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Tag: Chinese media

Who Supervises the Sky Eye?

This spring, Fu Song (付松), a former investigative reporter who now regularly updates his public WeChat account Chasing the Moon and Counting Stars (追月数星) with stories of ordinary people seeking redress against local officials, police and courts, stumbled across a major scoop.

He learned from one of his readers that a national science institution was quietly offering paid access to one of the country’s most highly secured facilities — a remote astronomical observatory nicknamed “China’s Sky Eye” (中国天眼) that is the world’s largest single-dish radio telescope. Fu traveled to the location about two hours’ drive south of Guiyang to check the story out for himself. His investigation, released on his WeChat account in October, made headlines across the country, and prompted China’s top science academy to launch a full investigation.

China’s Five hundred-meter Aperture Spherical Radio Telescope (FAST) located in Guizhou. Via Wikimedia Commons.

But Fu’s was not just a simple story of a hard-nosed reporter whose work brought results in the real world. In a post and a video last week, he exposed wave after wave of retaliatory actions against him and his collaborator over the weeks following the investigation. His content is a gripping account of the myriad pitfalls facing Chinese journalists — and the fact that it has since been deleted only punctuates these challenges.

“I felt a wave of dizziness,” said Fu as he related his experiences. “I simply couldn’t understand why the price of making a report under my real name was so high.”

The Investigation

Set in the karst hills of China’s southwestern Guizhou province, the Five-hundred-meter Aperture Spherical Radio Telescope, or FAST, is tucked away in a natural basin, where scientists use it to listen for the subtlest of radio signals from deep space. When FAST was launched in 2019, the provincial government launched protection measures and regulations to prevent electromagnetic interference, which included restrictions on unauthorized phones, tablets, and other devices on-site that could emit radio waves and damage the technology.

But Fu discovered that civilian tech could easily get through the electromagnetic “quiet zone” (静区), as long as one could pay. For as low as 2,688 yuan, or about 400 US dollars, tourists were offered an “exclusive” deal: one night in a twin room at the FAST Light Years Away (中國天眼光年之外酒店) hotel in Guizhou, plus a guided tour that allowed visitors to approach the ring beam directly — far closer access than the public viewing area — with phones in tow.

FAST Light Years Away hotel. Photo by Fu Song via WeChat.

How could such access be possible? Fu confirmed through public records that the FAST Light Years Away (中国天眼光年之外酒店) was indirectly owned by the National Astronomical Observatories of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), which oversees FAST. The profiteering scheme seemed also to have official endorsement: the legal representative of the hotel’s operating company, Zhao Baoqing (赵保庆) is also a manager of the FAST observation base.

Since the hotel opened in 2020, Fu found through publicly-accessibly data and interviews, it had received tens of thousands of guests. Other vendors on the Chinese booking platform Ctrip were also offering FAST “experience” tickets. Scientists told Fu that the electromagnetic interference caused by tourists’ cell phones on site could have contaminated its data. In his initial October 10 investigation, Fu added that he had filed a complaint with central authorities on the Observatories’ potential illegal activity.

Two days later, CAS published a notice stating that it had opened an investigation into the matter. From there, the story was quickly picked up by central and local Party media, including CCTV, Xinhua, and The Paper, and became a trending topic on Weibo under the hashtag “book a 2688 yuan hotel stay and you can drive to the center of the FAST telescope” (2688元住酒店自驾进天眼核心区).

The Backlash

It wasn’t until about a week later that the trouble started. In a since-deleted video and article, both posted on October 20, Fu detailed his frustration with local authorities in Guizhou, who had called him several times after filing the complaint. According to Fu’s own account, his friend who accompanied him on the FAST tour had been questioned by police. Later, Fu received a call from someone who identified themselves only as a “regional leader” (辖区领导), who had called to check in on Fu and emphasize that his activities must comply with the law. He then received a call from an individual who claimed to be from the “administrative department” (行政主管部门), who asked Fu what he had done and then notified him that he had been reported and would be investigated. Fu had also received a call from CAS, which informed him that they were investigating the matter. These phone interactions were recorded by Fu and published in a video, which was taken down for “breaking rules” (违规).

Fu’s initial longer video, which includes his phone calls with authorities — now missing from his re-upload (below).

The latest update on Fu’s WeChat account was on October 20, when he deleted and re-uploaded the above-mentioned video, this time without the clips of the phone calls between himself and the authorities.

So far, there have been no updates on the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ investigation. But Fu’s original investigative articles remain live on his WeChat account. For outside observers, the question of why Fu’s video depicting government pressure would be censored, while his original journalistic investigations could remain, is a puzzling one.

Fu Song’s re-upload of the video, now lacking his phone calls with authorities.

The answer lies in the concept of “supervision by public opinion” (舆论监督), a phrase translated by Chinese advocates of a freer press as “watchdog journalism” which has also been embraced by the Party as a means of “monitoring” societal problems toward the goal of stability. Xi Jinping’s moves to control a comparatively freewheeling press in the 2010s also meant ensuring their alignment with Party goals — one of which has famously been to rein in corruption by “hunting tigers and swatting flies,” or going after both high-ranking Party members as well as local bureaucrats. While the media played a far greater role in exposing corruption in previous decades — including among high-ranking officials — what Fu’s case shows is that, however rare supervision has become, there are still journalists determined to open up space for critical coverage.

But the broader Chinese media response exposes the limits of independent reporting. As a journalist working outside the formal CCP-led press structure — which the Party itself terms “mainstream” — Fu’s revelations could not be taken at face value as “reporting.” In China’s highly controlled press space, the “right to report” (采访权) is a privilege afforded only to licensed journalists and their licensed outlets. When Chengdu’s Red Star News, published by the local Party-led media group, picked up the story, quoting Fu’s work and adding its own reporting, it referred to him only as a “tourist.” Once Red Star had red-washed the reporting, making it safe for other outlets to use, the story could go national, provoking the CAS’ public announcement of its investigation.

“I simply couldn’t understand why the price of making a report under my real name was so high.”

While the facts Fu exposed might have been tolerated as they became the subject of nationwide reporting, his exposure of the pressure he faced was a far more sensitive matter — particularly as the FAST story was already in the spotlight. Local authorities were already likely facing pressure from central authorities to address what may become a major corruption scandal. Now, Fu’s video suggested authorities were pressuring him to keep quiet, just ahead of the Party’s fifth plenary session, which would push for greater Party discipline. As far as local authorities were concerned, it seems, Fu’s “supervision” work ended with his initial exposure of the scandal; it’s now on the implicated officials to try to clean up the mess.

Keeping China’s Labor Misery Off the Record

In September, posts began circulating on social media raising concerns that labor rights activist and journalist Feng Rui (冯睿), known also as Xiao Wu (小五), had gone missing. Over the course of several weeks, independent outlets and social media accounts began reporting that Guangzhou police had detained him on September 14 for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (寻衅滋事), an often arbitrary and politically-motivated charge used against individuals who challenge Party rule through speech or demonstrations. The Hong Kong daily Ming Pao (明報) confirmed on October 4 that Feng had been detained and had met with a lawyer, but did not specify charges. Some reports circulating online claim that Feng had become ill amid relentless interrogation by investigators and needed a wheelchair to be taken to and from questioning. According to Ming Pao, Feng was released on bail last week, but no official reports by Chinese authorities have been released as of this writing.

Feng Rui’s case comes amid an increasingly precarious labor market and a social security system under strain. As China’s government continues to release growth data whose validity some economists find questionable, viral social media posts of retirement-age individuals searching for employment and eating out of the trash reflect the country’s pessimistic mood.

Feng is best known for his WeChat account “East Wind of Chiapas TV” (恰帕斯东风电视机), which covered labor justice issues, including an extensive report on 2025 labor rights incidents in China as documented by himself and several volunteers. The account, which stopped updating in February, took its name from the 1994 socialist Zapatista uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas. Feng had also long been involved in workers’ rights mobilizations and initiatives across China, including at the grassroots-run Picun “workers home” (皮村工友之家) on the outskirts of Beijing. 

