Total War for Global Minds
CCP leaders are mobilizing society in an all-out bid to revolutionize the country’s international communication. Will the strategy end in absurdity and waste?
CCP leaders are mobilizing society in an all-out bid to revolutionize the country’s international communication. Will the strategy end in absurdity and waste?
First launched as a newspaper in 1946, the flagship media group of the Chinese Communist Party is now a sprawling content empire — relaying everything from the dictates of the leadership to the latest entertainment news. But the Party, as ever, remains at the center.
This week in a study session of the Politburo, Xi Jinping talked about “innovating internet propaganda.” Part of the answer to how China plans to do this lies in its growing network of cloaked official accounts. We take a deeper look.
An idiom inspired by a classic Tang Dynasty poem is now a modifier commonly used in the official political speech of the CCP to refer to the need to innovate the party’s communication of its political and social agendas — ultimately making them more palatable, and more easily accepted.
Navigating censorship and nationalism has given rise to “pink feminism,” a new trend couching feminist ideals in the language of “little pink” nationalism. Is this just a marriage of convenience, or something more?
This summer, China’s top political body floated the creation of a safety and regulation system for AI. A new document released this week by the country’s cyberspace regulators offers the first clues of what that might look like.
“Self-revolution” refers to a process by which the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping proposes to remain “pure” by rooting out corrupt and ineffectual cadres from their own ranks. Posited as Xi Jinping’s answer to the historical problem of dynastic rise and fall, it promises to confer the Party with an indefinite mandate to rule, or continued political legitimacy — all without having to stand up to external supervision or seek popular support through competitive elections.
US vice-presidential candidate Tim Walz, a former Cantonese learner who was popular with his Chinese students, is affectionate toward China — but he is no “dove” on human rights, Hong Kong, and Tibet issues.
Formally emerging during the Yan’an period (1935-1947) as the Chinese Communist Party made its revolutionary base in the northern province of Shaanxi, external propaganda refers to official communication promoting CCP agendas to audiences outside the People’s Republic of China, as distinct from “internally directed” propaganda for domestic audiences. The concept of external propaganda has been a constant but changing feature of CCP activity over the past century, and has generally sought to build international consensus and “friendship” to support China’s regional and international agendas. In the 21st century, it has taken on new urgency as the push to raise the country’s “discourse power” globally to reach a level of global influence that complements China’s growing comprehensive national power (CNP).
Outside China, the idea of “media convergence,” the joining together of communication technologies on handheld devices, is now so much a way of life that few even talk about it. But for China’s leadership it is a concept with era-defining significance — having far-reaching consequences for the current and future exercise of power.