li Xianting said on WeChat that they came under police scrutiny on August 18 after a posting an announcement online of the films to be shown.
10. Bans on Overseas Dramas. The General Administration of Press Publications Radio Film and Television issued a notice saying that overseas television dramas were not to be broadcast online without either a “Film Performance License” or a “Television Drama Distribution License.”
11. Library Bans. On September 18, a Chinese pro-literacy non-profit operating 22 branch libraries in the countryside in 12 provinces and cities for more than seven years announced that it had been ordered to shut the libraries down, and that it would no longer be receiving citizen support for the initiative.
12. Ban on Books. On October 10, GAPPRFT announced a list of authors — including Xu Yingshi, Liang Wendao, Xu Zhiyuan, Mao Yushi, Ye Fu, Zhang Qianfan and Chen Ziming — whose works could not be published inside China.

18 bans in 2014