Feng’s detention seems to be part of a broader crackdown on labor rights-focused media and reporting in the past several weeks. In September, Hong Guangyu (洪广玉), a former reporter for Beijing Sci-Tech Report (北京科技报), was detained at his home in Xiamen by authorities from Dalian, also on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (寻衅滋事). In a now-deleted report originally published on October 7, the business and current affairs outlet Caixin (财新) cited sources suggesting that his detention may have been linked to his efforts to defend the rights of farmers in Dalian, who had alleged that pesticides from a local agricultural company were responsible for the death of their cherry trees. 

Also earlier this month, China Labor Trends (中国劳动趋势), an independent outlet that aggregated labor data and academic research, announced it would cease publication. It cited the difficulty of maintaining “a long-term, structured approach to addressing social issues, particularly labor issues” in China. “Even if China Labor Trends is finished, and no matter how dire the political climate, societal concern for the plight of workers will not stop,” the publication wrote in its October 1 farewell letter. “Hopefully, when we meet again, we will have found new ways to contribute and make a difference.”

The crackdown has ironically drawn more attention to China’s poor economic and employment situation even as its goal was to prevent social unrest. As the country’s economic growth rate continues to decline, the ongoing suppression of labor rights voices and stifling of information is part of a broader effort by the Party to ensure stability and seize control over worker narratives.

Islands of discontent

The crackdown is hardly exceptional or surprising. Labor-related protests have been among the most-documented grassroots mobilizations in the country. China’s economic liberalization created a host of new problems for Chinese workers, and a new class of migrant workers who left their countryside hometowns to pursue work in the cities; social benefits became dependent on precarious employers — or else were tied to their place of household registration. While labor conditions in factories have improved considerably over the years, wage arrears, unpaid overtime, and long working hours without breaks remain among the most common problems faced by Chinese workers today. 

Portrait’s story about delivery riders re-published on the front page of Guangming Daily, September 12, 2020.

The rise of the gig economy — which now represents more than 40 percent of China’s overall workforce, according to one study — brought its own issues documented extensively by workers themselves online and by investigative journalists. A 2020 investigative report in Portrait magazine (人物), for example, found that food delivery apps were driving a sharp increase in driver accidents, injuries, and deaths through algorithms that placed unreasonable, even impossible, demands on riders. The government issued broad directives toward delivery app companies to ease the intensity of work schedules almost a year later, though extreme conditions continue to be an issue in the sector. Feng’s 2025 report, mentioned above, documented several problems among couriers and food delivery drivers, including sudden deaths after working consecutive excessive shifts.

The combination of a slowing economy and the growing number of highly-educated graduates that far exceeds job vacancies has driven many to gig work — yet even that sector is becoming overcrowded as both blue- and white-collar workers are losing their jobs to automation. After China’s youth unemployment rate rose to 21.3 percent in June 2023, the National Bureau of Statistics suspended the release of figures for several months. When new figures came out in early 2024, the official calculus had changed — with students removed from the count, lowering the headline figure. That statistic now sits at 18 percent as of September 2026, with an overall urban unemployment rate of 5.2 percent.

This poor situation facing workers in China has made spontaneous labor unrest more likely, said Li Qiang (李强), the founder and executive director of China Labor Watch, in an interview with CMP. Now based in the U.S., Li had advocated for worker rights inside Chinese factories before fleeing his country of birth under fear of arrest. He now represents one of the few remaining organizations documenting labor incidents in China. 

“For the current government, it’s as if there are two worlds,” said Li. “One is a world of wealthy people, where you can see AI and other things doing really well in China. But there’s also a world of the poor — people without jobs, under growing pressure.”

The challenges of the current environment, he says, are coming to bear on workers across the spectrum, regardless of background: “Whether they’re ordinary workers or white-collar employees at big high-tech companies, they face a lot of pressure and competition at work.” Given the pain being felt in the workplace, says Li, the drive to speak out is natural. “In this environment, everyone wants to improve their own rights and circumstances,” he said. 

China’s suppression of labor mobilizations goes hand in hand with pressure on publications and NGOs that document labor incidents across China. The Hong Kong-based China Labour Bulletin, which had documented collective worker actions and strikes across China, shuttered suddenly in 2025, citing financial issues. Lu Yuyu (卢昱宇), an activist and journalist born in Guizhou, documented over 70,000 “mass incidents” (群体性事件), China’s term for protests, including labor strikes, through his outlet “Not the News” (非新闻). Lu was detained by authorities in 2016. He spent four years in prison for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” the same charge Feng is allegedly facing.

Lu believes the reason the CCP is placing such significance on Feng’s case — despite his relatively small platform — “is precisely because it is extremely fearful of his ability to ‘piece together’ fragmented and isolated labor incidents,” he told CMP. “By cracking down now, [the Party] is attempting to cut off information channels before workers’ anger gains broader social consensus, ensuring it retains control over the narrative.”

One of the most significant consequences of Feng’s arrest and the closure of China Labor Trends is the disappearing space for interaction and solidarity between workers and journalists, Lu said. “Information will become extremely fragmented, the public will not be able to see the full picture, and laborers fighting for their rights will more easily find themselves on isolated ‘islands.’”

Harmonizing the working class

In 2017, an essay titled “I Am Fan Yusu” (我是范雨素) went viral in China. Written by a woman from Hubei, the autobiographical essay contrasts Fan’s literary ambitions as a child with the ambivalent realities of working life as a single mother in today’s China. In its opening line, Fan compares her life to “a book that’s dreadful to read,” but ultimately ends on a note of optimism: “Can’t you always do something in life? I am incompetent, I am so poor, but I can still do something!”

Fan Yusu. Photo: Beijing Youth Daily.

Fan’s essay emerged from a Beijing urban village, Picun, and its grassroots literary group (皮村文学小组). Her essay has become one of the best-known examples of “new workers’ literature” (新工人文学) — also the name of Picun’s literary journal — works written mostly by migrant workers detailing their own experiences of labor and survival. Other works representative of the genre have gained international acclaim, like Hu Anyan’s I Deliver Parcels in Beijing (我在北京送快递) and Xiao Hai’s Adrift in the South (一块滚石). 

As the Party strives to maintain stability in the midst of a slowing economy, a discontented workforce, and a digital space increasingly difficult to control, it has presented its own top-down answer to the grassroots “new workers’ literature”: “new popular literature and art” (新大众文艺). First introduced in Party newspapers in early 2025, the term conceptualizes digital amateur content creation about the realities of everyday Chinese life as a new art form, inheriting Mao Zedong’s earlier call for art to serve the people, rather than the elites. Calls to promote the flourishing of “new popular literature and art” were made official government priority in this year’s Two Sessions and the 15th Five-Year Plan. Meanwhile, economic pressure has only intensified on workers and those desperate to find any work they can get. As for Fan Yusu’s beloved Picun, which provided much of the fuel for “new workers’ literature,” its school for the children of migrant workers was forced to close in 2019, and its Culture and Arts Museum of Migrant Laborers (打工文化艺术博物馆) was demolished in 2023.

A selection of recent titles from the “new workers’ literature” or “new popular literature and art” genre released in the past three years.

A Xinhua think tank report paints a romantic picture of benevolent low-wage workers through their online creations “rooted in the soil of reality,” employing “unadorned means to express life and document the era,” listing Fan Yusu and “delivery poet” Wang Jibing (王计兵), who won China’s top poetry prize this year, as prime examples. Evocative of the self-sacrificing “model worker,” the aim of such messaging campaigns, says Lu, is to “‘harmonize’ working class voices, to package systemic exploitation as ‘striving and dedication,’ and to transform workers’ suffering into inspirational ‘positive energy’ stories, thereby diluting increasingly sharp class contradictions.”

These recent efforts in the arts and media seek to co-opt workers’ voices, making them part of a narrative of personal sacrifice for the glory of the nation. The unfortunate reality, however, is that the CCP, which places China’s working class at the heart of its founding narrative and legitimacy, remains very keen to ensure that worker voices from below stay fragmented. Documentation of worker exploitation, or online campaigns to improve working conditions, are highly likely to be censored.

Who Hit the Brakes on Negative Public Opinion?

This month, one of China’s most popular auto-review platforms, Dongchedi (懂车帝), also known as “DCar,” put a new luxury minivan model through a tough highway test — braking hard to a full stop from a speed of 100 kilometers per hour. The results, revealed in a video posted across Chinese online platforms, were enough to terrify potential buyers. In three live tests of the model with vehicles purchased from separate production batches, the bracket mounting the brake pedal to the van’s frame snapped.

As attention to the video soared on platforms like WeChat, Douyin and Bilibili, becoming the number one search term within hours, it was the worst possible news for Anhui-based JAC Group and the Chinese tech giant Huawei, the companies behind the vehicle in question, the Maextro V800 multi-purpose electric vehicle (EV). In a statement the same day, Maextro called the test non-standard and extreme, and promised the part would be redesigned. But the damage was done. Only the daily limit on stock drops imposed under Chinese exchange rules could keep shares of JAC Group from heading to the bottom of the hill. They ended the day down 10.01 percent.  

A controversy over a faulty brake pedal may seem far removed from the issue of media and censorship. But within 24 hours, the video had disappeared from Chinese platforms such as Bilibili, and several related online posts and reports had vanished too. Viewers on WeChat Video were informed the video could not be played due to an unspecified “violation.”  The case prompted discussion of the benefits and limits of consumer reporting in China — a vibrant consumer society with some of the world’s strictest controls on information. 

Faulty Brakes on Valid Concerns?

Online, the story quickly shifted to the vanishing of the Dongchedi test video. On the business news platform Huxiu (虎嗅), a commentary noted how the entire focus had turned. “By the time everyone realized the review video had suddenly disappeared, the public discourse had already shifted,” it said. “People were no longer discussing whether the pedal should have broken, but rather who made the video disappear?” 

Many suspected Huawei, suggesting the tech giant, which has a growing interest in automated driving systems and other car technology, had applied pressure. Some went even further, speculating that the powerful Huawei was being shielded by authorities. 

These questions were deepened by the disappearance of other critical posts. Among these was a post made on the WeChat public account Xinjiang Release (新疆发布), run by the government information office in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region. The post faulted Maextro for failing to address the real safety concerns head on, instead resorting to the citation of complex technical standards. It was called, “Can You Speak Like a Human When Responding to Product Safety Concerns?” 

On October 11, a commentary on the news app of the CCP’s People’s Daily newspaper came closest to an official response from the authorities. It addressed the V800 row directly, though it focused squarely again on the product safety concerns, cutting through the justifications offered by Maextro. “Widespread public opinion has focused in recent days on the Maextro V800 brake pedal bracket breakage incident,” it said. “While the case awaits an authoritative investigative conclusion, one thing is beyond doubt: a car’s brake pedal should never ‘snap’ while being driven!”

On October 15, a full week on from the start of the controversy, and shortly after Maextro released its own favorable test results for its vehicle from a third-party lab, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which regulates the auto industry, announced that an investigation into the safety concerns was underway. Interesting, however, was the fact that the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country’s top internet control body, would be joining the investigation to look into the problem “reflected online.” 

Huawei’s Maextro V800.

Many online remained skeptical. Was this a sign that Dongchedi would come under greater pressure for its critical reviews? Or were the authorities keen to look deeper into possible manipulation of online information by commercial interests? On October 16, Hong Kong’s Sing Tao (星岛日报) newspaper asked the question point-blank in a column titled “Why Has the CAC Entered the Stage?” (网信办为何登场). Noting that the video’s apparent removal had fueled speculation about “whether someone was controlling comments and suppressing attention,” it suggested the CAC’s role might be to address such manipulation. 

These swirling questions about the video’s disappearance come against the backdrop of China’s deeply conflicted record when it comes to reporting on product safety issues and consumer rights. 

In some cases, consumer product stories, particularly when they stay away from powerful interests and touch instead on the violations of small and medium-sized companies, can offer a relatively safe avenue for critical coverage — what can sometimes be called “swatting flies” (打苍蝇). 

At the small bore end of the spectrum, state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) has made the revelation of safety violations at mostly small companies and industries the mainstay of its annual Consumer Rights Gala. In one segment this year CCTV reporters went undercover to expose the use of hydrogen peroxide in the manufacture of low-price chicken feet in a Sichuan factory. 

But China’s media history in the reform era has also demonstrated that consumer reporting can bring down “tigers,” implicating major companies and government officials. Back in 2008, an investigation by a reporter at Shanghai’s now-defunct Oriental Morning Post blew the lid on a scandal that rocked China and became international news. Jian Guangzhou (简光洲) and other Chinese journalists exposed the widespread use of the toxic industrial compound melamine in the manufacture of baby formula by Sanlu and other dairy giants. The crisis resulted in the death of at least six infants, and the sickening of some 300,000 across the country. 

The full-page spread investigative report on the Sinograin tanker scandal in The Beijing News on July 2.

Such major cases of consumer reporting are almost never seen today, following a sharp contraction of the space for critical journalism through the late 2000s and into the 2010s. One of the more outstanding recent cases was reported in July 2024 by The Beijing News (新京报), which revealed that a state-run grain stockpiler, Sinograin, had been using the same tanker trucks to transport both food oil products and potentially toxic fuel products, without cleaning its containers. 

China’s State Council Food Safety Office followed by announcing an investigation in the toxic food oil case, and Sinograin issued an apology. But this outstanding work by The Beijing News did not mark a shift for investigative reporting, or signal greater latitude in pursuing product safety stories. 

Shortly after the toxic food oil story broke, a post on a WeChat public account credited the story for its “enormous courage,” and noted the importance of investigative reporting. “In every food safety incident, you can always find investigative reporters charging out in front,” it said, while mourning the fact that such journalists were “withering away.” The post was quickly deleted. 

To date, there has been no explanation for why the video and articles about the Maextro V800 disappeared. Speaking to BBC Chinese, Rose Luqiu (閭丘露薇), a former broadcast journalist and a professor of journalism at Hong Kong Baptist University, said it was not known whether press control authorities, such as from the Central Propaganda Department, had been at all involved. But she noted that pressures at the commercial end of the spectrum could also come to bear in light of Huawei’s stature as a national symbol of China’s development and technological prowess. Luqiu said it was possible that Chinese online platforms would be mindful of the political risks and their commercial costs — leading possibly to self-censorship.

AI Authorship in a Party Mouthpiece

As a general rule in China, Party papers (党报), those published directly by local and regional committees of the Chinese Communist Party, are cautious and unadventurous. On most days, the front pages of provincial-level Party papers are uninspired echoes of the CCP’s official People’s Daily and its top-level political agendas. Far from being an epithet, the word “mouthpiece” is an accepted label for these outlets, meant to be the “throat and tongue” (喉舌) of the Party. 

And so it was actual news this month when one provincial mouthpiece printed an article generated entirely by AI — with its artificial authorship stated clearly in the byline. 

A page-seven column in Jilin Daily on October 12 bylines an essay to “AI.” 

On October 12, Jilin Daily (吉林日报), the Party newspaper in China’s northeastern Jilin province, which borders North Korea, ran a page-seven article under the simple byline “AI.” Placed under a column called “Literary Teahouse,” the essay was a meditation on the arrival of autumn, lingering on the vision of bright red hawthorn fruit and crabapples — and seasonal changes in the kitchen. “As a pot of meat . . . . simmers over a low heat, the fat slowly melts into the broth,” the unidentified AI chatbot waxed, “and a rich, savory aroma fills the house.” 

Soon after the article appeared, the topic trended in media circles. The public account Media Observations (传媒见闻) remarked on the novelty of the byline, saying it may have “broken new ground” (首开先例). 

A commentary reposted by Media Insider (传媒内参), another media-industry account, went even further, marking the essay as the first time AI had been openly credited in the pages of a Party paper, where contributors are generally staff writers under official hire (编制), or even government departments cloaked in specialized bylines. “AI has been ‘clocking in’ for some time now at traditional media outlets, but always behind the scenes,” the commentary said. “In this case, for the first time, it has been handed ‘a public ID badge’ in the actual pages of a Party paper.”

What much of the commentary in media circles missed was the fuller context. Contacting the supplement’s editors on October 13, a reporter at Shanghai’s The Paper (澎湃新闻) had learned that the AI byline was part of a poetry and essay competition that the official outlet had been running since August. Under the theme “Autumn Letters from the Human World” (人间秋信), readers had been invited to submit work that could go head to head with AI-generated articles, so that the quality of each could be compared. Below the Jilin Daily’s AI-generated article was one written by a human, Sun Yuping (孙玉平), titled “An Autumn Fragment at Zhagan Lake” (秋到查干湖之断章).

The CCP’s central-level People’s Daily (left) and Jilin’s provincial-level Jilin Daily show nearly identical top coverage from the Party, and virtually identical layouts. Couldn’t AI do this job? 

The experiment recalled similar editorial trials in media around the world to probe the power and impact of AI. 

In March this year, the New York Times ran a feature that presented readers with pairs of short texts, including literary classics, alongside AI-generated writing, and asked which one they preferred. The challenge ran under the headline “Who’s a Better Writer: AI or Humans?” In a similar 2025 challenge, Columbia Journalism Review placed ChatGPT-generated news ledes alongside ledes from published stories and asked readers to judge which one was better.

Intent on a similarly illustrative experiment, Jilin Daily’s editors apparently did not think of offering readers the context they needed. Nor did they reveal which AI model had been used to generate the autumn tribute.

Media Without “Humanity”

A Chinese singer’s improvised tribute to a lost friend — and the media’s response — has given way to a new term: “informant-style reporting” (举报式采访). In pluralistic media environments, media “informants,” or whistleblowers, are typically citizens who provide journalists with sensitive information meant to benefit the public, oftentimes in cases of official or corporate wrongdoing. But in this case, it’s the journalists themselves informing on their subjects to ensure that citizens have followed the law.

The term emerged out of a recent scandal that swept China’s internet in late September. Singer Na Ying (那英), a Mandopop diva who rose to stardom in the 1980s, improvised a song at a Chengdu concert to pay tribute to her friend and mentor Liu Huan (刘欢), who had died one day before. When netizens began discussing her potential violation of performance censorship rules demanding prior song approval, journalists began to ask local authorities whether Na had potentially violated the law.

Chinese journalists and media haven’t welcomed this form of “journalism.” Instead, “informant-style reporting” — whose meaning is more akin to “snitch journalism” — has become a derogatory term that crosses the line into journalistic malpractice by “forcing a response to public discourse” (把问答推上舆论场), as one municipal media outlet put it.

In Na’s case, the public had raised concern about her potential violation of article 16 of China’s Regulations of the Administration of Commercial Performances (营业性演出管理条例), which states that performance details like songs or scripts should be submitted for approval in advance by local authorities. Artists and organizers violating the regulation can be fined for up to 30 thousand yuan (4,486 dollars). 

“Informant-style reporting” — whose meaning is more akin to “snitch journalism” — has become a derogatory term that crosses the line into journalistic malpractice by “forcing a response to public discourse.”

Journalists began reaching out to authorities not long after videos of Na’s performance began spreading online. Two days after the concert, the Xiaoxiang Morning Post (潇湘晨报), a provincial newspaper from Hunan, reported that it had reached out to several responsible bodies, including the concert organizer (which did not comment), the local culture, sports and tourism bureau (which said it was investigating the matter), and the Chengdu Municipal Bureau of Culture, Radio, Television and Tourism, which had not offered an “effective response” (有效回复) to the newspaper’s inquiries.

Three hours later, the Chengdu Municipal Bureau of Culture, Radio, Television and Tourism released a statement stating that Na’s “brief and fragmentary” improvisation was performed in the audience interaction section, and that “re-approval” (重新报批) was not required in this scenario. 

The Chengdu Municipal Bureau of Culture, Radio and Tourism’s Sept. 29 response to netizen and media questions about Na’s performance.

Commentators were quick to point out the absurdity of the Xiaoxiang Morning Post’s actions, while praising the Chengdu Municipal Bureau of Culture, Radio, Television and Tourism’s response.

“What’s so ridiculous is that both netizens and the media take it for granted that every word and every action performers make on stage must be approved in advance, which suppresses normal human emotion,” wrote Huang Zhijie (黃志杰), a former journalist for Xinhua’s Oriental Outlook (瞭望东方周刊) magazine, in a WeChat article. “In the end, it’s given rise to a new concept in news, ‘informant-style journalism.’”

Hu Xijin (胡錫進), the former editor-in-chief of the Global Times, wrote on Chinese social media platform Weibo that the Xiaoxiang Morning Post’s approach “lacks empathy” (缺少共情). Official provincial and municipal media also took aim at the newspaper. Shanghai’s The Paper and the Elephant News, operated by Henan Broadcasting System, pointed out on Weibo that the statement made by the Chengdu Municipal Bureau of Culture, Radio, Television and Tourism not only “upholds the regulatory standard” but “keeps the humanity.” The post by Xiaoxiang Morning Post has now been taken down. 

Violating performance regulations can hold serious consequences for performers in China, and the government’s intensification of performance pre-approval standards by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and Ministry of Public Security — which, since 2023, have strengthened on-site inspections and risk evaluations — have only made the Chinese public more sensitive to the Xiaoxiang Morning Post’s “informant-style journalism,” according to the Singaporean news outlet Lianhe Zaobao. Earlier this year, several performances by the famous cross-talk performer Guo Degang (郭德纲) were canceled and performance organizers were fined after he improvised a song about the War of Resistance Against Japan. Another singer, Jane Zhang (张靓颖), recently announced she might never again add spontaneous a capella segments to her shows after being fined a total of 760 thousand yuan (113.5 thousand dollars) for multiple violations. 

But the Xiaoxiang Morning Post’s “informant-style journalism” also raises questions about the role of media in today’s China. Xi Jinping’s declaration at a 2016 Party media symposium that the media must be “surnamed ‘party’” — and the subsequent push to tighten the leadership’s reins on the media — has nearly eliminated the space for the kind of enterprising reporting of government and corporate wrongdoing known as “public opinion supervision” (舆论监督), which was far more commonplace in the early 2000s. “Public opinion supervision,” which has also been translated by Chinese advocates of a freer press as “watchdog journalism” or the media’s serving a “watchdog role,” was embraced by the Party in the late 1980s as a means of “monitoring” social, economic and political problems to encourage unity and social stability. 

By the late 2000s, however, the Party had begun seeing watchdog reports that appeared in commercial metropolitan dailies as a direct threat to Party legitimacy and stability. Xi’s post-2012 media crackdown targeted what one internal document identified as the problem of “Western” principles rampant in China’s media. In Xi’s same 2016 speech at the Party media symposium, he declared that public opinion supervision and “positive propaganda” must be “unified” (统一), closing any gap where unaligned reporting might seep through.

But the demand that media work solely on behalf of the Party, with little latitude for critical coverage, has also raised new questions about the function of media and the line between “reporting” and “enforcement.” In September, the Zhejiang Media Group’s Li Xinglin (李星霖) wrote in a since-deleted article that public opinion supervision “inevitably touches upon the interests of some local governments and departments,” arguing that negative public opinion and dissenting voices could not simply be avoided. 

While Li was defending critical reporting, his analysis also illuminates the uncomfortable gray area “informant-style journalism” exists in. It’s clear to critics that the Xiaoxiang Morning Post’s actions weren’t serving the public interest, as “public opinion supervision” is supposed to do at its best. But the paper was simply following current media orthodoxy — to act solely in the Party’s interest — to an extreme end. The ultimate irony, in this case, was that the media attempted to play the enforcer while the regulatory body acted with more “humanity,” closing its announcement by thanking the online public for their “attention and supervision.” 

“Not Our Business”

Last month, the case of Sun Meihua (孫美華) rattled China before her name disappeared from the internet. The now 58-year-old Beijing-born woman was found in a village in Cao County, Shandong Province, by a Douyin vlogger, Chuxin (初心). After 26 years, videos of Sun appeared online, looking frail and hungry, eating a plate of noodles Chuxin had handed her. 

Sun had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and went missing in August 2000 after her husband allegedly left her at an intersection near her parents’ house, reports the independent media outlet Free Nora (自由娜拉), which monitors human trafficking and abuse against minorities in China. According to another outlet, The Aquarian (水瓶紀元), her family tried to report her disappearance, but the police did not open a case.

Sun was found living with an elderly man villagers call “Uncle Long” (龍叔). In August, villagers told Du Xiaohua (杜小华), a Douyin vlogger who met Sun, that Uncle Long abused her and forced her into prostitution. When Du went to the police to try to file a report, an officer told him that they had found no evidence of abuse and that relocating her was “not their business,” according to Free Nora’s reporting.

Before media outlets could begin reporting, Chinese social media platforms were already widely discussing Sun Meihua’s case. According to data from Wisers, a media monitoring database, there were dozens to hundreds of posts about Sun every day between September 8 and 11. The number reached 345 in one day on September 9. But from September 13, the number of posts dropped to fewer than 10 per day, Wisers data shows. The posts are now inaccessible, having been either deleted or blocked for violating platform rules.

In terms of media coverage, Free Nora was the first Chinese media outlet to report on Sun’s case on September 18. Free Nora also encouraged readers to continue following the case and to write about, share and discuss Sun’s suspected abduction on social media in China. The Chinese independent media outlet The Aquarian (水瓶紀元) followed on September 26, but its report on WeChat was deleted. No other Chinese media reports about the case were identified. The Douyin vloggers also deleted all videos related to Sun.

A familiar pattern

Netizens in China had been here before. The 2022 case of Xiaohuamei, who later became known as “the chained woman,” followed a similar pattern. After videos of a woman chained to a shed in Fengxian County, Jiangsu Province, circulated online, local officials released several statements initially identifying the woman as surnamed Yang, denying trafficking claims and attempting to explain her condition as mental illness-related. The local government blocked media from reporting at the scene before the city of Xuzhou later announced that it had discovered that the woman’s real name was Xiaohuamei, and that she was originally from Yunnan, arresting her husband on suspicion of illegal detention. Like in Sun’s case, authorities cracked down heavily on online discourse about the matter.

Also familiar in this case is where Sun was found. Cao County is located close to where Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, and Anhui meet, an area identified by researchers as a trafficking “hotspot.” According to court judgments made public in 2024, most victims of human trafficking are rural women with mental or intellectual disabilities. 

But what distinguishes the Sun Meihua case from Xiaohuamei’s is the public silence from authorities. As of this writing, no official statement from Cao County or Beijing has been released — what seems to be a deliberate departure from four years ago, when police were forced to backtrack on their previous statements following nationwide online backlash. Police instead seem to have dealt with Sun’s case quietly and privately, though again, only after much urging from online bloggers.

On September 4, Sun’s brother was notified by police in Beijing’s Xicheng district that his sister was in Cao County, and after several days he went to Shandong to pick her up. After allowing one brief video call with their sister, Meihua’s brother cut off contact with family members and refused to let anyone visit them, Liu Anjun (劉安軍), Meihua’s brother-in-law, told Free Nora. 

In a column for Deutsche Welle (DW), Chang Ping (長平), editor of the China Digital Times, wrote that during the case of the chained woman, the public had hoped the government would investigate, but the authorities’ top priority was maintaining social stability. Information control today has only intensified. “Those who are punished are often not the traffickers, but the people who expose human trafficking,” he wrote. 

National Security on the Silver Screen

More than three decades ago, the man who would later become Taiwan’s first democratically elected president sat down with a celebrated Japanese writer and spoke of “the sorrow of being born Taiwanese.” Lee Teng-hui (李登辉), the then Kuomintang (KMT) chairman who had been born in Taiwan during the period of Japanese colonial rule, was describing the tragedy of Taiwan’s repeated foreign occupations and historical lack of self-rule. “Even the KMT is a foreign regime,” he said in the 1994 interview. 

For many in Taiwan, the interview represented a new national consciousness emerging amid a democratic transition. Two years later, Lee would be elected to the country’s top political post in a fully democratic process. 

But in the debut episode of The Long Watch (交锋), a Chinese spy drama released last month, Lee’s words become something else entirely. They are the catalyst for dramatic action, with the underlying message that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. The words are a warning to all Chinese — and a call to action. 

Spearheaded by and co-produced with China’s Ministry of State Security, or MSS, the organ responsible for the country’s domestic and foreign intelligence and security affairs, The Long Watch is no ordinary spy drama. Its widespread release — and popular success — is a case study in how the role of China’s top spy agency has expanded under the current leadership. No longer is the secretive MSS focused only on domestic enforcement of political security, the harassment of overseas dissidents, economic espionage and hacking. It is an entertainment giant, working in newly creative ways to build national security consciousness on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party — so that the public is attracted, and even electrified, by its core messages.   

As the MSS itself asserted in an article last week, the public plays an important role in creating a “solid foundation” for national security, it said, adding that integrating the security agency’s efforts with the life of the public is now a key principle driving national security work. 

Capitalizing on Crisis

In the opening scene of The Long Watch, a Chinese news broadcaster reads Lee Teng-hui’s words, calling them “incitement of ethnic division and separatism,” before shifting focus to its three key characters — undercover MSS agents in a Hong Kong dim sum cafe. The action unfolds in the run-up to the “Third Taiwan Strait Crisis” between 1995 and 1996, precipitated when the United States granted Lee a visitor visa to speak at his alma mater, Cornell University, a move the PRC interpreted as encouraging Taiwanese separatism.

The Long Watch — or Jiaofeng in Chinese, meaning “clash of swords” — topped the nation’s weekly ratings on all channels after all episodes were released in September, according to the country’s television data monitoring platform Kuyun (酷云). The drama topped prime-time TV ratings during its premiere on September 6, the state-run CCTV, one of the show’s broadcasters, reported. The series draws inspiration from real intelligence missions that took place in China and Taiwan during the mid-1990s, blended with fictional characters and locations. 

Promotional poster for The Long Watch.

China, which sees Taiwan as an “inalienable part of its territory,” largely bases its “sovereignty” claim over Taiwan on the island’s partial annexation by the Qing dynasty in 1683. The CCP has never ruled the island. But in recent years, the PRC has stepped up its coercion of Taiwan through regular military exercises and threats to unify by force if necessary. Chinese and Taiwanese leadership have not spoken directly since the election of then-President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party in 2016, despite DPP efforts to resume communication. 

The release of The Long Watch coincides with the more recent escalation in espionage allegations across the Taiwan Strait. In a 2020 press conference, the Chinese government’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian (朱凤莲) suggested that Taiwan’s “intelligence agencies” have “engaged extensively in intelligence theft and subversive activities.” In 2023, a revision to the counter-espionage law expanded the Chinese government’s power to target security risks. Questioned about the risk of visiting China, Ma Xiaoguang (马晓光), another Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson, said during a 2023 press conference that the law’s intention was to “provide peaceful and integrated development of cross-strait relations.” 

Though open-source data on Taiwanese spies in China is limited, the MSS claimed in 2024 that it had cracked over a thousand cases involving Taiwanese espionage activities. In response, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council said that the CCP abused its power by detaining people who do not conform to its political ideology. According to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, 58 people were accused of providing intelligence tips to Chinese officials between last year and March this year. This June, Taiwan launched a website for Chinese nationals to offer intelligence tips, which was then condemned by China, which said it would take countermeasures. 

People Indicted in Chinese Espionage Cases in Taiwan

Hover or tap a year

0 20 40 60 6 16 10 48 64 58 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025–26 (15 months)

Source: National Security Bureau [1] [2] Case notes: Central News Agency, Reuters, Global Taiwan Institute
Interactive graphic created by Claude with China Media Project research

In the past, Chinese spy dramas have rarely touched on espionage activities in the period after the Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party, retreated to the island after losing the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949. 

But in September last year, another series, Silent Honor (沉默的荣耀) broke new ground as the first TV drama on CCP espionage operations in Taiwan set in the year 1949. It was also a breakout success, according to statistics from China’s National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA), which claimed it attracted 960 million viewers on its television debut.

A workshop on Silent Honor was held by the NRTA on October 25 last year, the same day that China marked its newly established “Taiwan Retrocession Day,” marking the end of Japanese colonial rule at the close of the Second World War. Joined by the central and provincial propaganda offices, the NRTA workshop emphasized the need to “tell good stories” (讲好故事) and commemorate the heroes. But the message just behind was unmistakable: Taiwan’s history is China’s history, and China’s national sovereignty over Taiwan is a matter of “firm will” (坚定意志). 

"Every Citizen's Responsibility"

Silent Honor was also produced under the “direction” (主导) of the MSS. But whereas that production is set in an era few are alive to remember, The Long Watch’s focus on the modern period feels far more relevant to contemporary audiences. Both productions represent a significant development in the MSS’ efforts to reach the public directly through the media. 

A closer look at the promotion surrounding The Long Watch paints a picture of this campaign’s core message. Across stories in state media, as well as in other official outlets, in press conferences, and in MSS social media posts, a common thread emerges — that national security is “every citizen’s responsibility.”

For example, the People’s Daily, the Party’s official mouthpiece, ran six dedicated articles about the series last month alone, spanning reviews, commentaries, and interviews with actors. One article notes that the show’s realism is what sets it apart from other spy dramas released in recent years. This was possible, says the article, only thanks to cooperation with the MSS, which aided the producers by providing them with research materials and access to security officers for interviews. Another commentary notes that the series’ realistic narratives “break down barriers” between popular understandings about spies and the reality of national security work, leaving readers with a call to action: 

“The small acts of perseverance by countless ordinary people have built the most solid grassroots barrier for national security. 12339 [the phone number and online platform opened by the MSS for whistleblowing tips] is no longer just a cold number, but an important channel for the whole nation to participate in safeguarding national security.”

The MSS has undergone a significant transformation under Xi Jinping, reshuffling its leadership structure and beefing up its capacity and scope of work over the past decade. Introduced in 2014, Xi’s “Comprehensive National Security Concept” (总体国家安全观總), as scholar Sheena Chestnut Greitens writes, pays close attention to “the risks of internal destabilization due to foreign subversion and infiltration,” particularly from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. 

The same year, a new counter-espionage law was passed and then further revised in 2023 to expand the definition of espionage and mandate further public education and awareness campaigns on national security threats. Soon after, the MSS began to experiment with creative ways to reach the public. It opened a WeChat account that provides updates on the country’s espionage challenges and released a comic series based on true counter-espionage stories in 2024. And in 2025, it deployed its own AI anchor, “Agent 012339,” a reference to its own intelligence hotline. Ambitious television productions now seem to have entered the agency’s playbook for successful outreach campaigns.

While agencies like the Taiwan Affairs Office and Taiwan-facing PRC media have taken aim at Taiwanese audiences in promoting the series, the success of this national security propaganda push has so far been limited to China. For its part, Taiwan has developed its own ways to counterbalance China’s unification narrative through the media. Released in August last year, the government-subsidized TV drama Zero Day Attack, which depicted a Chinese military invasion scenario, faced stiff criticism from Chinese authorities months ahead of release as well as after, panned as a tool of “cognitive warfare” and incitement of political resistance against China. 

For China’s leaders, it seems, a drama unfolding from any other perspective is simply not entertaining. 

Scripting the Source

“Many of our interviews aren’t done on the spot these days,” says Wu Ting, a journalist who works in television news production at Jiangxi Television, a provincial-level state broadcaster in China. “Instead, higher-ups set the direction for us in meetings ahead of time, and we just complete the filming on-site.” This may seem a surprising admission from a working journalist, but it is not an isolated phenomenon, Wu told Tian Jian. 

In recent years, the way some media outlets in China conduct interviews has changed. No longer do interviews need to unfold before the camera lens. Rather, their basic framework can often be set before the recording ever begins. At some television stations and for documentary-style feature segments, interviewees receive talking points before taping and some are even required to recite lines prepared for them. The interview, in other words, is no longer something generated on the spot. It is a programmed output.

The trend is expanding across many kinds of programming, says Wu, including current affairs reporting, segments on social issues and profile interviews. “If we can find someone who is willing to go on camera and say things the way we want, all the better,” she says. “We go back to them again and again, and give them a few hundred yuan for travel expenses as compensation.”

To explore this trend, Tian Jian interviewed several media professionals who have worked at Chinese television stations. For reasons of personal safety and to protect their employment, all interviewees in this article except Su Yutong and Liu Dongmei have been identified by pseudonyms.

Huang Miao, director of the news features department at Zhejiang Television, who has also worked on documentary-style programs, said that since the pandemic, public frustration has been growing under pressures like unemployment and mortgage payments. Yet the content, settings and structure of feature interviews must still follow official rules, so what gets said in an interview is often decided ahead of time. “That includes the dialogue between reporters and interviewees,” she said. “Content that once came out of live interaction has been moved up to the planning stage. The on-camera question-and-answer has become more a visual rendering of a set narrative than a process of producing information.”

Because hers is a state-run outlet, Huang said, its reporting must meet the requirements of the propaganda department. “What they want to see is that we ‘sing the main melody’ (唱好主旋律), guide the audience and spread ‘correct thinking,’” she said, referring to Chinese Communist Party language for ideological control. “That means we have to tell interviewees what to say. Some interviewees are given a few fairly standard lines, and they can’t really stray far from them.” 

“You can change the tone, but you can’t change the meaning,” she adds.  

Risk Management First

Behind this change lies a shift toward what these journalists call “risk management.” In the past, the risks a news story posed in China were dealt with during editing and publication, when stories could be reviewed, revised or rewritten. Today, some of those risks are neutralized before reporting even begins, so that content meets set requirements from the moment it is created.

Su Yutong, a former reporter for Beijing Radio who now lives in Germany, said the practice reflects the climate of public opinion in recent years. “Some interviewees are prone to grumbling and complaining, so sometimes the script is written in advance. The interviewee reads it over first, and then reads it out word for word.”

Such practices are not uncommon in news work, she said. “Sometimes people dig up footage or photos and find they’re several years old. That kind of thing we could see coming. But now even interviews have been reduced to reading from a script. It has reached an extreme.”

Four editors and reporters in Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Beijing and elsewhere told Tian Jian that interviews based on pre-prepared scripts are fairly common. This up-front control can include supplying the range of questions in advance, limiting the direction of answers, setting up frameworks to steer around sensitive topics and, in some cases, handing interviewees ready-made lines. What they say is confined within boundaries drawn beforehand.

Gu Le, an insider at Shanghai Oriental Television, said that controlling what interviewees say has become part of news censorship, with programs going through multiple rounds of review before broadcast. “The most important thing now is to keep anything uncontrollable from appearing. Rather than deleting it later, it’s better to prevent it from appearing in the first place,” Gu said. 

Gu pointed to a recent viral interview with motorcycle entrepreneur Zhang Xue as an example. Zhang founded the brand ZXMOTO in 2024, and its bikes won two straight races at the World Superbike Championship round in Portugal in March 2026. In a post-race interview, when a reporter prompted him to thank the Chongqing government for its support, he replied, “Not a single penny.” When another reporter, from the Chongqing Communist Youth League, asked what drove him, he replied, “Why don’t you just tell me what to say, and I’ll say it?” Social media users passed the clip around as a rare case of an interviewee going off script.

According to Pan Yi, a veteran Chinese journalist, this shift has also changed the source of journalists’ professional anxiety. Where they once worried about whether a story would get published, they now worry about whether trouble will follow “the moment words come out of [an interviewee’s] mouth.”

“This kind of pressure has warped journalists’ professional instincts, shifting their focus from uncovering stories to assessing risks,” said Pan. “Today’s journalists are less ‘looking for people’ than ‘looking for characters.’ Our function has been drastically watered down. We’ve been reduced to casting directors for a grand narrative, responsible only for finding interviewees who fit neatly into a predetermined script. As for the risks behind the content, editors-in-chief and media platforms hedge against them through rigorous self-censorship.”

Dai An, a communication scholar at the Communication University of China, said the goal is to head off risks in advance and keep problems from arising during interviews. By filtering out uncertainty at the very start of the process, news production becomes highly “controllable.” “This approach completely stifles the room for authentic expression,” he said. “Complex truths that might otherwise have sparked debate in the newsroom are shut out of view the moment the shutter clicks or the recorder switches on.”

Under this approach, reporters are no longer focused on providing information, but on avoiding statements that deviate from expectations. What can and cannot be said is often settled before the interview begins, and whether a segment airs smoothly depends on whether it stays within those boundaries.

“Scripting” the Editorial Process

As pre-interview controls have tightened, the role of interviewees in Chinese news has also changed. Once seen as sources of information and voices for different viewpoints, they have been folded into predetermined narratives, and their room for expression has noticeably narrowed.

The shift has not gone unnoticed by news consumers. Despite the government’s professed crackdown on fake news, suspicions that reporting and editing are “scripted” have persisted, frequently drawing the attention of the public and international media.

On April 16, 2022, for example, CCTV’s flagship evening newscast, “Xinwen Lianbo,” reported that some supermarkets in Shanghai had reopened during the city’s Covid-19 lockdown, with “ample goods and normal stock.” Internet users later questioned whether the footage had been staged. The next day, the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee’s propaganda office released an official response stating that the footage had been shot on April 15 in Jinshan District, which was “nearing zero-Covid” status. But a photographer using the name “Fei Diwen” (費迪聞) later claimed on WeChat that he had shot the footage himself on March 31 at an RT-Mart supermarket in Yangpu District, and that CCTV had used it without permission.

Such controversies are not isolated. On December 10, 2025, CCTV-4’s program “National Memory” (國家記憶) aired the first episode of “The Call of the Times” (時代呼喚), a documentary series about China’s high-speed rail. Some scenes of railway construction bore a “Doubao AI” (豆包) watermark in the lower right corner, the mark of ByteDance’s AI assistant. Railway enthusiasts online noticed that the construction footage “defied common sense.” The episode was then taken down from CCTV’s website — and when it was reposted, the footage had been replaced.

Screenshot from the original episode of the CCTV documentary series “Chinese High Speed Rail: The Call of the Times” with AI-generated images. Via 复兴号铁路 on WeChat.

Guo Yajun, a scholar at Peking University’s School of Journalism and Communication, said the phenomenon reflects an adjustment in how news is produced as a whole. “When an interviewee’s statements are controlled in advance, the interview is no longer a process of gathering information, but the confirmation of a predetermined narrative.” 

“The media no longer generate content on the spot,” he said. “Instead, they move the uncertainty to the stage before the interview begins.”

Guo said that while this mechanism helps contain public opinion risks in the short term, it will undermine the basic function of news in the long run. “News has traditionally relied on bringing different pieces of information together in pursuit of the truth. Once expression is uniformly restricted, audiences no longer confront reality itself, only a single, filtered version of it. As the public keeps noticing this gap, trust will gradually erode, and the media’s credibility will fall further.”

The Changing Role of Journalists

Faced with preemptive control and predetermined narrative frameworks, journalists are no longer in the business of uncovering information and building narratives. Their job has become managing risk.

Liu Dongmei, a former reporter at Hefei Radio in Anhui province, said that beginning in 2023, the first question before an interview was no longer “what to ask,” but “what not to ask.”

“The station instructed us that preparing for an interview wasn’t just about collecting information and drafting questions, but also about assessing the potential risks posed by the interviewee,” Liu said. “In the end, I could only find interviewees through classmates’ referrals or by approaching people I knew. Since we were on good terms, they would just say, ‘Tell me what you want me to say, and I’ll go along with it.’ I actually felt pretty awkward about it.”

A Chinese reporter stands nearby, holding a script for the interviewee to read from. (Screenshot from Xiaohongshu)

Liu found it hard to adapt. Three months into the job, she quit reporting and moved to another industry. She said that by the time she realized her work was shifting from “identifying questions” to “managing risks,” she had already decided to leave. “Where else — in foreign media, Hong Kong or Taiwan — is news reported like this? You focus only on the risks a story might pose to the station, never on its news value.”

As censorship permeates the day-to-day operations of every media outlet, journalists’ professional roles are being reshaped — from a focus on content to a focus on structure. In the process, journalists are no longer just reporters. They have also become regulatory checkpoints within the news system. Their work is not only to present reality but to ensure that expression stays within the bounds the authorities deem acceptable.

Shifting Boundaries

With the move toward pre-interview preparation and the changing role of journalists, the nature of news storytelling itself has begun to change. Content no longer comes primarily from on-site interaction but is increasingly built on a prearranged framework, producing a more uniform overall presentation.

The Chinese journalists, journalism instructors and media professionals interviewed for this story all described a similar situation in their workplaces: the information that reaches readers often already carries a clear stance and bias, making it hard for some readers to grasp the full course of events in stories about mass incidents or so-called “revenge against society,” a phrase used for random acts of violence. 

Liu said that for news and programming, propaganda departments typically draw up a plan in advance that the media must follow. “The ‘preset structure’ of news has been around a long time, and many people have grown used to working this way. Whether they are fresh out of journalism school or reporters with years of experience, they all work within the same framework. That includes the questions and answers, which are settled before the interview takes place. The interview itself is largely just a supplement to what’s already there.”

When the content of an interview is prepared before recording, the way news is produced changes, too. Much of the information no longer comes from the scene, and exchanges between reporters and interviewees often amount to repeating predetermined lines. What audiences ultimately see is often nothing more than a selection of pre-approved statements.

Tian Yu is a freelance journalist covering Chinese-language current affairs and social issues, with a focus on China’s media landscape and public governance. This article originally appeared in Chinese at Tian Jian (田間).

Paper Cuts

The Dalian Evening News, a fixture of daily life in the northeastern port city for 37 years, published its final edition on December 30, announcing it would cease publication with a brief notice thanking readers and contributors. The closure makes it the second major newspaper in Dalian to fold in recent years, following Xinshang News (新商报), which ceased publication in 2019.

Founded in 1988, the Dalian Evening News (大连晚报) was part of a wave of metropolitan newspapers that proliferated across China during the reform and opening era, serving as a key source of local news and advertising. These papers emerged in the early 1990s, with the metropolitan newspaper model accelerating after 1995 with the establishment of Chengdu’s Huaxi Metropolitan News (华西都市报) as the prototype for commercial urban dailies, followed by staples such as Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报), founded in 1997. Through to the Xi Jinping era these and other commercial papers were at the heart of a slow-burning professional revolution for journalism in China, breaking important and socially, even politically, relevant stories. Huaxi Metropolitan News, for example, was instrumental in early reporting on the AIDS epidemic in Henan province caused by contaminated blood collection practices that infected as many as a million people.

The Dalian Evening News is one of approximately 14 newspapers that announced cessation or suspension around the start of 2026, including Jiangnan Travel News (江南游报) in the Yangtze River Delta, Yanzhao Rural News (燕赵农村报) in Hebei province, and Langfang Metropolitan News (廊坊都市报) in Langfang, Hebei.

Folding Up

At least 14 newspapers announced cessation or suspension at the start of 2026 in China, marking another wave in the ongoing decline of China’s print media sector.

Newspaper Name Chinese Name Founded Years Active
Dalian Evening News 大连晚报 1988 37 years
Jiangnan Travel News 江南游报 1986 38 years
Yanzhao Rural News 燕赵农村报 1964 / 1982 (relaunched) 60 years
Pingyuan Evening News 平原晚报 2004 20 years
Langfang Metropolitan News 廊坊都市报 2009 16 years
Huanghai Morning Post 黄海晨刊 2003 22 years
Yandu Morning Post 燕都晨报 2003 22 years
Suqian Evening News 宿迁晚报 2001 24 years
Linchuan Evening News 临川晚报 2017 (media convergence) 8 years
Xinyu News 新渝报 1926 99 years
China Philatelic News 中国集邮报 1992 33 years
Today Ningguo 今日宁国 Unknown —
Yalu River Evening News 鸭绿江晚报 1996 29 years
Southern Radio & TV News 南方声屏报 1994 31 years

The wave of closures reflects years of financial crisis in Chinese print media stemming from broader changes in the media landscape in China and globally. Newspaper advertising peaked in 2011, then declined 55 percent by 2015 — and the freefall continued. By 2021, newspaper advertising revenue had shrunk to just one-fifteenth of what it was in 2011. Metropolitan newspapers were hit hardest: commercial advertising dropped over 70 percent, with some papers reduced to operating with zero advertising and forced to rely on their parent organizations for survival.

Circulation has similarly collapsed. Subscription and newsstand sales in 70 major Chinese cities plunged 46.5 percent in 2015, with metropolitan newspapers declining 50.8 percent.

Peking University professor Zhang Yiwu (张颐武) explained in analysis two years ago that short videos and livestreaming have replaced text-based newspapers as readers’ information consumption habits have changed. The most profitable local media outlets — metropolitan newspapers and evening papers — took the hardest hit, he said. Party newspapers maintained operations because the government needed them to disseminate propaganda and other official information. Zhang described the decline as initially gradual, giving false hope for recovery, but then becoming cliff-like, with many newspapers ultimately destroyed by their own wishful thinking about a potential rebound.

Today Ningguo announces its closure on December 26, 2025.

The decline of commercial print newspapers and periodicals in China since around 2010 has had a dramatic impact on the professional journalism cultures that once flourished in these contexts. The more local and relevant reporting they once fostered has also suffered in the face of efforts under Xi Jinping to wrest back control of news reporting, in part by building up Party-run digital convergence media centers (融媒体中心) and empowering local government bodies to lead on digital communication. One sign of this latter trend has been the proliferation of “blue notices” (蓝底通报), official statements released by local authorities on social media that sideline professional journalists and replace independent reporting with government-controlled narratives.

In its year-end reflection, the WeChat public account Aquarius Era (水瓶纪元), run by veterans of China’s commercial newspaper era, described its mission as telling “stories outside the blue background and white text” (蓝底白字之外的故事), a clear criticism of the dominance of official blue notices and the news vacuum in which they dominate. The year-end letter affirmed that despite intense censorship, journalists from different generations continue work in their own ways to document overlooked people and events.

The decline of print media can be seen in the precipitous decline of newsprint consumption, which has devastated the paper industry over the past decade. The Chinese newspaper industry reached its peak in 2012 with domestic newsprint production of 385 million tons annually and over 20 paper mills operating, but declining demand has forced most mills to reduce production or shut down entirely. According to the China Newspaper Association (中国报业协会), nationwide newspaper newsprint consumption totaled just 106.4 million tons in 2023, projected to decline another 3 percent to approximately 103.2 million tons in 2024, leaving only three newsprint producers nationally.

Rather than outright closures — though that is the real meaning — many newspapers are now choosing to announce “suspension” over permanent closure. The reason for that is political and regulatory, rather than commercial or financial. Under China’s tightly controlled press system, all news and other publishing or media outlets that do original content production are required to have licenses, or kanhao (刊号), scarce administrative resources issued by the National Press and Publication Administration that cannot be easily reacquired. By announcing suspension rather than closure, newspapers preserve these licenses even as they cease operations indefinitely.

Because in an era of profound digital, economic and political uncertainty, you just never know.

Xi Jinping’s Global Quartet

The front page of today’s People’s Daily announces the publication of a major policy article by Chinese leader Xi Jinping (习近平) in the party’s flagship theoretical journal Qiushi (求是), bundling together what the party now characterizes as “Four Great Global Initiatives” (四大全球倡议) — a quartet of related solutions for international challenges. The article, titled “Promoting Implementation of the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative, and Global Governance Initiative,” collects Xi’s statements from September 2021 to September 2025, organizing them around his concept of a “community of shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体).

The piece is meant to synthesize China’s response to what the party characterizes as four critical “deficits” (赤字) facing the world. These are: the “peace deficit” (和平赤字); the “development deficit” (发展赤字); the “security deficit” (安全赤字); and the “governance deficit” (治理赤字).

Xi’s Four Great Global Initiatives
四大全球倡议
Global Development Initiative Development Deficit
全球发展倡议 → 发展赤字
▼
Emphasizes “inclusive” economic globalization with six core principles, including development prioritization, people-centered approaches, and harmony between humanity and nature. Positions the Belt and Road Initiative as a practical vehicle for achieving these goals.
Global Security Initiative Security Deficit
全球安全倡议 → 安全赤字
▼
Promotes “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security” while rejecting countries “pursuing their own so-called absolute security”—a clear reference to U.S. security policy. Advocates for a security framework based on cooperation rather than zero-sum competition.
Global Civilization Initiative Peace Deficit
全球文明倡议 → 和平赤字
▼
Emphasizes respecting “diversity of world civilizations”—an implicit challenge to universal values that promotes China’s concept of “common values for all humanity.” This formula emphasizes the power of the nation state over citizens, with the “rights” of countries and their systems taking precedence over individual rights.
Global Governance Initiative Governance Deficit
全球治理倡议 → 治理赤字
▼
Confronts what Beijing portrays as threats from “Cold War mentality, hegemonism, and protectionism” — coded language for U.S. policies. Argues that global governance has reached a crossroads, with the implication that the world must turn in China’s direction.

This suite of global initiatives, the People’s Daily read-out today says, is China’s effort “to resolve the above deficits and promote the building of a better world” (破解上述赤字, 推动建设一个更加美好的世界). This framing positions Xi as a responsible and responsive global leader offering comprehensive solutions to international challenges. In this equation, the Belt and Road Initiative (一带一路), lionized during Xi’s first and second terms, is subordinated as a practical vehicle for these loftier aspirations.

The bundling of Xi’s “Four Great” initiatives has gathered pace particularly since late August and early September, taking the stage during the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The push to promote the concepts has redoubled this month with a crucial CCP plenum next week and the upcoming 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. The quartet signals Xi’s effort to consolidate his standing with both domestic party elites and the international community.

The People’s Daily read-out hailing the Qiushi article referred to this year “an important moment to remember history and create the future together” (铭记历史、共创未来的重要时刻). And the central idea here is that Xi Jinping is claiming this crossroads for China under the rule of the CCP.

Page 6 of the overseas edition of the CCP’s People’s Daily on October 13, a huge feature on China’s role in founding the UN (erasing the ROC from the story).

In recent weeks, before and through the grand military parade held in Beijing on September 3, state media have promoted a revisionist view of history in which China — meaning the current People’s Republic of China under the leadership of the party — played the most decisive role in the founding of the United Nations. Among these efforts, a large feature story in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily on Monday focused on China’s “immense contributions” to the founding of the UN, with framing that completely erased the role of the Republic of China (ROC) — the current name for Taiwan. The feature story showcased materials from the first session of the UN General Assembly now kept in Chongqing, the wartime capital of the ROC.

When it comes to China’s gaze on the future as glimpsed in Xi’s Qiushi article, there is an implicit but unmistakable message about the values of the West as failing to be “inclusive” (包容). Language about the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) speaks of respecting “diversity of world civilizations” (世界文明多样性), an implicit challenge to the notion of universal values that promotes China’s own concept of “common values for all humanity” (全人类共同价值). While those may sound superficially similar, China’s formula emphasizes the power of the nation state over citizens and communities — the “rights” of countries and their systems taking precedence over individual rights.

Another clear message between the lines is about the United States as an irresponsible force. The Global Governance Initiative (GGI) directly confronts what the party portrays as threats from “Cold War mentality, hegemonism, and protectionism” (冷战思维、霸权主义、保护主义) — barely coded language that is a clear reference US policies. The article argues that while the UN emerged from the “painful lessons” (痛定思痛) of two world wars 80 years ago, “the world has entered a new period of turbulence and transformation, and global governance has reached a new crossroads” (世界进入新的动荡变革期,全球治理走到新的十字路口).

The underlying message is unmistakable: Standing at this crossroads, the world must turn in the direction of China.